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MEMORY
,
CULTURE AND CRITICAL REFLECTION:
Cultural Mnemonics in a New Era of Selective Remembrance
May, 1986
Terry Kenneth Aladjem, B.A. Antioch College
M.A., Ph.O. University of Massachusetts
Directed by Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain
The work suggests that there is a place for the study of memory
in political theory and social criticism, and that it is particularly
appropriate to the examination of American beliefs and institutions
today. It questions notions of "ideology, "tradition" and "mass
society" and reconsiders probems of social identity that have been
posed in psychoanalytic terms. It suggests that memory integrates
collective and individual pasts to provide common orientations which
may affect the Western crisis of legitimacy that J. Habermas identi-
fies and the currents of power that M. Foucault examines. First it is
proposed that historical changes in the conceptions of space, time and
creative process which are fundamental to memory, and changes in the
use of mnemonic techniques and everyday applications of memory reveal
common patterns of reflexive thought. Next it is suggested that
fashionable conservative and radical theories which describe a mass
forgetting or the loss of a meaningful past are deficient without due
consideration for those patterns. Finally, the work proposes that a
particularly American crisis which entails the loss of meaning might
be better understood in terms of Selective Memory, at the level of the
-vi -
referents that inform private choices and public discourse, and might
evoke a sense of history or a nostalgic daydream. If selective memory
has always been at work in the consolidation of identity and cultural
orientation, its role is paramount in a crisis where guiding tradi-
tions have failed. It proceeds collectively to rank instructive
pasts, of history, childhood and competing traditions, and prescribes
adaptive means of apprehending them. Beyond the psychological
repression which negates threatening elements of the past, a positive
selective memory seeks out and refashions a fluid past to secure new
orientations in place of depleted traditions. It provides thematic
remedies to the age old instinctual conflicts and bodily concerns that
arise once more in an American crisis. The work concludes with the
suggestion that a new exploration of memory might draw attention to
hitherto neglected details of experience to provide a challenging, if
cautious, basis for social criticism.
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INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM OF MEMORY AND SOCIAL CRITIOUE
Around every corner these days one can discover books and
articles which proclaim that some meaning has gone out of Western life
or that some aspect has been lost, some motivation misplaced or some
memory obscured. There is a rather common belief that most everything
of value has been sacrificed to the overwhelming forces of modernity
and that belief is shared, if not always clarified, by the critical
thinkers who might have once had privileged insight into the process.
As if it were a revelation, this awareness seems to seep through the
works of established critics once more, or to appear like a light bulb
over the heads of newer ones. It grips them as they cross the divide
between social theory and psychology in hopes of accounting for a
social malaise, or as usual, for the place of the individual within
society. The critics assume the attitude of the returning traveler
who sadly gazes out over a changed but familiar city, looking for the
nostalgic landmarks that might revive an old inspiration in spite of
what seems lost.
The critics share a general awareness that traditions seem hollow
and the lessons of childhood insincere, and they are aware that this
circumstance has recently allowed the political right to claim the
mantle of the past to be its own. As history is so regularly
contested in the process, the critics stress the more historical side
of their work with the tantalizing implication that days gone by were
so radically different from our own that to awaken them might restore
a critical sense of purpose. In this, every attempt to provide a
careful account of history is perceived to be a radical endeavor of
some merit, as if the secrets of the past might burst the seams of our
narrow way of life by their own volition. That past implicitly
presents a kind of critical Eden, and yet it seems so ungraspable now
that contemporary historians and critics can only shrug and hope to
-1-
2recover some scent of its meaning. But as much as this retrospective
attitude may inspire such efforts it also produces cynicism, and those
who offer the best explanations are afflicted by the same sense of
loss and distance from the past that afflicts the general population.
Now, as they attempt to preserve the old bulk categories of social
analysis uneasily and like nostalic landmarks, it becomes evident that
they have reproduced the hopes and fears of everyone in them. There
'
is a certain inadequacy /a disturbing redundancy to the old terms of
criticism of systems, cl asses and mass psychologies — and the more
that this is felt, the more it reveals a deep problem of identity that
concerns the integration of everything past.
Once, critical analysis succeeded insofar as it revealed what had
been lost to a way of life, what dynamics of power had been hidden
from view and what human capacities had been stunted in the complex
relations of particular social systems. But this was accomplished by
a reinterpretation of the historical tides that were universally held
to be important and against the rather rigid background of traditional
thought and practices which still had substantial influence. Now that
this same background of history and tradition has faded and its
influence seems uncertain, criticism seeks to regain its footing.
Consequently, what is striking about the sometimes bitter, sometimes
hopeful studies of contemporary society is that their authors seem to
suspect that they have run out of the old rope. Their perceptions
often seem too general or too exacting like those of the traveler just
returned. The usual categories of analysis seem to miss the point and
the critical theories of interpretation which have been available are
no longer applied with confidence. On the one hand, the critics
continue to speak of the unbreakable dominations of capitalism that
restrict and alienate the individual — of pervasive rationalism,
technology, state and industry. On the other hand, that pessimistic
analysis of "mass society" no longer quite satisfies them, because the
precise historical ground for it has receded in time and awareness.
The categories which refer to that elusive legacy have lost their edge
3as they become a means for the critics themselves to remember just
what they opposed and why.
For the same reason criticism has made certain advances. A
reaction to the sweeping dialectical categories that once explained
the historical past seems to have led to the most minute examinations,
and these are revealing even when they cannot quite find a context.
Criticism has stepped down from the worst heights of abstraction to
examine the elements of discourse and the particulars of power. In
this, the critics have tried turning inward to examine the psycho-
logical dimensions of domination, driven still by Freud's disclosure
of the unconscious, almost as if they might "reinstate the lost
subject" by theorietical means. They have qualified that project by
revealing hidden structures and new forces of containment within
society. They have added dimensions of mortality, sexuality, culture,
technology and language to a Marxian dialectic in order to expand the
project, and they have sought out new strata of power in which
motivating meanings are lost or found beneath language -- and all of
this with some success. Yet in their own rush to escape the genera-
lities of past criticism they have failed to account for the very
losses that they take for granted. They have not accounted for a
general disruption in our common sense of the past or for the ways
that we have come to experience it.
In addressing this experience criticism is now obliged to
reconsider the assumptions of its own reliance upon the past. It
cannot presume to know the past as it enumerates the elements of
domination since the contemporary organization of the past -- the
weight and texture that is publicly ascribed to it — is part of that
domination. It cannot properly presuppose the historic existance of a
uniform working class with a uniform consciousness, or a collective
unconscious, or a happy family or community that has eroded over time,
a former capacity of reason or a hidden instinct for freedom which
might stand opposed to the present. And If there are monolithic
images that restrict a common experience of the present, criticism
4must discover how they are cut from the past and it should not also
see in monoliths. Otherwise the mystery surrounding the loss of
meanings will remain intact, it will only be announced and not
analyzed, and the processes by which a selective forgetting has taken
place will be missed. Then new myths will be put in place of the old
and the opponents of criticism will rightly charge that the new myths
are no better.
It seems that a wiser criticism can only escape that charge where
it offers deeper and more expansive explanations than its opponents,
and where it broadens and details the field of retrospective vision.
It can do this where it provides contact with the aspects of past
experience to which people might say, "Yes, we know, but have
forgotten that," or "We never saw the process before." It can do this
when it confronts the selective organization of the past that limits
an entire culture and each individual in the perception of what is
possible. Rather than casting down false idols, effective criticism
explains the tools and interactions which were used to erect them and
it makes those tools available for other uses. Therefore, criticism
must dissect the most familiar elements of a way of life and under-
standing to offer a different vision of them that also remains true to
their complexity. It should, in other words, confront them with a
theoretically informed and richer memory.
From this point of view it seems surprising that so few have
attempted to reconsider the themes of criticism in light of the
problems of memory. The loss of meaning in society is, after all, a
matter of memory as much as it is a matter of the interpretation of
language or of the structures of power or history. I do not mean to
suggest that a loss of meaning is precisely the same thing as a loss
of memory, but rather that there is a dynamic relationship between the
two that deserves considerable elaboration. Instead of looking inside
the individual psyche as others have, to see how the weight of our
historical circumstances has effected repressions, I want to step back
5to examine a more general question concerning the ways that meaning is
kept in memory when it is not repressed. My purpose is to suggest
that where there is discomfort and mystery that surrounds the eclipse
of certain meanings in modern society, we should examine the processes
by which they have been eclipsed or only selectively secured. I will
argue that those processes are mnemonic* inasmuch as meaning is
experienced through memory and insofar as the shared lessons of the
historical past infuse personal experience in the continuity of self
that we call identity. As we look backward in imagination, we
integrate many different pasts so that our memory is both private and
social. Our memory — that amalgam of retrospective thoughts which
might seem personal, historial or traditional -- is a reflection of
the prevailing organization of the past which is the very condition in
which we discover the problem of social identity and the general
uncertainty about truth and meaning.
The analysis of everyday language, like the psychoanalytic
explanations of the self has revealed that there is no simple and
uniform "false-consciousness," and no single set of "appearances"
which distort reality even if there are shared patterns of concep-
tualization which are quite general. There is no true-false dichotomy
that gives critics privileged access to the truth. Rather there are
sel ecti ve ways of understanding what is real or true or to be
believed. There may be grids of understanding as Foucault might say,
or systematic distortions as Habermas claims, and these I will argue
are coupled with selective modes of recollection which are not exactly
'untrue,' but may be narrow and prescriptive. The statements, "I
can't remember the meaning of marriage," and "I can't remember if I
had a happy childhood," may be linked in the manner and in the themes
*I am using the term "mnemonic" as it is given in the more complete
dictionaries to denote all things pertaining to memory as well as that
which assists or improves it. The term "mnemic" refers to the
persistent or recurrent effect of past experience upon the individual
or group, and I have sometimes used this instead.
6by which memory has adjusted to contempoary adult society. Even as
the locus of the "I" in the recollected imagery of my own childhood
experiences and in my knowledge of marriage bespeaks different
varieties of memory, the apparent distance within an internal focus of
attention which the two classes of retrospective knowledge obtain from
the self will be circumstantially prescribed. As cultural contexts
shift and change, established meanings assume a different shape within
millions of minds quite rapidly. Those meanings may receive new
emphasis to the point that they are actually remembered differently
and summon new associations, just as the conception of marriage in
certain circles is barely possible today without attendant mnemic
associations to divorce.
To begin to address the matter of how society has 'forgotten'
certain meanings, it is therefore necessary to examine those theories
of society which refer to a previous condition that implicitly
provides their inspiration. If the theorists are not immune to the
current afflictions of memory, it is precisely for this -reason that
many of them seek to revive lost arts and hidden themes in history and
to tap elusive aspects of experience. In the works of the Frankfurt
School and certain feminist studies this has been done in various ways
with concern for the formation of social identity. The conservative
theories of tradition in works by Michael Oakeshott and others also
shed light on the matter as does the critical work by Russell Jacoby
on "social amnesia," or Christopher Lasch on cultural narcissism. Yet
properly, the researches here must extend to poetry, art and litera-
ture answers may be found in the private experience of moral con-
flict as in the laments and revelations of ordinary self-reflection.
To treat the loss and formation of social meanings in its
connection, to memory one cannot ignore works in literature like those
of Proust, or about literature and history like Paul Fussell's Great
War and Modern Memory
.
Perhaps the greatest historical account of
changes in the retrospective faculty is offered by the art historian
7Francis Yates in The Art of Memory , and hers is the only expansive
study of the arts and techniques of memory use across the millennium.
Studies in historiography are important as are works by historians
like E. P. Thompson on such matters as shifting concepts of time, and
even the geographer Robert Sack offers insight into change's in
conceptions of space which have bearing on the ways that things are
recalled. Freud remains the greatest student of memory, and the
psychoanalytic examination of repression, of the mechanisms of defense
carried on by Anna Freud, as well as the studies of childhood amnesia
by Ernest Schachtel
,
of societal memory loss by the Mi tscherl ichs in
The Inability to Mourn
,
and of sexual excitement by Robert Stoller,
are all most useful to this work. The often neglected book, Of Time,
Work and Leisure
,
by the sociologist Sebastian de Grazia is important,
and a litany of psychological studies and articles on memory continues
to raise pertinent questions along with those concerning cognitive and
moral stages of development by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Carol Gilligan.
Where historical investigations reconsider the past errors of the
political left, reassess revolution or the Holocaust, each add greatly
to the project. The more detailed examination of memory itself by
analytical philosophers and in currents of hermeneutical philosophy
must certainly be considered, and the question of the social force of
memory is advanced in the scheme of crisis and social evolution
offered by Ju'rgen Habermas, as in Michel Foucault's vision of power.
Thus, and because the relevant literature is scattered every-
where, I must ground my project and drastically narrow my sights.
Since Augustine's Confessions
,
autobiographies have provided a rich
speculative index of the critical power of personal memory, but I can
only take a cue from these. A groundswell of concern over the loss of
memory of the events surrounding the Second World War has begun in
Germany, and again only selections may be engaged here. Psychologic-
ally oriented studies of concentration camp amnesia by Bettleheim and
others are also richly suggestive but deserve a study by themselves,
as do those concerned with war veterans, children, the elderly and
8other particular groups for whom the loss of traditions or of the
memory of specific experiences has proven to be a devastation. The
shelves of American bookstores are riddled with "how to remember"
books and primers on mnemotechnics which are again indicative of a
contemporary problem but cannot be exhaustively treated here.
As well, nearly every philosopher, psychologist and social
thinker has something to say about memory even while few develop their
comments on the matter — least of all in a social vein. For this
reason I have taken pains to show how memory is properly a matter of
social concern, the work is necessarily topical, and my interest lies
with certain themes and questions surrounding the processes of memory
and forgetful ness as they come to affect a collectivity. In this, I
anticipate the question from philosophers as to why I have not chosen
to review Hegel's Philosophy of History
,
Heidegger on time, or Bergson
on memory, and reply that to do so is not sufficiently historical and
psychological to raise the compelling questions of social identity
that I wish to address. Yet a little book by Bergson' s rebellious
pupil Maurice Halbwachs called The Collective Memory is closer to my
project as it provides many rich examples of how memory is a function
of groups which could stand further elaboration.
By political historians who would like a demonstration of how
memory is worthy of social investigation, I will be asked why I have
not taken a specific incident or series of events and analyzed how
they were remembered, and this is an equally challenging question.
Every incident involving a group is recalled in dozens of different
ways from as many points of view, and I could certainly review,
caricature, and categorize these perspectives, but something would be
missing. In doing so I would immerse myself in historical relativism
in a way that has been tried and tried again and I would have to leave
the crucial questions of theoretical approach to the conclusion. If
I elect to discuss the Vietnam War in such a way, or the Holocaust,
the problem of memory would be obscured by questions of why I did not
review the recollections of war veterans or of victims sufficiently
9or why I responded only to the historical record of commissions of
inquiry, or omitted this or that historian or individual case studies.
Why indeed, did I not select a theme within the mass of events and
reactions: guilt, suffering, attitudes toward freedom or administra-
tive decision-making; the effects upon views of the family or the
nation state? etc. I could certainly attempt to meet these challenges
and to justify a mini
-hi story of remembrance, to do so, however, would
be to apply my own selective grid to the problem of interpreting an
event and I would have the usual difficulty justifying it. It is, in
fact, the problem of justifying an unusually broad retrospective
stance that interests me and that I think must be addressed prior to a
specific historical study on my part. For that reason I do rely
heavily on historical works but they will present themselves as
examples and with this suspicion that the very category of the
historical past has a place in modern memory which bears scrutiny.
This is necessary if I am to do more than provide a catalogue of good,
fair and poor renditions of a history, and if I am to discuss instead
how they are -rendered, and what themes have achieved the status of
historical "interest" to memory and why.
Consequently, and as I am so interested in questioning the
foundations of this sort of enterprise, the concerns that I have are
largely those of a critical social theory. The cultural focus of that
criticism, although mixed on occasion with European examples, is
primarily American. This is appropriate now since critics and
reformers in this country seem to be especially ill -equipped to
respond to traditions and to incorporate lessons from the past. Here
too, the project is politically charged since those critics are
confronted by a "new right" evangel icism which preaches that the whole
"world of man" is only 10,000 years old, and by a political admini-
stration that would like to claim all of history for a new patriotism
and has chosen to see our own short past with the distorted memory of
contemporary prejudice. Although I am responding to a general
problem, it is exemplified by this highly reactionary collapse of all
10
that has been to the present, in the desire to be "born again" or to
"revive" America, but also by more subtle conservative and radical
attempts to claim roots for their competitive interpretations of
social meanings as they are derived from the past.
All such efforts are instructive and I do not wish to slight them
out of hand. On the left and the right, there are those who worry
that the past is mutable, who wish that it were otherwise, and that it
offered some precise instruction. Responding to a disruption in the
common sense of time and events they wish to generate a continuity in
time. And so, as Raymond Williams has noted, there is a contemporary
compulsion to draw the past, present and future into allignment.
There is, as he says,
... a determination to limit and restrict the channels
of growth; a habit of thinking, indeed that the future
has now to be determined by some ordinance in our own
minds. We project our old images into the future, and
take hold of ourselves and others to force energy to-
ward that substantiation. We do this as conservatives,
trying to prolong old forms; we do this as socialists
trying to prescribe the new man.[l]
Hence, from psychologists who suspect that memory is only a
social matter in such a politically devious unconscious way, I might
be asked why I have not responded mainly to the dynamics of repression
or of fixation on a leader, but I am concerned with the genesis of a
"conscious" popular understanding which raises different questions
from even a "group psychology." Foucault's notion of an "episteme"
suggests that there are conceptual dimensions of power that exceed the
limits of that sort of inquiry as does Habermas' understanding of
legitimation, and both expand the consideration of selective memory in
society beyond a psychological domain. For this reason, and although
I am concerned with individual and psychological processes of memory,
I have chosen not to distinguish them from those of society at the
start for reasons that I hope will become clear. But if there are
11
shared cognitions in society why must I speak of them in terms of
memory? If I am concerned with the determinants of group identity
what do I mean by suggesting that it concerns the individual psycho-
logical processes of memory?
At this juncture and where I refuse to distinguish group and
individual aspects of identity at the outset, both psychology and
philosophy will rightly pose a series of questions: Is it not the
case that lived events fashion personal identity more powerfully than
any group knowledge of the past? Don't group cognitions have a
veracity achieved in agreement that is something quite apart from the
exacting nature of personal recollections, and don't fantasies wash
over those personal recollections to be remembered in their own right
by individuals but not in the same way by groups? Do repetitive
private dreams repercuss in later experiences for individuals in ways
that have little to do with the group, and doesn't the unconscious or
forgotten material of the one mind carry a different force than the
material that is forgotten by the group? Does it make any sense at
all to speak of collective 'mental events'? To all of these questions
I answer vehemently, yes and no. Both personal and shared reflections
come to fruition in the individual to be sure, and both somewhat
differently affect the group. The elusive thing that we call
"identity" is comprised of retained personal experiences whether they
are consciously remembered or repressed, as well as of formative
cultural lessons and common paradigms for memory. The mnemic
composition of identity draws from both spheres, and within that
identity a certain symmetry is achieved among the most private kinds
of memory, selecting and defining their objects and subjecting the
past to common divisions which mark an entire repertoire of informa-
tive experiences. A world of common referents, some more personal
than others, some more substantive and some more hollow, becomes the
backqround to that identity.
Halbwachs addressed the problems posed by this integration of
personal and social pasts by postulating two general types of memory
12
that act together. While his explanation is not fully satisfying it
expresses the difficulty in distinguishing them prematurely. As he
says:
We are not accustomed to speaking, even metaphysically of agroup memory Such a faculty, it would seem, could exist
and endure only insofar as it was bound to a person's body
and brain. However, suppose that remembrances are organized
in two ways, either grouped about a definite individual who
considers them from his own viewpoint or distributed within
a group for which each is a partial image. Then there is anindividual memory and a 'collective memory.' In other
words, the individual participates in two types of memory
but adopts a quite different, even contrary, attitude as he
participates in one or the other . . .[2]
In light of this complicated suggestion my interest is a social one,
but it is not social to the exclusion of things that are generally
thought to be individual. Rather than accepting the thesis of
"collective memory" as a given however, I am interested in the ways
that personal and collective records of experience are mingled in the
minds and identities of the many. In this effort I am compelled to
examine a variety of different kinds of memory that are not so crisply
distinguished, and it opens a further question: In which if any
aspects of memory may we find the "center" of identity, and how does
that identity remain an individual quality or a social one?
In recent lectures, Richard Wollheim has stressed that the
variety of memory in which individuals recall their own personal
experiences, is the most fundamental to identity. 3 For him, this
experiential or "event memory" is a breed apart from sheer fantasy as
it is also distinct from the hearsay knowledge of events. Similarly,
such private event memories are distinct from the ready recall of
cultural lessons, or even from a general knowledge of worldly events
"as they happened to me." This personal event memory is distinguish-
able, and is a precise type of experience about lived events because
13
it must meet three criteria: First, it concerns an experience that
has been lived through by the individual and not merely imagined as in
the case of fantasy or even later thoughts about the event. Secondly,
event memory is memory of an event as it was experienced even if it
falls short of experience as it might have been more broadly grasped
at the time, and thirdly, it retains the point of view from which it
was experienced, the locus of the "I" of the rememberer. Further,
such event memories must carry affects with them and dispositions
stemming from the original experience, thus "centering" and giving
continuity to identity.
For Wollheim, that is, the mere knowledge of an event, even if it
occurred in a way that touched one's own experience, as well as those
sorts of events imagined or experienced and related by others, do not
necessarily incorporate such an emotionally charged point of view and
they do not contain the emphatic dispositions that continually modify
the way that we lead our lives. On the other hand, ordinary centered
event memories are distinguished in that they are crucial to the
continuity of identity so that the special requirements that pertain
to them may even come to provide the preconditions for the fantasies
which later become influential in identity. In other words, the
weight or degree of influence of recalled experience varies as it
forms different kinds of memory in an ascending scale -- whether it
refers to events that I simply know about, events that somehow
concerned me or those events in which I may locate myself and my point
of view. In this way "centered event memories" for Wollheim appear
to form a core of identity with considerable influence.
Still, I want to differ slightly with Wollheim on the importance
to identity of these "centered event memories," even if the difference
is only a matter of emphasis that naturally arises in the examination
of group experience. Personal event memory in which the "I" is
centered or somehow located may well be a requirement of identity as
we know it, but it is not the only way in which the "I" is centered
and it is not necessarily the predominant feature of this centering
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even if it is a necessary condition for it to occur. That is, if
Wollheim's criteria for event memories are sound, as I think they are,
it does not mean that group experiences or knowledge of mass events do
not also contain affect and that quality of "I centeredness" as those
events are experienced more circui tuously . While Wollheim claims that
all centered memory has "egocentrici ty" and must therefore be experi-
ential_ memory, this does not necessarily mean that egocentrici ty
occurs only in the personal recollection of events. In fact, there
may be a continuity of collective identity which also derives affect
and dispositions from the past, from a sense of having lived through
experiences together, and which contains a point of view, an imagined
vantage point in that bit of the past, even if it does not always
carry the visual type of placement of individuals imagining certain
of their own experienced events. The repetitive and confirming
expressions of a group concerning past events may act to locate the
"I" without being event memories as such, and without being quite like
a private fantasy either. Thus, while group event memories may be
distinguished from individual ones by Wollheim's criteria, I want to
direct my inquiry to the group affectivity and shared posturing of
identity that creates patterns and that operates like and by many of
the same mechanisms as personal memory.
Memory is always personal in one important respect, it is always
ultimately experienced by individuals, but its content and influence
are not merely personal. Written records for example may have many
functions but they are only part of a shared "memory" inasmuch as they
are retained within the minds of many people, and by their form and
content direct the way that memory should receive them. Accordingly,
the way that public records are kept will affect the ways that people
remember, and if they regard their acquaintances and organize their
obligations according to totems the order of their memories will be
very different than if the bulk of their formal records are kept on
paper or in the files and data banks of various institutions which
issue notices to remind them of their commitments. The very nature of
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what is obligatory to recall, and the very content that commonly
appears before the mind's eye also define the locus for the self, of
commitments and culpabilities that the "I" feels and remembers.
Indeed, somewhere between formative personal events like those of
early childhood, and a more impersonal knowledge of the past, there
are other formative reflections that effect the dispositions of adult
identity. There are patterns of thought, cosmologies with shared and
distinct imagistic boundaries and fanciful ways of envisioning the
self that are also fixed in memory. With these in mind, when I refer
to "shared memories" hereafter, I mean to include the sort of memories
that are somewhat shared and not the contents of some fictional
'collective mind.' I mean to include a pattern of memories that may
not only seem to unfold in the sort of explicit scenes of a personal
recollection which is brought to mind by some effort, but may also
seem to come to us by their own volition to "occupy" the mind without
our trying to remember them. I include those which we play and replay
like a favorite recording without realizing it, those that seem
startling and new, and those fleeting remembrances that are never
quite captured. In all cases, I am referring to the mnemic patterns
of emphasis by which we internally navigate our lives and the group
influences that do produce common retrospective experiences.
In response to Bergson, Halbwachs took great pains to demonstrate
a variety of ways that memory is especially social, an idea that I
have taken as a starting point. There are certain features of a
"collective memory" as Halbwachs sees it that nicely restore the issue
of identity to the influence of groups. "Our memories remain
collective," he asserts, "... and are recalled to us through others
even though we were participants in the events or saw the things
concerned. In reality we are never alone." 4 Other people are
everywhere involved in memory for him, and even where he speaks of
"personal memory," the groups that we participate in directly and
the more distant groups that we encounter, shape, trigger and populate
the regions of memory which are always responsive to social milieus.
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Even the foreground of emphasis in what commonly occupies the mind is,
for Halbwachs, the rarefied product of group relations: "What stand in
the foreground of group memory are remembrances of events and
experiences of concern to the greatest number of members. These arise
either out of group life itself or from relationships with the nearest
and most frequently contacted groups." 5
While I do not think that this claim successfully undermines the
importance to identity of Wollheim's individual centered event memory,
it emphasizes certain features within that experience that are worth
noting. For Halbwachs even that most private memory of events depends
upon the context of the "affective community" and those experiences
that appear to pertain only to the individual are initially recon-
structed from "shared data as conceptions." The personal recollection
is itself aided by the memory of others in the harmony of a "common
foundation," and at the very least there are important memories that
survive only in accordance with communicative reemphasis. 6 There are
so many overlapping elements to memory that one might conclude from
this that even the individuated experiences that could be analytically
distinguished from those of groups are actually blended with the
latter in the moments that they are reexperienced in recollection.
But Halbwachs argues to the extreme that, "a person remembers
only by situating himself within the viewpoint of one or several
groups and one or several currents of collective thought." 7 A
childhood trauma is a familial group event for him in a way that
psychoanalysis does not emphasize, and what is more, if a child is
afraid of the dark for Halbwachs, it is "because he peoples that place
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with imaginary enemies." Although the group slips in through the
back door of imaginings here -- and still does not preclude the
importance of the personal, centered event memories of the sort that
Wollheim depicts -- group presences in memory seem inescapable in the
most private reflections. Furthermore, there is some validity to
Halbwachs' claim that individual memory, as opposed to the testimony
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of others, is not a "necessary and sufficient condition for the recall
and recognition of remembrances." 9
Even Wollheim would most likely agree that while personally
experienced event memories are central to what we call identity they
are not alone sufficient for the orientation of identity. Yet for
Halbwachs, all of personal memory is an enigma in the end since, as
he reminds us,
Often we deem ourselves the originators of thoughts and
ideas, feelings and passions, actually inspired by some
group. Our agreement with those about us is so complete
that we vibrate in unison, ignorant of the real source of
the vibrations. How often do we present, as deeply held
convictions, thoughts borrowed from a newspaper, book or
conversation?[10]
The very "content of mind" that we evisage from a point of view in
our own recollection, reflects the intersection of contrasting group
milieus that might give it a quality of "familiarity" or "strange-
ness" that defines our belonging within groups. So it is that the
memory of the child comes to adopt adult mentalities or the traveller
those of a foreign land.**
The "collective memory," then, is a special category of under-
standing that pervades all other retrospective experiences for
Halbwachs. It is not equivalent to all knowledge about the past, as
it is only that particular knowledge that resonates within the
interests of influential present groups. It is barely distinct from,
and shades through what we take to be personal recollection, and yet
it is quite different from that academic historical knowledge which is
busily engaged in demarcating periods of the past and in distinguish-
ing the past from the present. Historical investigations set off the
past in an attempt to separate knowledge from the milieus in which it
1 o
originates. Instead, collective memory is the intersection of group
milieus within individual minds. As a social "memory" that does not
incorporate the whole of historical knowledge it extends only so far
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as the memories of those who are members of the groups in question and
fades as those members disappear or die. History is concerned with
discovering the enduring distinctions of the past in general while
collective memory is concerned to generate and secure living resem-
blances. The latter is not objectively concerned with events
themselves but with their repercussions and the shared interests
reverberating through them, creating shared conceptual contexts that
give identity a locus in space and time. 13
While I do not think that this view of collective memory
justifies a place for itself in identity far beyond the event memory
that Wollheim has distinguished, and while I agree that the point of
view that is peculiar to the recollection of personal experiences does
maintain its distinction, the combination of the two raises dramatic
questions about identity. When each is given its due, we must examine
the nature of particular events experienced, the points of view taken
up in recollecting them and the nature of the continuity of those
points of view themselves. Both encounter conceptual polarities of
space, time and affectivity that confer importance or familiarity upon
what is recalled, and these are all elements that I must consider.
There may yet be a more revealing picture of those moments in which
the bits of seemingly personal experience collide with group percep-
tions and may mingle with knowledge that extends beyond individuals
and beneath what we normally acknowledge to be part of the life of the
group. We may discover combined awarenesses that extend beyond
individuals and the living memory of groups, as today, the awareness
of historic events, medical knowledge, astronomy, or nuclear devasta-
tion in fact or fantasy have come to coalesce in a distinctive world
view. From Wollheim and Halbwachs we may proceed to ask how memory is
both individual and collective as it is active in formulating
identity, how it is thematic and selective and finally how selective
orientations in memory may become established. We may discover that
the relative weight of personal and collective influences turns out to
depend upon subtleties of emphasis in the common use of different
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sorts of memory, rather than upon an absolute distinction that follows
naturally from their origins in experience - that regardless of the
individual or social sources of recalled events, memory is the
formative nexus of their unity.
I will advance the notion that there are highly selective
mnemonic processes that elicit specific themes which are at work in
the formation of what we call culture as well as in the formation of
personal identity. I will suggest that the way, and even the topics,
that we choose to remember are prompted and guided by cultural forces
different from those of ideology. In short, I argue that there are,
cultural mnemonics at work everywhere with certain elements in common,
and which are repeated to the degree that we may speak of specifically
American patterns of memory.
We protect ourselves by forgetting. Individually, we do not just
rid ourselves of unnecessary or irrelevant information by a kind of
erasure, but we censor the unpleasant and overs timul ating record of
our experience by engaging complex mental exclusions, or mechanisms of
repression as Freud called them. But beneath a preconscious protec-
tive layer of the mind there remains a permanent record of our
perceptions--indel ible impressions which can in principle be recalled
even while they must be contained in order that consciousness may take
their pi ace.^ The permanence of personal memory and the conscious
ego's defense against it has been demonstrated repeatedly in psycho-
logical practice, as have the beneficial effects of fully recalling
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specific repressed experiences, and this persistent if not acces-
sible record of the past I also take to be axiomatic. In society,
however, there is not the same indelible quality of memory if only
because we have no complete record of all that has gone before, and
because we seem less bound to it. For this reason of course, the
benefits of good historical study are more ambiguous than those of a
personal revelation and there is no singular group mind to feel their
influence. Individual and society both protect themselves from the
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past, but where the former must repress, the latter may only select,
distance or deemphasize a disturbing memory.
Indeed, it has been said that at best there is an analogy between
personal memory and the historical record of experience, after all, a
manuscript is not an impression, and a war is not a childhood trauma.
Nevertheless, there is something more than an analogy here. Social
events that occur within a single lifespan may be subjected to the
same processes of censorship that individually perceived events are
they are also individual events. A class, a group or a whole society
may forget an experience, albeit less thoroughly and with different
implications, and in time this censorship may become part of what we
call history. Accordingly, if repression and societal forgetting are
not strictly the same thing, they pose the same question: how and why
is so much forgotten?
Much as the occasion of neurotic symptoms might impel someone to
see an analyst, the repercussions of war, holocaust, or crisis provoke
a period of questioning about how such horrors came to be. If there
is not an indelible record of historical experiences there is
certainly an informative one which has been neglected, quashed or
suppressed. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich pose the question
succinctly in the forward to their important book on the German
"inability to mourn" the experiences of the last great war: They ask,
"Why is it that, on closer examination, terrorism, the atrocities of
war, and the eradication of freedom fail, from one generation to the
next, to exercise any visible deterrent effect on those peoples who
have the power to determine the course of history?" 16 The question
seems naive if we are tempted to respond that of course each genera-
tion does not remember properly or does not want to recall what we
wish they would, but this provokes another question: Why and by what
selective censorship are such lessons evaded? Are there processes of
memory which work like repressions but are different in ways that have
yet to be determined?
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At first, we might begin to answer this question by suggesting
that the processes of memory are at once critical and adaptive to the
social order. They provide referents for critical judgement, but with
greater force they seem to become actively uncritical and a vehicle of
forgetful social adaptation as we grow into adulthood. However, if
memory is both social and personal and invokes fluid processes that
generate patterns of emphasis, then it does not merely adjust to a
"reality principle" by repression but selects experiences from the
past to be recalled or forgotten in accord with specific cultural
patterns or propriety. As the psychoanalyst Ernest Schachtel
puts it, even in forgetting certain experiences of childhood:
It is not merely the repression of a specific content, such
as early sexual experience, that accounts for the general
childhood amnesia; the biologically, culturally, and soci-
ally influenced process of memory organization results in
the formation of categories (schemata) of memory which are
not suitable vehicles to receive and reproduce experiences
of the quality and intensity of early childhood. The world
of modern Western civilization has no use for this type of
experience. In fact, it cannot permit itself to have any
use for it; it cannot permit the memory of it, because such
a memory, if universal, would explode the restrictive social
order of this civil ization. [17]
Accordingly, and as I will discuss in detail in the chapters that
follow, to consider the selective processes of memory is to obtain a
different view of social assimilation than that of the repression of
specific events. Significantly, the examination of these selective
processes of memory does not lead to the same conclusions as those
theories that apply a notion of psychological repression to society to
find "one-dimensionality," "reification," "mimesis" or other states of
absolutely forgetful assimilation.
Instead, the categories or schemata of memory that Schachtel
refers to suggest that there is a discernible pattern of memory in
society which is not fixed so rigidly as repressions. It suggests
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that there is an active conflict within such patterns of adjustment,
as there is between childhood and 'civilized' adult experience, that
does not lead inexorably to conformity. On the one hand, it may be
that certain memories are recalled as a narcotic in the interest of
conformity. This was the case in the example that Marcuse borrowed
from Sartre, where the demands of adjustment to semi-automatic
machinery in factory work were said to provoke the recollection of
private sexual experiences in a hypnotic manner. 18 On the other hand,
the mind does not freeze to the task invariably, and such memories may
also provide the grounds for resistance. In a single instance and a
single memory there may be signs of the most imitative conformity and
of the deepest discontentment. More broadly then, it may be ventured
that there are thematic shifts in the memory schemata of an entire
culture that arise from conflict and may only engender the most
provisional agreement or conformity. The very composition of freedom
is affected in the bargain.
In a time of difficulty, one culture may grow nostaligic toward a
period in its past to cherish and exaggerate characteristics of
toughness and rugged survival. It may produce the fodder of fantasy
and themes of identity that instruct a conformist memory. At another
time, or perhaps in opposition to this at the same time, a large
portion of that culture might cultivate images of a prior pastoral
innocence, an alternative vision of peace. Each may affect the
memories of individuals without determining them -- effect a common
bond to meet some challenge or resist its coercion. A culture might
become preoccupied with the fear of losing certain traditions and
revive old heroes to appease it. It may screen out certain types of
experience from childhood or history -- the special attributes that
made for heroes or villains in either past -- that might be disruptive
to the present terms of authority. It might favor the epic portrayal
of its cruelties to proclaim its strength, or repeatedly recall the
roots of struggle of its oppressed peoples to assert its tolerance or
to appease guilt. Yet always there are referents of truth that are
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sought after competitively to secure a framework of memories, and
conformity always rests upon the bel ievabil i ty or veracity of differ-
ent pasts ~ pasts which acquire the quality of truthfulness which we
grant to a memorable experience - whether they deserve it or not.
If there is a common pattern of memories that demands conformity,
and its elements are limited or aroused in circumstances of conflict',
it cannot simply secure conformity in the unconscious fashion of
psychological repression. Rather, for a society to secure its schemes
of memory it must always appeal to something truthlike about the past
that might be commonly apprehended and is affirmed in courting the
memory of each individual. Even if those schemes do produce a hidden
complicity among many people at once they must appeal to traditions
that have gained the weight of truth by their persi stance, or to
claims about the past which have proven their accuracy, and in either
case they must be affirmed by people in their own recollections of
comparable truths. There is, for example, either a biblical under-
standing of the creation of the world that is affirmed in personal
recollections of the faith and its virtues, or there is an evolution-
ary theory that is affirmed by demonstrable evidence and the recollec-
tion of analogous scientific truths. Thus, as they receive this sort
of cosmological grounding, the variations in shared memory are numer-
ous, and yet they are far more prescribed than those which result from
repression. For this reason, if I am to account for the many varia-
tions and restrictions in shared patterns of memory, I must establish
a means of discussing their relative truths that does not place me
inside any one camp. I must appeal to the condition of truthfulness
of a memory that does not rest only upon belief or upon some quality
belonging to the past itself; there must be something like an "accur-
ate" recollection on which the many variations of shared memory all
seem to depend, and which resists the most gullible and absolute
conformity
.
The problem of the accuracy of recall has long preoccupied
philosophers. The question of whether we can remember things
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precisely as they happened has been resolved in different ways from
the "pure memory" of Bergson to a harried search for factual memory in
the analytic tradition. With psychoanalysis, however, there is a
quite convincing claim that memory is inevitably infused with fantasy
and affect, and restricted by complex mechanisms of defense. In this
vein, it seems that we may never recall an event precisely as it
happened in its own time, but only as it was infused with fantasy and
desire at the time and again later on. if we can accept the
suggestion that a measure of accuracy and fantasy are both attributes
of memory, then the basis from which our assessments can be made is
not the factual reproduction of the past in experience or history, as
it cannot be just any sort of fantasy, belief or myth. However, there
is. still a basis from which to view changes and even distortions in
reflexive posturing. There are formative instances in experience
which, like Wollheim's event memories, contain a certain fixity of
point of view and affect even if they are mixed with the fantasies
surrounding an original event. For all that is memory and not just
fantasy there is some first step, some formative instance or founda-
tion that offers a hold for identity. This I prefer to call the
"integrity" of past experiences. It is the integrity of experience
that causes us to doubt the most capricious interpretations and
enticements to conformity, and if we can find a route to this
integrity where it pertains to groups a way to cut through the
selective grid that is continually applied to it, then we may find
powerful bases for cultural criticism.
By this integrity I mean, provisionally, that there is the
possibility of recapturing an experience as it was originally felt,
that is, as the experience was both empirically understood and colored
by fantasy at its inception. Although there may be repression,
distortions and selections made in the course of experiencing an
event, these are different from those which may be appl i ed in
retrospect by individuals, or for that matter, by official sanction,
and they may be distinguished as part of the experienced event itself.
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That integrity of experience might not be empirically verified, but it
is always a matter of unshakable conviction for the being whose iden-
tity rests upon memory, and even where it is proven that an experience
has combined fact and fantasy, the two together may still bear the
same weight of conviction that attends an "accurate" perception.
In considering this, we find that we do not merely conform to the
latest demands of society as if they had the force of repression, for
where an interest in integrity survives in the centered memories' that
secure identity, they derive a standard of truth from their own
freedom of recollection - their own ability to move in time and to
focus upon the integrity of the past which also sets limits for the
terms of conformity. A shocking experience is dulled and represented
differently in memory than in the integrity of its origin. The
phrase, "when we use to do V..." is rendered more or less in
respect of this integrity. It may be formalized and reduced to a
symbol or representative image of the past experience of V, it may
become fixed with a collectively shared meaning, it may be recalled
selectively and stripped of its original affect and associations, or
there may be a meditative attempt to reexperience it in its integrity.
On this basis, we must therefore continually ask, as Jerome Neu has
asked, "How and why is memory brought in as an intermediary? how is
one to distinguish meaning of reality, memory of fantasy, and fantasy
of memory? And do any of these distinctions matter to the indivi-
dual's unfreedom and the possibility of overcoming it?" 19 Further we
may ask if there are other and perhaps richer apprehensions of the
past that may be obtained for the group when we know how memory and
fantasy act as intermediaries for it.
Consequently, and as we are concerned with the mnenic sources and
limits to individual freedom, we must also consider how adult memory
has recast and retained only portions of the experience of the first
few years of life and whether there are cultural patterns and themes
at work here too. Clearly this involves us in the theory of repres-
sion and of 'working through' memories as Freud prescribed, especially
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as it suggests rekindling the contexts of original experiences but
the point of view is somewhat different. Rather than expl aining' thi
s
matter in terms of what happens to repressed or unconscious material
I am interested in the forces which promote a collective and selective
apprehension of the past, whether it is a conscious or an unconscious
past. Although the analysis of psychological defenses will be most
useful to the discussion, there is a selectivity to memory that is
close to consciousness and more culturally influenced than repression
appears to be, a selectivity that preys upon the integrity of the
past, but is therefore limited in its activity. This suggests that
there is a common orientation of memory which responds to cultural
emphasis and in turn shapes the experience of cultural meanings, and
it may lead to different conclusions about "collective" life.
But finally, I want to tread very lightly in the area of "collec-
tive" experiences. I do not mean to propose any kind of "collective
unconscious" which asserts itself for all people and all time in an
ahistorical transcendence. My point in contrast to this, is that the
societal assimilations of memory are accomplished by numerous means
which are very much historical occurrences. In other words I hope to
offer a portrait of the general selections and thematic emphasis of
the past as it occurs in specific historical contexts. In this way,
the theme of 'selectivity' is a way of avoiding generalizations.
Against generalities, for example, I will argue that one cannot say
with any assurance that ours is a "culture of narcissism," that it is
"neurotic" or "one-dimensional" for that matter. One can say,
however, that there are certain mnemonic processes by which specific
material is selected and amplified in cultural life. This is not a
collective unconscious but rather a volatile, selective thematics
that affects the integrity of the past and which must be researched
with extraordinary caution. We must not suppose as some theorists do,
that the loss of meaning in society is a loss of the faculty of memory
en masse, and we must not confuse the loss of meanings with the loss
of memories as such, but again these processes intersect in important
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ways. My point in the end, is to strengthen the retrospective posture
of critique. This approach has implications for theory at every turn
for how we envision alternatives, for the connection of individual'
and society, idea and affect and between individual and individual
which I hope to address in the chapters that follow.
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CHAPTER I
A PLACE FOR MEMORY TN CRITIQUE
:
OPENINGS IN LUkAcS, HABERMAS AND FOUCAULT.
The inquiry into the relationship between memory, identity and
culture should not rush too quickly past the concept of reification.
As awkward and undi scrimi nati ng as it may seem, that notion or some
variation on the theme persists within the most revealing theories
that introduce connections between cultural and mental fixations and
concrete historical circumstances. Further, and as it is a historical
thesis, reification proclaims the importance of changed conceptions of
space, time and creative activity, the very conceptual poles -- as I
will soon argue on different grounds - that memory cannot proceed
without. If the thesis of reification describes a prevalent social
reality at all, then it suggests that we have acquired historically
distinct ways of conceptualizing our activities along with profound
limitations to memory. Yet the notion may obstruct our view of these
as soon as it has introduced them, for if the qualities of memory do
not utterly adjust to the reified conceptual demands of society, then
that aspect of a modern social condition may not have the force and
weight that has been attributed to it. If memory still has some free
play then nothing is ever so fixed as it seems and the themes of past
life cannot be so completely lost to the present. Similarly, within
the communicative bases of power that Habermas has described, and even
within the overwhelming vision of power that Foucault presents,
certain reflexive operations are revealed that may continually
penetrate the so called "veil of reification."
LukScs argued that with capitalism, and as the all embracing
presence of commodities "becomes dominant," all social classes have
been drawn into a particular and narrow conceptualization of the
world, of their own lives and of time and transition. Within this he
says, they have adapted to a, "new rigidity and a new immediacy,"* and
under the productive demands of the present they have adopted
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"reified" attitudes that have severed them from those of the past
The highly rationalized process of production (which Lukacs finds
primarily in capitalism despite their prevalence in communist systems)
continually subject people to mediations of experience in such a way
that a present oriented, practical and fragmented mentality is
engendered in them. Only the working class may challenge this
"immediacy", in Lukacs' view, when its members "aspire" to comprehend
and change the social "totality". 2 Yet, the difficulty in doing this
is underscored, as LukScs demonstrates that a principle of "calcula-
tion" which has been applied to everything in capitalism has carried
the burdens of its rationalization directly into the mind where it
creates a closed "contemplative stance" on behalf of mechanical
functions. It is a stance which must, "... transform the basic
categories of man's immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space
and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of
space." Since LukScs' theoretical work, this notion has been carried
forward and expanded in the historical studies of E.P. Thompson, Harry
Braverman and dozens of others. The idea that productive techniques
must degrade or alter a contemplative attitude toward time in order to
induce a mental adjustment to their rhythms remains compelling, even
as a corrollary to Freud's claim that there is a necessary "amnesia"
for all culture to progress. 4 Now, this "new immediacy" does seem to
have acquired special features and a certain urgency within capita-
lism, although no one has yet settled just what this must mean or how
far it extends.
For LukScs, the central implication of the rationalization of the
labor process is that the social concerns which were once qualitative
have become quantitative -- they are denuded of the process of their
"becoming" and frozen to be what 'is' in the present, in a manner that
he feels is exemplified in philosophy by Kant's "thing in itself."
Thus he says, "time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature;
it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled
with quantifiable 'things' (the reified, mechanically objectified
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performance' of the worker, wholly separated from his total human
personality): in short it becomes space." 5 An older and more fluid
manner of living and working he argues, has now been reduced to its
measurable physical presence.
The concept of reifi cation stresses the qualitative, temporal and
conceptual dimensions of Marx's criticism in a way that has opened
many avenues for later critical theory as it may have closed others
too quickly. Now it may also indicate a place for the problem of
memory, for as Adorno and Horkheimer have put it, "all reifi cation is
forgetting." As the thesis of reifi cation suggests, there has been a
temporal slide or collapse to the present, as LukScs' "new immediacy"
is an adjustment in time, as of concepts of time, to the pace and
presence of things as commodities. However, if something must be
forgotten for reification to set in, a question still remains as to
what is forgotten and how thoroughly, and by what mechanisms a
rationalized amnesia can be introduced. The 'forgetting' here, we
must argue, like the "quantification" of time, cannot be absolute and
it is clearly necessary for criticism to look inside of such monoliths
of its own creation.
Workers do not merely "forget" a qualitatively better time with
the dawn of capitalism, and all of their time is not so strictly
organized as the advocates of scientific management might have liked.
Once the problem of memory is introduced into the analysis, as with
Horkheimer and Adorno, the conceptual revisions imposed by the
productive process must be seen as having a double nature: they mask
memories and induce forgetful ness on the one hand, but on the other
they must reconstruct memories, select and make use of other experi-
ence beyond the productive process. Therefore and to go a step
further, we will find that in light of this forgetting we are not
concerned with the "false consciousness" of reification as such, but
with the selective ordering of consciousness and memory, whether the
past has been glorified within it, shunned, or scanned for special
features. If the thesis of reification is not adequate to the subtle
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processes of adjustment in our way of life, we must ask precisely how
past experience has been recalled and structured to fit and justify
the present circumstance.
"Reification" no longer describes these
processes, and especially if capitalism may have found ways to replace
the old and 'qualitative' fluidity of culture with stock images and a
conveniently selective idolatry of the past. The noiiowness of
commodity fetishism is perhaps now filled, not with an understanding
of how the world is constructed in social relations, or of a "tota-
lity", but with the artfully exaggerated memories of a reconstructed
past.
Once it is argued that reification does turn upon a forgetting,
then it would seem that there may also be a possibility to remember',
and where that is the case, there are at least two implications for
the theory. First we must reexamine LukScs' claim that a "class
consciousness" which aspires to grasp the social "totality" is the
only or primary force that may break the bonds of reification. That
may be one, but it is not the only understanding which critical
consciousness must embrace. To grasp the "totality" requires certain
historical insights, but to understand the weight of the present in
its immediacy we must also look to other pasts, even into childhood
experiences, to find armaments against "commodity consciousness."
Secondly, and since this as at least theoretically possible, we must
modify the claims of those theorists who argue that the effects of
reification have become complete. If the faculty of memory is not
utterly stilted, critical promise may still be maintained. As Max
Horkheimer suggested, "the so-called 'social nature of man' his
sel f- integration into a given order of things, whether the ground of
that order be pragmatic, moral or religious, is essentially reducible
to the memory of the acts of force by which men were made 'sociable'
and civilized and which threaten them still if they become too
forgetful." 7 Consequently, the conformity of memory to the impera-
tives of productive rationality is never complete. The prevailing
"structure of consciousness" that LukScs refers to is constantly
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subjected to the undermining capacities of memory and must continually
reassert itself. If modern social adjustment is dependent on how much
can really be forgotten, then the extent of reification must depend on
how malleable consciousness and its contents can be made, but this
remains an unanswered question. Even if a sense of history can be
erased in such a manner as to allow an easy conformity with the
demands of productive time, personal experiences and desires still
cannot be eradicated. They can, however, be devalued and delegiti-
mized by popular culture and even by political or administrative
emphasis. Since reification seems only to caricature the complex
adjustments of today, it is this subtle process that needs to be
reconsidered.
For LukScs the malleability of consciousness that has presumably
made it captive to reification can only be torn from its present form
by the self-consciousness of the working class which falls most
completely under its weight. He argues repeatedly that a worker must
'become conscious of himself as a commodity' in order to perceive and
act to change his role in society. Historically, however, the
prospects for this kind of awareness have been limited, not only by
the mediations imposed on consciousness by the social order, but also
we might add, by the worker's own recollected sense that he or she is
not merely a commodity and that a lifelong resistance to complete
adjustment must count for something. For Luka*cs it is as if the
worker must first bow to the powers that be before standing up to
them, and although the idea has merit in theory it is difficult to
accept for those who already know that there has been more to life
than its "commodity form" -- who have, in short, a complex memory of
their experiences in conflict already. They are not 1-ikely to forego
this view or to perceive themselves as being entirely commodi ty-1 ike
no matter how theoretically informed they become, unless they succumb
to a self-deception that further limits their memory. For example,
LukScs takes Kant's "cynical frankness" about marriage to represent
the force of commodity relations where he had described "sexual
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community" as a "reciprocal use" of the "sexual organs and faculties "
and marriage as "... the mutual possession of each other's sexual
attributes..." But who really perceives marriage that way, and who
is likely to allow such an attitude to structure their lives? The
psychoanalytic claim that conflicting experiences are indelibly
recorded, as well as the common sense of such remembered experience
renders the idea of complete assimilation to commodity objectivation
problematic. In the case of marriage, the host of unconscious
desires and instincts that come into play renders the idea absurd
except in the most extreme cases, and a critical "consciousness" of
that extreme may be both inappropriate to the full scale reality of
those relationships and unattainable. Hence, even where the concept
of reification does not penetrate a social reality, it is itself an
intructive example of the reduction of memory. It reproduces in
theory the same impenetrability that it seeks to criticize in society
and which an understanding of human beings endowed with complex
schemes of memory cannot simply confirm.
Although there may not be the kind of freedom of will and
autonomy in society that some philosophers seek to demonstrate, 10
there is still a degree of mnemonic access to points of reference
beyond the immediacy of circumstance and training. "Commodi fication"
may indeed, "stamp its imprint on the whole consciousness of man" as
LukScs had suggested, 1 but the depth of the imprint must vary and it
does not, as in Marcuse's rendition of industrial psychology, yet
"claim the entire individual." 12 Much else goes on that is recorded
in experience, and that may provide a reservoir of reflection and
resistance prior to class consciousness. Perhaps too much of today's
critical theory still lives under the shadow of the concept of
reification and class revolt as the only means beyond it.
In one extreme, and in following LukScs, critics have run the
danger of reproducing the very "cynical frankness" that he thought he
had discovered in Kant and which should be criticized instead. Where
a rigid brand of criticism based on the analysis of reification
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discovers no conflict in today's society, and where opposing empiri-
cists find only the given facts, the two are often dealing from the
same deck. This tendency is exhibited especially where notions of
complete reification, and the 'death of Marxism' on the political left
have run too closely into the 'end of ideology' theses of the center
and right. The charge which seems to come from Lukacs, that we must
recognize the absolute quality of domination in our "life experience"
in order to cast it off, remains somewhat compelling, but it need not
mean capitulation to the same domination just because class conscious-
ness seems unlikely. The notion of reification lends itself to
despair today because it does not identify the processes which remain
in conflict over a "new immediacy". It leaves only one channel open
for challenging that fait accompli
. But if there is a deeper sense of
conflict represented in opposing strains of memory, and things are not
so settled as reification makes them seem, then the processes of
adjustment to new social conditions may yet be discussed in a manner
that reveals more subtle requirements for critical reflection. We may
discover that critical discourse can disclose which particular aspects
of past "life experiences" require emphasis and reclamation, and what
an expanded view of them might mean short of any class conception of
"totality" -- and this, of course, has begun.
Nevertheless, the image of the containment of life experience
that accompanies the concept of reification now occasionally leads in
another dangerous direction. Upon encountering the impenetrable wall
of immediacy that it conjures up, more hopeful thinkers have re-
bounded. Their efforts have sometimes seemed like a desperate flight
from the extraordinary rationalization of the productive process into
irrationality and a celebration of whatever experiences seem to
distinguish their thinking from that process. If the overly rationa-
lized collapse of the sense of time to a functional, objectivating
present is the hallmark of reification, then for some modern critics
all irrationality might seem to provide a challenge to it. Even the
timeless and irreducible unconscious of psychoanalysis, along with the
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fantasies, dreams and insanity that wells up from it, for them might
seem to obstruct the path of this rationalization. The danger in this
is that the same critics corrupt a richly promising notion of the
unconscious by romanticizing fantasy, insanity and the irrational
They fail to delimit the role of the forgotten or repressed idea, and
of pursuing it in the critical reflection upon life experience which
might contain an obligation to the integrity of the past that I spoke
of above.
Indeed, it is precisely in contending with irrationality and
fantasy -- in seeking some ground of truth beyond it that is like an
accurate memory — that we reassert our connection to present reality,
and we must now look within the process that continually restores a
sense of reality in the search for a more cautious reflexivity. A
passage from Proust may be instructive in this regard, as he recalls
the reconstruction of wakeful awareness from the irrationality of
sleep as an exercise in memory. Upon awaking from a dream, he says,
...I was more destitute of human qualities than the cave-
dweller; but then the memory, not yet of the place in which
I was, but of various other places where I had lived, and
might now very possibly be, would come like a rope let down
from heaven to draw me up out of the abyss of non-being,
from which I would never have escaped by myself: in a flash
I would traverse and surmount centuries of civilization, and
out of a half-visualized succession of oil -lamps, followed
by shirts with turned down collars, would put together by
degrees the component parts of my ego. [13]
The saving rope in this passage is not the recollection or celebration
of irrationality or of the dream. Rather, it is the reconstruction
from it, in which a polarity is maintained between the vastness of
prior experience, the ego, and the present world. The critical
moment, in this reflection, is not the dreams themselves, but the
struggle up from them which retains them in a special light.
Similarly, a loosened sense of time and place not only escapes the
dream, but continually confronts the 'reified' present, and a certain
39
kind of reflection offers specific tools for assessing it This
awareness is not merely a fountain of faith that springs from dreams
insanity or the imagined past, and not from the purely conscious ego'
but from the interaction between them, much as it has been valued by
psychoanalysis and as it is ordinarily practiced in certain activities
of memory that constitute a present reality.
Marcuse often seemed to border on a kind of faith in the
irrational with his high valuation of fantasy, imagination and
playfulness against the onslaught of technological society. Perhaps
he was trying to revitalize a neglected basis for potential new
understandings and to maintain the same polarity that Proust illumi-
nates, only in deliberate contrast to the historical tide. The
emphasis that he places on such things remains important, and yet, it
may lead too readily to a conflated foundation of criticism that
combines play, fantasy and memory into one last line of defense.
Frank Hearn, for example, leaps to such a foundation without the care
or rationale of Marcuse' s analysis in his article entitled: "Remem-
brance and Critique: The Uses of the Past for Discrediting the Present
and Anticipating the Future." He argues that an imaginary past with
all of the embellishments of fantasy may be used to debunk the
present. He claims to identify some compression of play, imagination
and the "remembered past" or tradition as the, "content of the
categories underlying the rebellious disposition." To be sure, visions
of the past always are possessed of a "mythical" quality, but Hearn
praises this as a proper foundation for criticism, and thus praises
Luddites, unionists and Chartists all in one long breath for their
imaginative appropriation of a mythical past. 14 He ignores the
specific sorts of reflection that such movements engaged and the
variations in their pursuit of a truth about the past in order to
celebrate all such romantic uses of "the past in criticism.
The "remembered past is not an objective factual portrayal of the
past" says Hearn, and this is true enough, but he goes on to say that
this remembered past, "constitutes an imaginative reconstruction of
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the past," and that, "Through imagination remembrance imbues the past
with a romanticism that results in the idealized conception of the
past as it might have been.
. . and can be employed to critically
assess the legitimacy of the present." 15 He makes no distinction
between attempts to remember accurately and the invention of memories
for the purposes of destruction - destruction, presumably, of a
reified present way of life. Hearn's praise of the imagination
notwithstanding, all critical movements are doomed if they are to pit
an illegitimate fantasized past against the prevailing legitimacy
Such a deliberate conflation of fantasy and memory would carry even
less convincing power than rank utopianism, and it is even more
dangerous as it abandons any aspiration toward truth. He seems to
forget that historians in league with Fascism did much the same thing
and he goes so far as to suggest that the remembered past might be
tactically portrayed as being "more emancipated than the present." 16
But if the past was not in fact more emancipated and we follow in its
footsteps, we become caught in the lie. If nostalgia replaces
utopianism and mere imagination supplants a mnemonic and historical
concern for truth then we are very likely in a worse place than when
we stared.
In response to the thesis of reification, critics cannot afford
to lose the polarity and the distinction between the elusive integrity
of the past, imagination, the self and present society as they
appeared to Proust, especially if their purpose is to do more than
construct fantasies. Because people do struggle up from their dreams
and reassemble reality by the use of memory, they can only be
convinced of the worth of reconstructing reality in respect of an
attempt to grasp the past truthfully. In this, critics may certainly
disavow the claims to historical objectivity among historians, but
they must still view the past in its integrity and with a concern for
truthful interpretation of the interests, or even the potentialities
expressed there. We may discover imagination within the past but that
is a very different thing from exercising imagination over the past
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and remaking it in hopes that it will mystically alter the present
The kind of reflection that this suggests is neither the playfuidistortion of the facts nor the objective attitude of traditional
historians. Instead it requires the concrete appraisal of restric-
tive conditions past and present of the sort that led Lukacs to
require that an emancipatory class must "know themselves as a
commodity" and have an "aspiration towards totality." 18 Now
however, the reflection that is needed cannot take the form in which
subjects perceive themselves primarily as the products of such
generalities of oppression - "as a commodity", or for that matter as
participants in some mass mind or collective unconscious - and
against which they can only posit a fantasy of the past or a wish for
the future.
Beyond that it must involve an inquiry into the formation of
human interests as they emerge from different pasts, an inquiry into
the facts and the emotions and needs surrounding them and this sort of
reflection may even require detailed affective recall of the kind that
leads to revelations in psychotherapy. In any event it requires a
critique of the details of experience within which the particular
facets of constraint and emancipation became known to individuals in
struggling with their own "immediacy". On the social scale that means
concern for the integrity of the past and for how it was originally
experienced and internalized as something selectively meaningful and
interested, a kind of critique which is both "personal and political"
at its core and not by some uncomfortable mix of principles. Thus, if
"all reifi cation is a forgetting," it is not enough to simply
remember; it is not enough to fabricate the past and it is not enough
to underscore the facts of its genesis or even to become class
conscious about that genesis. There are too many kinds of memory to
insist on this alone. Critics must remember all things better than
their opponents and they must sensitize themselves to the particular
selective processes of this culture that structure and delimit memory
and experience in the many dimensions where reflection is cut short.
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The reason for returning to such basic questions about reflecti
and memory, again, is that criticism is in as much trouble as the
aspects of society that it criticizes. The theory of reification and
the flight from reification into wishful thinking do not really solve
the problem if the legitimizing meanings that lie behind fundamental
social institutions are being recast, it does not solve the problem
if the rationale for a powerful state apparatus is being renovated
and the ideas of political rights, democracy and equality revamped
along with the notions of marriage, sexuality, and the family under
the pressures of a cultural crisis and the political gains of the new
right. Not long before Time-Life publications declared its current
campaign for an "American Renewal" in which it sought to portray happy
news and happy families, 19 one American feminist declared that she was
uncomfortable about the idea of marriage but "couldn't remember" why
it was that she shouldn't marry. Not only is the institution of the
family floundering after new meaning but the visions of an alternative
that once fueled criticism simply do not seem to make sense anymore to
many who have held them dear. They seem to be recalled in monoliths
or in crude caricatures which are then repeated in diluted arguments
without the subtlety of vision and affective force that they once
possessed. If a selective amnesia is setting in for critics and
prevailing culture alike, there is a need to refuel the efforts of
criticism to achieve a detailed counter-selective vision of social
responsibility; to look again at what is wrong but also at what is of
value in the corpus of threatened institutions, to see how our vision
of them has been stilted or mystified in specific reflections and to
gain a more powerful hold on "tradition" and on our own experiences
than the conservative revisionists now claim.
This, in a sense, is the intention that lies behind Habermas'
plan for a Universal Pragmatics. Although it is not usually put this
way, he is concerned with developing rational schema for a reflective
and retrospective kind of discourse which has the aim of justifying an
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analytical and moral bails for social action. „, comos to thU in
several ways which require that he penetrate the thesis 0 1 relocation
and comparable notions of one-dimensionality and the
"eclipse of
reason" held by his Frankfurt School predecessors. „ k „ n „ a whole
and with the understanding that it is still in progress, his work
provides first, a theory of the legitimation of state power within an
evolutionary model of society; secondly, a locus for reason and
agreement within that development coupled with an explanation of how
It has come to crisis, and thirdly, a related theory of the communica-
tive basis of culturally motivating meanings and of moral requisites
of Identity which might provide new rational basis for criticism. He
offers a vision of the foundations of power in modes of interaction
which Is complete with the promise that there are Stages in social
development yet to be reached, and a prescription for a new variety
of discursive critical reflection that might attain them.
Significantly, as William Sullivan's has put it, this prescrip-
tion for criticism suggests that:
Critique 1s the process by which legitimations that appear
as settled 'facts of nature' controlling the contours of
Interaction are subjected to questioning until they can be
traced back to a community's history of interaction. In the
course of this critical process the participants reconstruct
the generation of their environment and thereby come to
understand at the same time, their own process of identity
formation.
. .[21]
In short, Habermas is prescribing a historical and self-reflective
basis for criticism. This is to proceed by discovering a pattern of
agreement, and shared interest in the assumptions of all communication
which can be directed against the presumptuous and faltering legiti-
mations of prevailing society. The application of this discovery
would accomplish nothing less than a concensus about how to approach
the past which might be applied in the creation of new meaning and in
the assertion of an emancipatory human interest.
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From his return to Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind in Theory and
Practice and its concern for the genesis of morality in M story to
the recent treatment of Kohlberg's moral stages of individual growth
he has attempted to revive an explicit interest in morality and the
"normative grounds of critique." This is especially important since
as he suggests, the "new ideology" of the West has sought to sever its
self-justifications from 'normatively argued' grounds, those theoreti-
cally attained principles which have been with us since Rousseau. 22
There is however, a highly rationalistic impulse in this endeavor and
it is by no means just a celebration of morality. While Habermas
continually parries with positivism he is far from engaging in
humanistic assertions or in fleeing to dreams of a glorified past. He
appears at times to be almost caught between the objectivating brand
of reason of his positivist critics, and the condemnation of Enlight-
enment rationality made by his forerunners of the Frankfurt School.
Indeed, he wishes to redeem 'reason' from the places where it is mired
in opposition to irrationality and criticism, as we find it in LukScs
and carried to extremes in the works of Horkheimer, Adorno and
Marcuse. He posits an "ideal speech situation" for example and as he
says, "I use it only to reconstruct the concept of rationality, that
is, a concept of communicative rationality, which I would like to
introduce in opposition to Adorno and Horkheimer' s Dialectic of
Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno let rationality sink to a
non-rationality of mimesis." 23
With even greater effort however, he must rescue reason from the
hands of technological domination and positivism to demonstrate that
critical reason need not follow the same path. As science seeks to
purge itself of myth and insanity and to reign over technology and
certain varieties of criticism, it casts a dangerously reduced version
of reason over everything. Left in this scientific mold, reason will
continue to be employed in the narrow domination of life, where the
theoretical concern for human interests is left wanting. Upon
investigating the limits of this reason it becomes clear that it is
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linked to power in a divisive way, "the danger of an excessively
technical civilization, which is devoid of the interconnection between
theory and praxis, can be clearly grasped; it is threatened by the
splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting of human beings
into two classes-the social engineers and the inmates of closed
institutions." 24
The dominant brand of reason would side with those social
engineers but, far from romanticizing some vision of insanity or
irrationality to counter its excessive force, Habermas is attempting
to broaden the scope of reason itself to embrace the value laden
domain of public choice. He wants to retrieve elements of the
dominant applications of reason and to replace them, or their
dominance, with a practical
-critical reason which is capable of
generating moral motivations. The new pragmatic use of reason that he
advocates seems to be highly rationalistic at one turn and moralizing
at the next, as it is capable of entering the domain of science but
also the domain of lost interests and suppressed experiences. That
use of reason is distinct from the scientific bent of the psycho-
analyst or the administrator, as it is from the chaotic musings of the
patient or the citizen. Applied retrospectively this reason culmin-
ates in a rather specialized use of memory and reflection that may
accomplish precisely what Hearn fails to do. It is supposed to
provide a vantage point from which to grasp the unwelcome realities of
the past without embellishment as well as the needs and interests
reflected in them.
Habermas is therefore opposed to the theoretical reduction of
society as an object of scientific reasoning, but he is equally
opposed to the kind of abandonment of reason by critics that would
leave it in the domain of science. Instead, he seeks a middle path of
inquiry into both facts and needs, and though the thesis falls just
short of an inquiry into desire, it outlines a critical variety of
reason which can assess and test its conclusions, but also requires
or
hermeneutical understanding. In order to accomplish this he has
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made a distinction among different kinds of reason; principall
between Technical reason, (allied with instrumental and technical
productive knowledge achieved in a synthesis through labor)- and
Practical reason, (allied to the struggle over interests or a
practical, reflective knowledge). 26 The two cannot be reduced to each
other and indeed they persist in conflict.
While "Technical" reason has achieved a dominant position
historically it should not be preferred as a means of understanding as
it is in the rigid Marxist analysis of base over superstructure, or as
a positivist given. "Practical" reason is necessary as well, and
having made this distinction his program for criticism can be directed
to a systematic revaluation of the formation of practical and
normative foundations of social meaning. That is, he can attempt to
locate the rational bases of truth and agreement of which social
identity is fashioned in communicated understandings — and to attempt
to divest them of the manipulation and force which have distorted them
socially and "intrapsychically ," 27 "Human interests" are thus
portrayed as being constitutive of society in a most powerful way as a
part of Practical reason. In this view, the traditional meanings that
guide culture, morality and the expectations of reciprocity in
discourse, all assume the status of social facts. Such value systems
op
have testable "factual consequences" 0 which are no less important
than other facts, or other material condi tions--especial ly as they
form the legitimating basis of social power. 29 These human interests
which are embedded in Practical reason must be revived by critical
dialogue, or reclaimed by a very self-conscious kind of reason in
"universal pragramatics." As it were, he is calling for a kind of
communicatively self-conscious redirection of memory and reflection
that is attentive to the integrity of past experience.
From the point of view of social memory and its usefulness to
criticism this is an enormously suggestive program for analysis as it
opens the door to a series of questions surrounding practical
reflection. If the sort of reflection that Habermas is prescribing is
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"ambiguous" as Thomas McCarthy says it is, the reason is that it must
be carried out in several dimensions that have not yet been addressed
It involves both the "critique of knowledge" and the "critique of
ideology," after Kant, Marx and Freud, and it engages reason in the
search for an "emancipatory cognitive interest" beneath them. In this
Habermas is attacking the modern limitations to reason on every front,
that is, in cognition, in ideology, in political structures and in the
processes of individual learning and development, in all (or many) of
the formations of power and identity. To that end, he has considered
individual moral and cognitive stages of development and within them
he has found a pattern of progress which holds promise. In human
development, specific communicative and linguistic competencies are
acquired by individuals. There are rules of learning which not only
apply to individuals but to societies as well, as they develop through
various stages and modes of production. He identifies a collusion of
individual and global forces which have stifled the emancipatory
interests and new human competencies that still continue to grow, but
are buried within them, and here the task of critical reflection must
seem ambiguous. It follows that the sort of enlightened reflection
which may find those past interests, and elevate them to a discourse
which challenges the distortions that limit their competency, must
also engaqe memory. It must engage memory to regain the lessons of
individual and social development, and against personal affective,
cognitive and ideological obstructions alike if it is to account for
the current "distortions" in each dimension.
That is to say that the resuscitating reason that Habermas calls
for should lead us to ask if there are constraints on our ways of
viewing the past, constraints upon memory, which are operating in each
dimension that it addresses and that inhibit reflection. We must not
only ask what is the nature of the emancipatory content trapped within
each dimension, but just how social power is manifest in the very ways
that we come to know those meanings of the past which now require
discursive reexamination. We must ask whether the task of laying bare
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the principles of communication is by itself capable of identifying
which particular clusters of meaning are deserving of criticism or
what specific themes are particularly clouded in our
"systematically
distorted" communication. To carry out Habermas' program we must
identify the selective processes and thematics which resist the search
for 'practically valid truth claims,' if we are to know what content
is to be targeted for criticism.
Participants in Habermas' Universal Pragmatics must assume an
"enlightened", "retrospective posture" against prevalent distortions,
and it is this posture which allows the possibility of undistorted
communication and the penetration of deceptive ideology. 32 As well,
they must uncover the "immanent relationship" that language bears to
truth and attempt to reinstate it. In doing both, Universal Pragma-
tics claims to have tapped the core of the genesis of social meanings,
since it is in the discursive connection to truth and tradition that
Political claims to legitimacy are also obliged to a version of
truth. Yet in cognitive development and the use of language alike,
this truth rests upon prior experiences, 34 upon the presuppositions of
language and a common heritage taken together, and it must be recol-
lected from such experience. Here another problem arises from the
vantage point of memory inquiry: Is this prior experience or
"experiential source" of language and even the presuppositions of
language subject to its own distortive structural on? If at all, how
might selective processes of memory enter even into the validity basis
of language, or how does the mnemonically structured emphasis of cer-
tain prior experiences shade into the presuppositions of communica-
tion?
Inasmuch as the truth-claims of communication rest on prior
experience there is difficulty in discovering their deepest, purest
form, especially that purified form which may provide guidelines for
equality and freedom as Habermas would like. If a culture were
strongly predisposed to race hatred for example, and could find
traditions and personal experiences to confirm the idea, we would have
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to find how deeply that associated nexus of concepts penetrate into
prior experience and even into the background of the validity basis of
communication. While the foundations of speech may presuppose
reciprocity and presume a certain "equality" as Habermas argues they
share the floor with images that inform ways of speaking and manners
of action which may also provide an imagistic and repeatedly recalled
background for the exercise of that reciprocity, even to the extent
that one may utilize different rules of communication to address a
presumably "inferior" person. Therefore, we would have to find other
zones of experience within that culture as well as rational grounds of
communication on which to base the criticism of inequality and assert
its different legitimacy. We would have to appeal to specific
memorable relationships that enter into the structure of reciprocity
and equality and might expand their terms. Then we might discern the
nature of the "experiential" bases of truth claims, but this needs
further explanation.
Habermas seeks to elucidate three aspects of communication that
reveal its validity basis in a way that can be used to further the
formation of a new consensus. For example, in ellocutionary acts,
there is, 1) an "immanent obligation to provide grounds", wherein the
certainty of truth rests on an "experiential source"; 2) There is an
"immanent obligation to provide justification", and for it the
conviction that one is right and one's claims valid rests within a
"normative context"; and 3) The "obligation to prove trustworthy."
Communication thus depends on three spheres, one representing facts or
verifiable experiences, another "legitimate interpersonal relations,"
and a third, one's own subjectivity which corresponds to a "particular
inner world" of the speaker as the "totality of his intentional
experiences." Of course, he says, such validity claims may vary as
they can be "thematical ly stressed."
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However, this sharpens the
question: How is the "experiential source" of truth; the "normative
context" of justification, and the whole of "intentional experiences"
a record of prior experience which is subject to selective stress
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beyond its immanent use in communication? Again, is the "thematic
stress" in the validity basis of communication to some degree ordered
for us by the habits of recollection that we bring to bear on them?
If so, then the reflexive discourse of a Universal Pragmatics must
also have access to uncovering the processes by which content is
selected and engaged from the very "experiential background" of
speech.
In one way at least in his discussion of the psychoanalytic
process, Habermas has suggested the need for sel f- reflection along
these lines, although he has not fully explored its implications. He
treats psychoanalysis as an interpretive dialogue involving the
"languages" of consciousness, of the unconscious and of an analyst.
Here he is especially interested in preserving the integrity of the
"need dispositions" of the unconscious "excommunicated language," and
to make them accessible to public communication. 38 To accomplish this
he shares the hermeneutic interest in recovering meaning from the
"mutilated text of tradition," only where the text in question is the
record of the unconscious mind the recovery must involve a special
sort of memory. By assuming the psychoanalytic concern for the
meaning of the processes of distortion themselves, he unites the
interpreter with the material that is to be interpreted. So the
necessary self-reflection must preserve the link by which it enters
into the "excommunicated language" of tradition, of the text or of the
unconscious. It cannot be satisfied with bringing such material under
the control of the conscious ego, but must reunite with it, and learn
from it in order to supersede the conflict. In this Habermas be-
lieves he has gone beyond Freud to preserve the critical import of the
meanings that have been lost in the language of things repressed. 39
This sort of redemption of life experience involves a double-
edged difficulty however: First, psychoanalysis warns of the dangers
of releasing the affective charges of "banished" unconscious mater-
ials, and the reasoned research of them may prove difficult. They are
developmental ly layered over in a way that would have to be broken
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down cautiously or it would rekindle more than just the "need
dispositions" of which Habermas speaks. Secondly, if we are to
preserve reason in this effort, the rules by which "unconscious
residues" are connected with "verbal residues" would have to be
understood as Habermas suggests, but as well as a developed theory of
language that can do this, we might need a way of conducting a
thematic search for specific meaning contents, as with Freud for
example, we were directed to enquire into the sexual desires and
traumas of childhood.
That is, the validity basis of communication has provided a route
into the content of excommunicated meanings, but these in turn have
been made available to us only as filtered recollections often with
the force drained out of them. We must confront both the recollec-
tions as they stand and also the hidden force of desires and repulsion
attached to them. First we must locate the manifest meaning and the
affective themes that are buried alongside of interests and need
dispositions within original experiences. Otherwise, we might either
lose the integrity of those meanings or find that we are opening
Pandora's box. Secondly, we need to return to analysis of the
processes of selection and distortion that affect the psyche if our
understanding is to surmount them. We need to refine a theory of the
inhibitions that constrain human needs and interests, but also
a • 40desires. Only with the explication of the varieties of "distortion"
can we find the retrospective posture that can allow us to enter
into, and step out of "excommunicated" meanings -- to use, and not
merely be infused with such meanings on a social scale. Only in
disclosure of the various kinds of differently charged memories will
we find the "experiential background" of speech and detect its
formative influence.
The questions surrounding sel f-refl ection have further implica-
tions for Habermas' project. One might even say that there is a need
to sort out the ingredients of a life-history of the "il locutionary
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roles" that Habermas considers to be basic to his theory of communica-
tion. This is especially necessary if these roles are cluttered not
only with intentions, but with affective interests which may
prescribe themes in the content of discourse. That is, if the "inner
world" of individuals contains some indelible memory of the roles that
they have assumed in speech acts, then this provides a part of the
field in which proposi ti onal contents may emerge. Thus, if the
"inherent reflexivity" of language involves a "sel f- reference" in the
simultaneous expression of i 1 1 ocutionary acts and contents, 41 we must
ask, what is the nature of this self that is being referred to? The
self-reference must involve an ontogenic reflection on the possible
roles that may be, or have been, engaged in speech acts, and it may
lead us back to an interest in the affects, instincts, and charged
experiences which Inform them. This would not suggest the generalized
historical account of instincts that Marcuse has offered, but a more
particularized account of affectivity informed by language theory and
the efforts of a penetrating reflection.
If ill ocutionary acts are informed by a record of experience, the
speaker has a certain freedom as he or she relies on particular shared
experiences to communicate with listeners. Specific and even
affective content may be summarized and designated within that speech
or in the role assumed in speaking, and an expression may be passive,
aggressive, authoritative, infantile, etc., each with personal and
cultural implications and bringing to bear specific mnemic referents,
themes and periods of a presumably shared life experience. This is
not really the way that Habermas proposes the matter, but if the
optimism of Universal Pragmatics is to be sustained against the rather
bleak vision of a wholly determined subject, then it must rest more
explicitly on an ability to harness an uncluttered and counter-
selective memory. It must have a freer range over experience than
prevailing interpretations and it must direct attention toward
specific varieties of experience.
53
That is, by way of justifying a new basis for criticism Habermas
maintains that there is a universal competence that lies behind
language to which we may only gain access by a resuscitated variety of
reason that is sensitive to human interests. He offers a consensual
theory of truth in which even the objectivity of experience rests upon
persuasive reasons and justifications that might be rationally
reconstructed to reveal how truth rests upon mutuality, reciprocity
and an implicit interest in freedom. 42 Yet this may run us up against
another criterion for truth if the constancy and fixity by which such
a truth is held in mind also depends upon the kind of memory that it
obtains. In addition to what Habermas discovers, then, there is an
intrapsychic event that accompanies the intersubjective moment in
which agreeable, truthful referents are maintained. The truth emerges
as an agreeable and constant referent in memory that appears with the
certainty, the veracity of an experience recalled as if it were pulled
up by Proust's rope. The consensual truth may obtain a memorable
quality which is 1 ike an experimentally derived truth, even if it does
not refer to something factual, and it is in that integrity as well as
in agreement that it becomes something real and persistent to memory.
To obtain reasoned agreement as to what is true and justified
remains a complicated affair that may involve us in new applications
of reason and a different use of memory. When Habermas is done we
must not imagine that his "ideal speech situation" could emerge only
in a cold calculation of interests. Indeed, for him "interest
structures" are linked to the human body and the environment. 43 As
such, 'interests' can never be wholly distinguished from 'affects' and
affectively charged memories which must be recognized where they are
consensual ly confirmed and in the manner that they emerge as truthful
memories, or do not. If, in discovering them, those interests are to
be sorted out from merely personal biases we must find a means of
penetrating the selective content of prevailing memorable truths to
augment the rational reconstruction of the interests and competencies
that have been denied in them.
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Although Habermas pursues a rational reconstruction of the
possibilities embedded in discourse, and with him we do not wish to
return to fantasy or the unconscious itself as the foundation for
criticism, we must continue to consider both. As he retains appre-
ciation for the integration of private "pal eo-symbol s" and public
interpersonal ones, as well as for the moment of emancipation which
"dips" into the unconscious with jokes and the "scenic understanding"
which refers to original experiences, 44 we must ask how this dipping
can be accomplished best for criticism and what sort of memory it
demands. In this, the justification ot proposi tional truth that
critical discourse will find must distinguish the interests and
desires which would be flushed out from unconscious historical and
current life experience as it proceeds. It must discern the orders of
memory which are themselves consensually credited with truth. This
may seem to be a project that is not accessible to the resuscitated
reason that Habermas would apply, but as we shall see, it must
eventually be amended to the special exercise of self-reflection that
he ultimately recommends.
A self-conscious memory that accounts for its steps is especially
necessary if we are to acknowledge the importance of affectively
charged recollection as psychoanalysis has done. If psychoanalysis
seeks to bring "affect and idea together again" 45 and Habermas'
practical reflection will do the same thing in a different manner, we
must find a way to make the synthesis discussible while retaining some
of the force of affects. This suggests that we must define the
interest that we have in selecting the material which is to be
discursively redeemed against the backdrop of the prevailing selective
themes of memory which must be identified as such. Once again,
remembering is not enough, nor is the theoretical retrospective stance
of Universal Pragmatics, especially where there is the danger of
basing our justifications on a 'fantasy of memory' or a 'memory of
fantasy.' Truly critical memories bear the force and integrity of
their origins and original intentions and interests. Yet if
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intentions lie at the core of what Universal Pragmatics seeks to
understand, they are still prey to what Habermas describes as a
"scarcely developed theory of intentional ity." The role of selective
memory, of the thematic interests in the cultural emphasis of affects
remains crucial to understanding how interests and intentions emerge
in recalled experience, or might emerge differently.
Therefore, in order to apply the reflexive reason of a Universal
Pragmatics, reflection must make three steps. It must detect and
enrich itself upon the interests that are embedded in the requisites
of communication. Since these interests are hidden and many, it must
have a contextual means to sort out interests and affects and to
reveal what is the particularly worthy content for a critical
discourse or, which "suppressed interests" are general izable in the
discourse between groups or their representatives. 47 And conse-
quently, it must have a scheme for assessing the images, themes and
general affectivi ties drawn from the past into this discourse which
may determine their relative importance as they are decoded. To some
degree Habermas has mapped out a plan for doing this in identifying
the dimensions of a modern crisis, the rudiments of discourse and
moral development, but between the two broad fields of inquiry we must
still find means to focus upon the particular content and processes of
distortion that are now in operation -- elements that have not utterly
fallen prey to reifi cation and which persist despite the prevalence of
technical reason.
The expressly political analysis that Habermas provides to give
focus to this inquiry turns upon questions of how social identity is
formed and how legitimating meanings have been generated or have
broken down. Still true to his Marxian heritage, he wishes to display
and retrieve the alienated communitarian basis of those processes,
especially as they extend to the domain of the state power. From his
early work in Legitimization Crisis to the present, he has stressed
the inability of modern state administrative bodies to generate the
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necessary legitimating meanings to sustain their power. This is not
however, because the modern state is merely a "superstructurar
phenomenon, but because its legitimacy rests upon reasons, and relies
significantly upon the consensual force of discourse. Legitimate
power in his view, has for some time been based upon arguable grounds
but more modern debates culminating in theories of natural law have
made a "procedural type of legitimacy" explicit as they represent upon
a new "learning level" for society involving the idea of principled
agreement among competent parties. 48
The problem today is that this vestige of community in the
argumentative basis of power is being slighted. While that foundation
remains crucial, the state and theorists of the state have attempted
to replace such consensual roots of legitimacy with complex admini-
strative functions that are now supposed to win approval after the
fact when they have proven to be "efficient". That, according to
Habermas, is a mistake in theory and practice, and the dissociation of
the state from community of discourse is much of what has precipitated
a modern crisis of legitimacy..
With a long term crisis in capitalism and the reshuffling of
existing powers, the state "can no longer rely on residues of
tradition that have been undermined and worn out during the develop-
ment of capitalism." 49 There emerges a "legitimation deficit," which
means, "that it is not possible by administrative means to maintain or
establish effective normative structures to the extent required." Such
meanings or traditions "cannot be regenerated administratively" as
50they need motives or reasons established in communication. Habermas
rightly challenges systems theorists like Luhmann and Schmitt who
argue that there can be neutral, non-normative "systems of integra-
tion" which stand above public consensus, or that an observable
efficiency on the part of administrations is adequate for its
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1 egitimacy
.
Instead Habermas argues that as the administrative power of the
state rests on reasons and relies on the consensual power of
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discourse, it can never be replaced by the proven "efficiency" of the
activities that produce domination unless the nature of discourse
itself were to be transformed. At the bottom line, he says, "before
norms of domination could be accepted without reason by the bulk of
the population, the communication structures in which our motives for
action have till now been formed would have to be thoroughly destroy-
ed. Of course, we have no metaphysical guarantee that this will not
happen." One does not have to side with Luhmann however, to suggest
that the state may enter into the very communication which ration-
alizes its power, or that the 'destruction' of communicative struct-
ures might be preceded by the selective structuration of meaning in
culture. In other words, it is quite possible for administrative
bodies to engage in ideological ploys, in a retrograde rhetoric of
tradition, and in public policy to effect a selective emphasis on
cultural themes that will retain and promote some vestige of legi-
timating meanings. Further, if we admit the importance of the
mnemonic and affective "stress" that lies within the very meanings
that Habermas emphasizes as within the "reasons" which justify
meanings, we cannot be sure that state functions cannot influence them
substantially. Then, we must still prevent Luhmann' s vision from
becoming truer even if it is a misrepresentation of the present.
Indeed, since 'normative determinations of identity' are at the
root of legitimacy and are generated in community interaction, they
rest on a "background" of tradition. This in turn, and like the
experiential basis of language, requires selective symbol izati on of
CO
the past as might be accomplished by the elders of tribal societies.
Similarly, we may argue, the state can influence this selective
symbol izati on: the state can underwrite certain interpretations of
history or of a "national ethic." Its officers can reiterate them in
speeches aided by the tools of the mass media. Conversely, the state
can subtract from the source of a community's ability to sustain old
values or generate new ones against its efforts at legitimation. It
can break up public gatherings be they political or for celebration
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and sport as was done in 19th century England. 54 it can even affect
the genesis of meanings as it exercises control over the structuring
and conceptualization of time, it can affect work schedules and the
discourse that takes place within them, just as it can make the
present seem more urgent by declaring a crisis. It can devalue the
teaching of history in the schools as has been done in Germany since
the Second World War. 55 if the state cannot reproduce the requisite
meanings for its own legitimation it can still participate in the
structuring of experience so as to direct the manner in which it is
recalled or interpreted, and this must be analyzed. A community of
understanding may become so flexible, for example, that when the Third
Reich fostered the invention of an Aryan legacy there were all too
many Germans who applauded the return to "good old German values."
Accordingly, the detailed analysis of the processes by which state
power affects retrospective understanding remains important to the
analysis of legitimation, just as the thematic recollection of
experience must be sorted out at the roots of a universal theory of
communication.
As Marx identified human and class interests behind the fetishism
of commodities, Universal Pragmatics seeks to identify generalized
moral interests in the precepts of communication and the analysis of
social evolution. To do so it must also identify the fetishisms that
prescribe the particularly narrow morality in specific times and
places. Habermas has begun to do this in his evolution theory, in
analysis of social theory, of scientific reason and of moral develop-
ment, by revealing general dynamics in each. The next step must be to
bridge the gap between these dynamics and the content of particular
events; between the rules of communication and particular interests,
and here we must identify the fetishistic thematics of a public
discourse which can accommodate holocaust and nuclear war in its
"morality," and justify them by forgetting. In the media, in
discourse, habits and conventions a people may recall the bases of
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their identity by publicly sanctioned symbols which may even appear to
be rationally and consensually secured when they are not.
In summary, we might ask of Habermas: How are the rationally
procured and normatively argued sel f-justi fi cations of society imbued
with a particular mnemonic content? How much does the "retrospective
posture" of universal pragmatics depend upon an opening or deepening
of memory if the fixed grounds of communication are dependent upon an
"experiential source" of truth, and a "normative context" with
reference to the past? If such bases of validity claims may be
"thematically stressed" what are the retrospective themes of emphasis,
and how do they come to be selected and affectively charged in
personal and historical experience? Do media and administrative
practices affect the experience of a "background" of traditions and
how it is recalled in ceremony or by individuals in a way that might
modify Habermas' claim to the contrary?
If the legitimation of contemporary power of the sort that
Habermas discusses is indebted to specific precapitalist and early
capitalist meanings which are justified by reasons, then we must ask
if there are other and perhaps more long-standing currents of power
which are not. The question is raised pointedly by the works of
Michel Foucault, since they do not present a historical dialectic of
power which constrains the possibilities of discourse, but rather, an
account of the texture of power in its own consistency and of
'mutations' in the form of power that does not admit such hidden
promise. For Habermas, Reason lies at the foundation of language
where it retains a transhistorical status and an emancipatory interest
that is subjected to different phases of power in a historical
dialectic. Yet, Power has the quality of an inter-historical
continuity for Foucault, a continual linkage that depends expressly
upon reshaping memory as it establishes the confines of language. In
this, power is an "emergence" in a "series of subjugations," 56 and it
precedes the rationales and applications that it finds in history. In
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different strategies and legitimations,
"Humanity installs each of
Its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination
to domination."^ Domination is not fixed only in particular
relationships of power or in specific places or times, but is fixed
"throughout history ... it establishes marks of power and engraves
memories on things and even within bodies. It makes itself account-
able for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no
means designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it." 58 For
Foucault, power has a calling of its own which is only employed in
different ways historically whether inscribed on the human body in
"disciplines," encoded in laws or used in the strategies of the state
or science to order experience, memory and understanding against the
universal fears of death and the unknown.
The locus of legitimating power for Foucault is no more in the
state or administration than it was for Habermas. But power does not
rest on the same intersubjective, communicative basis that requires
reasons. Rather, it has no particular locus and prefigures the
political community and the specific legitimations that it may have.
This power is something more imposing and yet less tangible, something
between the layers of the applied strategies which employ it selec-
tively in different "emergences", and beyond the subjective intentions
by which it is exercised and legitimated. Power remains a precondi-
tion for the epistemic conditions of life and we can know the history
of that life only in the strategies of power that guide its expres-
sions in distinctive patterns. Thus, for Foucault, "reason" would be
too much of an accomplice to power to be salvaged in the systematic
application of a Universal Pragmatics without suspicion. Even the
expanded practical reason by which Habermas seeks to reconstruct
meanings would be difficult to procure. Reason is itself party to the
particular " epistemes " or structurations of thought and practice that
are wedded to power in different periods and it is a part of their
imposition of order on the universe of possible understanding.
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Nor, for Foucault, can a rational basis of communication break
the bonds of such power. Language is too "opaque" to provide the
grounding for effective criticism and it is too insistent, as one
critic puts it, on fulfilling its role to "serve the purpose of
'representation' which had been foisted upon it, all unthinkingly, in
the late sixteenth century." 59 Only psychoanalysis and ethnology
came close to the realization that the "thingness" of language itself
presents the true barrier to the special project of the human sciences
that Foucault wishes to further. 60 Like them, Foucault seeks to
return by inquiry to the borders of the world of expression and
imagination, and to penetrate the symbolic order that it 'mirrors to
infinity' against disorder and death. 61 If there is a lesson for
criticism here, it is the acknowledgement of a need to find out how to
return to experience in the process of its structural on of power and
language, to disclose the pattern of power at the point that it
emerges within language. Habermas seeks to do this through language,
while Foucault presents a tightly woven vision of structured life and
power that makes that endeavor seem nearly impossible. Perhaps
somewhere between the two, criticism may still recapture experience
and debunk the selective processes by which it is shaped.
If power is not so dependent on legitimating reasons for Foucault
as it is for Habermas it may be partly due to the fact that he
prefers to address the pre-democratic forms that it has taken, but
still, the ways that power is legitimated and interalized there, are
instructive from the point of view of memory. With regard to law, for
example, Foucault discloses the necessity for society to invent an
idealized "pure form" or fable of the "ultimate crime." It must
depict the worst, most infamous deed in order to justify its "earning
of the power to punish." A mythic memory of that fantasy crime
serves to justify the dominion of law. The horrors of this mythical
offense and the visions that it evokes legitimates an absolute
reprisal undertaken in the name of justice, which therefore overrides
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the impurities of its version of "justice." This sense of justice,
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in kind, is not so concerned with the immediate and practical
consequences of crime but more with its general capacity to cause
disorder. Like power, it operates behind the particular applications
of law. In this, however, we might even take the myth of the ultimate
crime itself to be a constitutive force within the "human interests"
that call for justice. A kind of structuration of order against
disorder appears to be legitimate prior to the specific legitimations
that Habermas is concerned with. Inasmuch, our attention is directed
toward the selective emphasis which is placed on a mythical and
affective memory and its role in the process of legitimating power.
So now we must ask how this myth is constituted and what pool of
common experience it draws upon to become infused in public under-
standing.
Again, for Foucault, power retains an identity of its own and is
neither the property of the voluntS general
e
of the people, nor the
property of the state. The nature of "discipline" for example, "may
be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is
a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set
of instruments, techniques, procedures. Levels of application,
targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology." 63
Although power is linked to the administrative or police apparatus of
the state and within the minds of the public, Foucault only hints at
how this comes to be. He conducts his studies on the side of power
and is deliberately unconcerned with the role or experience of
individuals in its application. Nevertheless, there is an indication
of how power is internalized through discipline, for here, "the memory
of pain must prevent a repetition of the crime, just as the spectacle,
however artificial it may be, of physical punishment may prevent the
contagion of a crime." 64 So the mythic memory of "pure" crime which
helps to legitimize a notion of justice is assisted by explicit
memories of punishment. A mental grid begins to close around the
frightful idea of pain and punishment beneath and beyond any specific
ideology. Thus, the public execution of J.D. Langlade in 1788 brought
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with it, "beneath the apparent morality of the examples not to be
followed, a whole memory of struggles and confrontations." 65
The door is opened a crack here to understanding the panoply of
experiences and remembered associations that surround the idea of pain
and the public reception of discipline. Foucault suggests that the
memory of experiences is shaped in the strategies of power and in the
kind of public collaboration secured, but we do not know how a
collaborative memory is shaped and secured. From the use of the
scaffold, to a later and more "gentle way of punishment," 66 there is
only a suggestion that different memories and associations are drawn
into the service of the public acceptance of power. Accordingly, we
might suggest that within the series of retrospective assocations that
justify Foucault' s vision of power, there is the memory of the myth of
crime, the memory of the punishment, the memory of what should not be
done, of struggle and so on. Beyond what Foucault designates, however,
there must also be a memory of personal experiences with authority, of
the visceral terror of childhood "lessons", of the learned discipline
which has been rationally expressed in those lessons, of education and
the memory of the freedoms lost in every such experience with
authority, a memory of the traditions which must be upheld -- in short
a chain of horrors and reasons is linked together in the memory nexus
of discipline which adds into the legitimation of "justice."
Here we may combine as people do all the time in their own
experience certain aspects of meaning pointed to in the disparate
theories of Habermas and Foucault. From the point of view of the
mnemonic constituents of discipline we find that there must indeed be
some of the reason, or rationale for power that Habermas identifies in
communication, but there must also be a process by which the imagery
and emotional associations of power are summoned and woven through it
in the manner suggested by Foucault, as a part of the distortion that
he wishes to penetrate. So, between Habermas' intersubjective
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portrayal of power and Foucault' s almost subjectless one we must
still discover just how reasons, memorable horrors and specific images
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are intertwined in the self-perpetuating effects of power The
generalities of power that Foucault elaborates may be pierced by a
critical practical reason of the sort that Habeas uses against
distortions in meaning, but both the general power and the individual
capacities which stand against it must be disentangled from the
selective bond that unites them in public ways of understanding, and
those of course, are in some measure directed within memory.
Foucault approaches this matter from another angle as he stresses
the positive deployments of power. Power does not "repress" sexuality
for example, but heightens the discourse about sex selectively 68
Power does not negate the body, suppress and make things abstract but
makes them concrete in a "multiple and differentiated reality."69
Thus, it is not the containment of human capacities that critics find
in "repression" nor even the "distortion" of meanings that is at
issue, but their selective expression in ways of understanding.
Power "produces knowledge" 70 in the deployment of selective under-
standing and in the form of an " episteme ." The episteme represents
the ordered formation of language, memory and knowledge against the
randomness of the world, which changes by its own imperatives. The
"classical epi steme " for example, endured till the end of the
eighteenth century, and proceeded to classify nature in various charts
and tables, but 'mutated' into something else when it finally came to
embrace the "sciences of man."
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Within the epi steme of a particular age, there are ways of
isolating the identity of certain objects, marking differences,
tabulating space or time, which appear in changing patterns to freeze
visions of nature or of the past in different lights. The episteme
appears like an embryonic net cast over the yoke of nature and
society, a complex of representations in the matrix of understanding
which reflexively reasserts the particular order that it gives to
memory:
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The chain of representations can, in effect by means of th*
jars £&,,^rx.u\r«.=35of representations as they capriciously present themselves
2hU «f .iraJf*11y .immobilized ^ the form of atable o all that exists; man is then able to Include thiworld in the sovereignty of a discourse that has the powerto represent its representation. [72] P
The immobilization of memory that occurs in this vision of an
epjsteme suggests that society must strictly limit the free range of
memory expressed in the quotation from Proust above. Here memory
conforms to the service of order and power not like a rope that saves
but like a rope that binds, and it seems to lose the tension between
the past, the dream, the present and subjective identity. The
episteme apPears t0 cl °se off the possibilities of the henneneutical
reflection which Habermas significantly retains. But still there may
be a less conformist role for reflection within the episteme itself
inasmuch as it is suggested that this fixity of memory has come to be
established in conflict. That is, power may come to be deployed in
particular strategies and the selectivity that these strategies impose
upon experience and the memory of experience did not always confine
all experience in the same ways. Reflection and memory may duplicate
order against the backdrop of the 'unbroken expanse of beings,' but it
may never be completely "immobilized", even, we might argue, as it
joins in positive deployments of power and in the episteme . We may
finally maintain that reflection and memory do indeed confirm and
duplicate order, but with Habermas, they can still cut beneath it and
do so by their very nature.
There is some indication that even Foucault finds this epistemic
power to be penetrable. In face of it, he proposes an "archaeolo-
gical" inquiry into discourse and the limitations that language places
upon experience and there is still a little hope that a special
research of the past will offer a reservoir of difference and
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potentiality aqainst them. Says Hayden White, "The aim of 'the
archeology of ideas' is to enter into the interior of any given mode
of discourse in order to determine the point at which it consigns a
certain area of experience to the limbo of things about which one
annot speak. Thus for Foucault, history as it has been written so
far is particularly suspect. Its temporal i zation of thaies, identi-
fication of objects and the priorities it assigns to topics is imbued
with the discourse that derives in power and domination. This
"history" divides off experience and the qualities that might even be
called human interests from the past and redoubles the present order
of power.
So "history" does two things here, it severs our present human
capacities, interests and affects from a full range of contact with
the past, but it also places a selective emphasis on these and draws
them into the present scope of power. The criticism in this, is not
only that history has been too concerned with objective accuracy,
being oblivious to its interpretive role, but that it has been I
selective dramatization and an imposed pattern of memory. Implicitly
and beneath the usual issues of interpretation there is a suggestion
which Foucault has not developed that there is a kind of memory that
can unite qualities of subjectivity with the broad record of exper-
ience. History corrupts the kind of reflection that might redeem us
by a special new "use of history that severs its connection with
memory, its metaphysical and anthropological model, a counter-
memory--a transformation of history into a totally different form of
time." 74 The form that time has taken for the usual historical
knowledge is vastly different from that of the memory of the unspeak-
able array of past experience which might confront the given order of
knowledge. In Foucault' s account, it remains just barely possible to
map the order of knowledge at the points where it captivates time and
experience, but to do so the map must be presented as it floats in the
boundaryless ocean of all possible reminiscence.
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Thus, whatever liberation may be obtained from within the power
that is represented in historical knowledge, it requires a confron-
tation with the "threshold" of the "historical archive" which limits
the possibilities of knowledge. 75 The possibilities of experience can
be sensed at the points where they are delimited, in the way that they
are by most historical understanding. m the search for these points
Foucault does not posit liberating capacities of historical tides that
would give birth to the 'new man' for history remains as corrupt as
memory. Instead he challenges that memory by offering the, "libera-
tion of man by presenting him with other origins than those in which
he prefers to see himself." 76 He confronts the wish, the promise and
the subjectivity of historical thought with the incongruous presence
of different pasts. It is unclear however, how we are to find these
liberating origins, how we are to confront the threshold of the limits
presented by historical understanding beyond sketching the dimensions
of its power, and of what material the threshold might be made beyond
words and an order of understanding. The display of an order of
knowledge and of the deployments of power that we find in Foucault'
s
analysis is crucial, but it may not be sufficient to the critique of
all that provides order, especially if we wish to "rediscover
ourselves" as he would like. Sadly, we do not know what sort of
reflection to pursue in his wake.
Foucault offers an extremely powerful analysis of the selectivity
of power that permeates experience, but we still do not know how it is
woven through, and have only some clues as to what experience is
contained there. If we wish to rediscover our 'selves,' then we need
to know how this selectivity works for individuals in the process of
their development so that we may connect what has been severed in our
understanding, and we must pursue this at a different level of
analysis than Foucault. We need to know how that selectivity works in
culture, and beyond patterns of knowledge, how it structures affective
emphasis upon certain themes and preoccupations that afflict a given
culture at a given time. What happens for example when sexuality, if
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not repressed, is augmented and transformed into a discourse of
sexuality and what kinds of recollection are then employed? How dopeople recall and discuss sexual acts, or the abstractions of sexual
relationships or select domination or violence as themes of obsession
within it? What is the content of our preferred self-images and how
much of it relies on those themes? The ways in which we prefer to
see ourselves and our origins, those preferences that Foucault wishe
to shatter, are not lodged only in an episteme, but in the themati
of recollection that are rooted in individual development as well.
Thus, if we could discern the particular modes of establishing a
preferred view of the past, we might use them as tools even to pass
the threshold of the historical "archive," to tap unspoken and
unspeakable experiences, and thus move beyond the sketch of its walls.
If there are patterns by which past experience is made familiar or
acceptable, heroes selected, symbols of identity found, then we must
penetrate through the language of their presentation and its claims to
truth, to the processes of their selection and to the content of the
experiences from which the selections are made to discover how we
really internalize and envision the ingredients of our understanding.
Habermas offers a remarkably rich portrayal of the social dynamic
of the loss and .genesis of meanings. On the basis of communication
and its preconditions of truthfulness, justification and trust, he
grounds criticism in a common experience which can be entered and
reconstructed to provide new meanings. Foucault on the other hand,
presents a formidable vision of the closure of discourse and its
connection to power and knowledge. In "theoretical schemata" he finds
a "group of relations that constitute a system of conceptual forma-
tion." These are implanted at a "preconceptual level" which cannot
be broken from within but only challenged at the limits where they
structure experience. Nevertheless, a link may be forged between them
in the analysis of language and experience.
While Habermas seeks to reclaim the interests of past experiences
by the freed principles of discourse and in an expanded dialectic of
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social evolution, Foucault finds similar aspects of past experience
hidden behind expressions and just beyond reach. The rudiments of
language do not appear to be so promising. His episteme contains a
"set of rules for arranging statements in series,
"
/y
or orderings of
"enunciative series." The closed enunciative field that Foucault
describes includes a "field of presence"~invol ving truthfulness,
exact description, and means of inclusion and exclusion; a "field of
concomitance" which refers to varied object domains and draws from
analogy for confirmation; and a "field of memory" or "statements that
are no longer accepted or discussed, which consequently no longer
define either a body of truth or a domain of validity, but in
reference to which relations of filtration, genesis, transformation,
continuity and historical discontinuity can be established."80
The "field of memory" here is outside of, and yet necessary to
validity, justification and legitimation. It touches a domain beneath
the rational basis of legitimacy and beneath the episteme
, and it
indicates that a prestructuration of experiences might occur there.
It emerges at the limits of analysis for both Foucault and Habermas.
The two accounts only allude to "a field of memory" -- or for
Habermas, to an "inherent reflexivity of language" — but they do not
emphasize that presence within a subjective experience of meaning as
it might be recalled in consistent ways, according to shared concep-
tualizations, or with 'thematic emphasis.' There is, so to speak, a
field of memory behind expressions that is most present to our
awareness in the special content of "I centered experiences" discussed
earlier. Yet it also contains associations, as in Foucault' s "field
of concomitance" in which the elements can be pictured or envisioned,
referred to with some deliberation in such a way that they include the
most impersonal sorts of common knowledge and a private record of
sensations and affectivity. Beyond this, of course, meaning is
established in rules of language, expectations of reciprocity and
truthfulness, structures, signs or other symbol izati on s which may be
discussed independently of memory, but even these ultimately become
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meaningful in conjunction with a field of memories. It is in this
field of memories as it entails that fluid human capacity which has
not been fully examined that "power" sets its limits and the fate of
"emancipatory interests" will be decided. The weight of the epi steme
falls upon memory, and liberation, or even a Universal Pragmatics
rests on a purified memory which may find new meaning in the further
reaches of recollected experience.
In summary we might ask of Foucault how "power" invokes what
particular "memory of pain" or generates a mythic memory of the "pure"
crime along with other memories to sustain itself? What selections
or delimitation of contents do we find in the restrictive memory of
historical knowledge? What makes up the "field of memory" in the
enunciative series which ground the " epi steme "? In short, how do
selective patterns of memory inform human interests and their
emergence in legitimations of power or emerge in an epistemic field of
power? Do the conservative guardians of power assume a particular
retrospective stand point which serves power, and if so, can critics
assume a different or broader reflective stance?
With Universal Pragmatics a penetrating mode of reflection
begins. When it runs up against Foucault' s image of power, discipline
and a technology of domination, however, it may need to become more
precise. Here, discipline is based upon more than arguable reasons
and it will take more than revived reasons and interests to prevail
against it. The broadened consideration of social evolution has begun
to reveal certain ingredients of morality and communication which
deserve to be included in critical debate, but in this vein the whole
chain of associated memories — the scars that become "character" in
Adorno's rendition -- must also be reconsidered with an awareness of
all that has made them. To return to dominations again and again in
criticism, to approach and reapproach the past with awareness of its
claims to truth and awareness of the epistemic pattern that it
impresses within memory may make the possibility of critical dialogue
a reality. To return with this awareness might reveal a series of
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selective mechanisms of apprehending the past so that a critical
debate does not degenerate into irreconcilable argument, but develops
a common and constantly renewed thematic critique of a kind which
seems difficult for Foucault to pursue and is just begun with
Habermas.
Critics remain preoccupied with systematic distortion, false
consciousness, reification, one-dimensionality and the freeze of
discourse-and rightly so. It seems that from LukScs to Habermas and
Foucault there is the discovery of obstacles to regaining and
reinterpreting experience. The obstacles appear at the level of an
ideology, that of a monopoly of one variety of reason, or a patterned
structure of understanding and language, but to these I wish to add a
footnote on the selective dynamics of memory. I want to ask how is an
ideological or a cultural image like a cliche and like a stereotype
and like a memory of fantasy? How does memory sort these out? What
selections are made in the monolithic cluster of associations that
make up nostalgia? From what sources and by what processes does a
pattern of prejudice emerge, a systematic distortion or an epi steme ?
And what sort of reflection can perceive them?
My speculative proposition is that the current obstacle to
critical understanding is not one-dimensionality, but rather there are
four-dimensional selections that bind identity. There are actively
recalled images with height and breadth which serve as symbols of
power and of the way things ought to be, in a facade of selected
components. There is a depth of emphasis here and there in the
facade, an affective weight within a string of associations, and a
means of locating the self within concepts of time and duration in
history or the day's events which is borne out as the facade is
recalled repeatedly. The provisional fixity of things in four
dimensions in their height or bredth, depth of emphasis and place in
time, is what makes a thing seem "reified." It is not rendered either
as something "thinglike" or "abstract" however, but it is both
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thinqlike and abstract as it is formulated in the selective associa-
tions of idea, affect, image, and time which allow it to be repeatedly
recalled in specific set proportions. Much is frozen in such memories
that criticism must still consider and as beings who possess them, our
constraints are reflected there as well.
The idea of a critical memory that might see into this will need
explaining, but for the moment I would suggest that we may return
again and again to an experience and make new discoveries with each
return. Unless we do this we may return only to confirm some fixed
version of the memory as it becomes a cliche to our own experience,
then memory only affirms an episteme or closes off the possiblities of
critical discourse. But to unravel the dynamics of the kinds of
memory in which we engage or might engage with the aim of strengthen-
ing the retrospective posture of critique, a different return to
experience must be instigated. Guidelines may be drawn from the
manner in which we already recall and make use of the past and how, as
we see in reflecting on the matter, memory lets down its rope to save
or to bind us. Epistemic patterns in society are not woven out of air
but from reflection upon the particulars of experience and in specific
modalities of conducting that reflection. The matter cannot be
resolved in a philosophical reconsideration of how we came to know
objects in the world, as it must confront the precise manner in which
we recall our own experiences and attribute importance to them.
Further, to confront selective memory in our own time is a
prerequisite to discovering it in any other, and to do this it seems
that we must reflect upon specific shared experiences -- the act or
fear of being assaulted, the evident lessons of the media and the like
— that come to mean something together for us. Within this rather
conscious aspect of memory there are themes that surface from time to
time in different phases of life and culture in a most stubborn and
obtrusive way, a style of sexuality here, a great war there, a musical
rhythm or a dread disease return to occupy the mind. These may come
to fill our thoughts like favorite objects that we hold up to the
73
light, just as there are other things that are within our grasp but
which we push away as if we could consciously repress them.
In this way I am concerned with what this memory inquiry can add
to the understanding of episteme
, power and a Universal Pragmatics- to
the loss and regeneration of social meanings and to the recreation of
morality. I believe that this approach may direct attention toward
specific and neglected themes that might be included in critical
debate, themes that reflect a collusion of rational lessons, affective
and epistemic patterns of identity. If we wish to improve our society
it can not be by adopting old models for a glorious transformation
wholesale. It can no longer be done by resurrecting the arguments of
the liberal values of the past against the current swing to the right
without amendment. The ability of the "new right" and of the current
administration to make selective use of the past to bolster itself and
its convictions can only be countered by a better use of the past,
more comprehensive, more detailed and more responsible. Too many
critics parade the banner of freedom in opposition to this, offering
empty images as alternatives. The concept of Freedom requires
reconstruction from within and in light of the pasts which fill it.
Political scientists cannot ignore the uses made of the past
either. They are of immediate and practical concern. Youth violence
has recently swept Europe and the Chief of Police of Bonn, Germany,
described the rioters who have been occupying abandoned buildings as
those who have a "no future philosophy," they have themselves adopted
the name "no future people."
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They do not represent a 1 Utopian
future' movement or a conservative return to a glorified past, and the
rebellion is markedly different from those of the 1960s. The
rebellion is more a reaction to the present, and its preeminent
feature seems to be a spontaneous expression of collective disgust.
The zombie-like expressions of "punk" in America, and its concern for
"devolution" may similarly express the wisened, cynical humor of a
painfully lost youth. The glazed eyes do not mimic death so much as
they imitate the dazed amnesiac who suffers from a loss of identity, a
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lost future and a lost past: they parody us. They know no different
past and can know no different future. Students of society had better
take note of this and recognize that the old diagnoses of what ails
this culture are no longer adequate. The content and meaning has gone
out of them too.
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CHAPTER II
MEMORY AND ORIENTATION
: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF SPACE TIME
WORK ANO LEISURE AS HISTORICALLY VARIABLE POLES OF MEMORY.'
We must learn very early in our lives to control our Emories
We must learn at least how to hold on image in mind and to visualize
space, to repeat images and give them continuity in time. We must
locate things in memory if we are to learn to speak of them and we
must be able to isolate them, and to eliminate other images and
sensations that distract from them. In the act of remembering we may
focus attention, illuminate things or keep them secret. Equally
memory allows things to become familiar and serves to dissipate the
disturbing presence of the unfamiliar the uncharted and the unknown.
In memory that is, we create order and familiarity, but paradoxically
those familiar images that we keep may be remembered precisely because
of their oddity and they are often marked quite deliberately with
incongruous or grotesque features, or are perceived to have grotesque-
ly exaggerated attributes which we select as a device to help us
recall them. We also find a place in memory for the things or
shadows of things that we find most threatening since we must also
keep them within ourselves. Something that is deeply at odds with our
experience may be rendered in rather comforting and familiar shades of
recollection. Yet a thing which seems so ordinary as to slip from
remembrance may be made strikingly unfamiliar in a way that aids our
memory, and the great treatises which have taught memory techniques
since their earliest appearance in the field of rhetoric have
generally prescribed the use of radical distinguishing marks in
imagery as a most useful aid to recall. 1 The faculty of memory seems
to operate on the border between familiarity and unf ami 1 i ari ty
,
between order and chaos, and indeed, it defines that border.
One afternoon I watched a small child collecting shells on a
beach with the most determined concentration, and after a while he
-81-
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washed them thoroughly and carefully arranged them in a box He
ZZ'T-AT d1StingUiShing ^ which he seemed mostPleased to identify, sorted them again and grouped them together not
according to their most obvious qualities but according to his' owndiscoveries, and then he covered them as if to conceal their secret
order. He would not show them to me when I asked; he would not reveal
the order he had given them. I wondered what he was doing and why he
looked so satisfied. Each shell seemed unique to him, self-contained
and yet completely evocative, though they did not serve as markers for
where they were found; they were not by any means the best of their
type or species; they could not be samples or examples in any ordinary
sense
- and when he finally revealed them to me I saw that there were
bits of glass mixed in among them. There was no apparent hierarchy of
size or shape in the child's arrangement - no typology as such. He
seemed unconcerned with kinds, and even when I indicated the
similarities of certain shells, he looked at me as if I had missed the
point. Rather, he seemed enchanted by the oddest markings among them,
the very things that the scientist might consider to be flaws, and
each mark seemed to be something special and meaningful, something
which the ancient rhetorician might have thought memorable. And yet
it seemed most important that they remain his secret.
Perhaps the child had not quite found the perfect order for his
collection but had given himself a mysterious orientation among its
elements. He had built a magic dragon, something known but very
private, a small temple of affects that satisfied him and secured the
sanctity of small things made familiar. I think this child had
performed a masterful orientation in memory. He had built a thing to
be kept secure and made exciting only in its secrecy, a completed
private world providing a little order against chaos even as it had
been selected at the edge of the incomprehensible ocean beyond. For a
moment he had arranged space and time and creation to his satisfac-
tion. With more originality than Crusoe, he had played at a kind of
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discipline, mimicked and bested the order of traditional lessons beingpressed upon him. y
Children may have always done this or something li ke it to create
continuities of experience for themselves, struggling valiantly, and
sadly in a way, to set up their own world and to learn the world of
others. Yet society presents the world of others in a far graver and
often less satisfying continuity. it offers long standing lessons
established concepts and traditions just as it teaches a proper order
for shells. Society can only mimic the comforting secrecy of children
as it builds real temples, fixed cosmologies or streams of familiar
images that kill the dragon in the end. The box of shells and the
traditional lessons of society have something in common however, and
though they may seem to be opposed to one another they are both' part
of a single process. The process is one of mapping experience, of
identifying and maintaining the continuity of its elements, and both
provide orientations in memory. Things must be made familiar. Images
must be repeated and signposts must be clearly marked in memory for
the child to function as a child or for society to function as
society, and in this the box of shells could not suffice for very
long. Private memory and tradition must both provide continuity, and
both contribute to the construction of powerfully necessary
orientations. Orientation in memory has to do with securing roots,
distinguishing places and objects while assigning importance to them,
securing things that are familiar and discussable, unfamiliar and
secretive. For the child or for society, there must be mnemonic
mappings which are imagi stical ly (or symbolically) secured. This must
occur as a developmental capacity in the first two years of life, as
an ongoing psychological principal, and as an ontological a priori in
the societal lessons of tradition, custom and practice. In many ways
the efforts of individual and society are joined together in a nexus
of memory and even where they seem most distinct they are drawn
together by integrations of memory that surreptitiously establish
orientation.
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in recallinq how Stendhal remembered his grandfather for exampleMaurice Halbwachs indicates that it was the adult Stendhal's inter! iin authors who were contemporaries of his grandfather that helped tofix the memory of him. Thoughts of his grandfather were not more
accurate for this reason but occupied a more important place in his
memory and in his orientations toward the past which therefore
simultaneously involved selectivity and affection, historical
awareness, a sense of literary tradition and personal experience 2
Hence, the continuity of images in mnemonic mapping provides the
latticework for anything we might call "identity", be it social
identity or psychological identity, but this lattice is dependent upon
the building and retention of certain concepts.
Concepts of place and dimension offer bearings in a kind of
mental topography (it is not a coincidence that Freud began with a
topographical model of the mind and that every philosophical consid-
eration of memory includes an account of conceptualized space).
Concepts of time offer order in the form of sequence and an ability to
designate 'priorities.' As well, in achieving concepts of space and
time, experience is marked and divided for recall and made ready to
apply in creations -- it is reconceptual ized in the record of its
genesis and with a sense of its malleability. 3 With concepts of space
and time we acquire conceptions of cause and genesis, and very early
in our lives we learn how we miqht influence them in our own arrange-
ment of memories. No matter how a world of objects might be philo-
sophically distinguished, it must be reconstituted reflexively with a
certain awareness that the recreations of memory are made against the
impulse to fantasize. In the differentiation of objects early in
life, in the learning of words and in productive activity thereafter
memory acquires a self-awareness of its own creativity and finally a
concept of how it is to proceed in various states of mind. Ultimate-
ly, concepts of space, time and creation become subject to determina-
tions about when and where it is appropriate to dwell on certain
thoughts, what images should be associated with them, in what sequence
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and proportion, when to throw out the box of shells or enter the
temple, as the concepts come to be of service to a broader social
orientation.
Therefore, the acquisition, change or loss of this mnemic back-
ground of meaning is a desperate matter for mnemonic orientation which
should be considered before the many 'vessels' that memory may find in
tradition, ceremony, the keeping of records, or in history. We must
suppose that the mapping that is involved in it is always changing and
always somewhat distinctive for each individual. Still, while that
orientation is personal it must also contain a common impulse to
achieve a degree of continuity that is shared and kept secure. For
example, a repetitive fantasy may acquire new components and charac-
ters in the course of a lifetime, but also a kind of comforting
stability. A tradition or custom may be coupled with new imagery and
change accordingly, but it must also remain quite intact. Similarly,
a change in the fundamental orienting concepts of time, space and
creation may alter the constellations of mnemonic orientation, but
these constellations resist alteration and are reluctantly responsive
to historical changes in popular understanding. Memory is historical
to the extent that it imposes guidelines upon the past that make it
coherent to the present, and such guidelines form effective and
lasting orientations only inasmuch as they are culturally appropri-
ate. Although one may certainly have personal memories without
apparent guidelines, that would not in itself be remembering meaning-
fully. Meaningful memory is in large measure a cultural orientation
fitting experience to prevailing social concepts and beliefs, and it
is driven to secure them, it contains an interest to unite them as it
were, by integrating the very aspects of meaning that might otherwise
be distinguished as ontological and psychological. Thus, memory does
not provide orientation in being an accurate reflection of reality per
se, but by establishing or accepting the scenarios in a script for
living, 6 albeit a script which is subject to personal and social
editing. It contains conceptual inclusions and exclusions that come
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to be settled as if they were predications for what is meaningful
The motifs and characters in such a script are delimited by the
concepts available to the writing. The scripts must be different for
those people who have never left the village and for those who travel
from place to place by camel, train or jet. Memory may be a mental
capacity but as it functions on behalf of orientation it is dependent
on developmental ly and historically available concepts to construct
its scripts just as any other creative capacity might be. Concepts
like those of space, time, creation, labor, family, god or totem must
be accepted as rather fixed elements in the script wherever memory
functions as an orienting art of familiarity. When memory is so well
directed, it seems to present a kind of unity that allows elements of
experience that are really disparate and disharmonious to be drawn
together. The unity is actually a "multiplicity" of relationships
which are kept in mind and, as Halbwachs suggests, which are rooted in
the many social milieus that intersect in life experience, 7 while at
the same time ideational distinctions which are taken for granted are
also fixed there. In the West, the milieus of family, professional
group, nationality, may appear to be harmonious and yet distinct. The
forces of economy, politics and personal psychology appear together
but are differentiated in distinctive mnemic associations. In this,
the shared and orienting aspects of memory are part of social reality
and not only an idealist reflection of it. Like the "subtext" that
Frederic Jameson declares to be part of literary works and cultural
objects, memory effects identity in its designational response to
common experiences, and like that subtext, it "brings into being that
very situation to which it is also, at one and the same time, a
reaction." In the experienced memory, as it is alive again in that
moment of imagination that strikes us in the present experience of
recalling it, the subject and the object of recollection are actively
linked, and the individual and society are immed i ately integrated even
in the very ways that they are conceptually distinguished. That is,
the distinctions made in memory orientations that allow an interior
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portrayal of experience and the place of the experiencing self are
provisional, and they are established in opposition to the condensa-
tion or unity that memory also tends to make of them.
There is nothing too remarkable about the claim that memory often
functions on behalf of orientation or that orientation to cultural
standards and the divisions of understanding cannot be achieved with-
out it. Yet if this is true then it follows that cultural standards
and even the terms of political power ought to be viewed as mnemonic
orientations as well. This is quite a different claim than to say
that social norms must be "internalized" since it does not refer to
principles which stand outside of individuals and are brought into
them on the model of learning a lesson. Theories of internalization
always seem to posit a distinction between the external and social,
and the internal and psychological, such that they must force a fit
between sociological concepts and psychological ones (concepts which
were designed to look at different things even when those things act
in concert). Rather, the point is that individuals themselves make
these connections at once in the exercise of their memories, in the
moment that memory is experienced. Things that are material, sensual
and conceptual take place there; things individual and social are
wedded in memory as a script for living is presented and repeated.
Private fantasies blend with more or less accurate records or experi-
ence and with grandiose images presented in the cultural media.
Images, symbols and words are directed toward each other or float
aimlessly and the careful distinctions of theory seem to melt away in
the experience of remembering. Not only are external things interna-
lized -- and internal things supposed or projected to be external
but there is always a complex integral point of view in memory which
has eyes facing inward and out. It has structure, but only as an ant
colony has structure with some pathways shifting day by day and others
seeming constant.
Therefore, any diagnosis of society and especially of the loss of
nings in society ought to reckon with historical changes withinmea
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mnemon ic orientations inasmuch as they can be determined. It is not
easy to sort out the shifing elements that belong to them, but it is
necessary if we are to give what is due to the complex guidance that
they exercise in daily experience. For that reason, in what follows Ipropose to briefly trace the changes in several concepts that are
essential to memory over a long span of the Western past and to showhow they indicate that there has been a broad transformation in
mnemonic orientation. In the next chapter, I propose to show how
applied uses of memory (memory techniques) have been dependent on such
concepts and have changed historically in accord with them. In the
chapters of Part II, I will examine a narrower field, first a
conservative view of tradition and of the contemporary Western loss
of tradition, and secondly the suggestion that there has been a
collapse to the present in modern conformity, "social amnesia" and
narcissism, that has been offered by various critics of American
society. My comments there will still need to be grounded more
systematically in the third part that follows.
Changes in Conceptuatl i zati on
;
Changes in Memory
Because memory accomplishes integrations at different levels of
meaning
,
and across different spans of time, I begin with an over-
simplification that is not very satisfying. We may speak of two axes
which intersect and define certain historical changes in the form and
substance of retrospective thought. Along one axis there are
orienting concepts changing over time, while a second axis represents
the timely uses of the capacity of memory as it conceives and retains
them. More simply one axis represents historical changes in certain
concepts that are fundamental to memory and the other, the changing
uses of memory which dictate the arrangement of those concepts.
Halbwachs used a similar analogy to demonstrate how currents of
collective thought blend into personal memory, but I have something
more historical in mind. 9
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I suggest this because there is no clearcut way to document the
historical shifts in a capacity like memory. There have been no
surveys taken over the ages to show how the uses of memory or the
interests taken up by it have changed. The record of writings and
publications which might reveal those changes are biased by
professional and commercial interests or merely because they are
writings. Still there are other ways to examine the problem. First
Of all it might be possible to display the different ways that memory
has been employed and the kinds of uses that have been made of it in
many different ways of viewing the past. One might sketch a number of
ways of using or viewing the past along one axis and look for patterns
in those uses over time. Here we might find storytellers and epic
poets and daydreamers, we might find books that contain records,
diaries, reports or 'news,' polemics or histories or theories of
history. We might find portrayals of certain events designed to shock
an audience into remembering, anecdotes or stories to teach lessons
and train memory, traditions, ceremonies, autobiographies and so on,
that each inform or activate memory or focus attention, and still the
most important patterns that seem to coalesce in private memory would
be the most elusive. To do this we would need an extraordinarily
complex typology of the kinds of retrospection and the only thread
that would seem to bind the elements along one axis would be some
general concern for the past, and at that, any past.
From such a vast record we might be able to locate and describe
what have been the predominant modes of retrospection in certain
historical periods. We might find that the traditional story is of
great importance in one place and time, the epic poem in another, the
historical work or the daily news in still another. With a leap, we
might barely be able to demonstrate that one people read or reflected
about a certain kind of past more than another, as we might find that
some kept diaries and others did not, that an age of individualism
brought on a certain kind of autobiography, and so on. Any historical
speculation on memory, or for that matter on the broad history of
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ideas, is likely to set out its elements in this way, and to some
degree it is unavoidable although it cannot be terribly accurate Atbest that sort of overview might reveal an apparent pattern of empha-
sis in memory which would not do justice to the complexities of mne
monic orientation. I might say for example, that many Americans read
only the daily news and consider the 'newsworthy' immediate past to be
the most important one. Or I might argue that Born Again Christians
disclaim a personal past, discard old diaries and cherish a reworked
biblical past as it is described by television preachers and the like.
But I could not demonstrate how this is an historically distinctive
phenomenon, if it is true, without showing how orientations toward the
past have been different in other times and places, and what essential
ingredients within them have shifted or have been transformed.
Alternatively, to trace the list of all possible uses of memory
might reveal its specialized uses in history by means of discussing
abstractly how it has changed as a 'capacity.' Memory, however, is
always the memory of something, and the capacity is always engaged
with its objects and must seem as varied as they. For this reason it
is not possible to consider a history of all possible views of the
past or a naked history of the faculty of memory itself, and we must
simultaneously consider the nature of the contents of memory and the
aspects of conceptualization which allow it to function as memory.
The axis upon a graph which describes changes in the capacity or use
of memory is incomplete without a second axis which presents changes
in the conceptualizations within it; especially those concepts which
are most generally necessary to its orienting function.
So we must begin by recognizing that the memory of things and
events require certain fundamental concepts that allow us to fix them
in our minds. There are several concepts which are crucial to
orientation, which designate content and capacities of memory
together, and which change or are different in different circum-
stances. Again, there are concepts of space and location (which may
be concerned with places of origin or notions of the dimension of
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things); concepts of time (which may yield notions of sequence or of
priority); concepts of creation (which may allow us to form sentences
or to build or to labor); or concepts of rest, exhaustion, fatigue or
leisure that pertain to the social awareness we have of creation. All
perform as poles in orientation which are different in different
circumstances. (Of course there are others which are more highly
focused: concepts of the family, of the body or of beauty, pleasure
or god or sexuality, but one cannot cover everything and it may be
more useful to select those which seem most basic, general and
essential to mnemonic orientation.)
I choose space, time and creation and within creation those
things to do with work and leisure for several reasons. Conceptions
of each seem to be the minimum requirement for a mnemonic function of
orientation. Each develops in memory and is also necessary to it and
together they seem to represent that polarity of thought turned to the
past which is most often given in other writings concerning memory.
Some mixture of them appears in nearly every discourse on the matter
from Aristotle to Halbwachs even though they may not explicitly refer
to a concept of creation or genesis. Nevertheless, concepts of space,
time and creation must each involve associations which reflect histor-
ical circumstances such that the axis of those changing elements may
be a kind of subindex to more general historical changes -- the rise
of the state, the advent of Christianity, capitalism, rationalism or
technical reason -- are each incribed in them and by the use of them.
Developmental ly, Piaget gives credence to this essential concep-
tual polarity of memory. Conceptualization of time, he says, unites
two cognitive areas, time is "necessary for duration," and it is
"necessary for order of succession," 10 and "child development is a
temporal orientation par excellence." 11 The development of a concept
of space is also essential, first as "egocentric spaces" which are
bodily oriented, then as object spaces. For Piaget, none of this is
innate but it must be "gradually and laboriously constructed." 12
Accordingly, there must be symbolisms of gesture and imitation, mental
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pictures or "interorized imitation," 13 which initiates memory as it is
necessary to a child praxis, 14 and to subsequent conceptions of
creative activity. Time and space are therefore principles of
creative acts, as they are principles of memory or mental representa-
tion. At once there is an activity in and retention of the temporal
world. As Wittgenstein put it,
We move among things, portray them, represent them. Bvportraying and representing them we touch them and are vetseparated from them. This connecting being-separated isshown not only in the spatial ity of our world, in the poss -bility of portrayal and of language, but also in tempo£ -
1
:
y\ u , imension in whicn we touch things is in itself
Lm^o^ t0 th1ngS and distance in itself M
We move within and touch the world from distances of time and space as
we creatively represent its elements in memory.
Further, the best techniques for improving the use of memory have
always reproduced these elements. As Francis Yates tells us, the
Greek word topoi (t6ttoi ), meaning place or spatial location is the
initial starting point for the historic teaching of memory skills.
"There can be no doubt that these topoi
,
used by persons with a
trained memory must be mnemonic loci
,
and it is indeed probable that
the very word 'topics' as used in dialectics arose though the places
of mnemonics. Topics are 'things' or subject matter of dialectic
which came to be known through the places in which they were stored
16[in memory]." In the teaching of memory skills time quickly follows
place such that the "movements of recollection follow the same order
as the original events" 17 as they were supposed to for Aristotle. For
him as well, conceptions of time and place were necessary to memory
since it "depends upon the potential existence of the stimulating
cause," and this is why "some use places for the purposes of recol-
ii 1
8
lectinq." Halbwachs also felt the need to reinstate the importance
of spatial framework for memory alongside a temporal one in face of
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Bergson, and Freud, in discussing the genesis of the superego
suggests that a "time-factor" linked to conscious subjective mem ry
. y also derive from n » But even as the mental dupl icatiTo,
Physical time may be important to the training and maturation of
memory it would be prudent to remember that mnemic time need notduplicate physical time exactly, or as Wittgenstein says "the
original time concept which is implied here [in remembrance] is
radically different from that of physical time." 2 ! Temporal and
spatial conceptualizations are cornerstones of memory, but they may
also be subject to their own variations.
For developmental theory, however, memory is to some degree
dependent on sensory experience with objects and it is integrally
bound with the creative act. A developed memory must be constructed
by the retention of more or less creative operations from infancy to
adulthood. There is something of a creation or a selective use of the
past in the structures of intelligence that Piaget discusses, and as
he says, "the present structure is a scheme which proceeds from other
schemes but which reacts on them by integrating with them." 22
Further, and since, as Marx has put it, the thing that distinguishes
architects from bees is that architects construct things first in
imagination, this imagining is partly a construct of memories in new
applications. Just as memory requires conceptions of time and space
it must include conceptions of things coming to be and changing in
their genesis. As this envisioning is not static it must interpolate
conceptions of process which derive in creative acts and prevailing
notions of creativity which are learned, whether they concern magic,
principles of physics, of play or of labor and leisure. Creative
acts, from the use of symbols and word representations to labor -- the
moving, molding, storing and retrieval of real and imagined objects --
are essential to the development of memory, as memory is essential to
them. Even the most habitual, traditional activities of labor which
writers like Oakeshott consider to be carried on without self-
consciousness involve some conceDtual ization and memory. 24 Thus, it
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seen* l,kely that changes in the ways that creative acts or labor areexecuted an conceptualized indicate changes in the use and nature
memory brought into play. There may be changes in the reflections
that occur dunng the process of work or creation, at rest fro, theprocess, or in the limits prescribed by the process - in the
Z"Tl ?
X
r
n' enCeS
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f «*.ust1on. ^tigue or leisure. In suchfmitudes of labor as Foucault might call them, common patterns are
imposed upon the body, the thoughts of the moment and reflections all
at once. Here, as he expresses it, "all are subject to time, to toil
to weariness, and, in the last resort, to death itself." 25 At the
very least, the historical orientations of memory like developmental
ones take place among poles of time, space and location, labor and
creatnon and are subject to the historical limitations of knowledge
and practice regarding each.
Still it may not be clear what is meant by saying that memory is
a capacity and that it changes historically. Human faculties seem at
first glance to stay the same and merely to be directed toward
changing objects as time progresses. Especially where memory appears
to be dumb, passive and like a sensual function which is not creative
at all, it would seem that it is simply a given human capacity which
has persisted through time. But, as its objects change over time and
the conceptual poles by which it operates are altered along with its
use, the function of memory changes and it is different as a capacity
just as it may also be different for the infant and the adult. Memory
is a faculty like the senses are faculties, but it is even more
responsive to circumstances than the senses. Its timely objects have
moved within the perceiving faculty completely, it 'sees' by them and
must imitate where the senses seem only to respond.
In one way, to be sure, even the senses may be considered to be
historically responsive as they are engaged in the particular creative
operations of a mode of production. For Marx they would reach out to
objects in the confirmation of " human reality " 26 if only they could be
freed of the historical limitation and alienation that occurs with
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private property. Just as the senses are bound within their histori-
cal condition they might be unbound so that, in his example,
taa^%
h
oc^T
eT^at eye when its object has become anuman, s ial object, created by man an d desti ned for himT^senses^have, therefore, become directly t^lTJsl
But even if the senses are not capable of such extreme historical
transcendence, they emerge historically in a continuous stream of
subjugations as Foucault has indicated. He suggests that, "the eye
was not always intended for contemplation..." it "initially responded
to the requirements of hunting and warfare." 28 Elsewhere he suggests
that there is a "political economy of the body" revealing both the
effects of historical existence and its responsiveness to the
influences of power/ The eye and its prosthetic devices are attuned
to power and employed as faculties of power, for example, as a tool of
discipline in the observation of prisoners. 30 The eye itself, its
movements, its possible afflictions, as well as its perceptions are
shaped in such circumstances. The capacity of seeing, like hearing,
tasting, touching or observing, thinking or remembering, cannot be
entirely separated from its use or from perception, and if it is not
'prevented' from some greater historical fulfillment as it was for
Marx it is no less 'historical.'
Despite the vast number of modern psychological studies which
seek to discover the accuracy, duration, and limits of memory,
remembering, like seeing, is not merely a physiological capacity. It
is an activity of mind and sense and even more strikingly than any
sense it cannot be isolated from its highly social objects. The
"objects" of memory are explicitly mental ones, and even if they were
once sensed directly, there is someting selective and interpretive in
their recall. As a capacity, memory forms a nexus among things
physiological, individual and social and operates a dual principle of
being a capacity itself and also being concepts of things. Memory is
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a re-cognition" as Wittgenstein puts it, which is the "possibility
of being-able-to-know that sorting is as it 1./31 and as such jt ma
integrate all sorts of knowledge. Therefore m«nory changes as a
capacity and in many respects it is the shape and contour oflts
content like a sensation is the amalgam of certain senses, only memory
has no "senses" outside of its sensations and is only limited by its
internal ob.iects and its fluid arrangements for reproducing them
where the senses are limited in their encounters with certain external
objects.
Ernest Schachtel treats memory as a sense, but he indicates that
its development is distinct from that of the senses as it acquires an
expressly social function, both ontogenetical ly and phyl ogenetical ly
.
He argues that unlike other senses and perceptions which in some way
bear an "immediate relation to the situation experienced, the object
perceived... memory is distant from it in time and space... Memory is
a distance sense, as it were." 32 As opposed to our experience of the
"proximity senses" of smell, taste and touch, then, we should notice
that a more complex reduction of experience takes place in memory,
"...The experience is always fuller and richer than the articulate
formula by which we try to be aware of it or to receive it. As time
passes this formula comes to replace more and more the original
experience and, in addition, to become itself increasingly flat and
conventionalized. Memory in other words, is even more governed by
conventional patterns than are perception and experience." 33
In this way, for Schachtel, "the processes of memory" may
substitute a conventional cliche" for an actual experience. In
individual development one acquires a "conventionalized adult
memory" dependent upon a specialized amnesia that delimits the
memory of an earlier period in life when other and more immediate
senses predominated. Thus the extraordinary power of the proximity
senses in infancy, the coprophilic desires of smell, excitations of
taste and touch which Freud has described, are replaced in development
by the more conventionalized and controlling "d i stance " sense of
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memory. The immediacy and "newness" of the senses is in this way
supplanted or differently reproduced by "familiarity and recognition"
1
a
,
amnesia of childhood, as it is presented in suitable memory
vessels or schemata" which soon incorporate the "biases emphase
and taboos" of adult society 35 Tn thic
s
. i this way memory contains the
senses and gains primacy oyer them, and Schachtel posits that this
occurs phylogenetically as well as in development. He suggests that
the world historical ascendency of memory is a significant part of the
ascendency of consciousness which distinguishes modern humanity fromits furthest ancestors. 36 Memory allows and partakes in conceptuali-
zations which differ from immediate sensual orientation and it plays a
part in the containment of the senses on behalf of cultural
domination. The very presence of memory is a prelude and a necessary
condition of later repressions.
In this way, memory is a capacity like a sense and having to do
with the senses, but it does not operate like they do. Past exper-
ience is its object and it is distant from that object in time, in
space and as the mind confers priorities within it. A remembered
thing may seem remote or long gone or irrelevant, or it may seem
distant, just as in the moment before we recall something we may have
an inkling that we will not be able to recall it very well as if it
had already been consigned to a far away past. This distance allows
memory to be a conferring sense which is generally obliged to
established and societal conceptualizations. As in the relationship
between perception and the eye, that distance allows a conferring of
order. Buildings seen from a distant height might better be perceived
in their rows and can be grouped mapped and ordered in perception.
Past experiences conceived from a mnemic distance may likewise be
subjected more easily to order, and must be ordered somehow if they
are to be recalled and not only to drift in and out of awareness.
Memory can repeat and represent images, scenes and experiences. It
censors and focuses and if it resides between order and chaos, like
perceptions, it also resides between sense, thought and convention.
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It
1 like the human eye turned toward the past in the way that
oucault describes that organ. "The eye is a mirror and a lamp- itdischarges its light into the world around it, while in a moment thatis not necessarily contradictory it precipitates this same light inthe transparency of its well." 37 Here, and this must be stressed
memory is always and busily conferring emphasis. While certain
experiences have been repressed, others are merely kept at bay
shunned or given the quality of unf ami 1 i ari ty as if they were
perceived at a distance. Other experiences are given center stage
are repeated and even decorated as they overshadow those uncomfortable
reminiscences which are kept at a distance without necessarily being
repressed. In these images, certain repetitive themes are allowed
while others are disallowed and recede from view, and memory functions
to screen the priorities of comforting and disturbing themes, to
confer 'difference' and 'familiarity.'
As it is like a sense, memory would seem to be no more histori-
cally changing than the senses, but as it is linked to thought and
conceptualization and is like perception, it seems as changeable as
concepts are in the history of ideas. As a conferring sense memory is
both conventional and creative, changing and stable. For this reason
memory has been described for centuries in different metaphors that
reflect the creative vehicles of their own time. It may seem passive
and like a "wax tablet" on which inscriptions are made, or memory may
"paint" images or construct a "visual architecture" of past experi-
ences, it is like a tape recorder or the function of a computer. 38
Memory is creative and selective about its creations but it also
follows rules of creation which are currently available such that the
metaphors used in describing it become instructive for its use.
On the creative side, we should add that memory is connected to
imagination but imagination that is subjected more or less to social
traininq. Children must develop a capacity of "reversibility" in the
development of their intelligence which is capable of detours and
returns as Piaget tells us. With the development of a capacity that
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retains and recalls images we might say that children must soon beable to imagine the backs of things even if they have not been seenWhen as adults we see a painting of trees and men, as Wittgenstein
offers the example, we - re'
-cognize the painted men as men the
painted trees as trees" and not as images which are merely compa'rable
to men and trees. Thus, memory portrays again a house that we have
seen in passing as a house, and secures it as a familiar object of
sensual and spatial dimensions. Its familiarity is linked through
aSS°Ciat10nS t0 its use as we HSiine it. Imagination takes the form
of knowledge and tells us that the facade of the house that we
visualize is probably a family dwelling which would not extend further
out of our view than others of its kind; it does not conceal a hidden
catacomb of rooms beneath it, and our memory of it is assured (though
not made positive) by such imaginary expectations, ("Just as re-mem-
brance shows me the same thing," says Wittgenstein, "a fulfilled
expectation also shows me the same thing.") 41
Memory is linked to experience, understanding and creative
expectations and imagination, and because of memory these elements are
never completely separable. Memory locates things in time and place
and orients us among them with the assistance of a trained imagination
which knows what to expect and which seeks out familiarity and
continuity. Social orientations are achieved in such a process. As
J.G.A. Pocock suggests, "societies exist in time and conserve images
of themselves as continuously so existing. It follows that the
consciousness of time acquired by the individual as a social animal is
in large measure consciousness of his society's continuity ,.." 42 it
follows also that a trained imagination working through memory
participates in the continuity of things familiar and of the 'society'
it takes to be its own.
There is still another way to consider how memory is social and
is historically attuned to circumstances, and this is a speculation on
phyloqenesis. Here for Schachtel , in its primordial origins, memory
appears to have emerged with consciousness against the immediate
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sensory and more arbitrary life of our distant ancestors. Lately
geneological, anthropological and evolutionary theory tends to
designate the emergence of language, or the "signification of signs"
as the break with that sort of prehistory. As Foucault puts it "It
is the man-made sign that draws the dividing line between man and
animal, that transforms imagination into voluntary memory, spontaneous
attention into reflection and instinct into rational knowledge." 43
Such theories indicate that the things that we call human and social
must have had language as their prerequisite. Habermas has also
attempted to find an order in this development and he speculates that
a dual evolutionary occurrence preceded a phase in which lanquage
emerged. There must have been, and his evidence indicates, an
adaptive "social evolution," coupled with the evolution of the hominid
brain at the threshold of homo sapien life. 44 Here language began to
emerge, but it is not until the development of a "familial principle
of orqanization" and a concept of "social labor" that we may speak of
a specifically human mode of life. 45 In the course of several million
years, he suqqests, the economy of the hunt is supplemented by a
familial social structure and by a "system of social norms" that
presupposed lanquaqe. 46
For Habermas an explicitly human system of social norms
presupposed lanquaqe and labor, but, we may add, it must also have
presupposed a versatile memory. As Freud has said, "always, the work
of the function of speech, brinqs material in the eqo into a firm
connection with mnemonic residues of visual but more particularly of
auditory perceptions." 47 The signification of signs in language then,
requires the retention of images. Though animals may retain images,
human beings capable of speech make signs of them which have order,
meaning and durability, and this must be crucial to a system of social
norms. In a familial and communicative phase of social evolution we
would find the evolution of myriad human relationships. Here there
must have been increasinqly complex relations between different
peoples and qroup interactions that endured by established signs in
101
specific expressions and in unspoken mnemic patterns to engender
communication, cooperation and hierarchy.
Thus, what distinguishes human society from the animals or itsown predecessors is indeed its organization of la bor, language
consciousness, etc., but it is also its capacity to remember as it is
engendered in the continuity of complex relationships. So too thebirth of the prorn^e or of obJ_igation is a necessary social applica-
tion of memory in the development of fluid human relationships. Some
form of instructive memory must have existed before this as instinct
does for animals, but it must have assumed (or become) the burden of
obligation once there were divisions of labor and the differentiation
of responsibilities that it entails. Only by a new application of
memory could routines be established with any deliberation that would
elevate them beyond instinct and habit. Thus, a system of social
norms presupposes language and also mnemonically structured obliga-
tions. For the family to become an economic and sexual authority,
there must be a kind of recollection which associates faces, tasks!
locations, time, skills and finally 'debts' or obligations and' renders
them memorable and familiar. And it must be able to discard or forget
that which is unfamiliar, painful or threatening to that order. If
humanity is conscious, tool
-making, linguistic and the like, it also
keeps different kinds of records of itself. The first and most
persistent form of the social self-record is the memory that keeps
images and signs for constructive and reproductive continuity, for
order against chaos, against starvation and the spectre of death.
Perhaps this is one reason why tribal elders, or the scribes of
ancient Egypt were such important personages and their memories or
inscriptions tended to surround the significant rituals of birth and
death. Perhaps they preserved mnemonic orientation amidst something
more than shells.
The earliest of 'contractual' relationships involving debtor and
creditor as Neitzsche speculated, involved a distinctive sort of
memory: "It was here that promi ses were made; it was here that memory
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had to be made for those who promised; it is here one suspects thatwe shall find a great deal of severity, cruelty and
111;:: r/°rmUlae """«— '"tine. and the pressin
diStan
" ° f ^ «« -oryschemata. As psychoanalysis reveals again and again,*9 routinized
^ory and repetitious fantasies 50 dampen the affect of origin^
experiences. Perhaps this ability to formulate casing repetitions is
at the phy ogenetic root of system of justice and political power and
ve of the,r formalized, selective recollection of precedents
Perhaps this is a sub-function of psychological repression which has1-edi.t. social bearing.
,t is possible that the social development
of the capacity of memory as a distance sense lies near the root of
what Nietzsche calls a "pathos of distance" 51 which set apart his
myth,cal Nobility in that manner that it assumed the right to rule for
itself and originated the distinction between "good and bad." When
Freud and others say pessimistically that "right is the might of the
community" it is might that is exercized at a distance and it is a
power which seems to look back from afar to claim its jurisdiction in
the haughty attitude with which memory sees old passions as dimmed
now remote and cleansed. It is abstract right because its grounds are
not immediate bodily superiority, but the annexed weight of all
superiorities in the mnemonically secured patterns of living.
In summary, memory is a developmental and individual capacity
as well as a historical one where it performs a function of orienta-
tion. It does this by defining certain relationships between the
senses and the mind, the individual and the social and by the use of
conceptualizations of space, location, time, priority, genesis,
creation and labor. It receives and confers order, distance and
continuity and uses imagination even as it is tuned to conventions.
Memory enables language and obligation. Memory is a necessary
function for other functions that we call human and social as it must
preceed them and be refined by them, and consequently the order that
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is learned or reproduced in memory is a vital ingredient of power
obligation and social continuity in changing forms.
Space and Origins
The creative aspect of memory that assigns or repeats the
distances in things, cognizes the familiar and locates images among
other images, has undergone historical change just as those images
themselves have changed significantly. Some aspects of the capacity
of memory appear to be universal and unchanged over time and yet this
capacity, more than those of the immediate senses is a creature of its
objects as well and of the concepts generally applied to those
objects. Thus, when we say that memory is "creative," it should not
immediately be confused with "abstract" thought. Where memory
reproduces or assigns spatial dimensions it is first in correspondence
with actual places, objects and localities where experiences have
taken place. In this way it operates within and continually generates
a spatial framework and it is not, to begin with, generating abstract
geometric spaces or stark images and highly condensed symbols for
space. Rather, it reflects actual things and places like the shells
or the temple, and it resonates with impressions associated to them
and with reference to the locus of original encounters. Purely
abstract conceptions of space should not, on this account, be taken as
a historical a priori to ideas or memory, and even though there have
been geometers for thousands of years, the popular conceptualization
of abstract space is a relatively recent achievement which now plays
back into memory and its visualization of things in space.
In an important way, memory is a topographical affair, and even
beyond the spatial conceptions which Piaget and others have stressed
it provides a kind of map. The geographer Robert Sack is inclined to
emphasize this aspect of development where at first, as he says, there
is "a simple topological conception where the child is aware of little
more than his own presence, then in terms of more complex topological
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schema." The uses of adult memory have followed a similar path over
time From the classical period to the present, memory games and the
techniques of the "memory arts" have depended upon continued associa-
tions to locations in a spatial i zation of images. 54 An imaginary
chart or figure would assist in fixing images, a sequence of rooms in
an imaginary building helped to locate an order of names for the
mnemismatist or for a poet reciting to an audience. This, however is
more than a device that was employed as techniques of memorization
were refined, or a phase in individual development to be achieved
More generally, and within the envisioning power of memory the
conceptualization of things in space has been tightly tied to
particular places and locations which are oriented topographically or
within an imagistic cosmology. These mental locations, whether they
reflect the home of one's origins, futuristic structures or symbols
for structures, have bearing on identity as they are continually
repeated and shared and as they are implicit to communication whether
or not they are generally articulated.
Most forcefully such conceptions of space seem to be comprised of
experiential origins or to concern themselves with initial paradig-
matic scenes that form long lasting settings into which later images
may be added. Familiar kinds of buildings and arrangements of
objects color the analoques that are brought to bear in consciousness
qenerally. The "genetic" explanations of psychoanalysis for example
have made much of the persi stance of initial occurances and the force
that they exert in later experience, while Erickson, for one, believed
that it had made too much of such an "origi nol ogy . " He refers
criticially, to a psychoanalytic "habit of thinking which reduced
every human situation to an analogy with an earlier one and most of
all to that earliest..." 55 But perhaps psychoanalysis has done this
because memory does thrive upon origins to a significant degree and
depends upon, if it is not wholly determined by original scenes and
locations that provide settings for later "human situations." Perhaps
it is also the case that the presence of certain original scenes, or
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even of familiar spatial analogues of long standing, once played agreater part in the mental life of groups.
As I have argued in the use of the phrase, 'integrity of past
experiences,' the original setting of experience continues to havedecisive impact even if the issue is confused, as it was for Freud by
the realization that original scenes can be imaginary in the form' ofthe urphantasien," which are primal or original fantasies. 56 The
very fantasy-like quality which charges the original locus of
experience may contribute to its later impact for the individual For
the group as well, the shared affect attached to an original locus of
experience carries special significance, in that way, as Halbwachs
puts it, "Each aspect, each detail, of this place has a meaning
intelligent only to members of the group for each portion of its space
corresponds to different aspects of the structure and life of their
society, at least of what is most stable in it." 57 The actual place
of origin is hence more than evocative and inspirational to memory as
it is necessary to the stability that maintains identity and is
shared. There is more to "atmosphere" - and especially more to the
atmospheres of the locations that we cherish and that provide comfort
and guidance in our daily lives - than just a series of mysterious
impressions. In memory, then, there are linkages between the social
space of origins and more abstract conceptualizations of space itself
which are also subject to historical and circumstantial variation.
Being aware of this, Robert Sack attempts to demonstrate how
spatial conceptualization has altered over time and in response to
societal transformations. For him there were once primitive concep-
tions of social space which were inextricably bound to the locations
of life experience and tradition, to the lands occupied, the dwellings
constructed and the beliefs with which they were embued by their
inhabitants. These were ultimately ruptured by the abstraction of
principles for living in increasingly complex societies, the need, for
example, to reconcile economic inequalities or to rationalize other
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social differences which in turn generated more abstract conceptions
of society, of social, and even of 'geometrical' space itself He
argues that primitive notions of place and spatial ity were bound
together in immediate association to the community, its localities
past events that happened there and ancestors who lived there He
guotes Strehlow for example, who describes the Northern Aranda
aborigine of Australia as one who,
...clings to his native soil with every fibre of his being
eve" ] ce
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^e handiwork of ancestors from whom hehimself has descended. He sees recorded in the surroundinglandscape the ancient story of the lives and deeds of theimmortal beinqs whom he reveres.
. .[58]
Though this is second hand and seems somewhat romantic, Sack is
not attempting to revive some pristine and wonderful vision of the
"primitive" conceptualizations. Rather he is attempting to display a
difference in the way that space is conceived and how it is linked to
origins and places. A landscape that held specific orienting meanings
was vastly different from a view that, "looks just like the postcard,"
utterly different from "scenery" as it might be presented and held in
the contemporary mind of the beholder. Sack suqgests that modern
Western statements like, "what if the social order were altered so
that land were held differently," or "what if the village were
redesigned, placing this here rather than there, making that rectan-
gular rather than circular, so that certain goals will be more easily
attained," are simply unthinkable in primitive conceptualizations of
space. "Society and place," he says, "were so closely interrelated
that for the primitive to indulge in speculation about society else-
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where or about the society having a different spatial configuration
would be like severing the roots from the plant "60
Although this claim may not stand as an anthropological univer-
sal it finds confirmation in the extraordinary suffering and
emotional devastation which has accompanied the physical dislocation
of such societies where they have derived meaning and vital orienta-
tion from places of origin. Similarly, with the birth of the
political state, the aggregates of power and of the locations and
spaces over which it presided were altered significantly to affect
orienting conceptualizations. The state, as Sack indicates, moves
boundaries, assimilates peoples and crosses cultures and rivers until
is is no longer a "place" but a power in the " abstract ." The fomer
conceptions of space, inasmuch as they were rooted to locations and to
ancestral and community associations within specific places are
disrupted, and the abstract political power of the state embodies an
abstracted conception of social space. There is a marked difference
between the notion that this is my place, my home and my birth right
beyond which lie mysterious lands, and the view that I am a citizen of
this country which borders on the next. Thus, the compelling mnemic
associations to concrete places within concepts of space acquire a
different relevance within the political power of states where they
may only persist as an archaic cultural residue among spaces now
conceived in a wholly different manner.
In this way the abstraction that comes about with the rise of the
political state has repercussions for the spatial aspects of thought
and their linkage to places. That is, the roots of orienting concep-
tions of spatiality itself in the places of origin, birth and ances-
try, have been slowly if never completely severed, and eventually they
have been supplanted by the practical concerns of state power and the
imagery of social planning. As Sack describes this process it sounds
a bit like a conceptual footnote to the thesis of reifi cation, but the
emphasis and time frame are different. With reification there is
supposed to be a shift in consciousness from qualitative to quantative
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thinking attuned to industrial demands for efficiency which fragments
thought. Sack is addressing an earlier conceptual shift, however
which is .ore of a reversal to abstraction overall than a fragment^
tion by the particular abstractions of the capitalist productive
process. Here concepts of space are said to have changed as a "social
definition of territory" which was once rich in waning, was trans-formed into a conscious and "abstract,"
"territorial definition of
society." Perhaps this is why some of our more culturally bound
social thinkers were once so preoccupied with, and yet so poorly
equipped to explain the very distinct stages in what they called a
territorial imperative." 62 The shift that Sack describes took a
very long time in the course of society, several thousand years by his
reckoning, and it took as long to link abstract state power to
abstract concepts of space for the bulk of such populations. Indeed
people still carry with them a dual memory of origins, of traditional
or ancestral places, and of a knowledge of the ephemeral boundaries of
their political states. Nevertheless, memory had changed when its
polarity in space and location was altered in this way, and when
abstract principles of power transgress upon the places of origin, it
distances the memory of them until they may be forgotten altogether.
To a significant degree state power depends upon uprooting mnemonic
origins in this way, and, against odds, it has often been successful.
Indeed, this kind of program for state power was made explicit in
theory as early as Plato. As Sack notes, he explicitly urged that the
roots of social cohesion which are associated with tradition and
traditional places be replaced by a myth of origins in order to secure
the loyalty of the people. Plato says that he would like,
... in other words to utter the audacious fiction, which I
propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then
to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be
told that their youth was a dream and the education and
training they received from us an appearance only; in real-
ity during all that time they were being formed in the
earth... they are bound to advise for her good, and to
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defend her against attacks.
. ."[63]
The places and associations of the past are to be replaced by the myth
of the mother earth as it allows the philosopher-king to depict and
create a new "reality." One must wonder where Plato's idea originated
and if it was not already well established in the influence of state
power, ns abstractions and its intrusion upon earlier orientations of
memory on behalf of nationalism or allegiance to the city-state.
Still, it is not until the emergence of capitalism, the mobility
of its labor and mass techniques of education that the state regularly
began to seize upon such myths as a self-conscious means of securing
its power. And later of course, the whole idea of a social contract
or of a "state of nature" may be viewed as an attempt to create a
mythical place of origins to justify a new kind of state power along
with its abstract principles. If myths of the old ancestral origin
were fixed to places in the peculiar spatial orientations of the
community, eventually the actual place of origins would not matter in
the same way for the myths that were created to justify state power.
The mythic foundations of that power came to be distinguished, and
sometimes rather crudely, like the less calculated contrivance of
origin within the religious and other cosmologies that also do not
have fixed borders and localities.
The state, however, could not succeed completely or for very long
with Plato's program for the simple reason that people continue to
devise numerous means of preserving their own orientations that are
generally resistant to new myths of origin. Conceptions of space and
of the important things that fill that space may have been uprooted
from original places of origin, but people create their own replace-
ments for this, they rapidly restore a vestige of old imagery within
new orientations and they accept the new insofar as they can locate it
with the old. Conflicts arise between old images and localities and
the effort to uproot them, so that still in Ireland for example, the
tearful memory of the "land where my fathers fought" and the
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locates where the, died, is represented in the vividiy paintedi-nagery which is paraded on piacards to co^orate roots of identitythat s and at odds with state power and its abstract demands for unity
under law. y
No less than the state, Christianity developed elaborate topo-
graphical designs for heaven, earth and hell, but within its various
maps of the cosmos it had to keep a semblance of traditional imagery
of the biblical localities common to Judaism since its object was to
instill a kind of belief that would be transcendent but not
abstract.' It had to create orienting memories in cosmological loca-
tions that corresponded to those of an earlier view which still reso-
nated in the minds of its converts. Only in this way was Christianity
able to remain an abstract power in its own right capable of crossing
or superseding the physical boundaries of states. In its time it did
not need to disrupt a human affinity for localities as the state had
done, but to build out from it - to offer an order of the universe
over and beneath it. Yates offers abundant evidence that the monks
who mapped the Christian order of the universe and produced elaborate
charts of its localities were quite well aware of their importance to
memory and explicitly as a memory device that could serve as a vessel
for traditional imagery. 64 Thus, and while the association of tradi-
tional lessons to specific places had been disrupted in the graphic
imagery of the church, certain memories were also preserved in it, a
duplication of moral rules, the flavor, attire, and even the artistry
of Christian origins was affixed in those new designs.
Something certainly changed in this series of efforts. As
Oakeshott has argued, the original early Christianity, "was a way of
living distinguished in its place and time by the absence from it of a
formulated moral ideal; and it was a way of living, departure from
which alone involved the penalty of exclusion from the community." 65
Although we may question this interpretation of Christian origins,
there is something more to Oakeshott 's characterization here. Under
the pressure from an "alienated intellectual world" lasting two
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centuries, he claims, Christianity had to translate its teachings to
make them abstract, no longer a lived morality, but a creed, and yet
some of the original "way of life" still survived. 66 Despite this
however, the same conceptual shift to abstraction has a rather more
pressing feature for Sack. Under the sway of feudalism, he argues
Christianity had nearly leapt to the sky, to new places as it were'
and a new locus for memory in a City of God. Christianity as Sack
puts it became "a-spatial" and the embellished crosses and priestly
robes preserve as well as change a tradition of specific imagery and
lessons until they are replaced by business suits and neon crosses.
If Christianity remains an abstract power today, pockets of its
origins are still recalled in the physical locus of the church, in the
ceremonial remembrance of an abstract cosmos filled with its special
imagery and lessons. The road to abstraction appears to be a long one
and the traveler upon it seems dedicated to set down roots in the
places along the way. Conceptions of space, no matter how abstract
and geometrical they seem to have become have not severed all contact
with places and origins. Abstractions proceed but memory replenishes
and rediscovers places for them in changing patterns, patterns which
in turn are less connected to actual places of origin and slowly
become more "abstract" in a fundamental sense.
It seems that a history of concepts of space on one axis has been
attended by a change in the manner of orientation in memory and a
change in the contents and loci of what is recalled. Some features of
the capacity of memory remain constant while they also yield to
changes in the concepts on which they depend and which also derive in
the alteration of societal arrangements. The change bespeaks a new
comprehension of society itself and new mechanisms for the trans-
mission of social lessons. "In early civilizations," as Habermas says,
the ruling families justified themselves with the help of
myths of origin.
. . With the imperial development of
ancient civilizations the need for legitimation grew; now
not only the person of the ruler had to be justified, but a
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took the place of narratives. [67] arguments
The mneniic referents for these arguments had to entail increasingly
abstract conceptions of space severed from places of origin.
I do not by any means wish to suggest that the emergence of
abstract political and religious power is the only turning point in
the abstraction of concepts of space as they apply to memory. it is
only that with these developments there is a pressing societal need to
envision abstract, and even geometric space which also responded to
imperatives within physics, philosophy, art and elsewhere. Space had
to be concieved in a different, more general izable imagery and could
less easily make reference to a community locus of origins once it had
been disrupted or superseded. Of course the advent of capitalist
industry, urbanism and the popularization of science accomplished as
much, or more in this regard. Abstract labor, for example, is not
only a Marxian principle of the analysis of capitalist relations, but
in a peculiar way it is a facet of the self-understanding of people
engaged in them. The increasing separation of the activities of work,
home life and religion in time and place must have altered conceptions
of space and time considerably.
The presence of timepieces, timed work, printed material,
cartography, architectural innovations, and the introduction of
perspective in art all indicate complex changes in conceptualization
and memory. But by contrast to other modes of life and thought they
give credence to Sack's claim that "primitive society" has no need of
the same abstractions, no need for example to have an abstract love of
l_ove, only of a person -- no need for an institutional enemy, only an
individual one -- no need to conceive the individual as ooposed to the
CO
abstract society. In such cases, "The society derives its meaning
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fro. place, the place is defined in tenns of social relationships, andthe individuals in the society are not alienated from the land " 69
Though such a claim may be too broad, it is likely to contain some
truth, and today we may find that it is confirmed as our jumbled
spaces must also be recalled in ever greater abstractions.
Work and Leisure
It may now be argued that the charges in conceptions of space at
the same time involved changes in the conceptions of the processes of
work and creation. The abstract conceptualization of things in space
has its roots in the altered locus of community origins as well as in
the imperatives of industrial technology and scientific knowledge.
Now, the combination of these elements contributed to an imagery of
things in space having impact upon each other and a manner of
conceptualizing that is essential to a "physics of causality." With
this development, memory, abstract as it had become, could be applied
more readily to creative processes .and may be shaped by them in turn.
Thus, in modern Western society as Sack argues, the notion of
causality assumes a peculiar importance which unites science, social
science and a public world view. In the modern society he argues,
there is a conflation of the physical principles of "action by
contact," and "conservation of energy" that is wedded to the abstrac-
tion of the conception of space. 70
Increasingly, and even for the general public, there are notions
of objects in motion, energy, space and time which intersect in what
is primarily a scientific view of causality. Indeed, the search for
the causal origins of events, as for example of the cholera epidemics
of the late nineteenth century, was in progress everywhere, in
physics, medicine and the practical concerns of industry. Particu-
larly at that time, there seems to have been a dramatic proliferation
of conscious applications of physical principles of causality to the
problems of the social world. As Foucault has pointed out so
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frequently, the human body was subjected to medical and disciplinary
strategies of treatment which were decidedly a "physics of power " 71
Thus, an abstract scientific conception of things in space, having
cause and effect in fixed quanta of energy is embedded in applied and
public conceptions of society itself. The spatial referents for
memories and the images held in them had to accomodate this most
particular set of abstractions as it had found a place in medical-
psychological assessments of human beings, in physics and even in
theology. Yet more broadly, the same abstractions became part of the
self-conceptions of work, rest and the ailments of the body which in
turn collaborated in the exercise of general social power by the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Now disease did not appear mysteriously in the body but was
perceived in terms of cause and effect and even in terms of limita-
tions to the use of limbs and organs. Now, work was conceived more
commonly as a matter of abstract bodily capacities in space with fixed
quanta of evergy tending toward depletion, and the very conception of
the exhaustion and fatigue brought on by hard work had changed its
character. As Anson Rabinbach has indicated, the notion of fatigue
came to encompass an altered conception of disease as it might apply
to the bodily mechanism, disease as a negative limitation to the
activity of the body in space. 72 The law of the conservation of
energy had seized concepts of space in visions of "action by contact,"
and as Rabinbach indicates, it had also defined the limits and concep-
tions of creation and labor. Thus, a physics of causality gave unity
to the way that space and labor were conceived and both were stripped
of the earlier imagery which attended them. With the abstraction of
political power, scientific reasoning and so forth, popular concep-
tions of space and labor now would recall images of bodies in motion
possessed of an energy subject to depletion, and this offered
substantial grounds for a new and distinctive polarity of memory.
The principle of the conservation of energy, for example, entered
nineteenth century conceptions of work and fatigue with a profound
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effect. As Rabinbach explains:
The sinqle-mindedness which characterizes the medicalphilosophical and literary concern with fatiaue in thl
a1
C
rte\
a
reVt
f
fr
h
om
19
t^
CentUr
^
Cann
,
ot^ ^"undeAtoo
civil i+ \i *
nxieties 0f urbani* sm ™d modernization, it reflects a much deeper and more profound
Sr~i!K10n -1n c°nsc1ousnes *» • new perception of phys
'
flfa ^ «< nature - The concept of exhaustion is ulti-mately linked to its opposite, the concept of energy, whichattained universal significance in both theoretical physcsand the practical sciences by the end of the century. [73]
A changed conception of work and fatigue was wedded very slowly
to the conceptualizations of physics and the memory of those experi-
ences was commensurately altered such that the processes of genesis
and creation would not be recalled so readily as magical or unfounded
occurrances. Earlier, in the eighteenth century, Rabinbach maintains,
fatigue was seen more as a "natural marker, a warning, an indication
of limit..." It "marked the point of over-exertion, but it was not
necessarily an unpleasurable experience." It was perceived in one
instance as "... a sign of having utilized the body and mind fully, a
mark of accomplishment." 74 Further at that time, "there is a
spiritual element in this vision that is unmistakable, reminiscent of
the medieval image in which 'the strength of the soul enters through
the fatagacion of the body.'" 75 And later, except among aristocratic
classes, fatigue was associated only with despair, depravity or
pathology of the mind and body. Yet by 1875, says Rabinbach, fatigue
achieves the status of an ill ness . 76
An image of the human body, its spirit and humors which were once
not so systematically divided was now subverted by a notion of finite
and constant energy within the body as in the universe. In the
transition, Von Helmholtz's notion of the world as "Protean energy" is
revealed as a central feature in the conceptualization of life itself.
This idea, argues Rabinbach, "seized the popular imagination," to the
point where the human body was imagistically portrayed, "in terms of
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mechanical functions and static emotional states, [and by the mid 19th
century], the dynamic language of energy, force, power and will
expressed in the new image of the body as a field of forces and
motion." under the pressures of industrial labor to be sure new
conceptions of human energy and fatigue were joined with an isolated
imagery of physical bodies in space and time. This found aesthetic
expression in the abstract isolation of architectural space in the
same period which arguably reflected a change in self-conceptions and
the conceptual limits of memory. For example, in discussing Des
Esseintes' "retreat to a fully privatized hermetic existence," in the
novel A Rebours by Huysmans, Rabinbach argues that,
Exhaustion, or rather the flight from it gives birth to a
radical interiority of the subject, corresponding to thetomblike neaviness of the interior design of the later 19th
century. For the ascetic artist, withdrawn into the sanctum
of the interior, the goal was to construct an environment
entirely of objects, to enshrine the alienation between
artist and society, the antagonism between individual and
nature. [78]
Whereas fatigue had once been associated with a kind of leisure,
a "pleasurable sensation, a luxurious respite from labor and travel,
that permitted withdrawal of the mind from the stimulations and
excitations of the world," 79 it is now associated with depletion,
depravity, illness and escape. Not only are the conceptualizations of
space and work altered along with their points of reference in memory
but the whole character of leisure and relaxation has changed as well.
As Horkheimer has also said, such developments in the realm of labor
ultimately penetrated the activities of leisure and affected the
content of philosophy and in America:
The deification of industrial activity knows no limits.
Relaxation comes to be regarded as a kind of vice so far as
it is not necessary to assure fitness for further activity.
'American philosophy,' says Moses F. Aronson, 'postulates
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Significantly, as a concept of creation met the limit of exhaustion
thus conceived, it appears that it was driven inward to give contem-
plation, relaxation and ultimately
'imagination' the same
distinguishable place in memory that it had now also acquired in life
activities.
Not only do the meanings of space, fatigue, relaxation and
leisure seem to have changed in these estimates of what has happened,
but their contemplative contents and the mnemic assocations within
them have altered even for individual orientations in practical life.
Accordingly, as Sebastian de Grazia has indicated, the notion of
leisure once sounded an "ethical note" and was supposed to provide a
time for moral reflection associated with peace and freedom. 81 The
Aristotelian notion of "leisure" was hardly the same as the modern
idea of "free time," that relaxation which today has become "time free
from the necessity of Labor." Previously leisure was conceived
differently; it was rather a time in a state of peace which was to be
used to gather the virtue of_ wi sdom and not to be misused as the
simple idleness of spare- time. 52 Leisure was then conceived to be
free of occupation but not active in the sense that it now involves
play or recreation. It was once, argues de Grazia, to be filled with
music and contemplation as if those quiet activities might provide
some refuge for virtue, wisdom and happiness which must be pursued for
83their own sake. Even as this old concept of leisure persisted
primarily as a prescription for living, it endured in many forms.
Seneca and Cicero retained the ideal of leisure as wedded to moral-
izing contemplation for, "only in leisure can one choose the model by
which to direct his life." De Grazia argues that early Chris-
tianity too maintained the contemplative side of leisure which the
Greeks had linked to divinity and ethics, even as the focus became a
directed contemplation of God. In either case it marked a time for
118
reflection and a quality of reflection which admitted different
memories and different apprehensions of creative activity within
memory than those which would receive emphasis later on.
A change in this had bequn in the Middle Ages in de Grazia's
estimate. Epicurius, for example, enjoined a disciple to, "remember
that by your reason you have reached infinite and eternal nature and
contemplated that which is, that which will be and that which was."86
Now the principle came to be applied differently and the leisurely
harmonious contemplation of nature began to give way to an active
quest to learn its laws. Contemplative reflection became a facet of
the intrusion into nature by magic, astrology or science and it was no
longer so concerned with ethics as it joined ultimately with the
province of work from which it had once been a refuge. Thus, by the
seventeenth century a "work society" was on the horizon and a
classical side of Renaissance thought began to slip away along with
the old notion of leisure. Within this new society the division
between "work time" and "free time" for most people, came to exclude
the old niceties of the distinction between work and leisure and even
the exhortations to "leisure well," had faded away. Although some of
those qualities of leisure may have survived among dominant classes
into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they had virtually been
disrupted. Concepts of space, fatigue and leisure have each lost a
moral or moralizing dimension along with the mnemonic associations to
places of origin or nature that had also filled them. Mnemic
referents of genesis and creation are supplemented and displaced by an
imagery of energy initiated and depleted.
In this way it may be argued that the changes in the conceptuali-
zation of work, fatigue and leisure also reflect a change in the ways
that the contents of these life experiences are recalled, and further
that they are aspects of experience which are crucial to the mnemonic
orientation of identity. Just as the child learns by initial contacts
with objects and operations upon them, so adult society continues to
envision its capacities in the experiential boundaries of
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styles of working and rest. Like the repeated imagery of place s
associations to creative endeavors form a referential pole for certain
orienting memories and a change in the conceptualization of those
endeavors produces a change in that much of identity, or, as it were
in those contents of identity. it is even possible that today the
notion of a bodily physics of depletion is changing again and that in
the absence of a religious or moralizing cosmology elsewhere, the
human body is being remoralized in the numerous health fads, jogging
and vitamin therapies, to the extent that the phrase, "your body is
your temple" should be taken seriously.
Time
If the abstract conceptualizations of space, work and leisure may
alter the fundaments and origins of memory orientation, they are not
alone. For de Grazia as well as for E.P. Thompson an inseperable
element in this transition is a change in concepts of time. Thompson
in particular emphasizes a change from pre-capitalist concepts of time
and their relation to "natural rhythms," and a variegated "task-
orientation," to the clock-work time of the factory which pervaded
most of Europe by the late 18th century. 87 The early task-orientation
of society, he argues, were more "humanly comprehensible than timed
labor" as they were then geared to immediately observed necessity.
The communities which share this early orientation to time and labor
appeared, "to show the least demarcation between 'work' and 'life.'" 88
Thompson traces the long history of the use of timepieces, as the
emergence of the church bell or tower clock, the clock in the
workplace and the pocket watch signal the intrusion of a new concept
of time that divides work from other aspects of life. With such
devices there is a clear division of time in which community activi-
ties, rest and anything like leisure came to be regarded as idleness
and "time wasted," and that attitude grew despite efforts at
resistance among parts of the population and even attempted sabotage.
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More and .ore a work morality resided in the disciplinary measurements
of the clock and not as they might be discovered in the necessities ofthe harvest, or in a contemplative, moralizing leisure. On the onehand, as Thompson suggests, "one cannot claim that there was anything
radically new in the preaching of industry or in the moral critique ofidleness," which accompanies time-discipline and a Puritan ethic in
this period. "But," he continues, "there is perhaps a new insistence
a firmer accent, as those moralists who had accepted this new
discipline for themselves enjoined it upon the working people."89
Time did not precisely "freeze as space" as Lukacs has put it
but something had been strained out of it whether we call that
communitarian principles of need, 'natural' rhythms, a contemplative
moralizing moment, or a prior morality affixed to the old under-
standings of time, free time and leisure. Indeed if we were to follow
Thompson's history of time and time keeping devices to the present, we
might find that the digital watch signals yet another conceptual
change. The division of life into work time and free time may be
furthered and may become more substantial when time as it has been
conceived to be a relation of space and motion is stripped from the
watch-face, and we are left only with the ominously correct "hour;"
not time but the time watched with the same attention in every
activity. The change which Thompson describes is not merely from
quality to quantity, but it is the beginning of a collapse around the
demands of the present which has forgotten the meanings and
associations that time and free time once held. The change is a
cognitive one to be sure, but it also occurs in dimensions of
morality, the community and the body by virtue of the ways they are
recalled. As Thompson says, "the transition to mature industrial
society entailed a severe restructuring of work habits - new
disciplines, new incentives, and a new human nature upon which these
90incentives could bite effectively."
The historical acquisition of a modern sense of time orders
thoughts and their mnemonic content. As Foucault too has suggested,
the 19th century presented a change in which, "knowledge is no longer
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constituted in the form of a table but in that of a series of
sequential connection, and of development." 91 This ushered i'n a
peculiar attempt to chronologize the past of both nature and humanity
to search for beginnings and to bring them into the fold of an ordered
human memory. Abstract, sequential, measured time then, is new and
it is newly applied both to 'history' and to individuals. For
individuals it must be regarded as an imposition upon the very
different form of mnemonic time that still survives in spite of the
tendency to mark memory with calendar dates, and to envision past
events in temporal sequences of hours and minutes. While the personal
sense of time that skips and slides through memory is not necessarily
regulated or even sequential, there is a need for groups to impose
such consistency. Clock time is abstract time, as Halbwachs
indicates, and it acquires central importance in the need for groups
to to integrate and compare a vast array of experiences which are
markedly different from one another. The very mobility of labor in
emerging industrial life furthers a common abstraction of time which
serves as a reference for more private memory and for public power as
well. Says Halbwachs, "It is precisely because individuals must move
between... groups, each separate and having its own characteristic
movement, that temporal demarcations must be sufficiently uniform." 93
Time, for memory, we should add, is not linear except as we
administer sequence within it to aid memory, and sequence often
appears as an afterthought in attempts to recall events. Just as in
dreams, the order of time which designates events as having occured
early or late may not always hold in memory. A very early event may
be accented " as if it were yesterday" or may appear distant, as if it
were "so long ago." As memory discerns priorities it has some free
play over the tapestry of experiences and for that reason measured
sequences do not always seem equal such that a year now, does not
equal a year then. This personalized aspect of memory may be likened
to an historically earlier sense of time where seasons were designated
in the experience of work cycles and by associations which were not
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months and numbered days. Today however, sequential measured time hasbecome more important than that kind of time and much more importantthan a more random mnemic time. The measurement of time as an
abstract sequential movement in space has taken over and is well
suited to contemporary work. Now, time does not exactly "freeze as
space," but spatial measurement of time intrudes upon and orders
thought and memory.
The internal contemplation which was once supposed to provide a
model for directing life is eroded by an external order of time and
external "priorities" within time. Beyond that, free time and the
"interiorization of the subject" may be subjected to the priorities of
this modern abstract time sense in ways that prescribe moral criteria
and the priority of what comes first or matters most is hidden in its
sequences. Perhaps this is what Adorno meant when he suggested in one
rather sweeping statement that,
Abstract temporal sequence plays in reality the part one
would like to ascribe to the hierarchy of feelings Theirreversibility of time constitutes an objective" moral
criterion. But it is one intimately related to myth, like
abstract time itself. The excl usiveness implicit in time[the exclusive character of what comes first] gives rise, by
its inherent law, to the exclusive domination of hermetic-
ally sealed groups, finally to that of big business. [94]
It may be more precise however to modify the claim that the abstract
time of physics and industrial labor has swept over everything once
and for all. It predominates, it is more important today in the
self-estimations of many people for whom it has become the pulse of
existence, but it resides side by side with another older sense of
time that persists in the contrary movements of memory. In this older
sense of time there may be different priorities that still emerge
occasionally like whispered revelations or small refusals.
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Once again, this miniature history of ways of conceptualizing
fL
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an
vr ion does not exacti * ™ «• «i. 3re loats. Rather it describes a very iong conflict within
or,ent,ng poles of memory. Notions of space, conceptions o, creagenesis, fatigue, and leisure, and the movements of tine as they „ .once conceived, have met abstract power, science, conservation of
energy and industrial clock time to form new orientations. But still
remnants of the old survive in the new. These aspects of conceptualNation intersect with the capacity of memory and shape it, but
memory is capable of dual allegiances and a contradictory sense oftme. of space, of creation and rest. For reifi cation or this new
polarity to really succeed the old meanings would have to die and a
societal amnesia would have to become complete in the form of a
personal forgetting. Instead we may find that there is still tension
between old and new poles of identity which may continue to fuel
critical imagination.
From the point of view of memory, the changes which Sack,
Rabinbach, de Grazia and Thompson describe are part of a very long and
incomplete process. The concepts that each describes seem to have
lost content and to have staggered and fallen over the threshold
leading into the late 19th century. The conception of space becomes
abstract and forgets its connection to places and its associations to
origins; a popular conception of fatigue forgets the aspect of good
depletion and moral invigoration of the soul. Free-time and work-
discipline forget leisure and its former prescription for a contem-
plative and moralizing reflection; abstract conceptions of time lose
an immanent relation of time to the needs and activities of the
community. I say each forgets, not because life once and everywhere
involved a way of conceptualizing which was morally rooted in
community and a place of origins, but because the concepts by which
life orientations are understood had to change and to lose such frames
of reference for individual memories as well as for whole societies.
The vessels that a common memory has found in traditional, religious
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or historical streams of understanding have been arranged and
variously preserved in light of these.
In many respects these concepts have been freed from their roots
and freed as well from many of the restrictions of earlier modes of
1
ft. But they were not freed in a manner that encouraged the many
minds to reflect on what that freedom might now contain. As their
roots faded or were replaced, the conceptual freedoms of the new
abstractions became a "freedom" by alienation geared to industrial
priorities. In other words these concepts were freed but they were
freed so as to receive new lessons. Abstract space does not onlyinstruct a universalizing imagination but creates a vacuum for power
and planning of the aggregates of social space, it teaches cosmologies
and nationalisms and instructs a search for justifying causes as it
enables the expansion of political power to new territories such that
mnemonic roots can now be fixed almost anywhere. Abstract time
teaches new rhythms of living and instructs a general acceptance of
external priorities; it teaches memory what is prior and what is
important in the course of work-time. Abstract leisure in the form of
free time instructs isolation and teaches the activities of a
mechanism and of the human body as charged or depleted of energy.
Today "my roots," "god," or "the enemy" might reside anywhere in a
juggled space and time made suitable to receive abstract lessons. And
in the desperation that oscillates among this modern polarity it makes
particular sense that an American might suddenly "find" a God that
recognizes national boundaries sits on dashboards, brings luck in
recreational activities, pardons certain excesses and favors the
deployment of multiple warhead missiles. A modern polarity of
conceptual orientation hints at a complex thematics of identity and
memory which is torn between old and new meanings, one which learns
lessons quickly and quite selectively. A brief history of the uses
of memory may now help us to determine some of the ingredients at work
in these modern orientations.
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CHAPTER III
MEMORY AND ITS USES AS A HISTORICAL MATTER
If the conceptual foundations of memory have changed historically
there has been a related movement in the history of its uses. Once it
had been freed from a locus of social origins replete with the lessons
of ancestry which might be passed on by tribal elders, there would be
changes in memory along another axis. It would now become the world
of self-conscious techniques that were employed in the enhancement of
the arts, and ultimately of use in the refinement of certain peda-
gogies and in the preservation of their doctrines. Now we may find
that the arcane history of such precise instructions in the use of
memory has played a part in determining the internal arrangements of
identity
-
the images, envisioned spaces, symbols and permissible
uses of imagination that have changed across time - and that such an
account may prove useful in considering the makeup of identity today.
That history reveals that memory may seem to "belong" to any number of
discipline, and that every kind of memory may at one time or another
come to predominate in a common sense of identity.
The classical European "art of memory," as Francis Yates has
called it in her extraordinary historical work on the subject, began
with the poet Simonides of Ceos (556-468 B.C.). 1 While delivering a
poem to honor the host of a gathering of nobles, as the legend goes,
this lucky man was summoned from the room and away from the building
by a spirit who had sent for him. During his enchanted absence the
roof collapsed and all of those who he had left behind were killed.
In the confusion that followed the catastrophe, it is said that
Simonides was able to inform the relatives of his unfortunate audience
where each of the bodies lay, and who indeed was in attendance. This
was possible because he was able to remember precisely which places
they had occupied at the table now covered with debris. Not only had
he relied on his memory to comfort the bereaved but he had made
-131-
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miraculous use of it, he had, in fact, initiated a system for the use
of memory which would later be refined. As we began with the notion
that memory has a spatial aspect and cleaves to places as to one's
Place of origin, it is easy to see that Simonides had borrowed this
awareness for his own special application and he had made use of place
and location as an explicit memorization technique. He had detached
memory from particular places ~ from its primordial applications to
sacred and unchanging things ~ to apply its spatial aspect as a
systematic mnemonic device, and later as Cicero said of him, "He
inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select
Places and fom, mental images of the things they wish to remember and
store those images in the places..." 2
This simple principle taken from the experience of the poet
became the foundation of the early memory arts which would be broadly
disseminated in the teaching of rhetoric. That extraordinary
combination of imagination and memory would emerge as the invisible,
if not wholly secret, foundation of so many other arts as Yates'
historical work reveals. Indeed, the trained memory not only
preceded printing as the medium of records, but was given priority
over writing as a tool of learning as well, and Socrates had even been
given to suspect that writing might have a corrupting influence on
such better devices. 3 From this, the lessons of memory or of an
"artificial memory" as it was called, were catalogued in innumerable
texts and admonitions. The first step in this classical art, says
Yates, "was to imprint on the memory a series of loci or places", and
to embellish them with the material to be recalled.^ For this reason
a vivid place was to be constructed in imagination, preferably an
architectural structure of precise dimensions such as a large (and
familiar) type of building in which the ancient orator may be found,
"moving in imagination through his memory building whil st he is making
a speech." 5 In the imaginary place that aids the orator's memory, one
phrase is to be attached to the entrance, another to the hallway, a
statue, a stair and so on until the march and speech are done, and in
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this way the artificial memory is a technique at the same time as it
is a creative art, and as it is also a conception of the workings ofthe mind. 3
For generations the field of rhetoric gave such central impor-
tance to the trained memory that it was regarded as the "treasure-
house of inventions, the custodian of all parts of rhetoric." 6 Here
It was discovered that the mind could be enhanced and memory strength-
ened through the senses, particularly that of sight, and mnemonic
techniques would come to place their highest premium upon the sensual
artifice of imaginary places that were neither bound to the emotion-
ally charged localities of ancestral origin nor given to pure
abstraction. Hence, Ad Herennium
, the seminal rhetoriticians' text of
unknown authorship (86-82 B.C.), instructs that there are two kinds of
memory, one is merely "natural" and is briefly described, while the
other, the "artificial memory," can improve the first by a series of
uncommon devices. As they are refined, the imaginary places within
artificial memory contain, "forms, masks or simulacra of what we wish
to remember." Imaginary places are hung with strange markings and
memory performs like an inner imagistic writing as the text suggests,
"for the places are very much like wax tablets or papyrus, the images
like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the letters like
the script, and the delivery is like the reading." 7 The artificial
memory stood in instructive proximity to the natural memory and its
peculiar representations provided a curious and essential blend of
imagination and the actual thing to be recalled.
Although this may seem familiar to our own modern experience of
memory, and there are surely moments when such imaginary creations
occur to us, we would do well to note that the artificial memory
contains an utterly different relationship between fantasy, imagina-
tion and fact than is common today. Not only had memory itself
obtained a place of supreme importance within rhetoric beyond the
things to be recalled, but an open relationship between the object and
its mental representation was deliberately cultivated. Here at least,
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and lurking behind the store of religious lessons, memory is not taken
to be a mere recepticle of accurately rendered facts, but as the
creative source of 'simulacra.' From the first thoughts about the
artificial memory it is considered to be a highly creative process an
art la nseU and not merely a device to be used for other arts
'
It
was a process which embellished imaginary locations as it decorated a
"natural memory" and fused words and images by skewing, and not merely
matching them. The analogy of the wax tablet reveals that it is an
"invisible art", and beyond a technical interest in mnemonic devices
the artificial memory was concerned with how to create, how to recall
and impress the mind with powerful imagery. Thus, and beyond a mental
architecture as well, the memory image most commonly prescribed in
these techniques is not just a symbol or a guide - it must be a
jarring reminder if it is to endure. It is not a representation for a
thing even if it may correspond to something about the thing to be
remembered, it is not comprised of signs in a linguistic sense, and to
the contrary, the cultivated mnemonic image enriches verbal expression
by oppositions and distinctions in contrast to precise symbolic
replicas or mental representations. Strange though it may seem,
memory was taught to employ a counter-language of images to facilitate
the speaking arts themselves. In contrast to the sorts of memory that
now are taught within larger schemes of understanding — in science or
religion, where the one true representation must be put first -- the
artificial memory would make things memorable and familiar by
elaborate contrasts and hideous markings, not by the representation of
likenesses within a proper order of symbols alone.
So it was that Albertus Magnus once suggested to his medieval
audience that, "If we wish to record what is brought against us in a
law-suit, we should imagine some ram, with huge horns and testicles,
coming towards us in the darkness. The horns will bring to memory our
adversaries, and the testicles the deposition of the witnesses." 8
This is hardly a modern vision and it must seem utterly peculiar to us
today, yet it is a creation which must have seemed bizarre in another
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way to Albertu s as well. Even then the ram was a striking if morefm11 1« and as Yates informs us, it was that very bizarreness
that distinguished a useful memory creation for the artistry of mind
in memory, people were therefore admonished to create mythology and
mythical beasts, but it was to be a mythology of our own construction.
Perhaps those favorite figures of myth - the most bizarre and
grotesque characters
- also served at first to fix some memory or
lesson. The Centaur, the Minotaur, Behemoth, and Grendel may have
served to consolidate the message of a story, but in the artificial
memory we are to imagine disfigured faces and peculiar bodies of our
own creation in order to fix them with a private message. Words are
harder to remember than things, suggests the Ad Herennium and Cicero
after it, but the memory of things, if undertaken with sufficient
care, will suffice to evoke the memory of words. Thus the ancient
rule for recalling things by their location insists that the imagined
place be "deserted and solitary", with moderate lighting and differen-
tiated spaces. But if memory was a spatial and evocative art in these
times it was also subject to failures and had to be stimulated with
the assistance of clear and powerful images.*
With regard to this, the Ad Herennium adds a psychological note
regarding the selection of memorable images. They are best marked by
extraordinary difference and distinguished by being unusual as Alber-
tus had suggested. However, just as the most useful mnemonic devices
are not merely visual analogues and symbols, it is best if they bear a
special peculiarity. At best they are to be emotionally and morally
charged with great deliberation, for, "if we see or hear, something
*A simplified practical version of this old technique is presented
today in memory primers and by mnemi smati sts as if they had just
discovered it, but of course it was oringinally much more than that.
The Memory Book by Harry Loryne and Jerry Lucas is one of many
examples. (See, The Boston Globe Jan. 13, 1982, p. 61, a related
article by Diane WhTte.1
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exceptionally base, dishonorable, unusual, great, unbelievable or
ridiculous, that we are likely to remember for a long time. Accord
mgly, things immediate to our eye or ear we commonly forget-
incidents of our childhood we often remember best." The arousal of
emotional states is to be used to better memory and to enhance by a
weirdly populated memory" creation. 9 Here, extraordinary things do
not necessarily appear first in art, in written or painted works on
fabrics or on walls, but within such a carefully constructed imagina-
tion. In that early order of memory, things mystical and mythical are
internally consistent with what was then deemed to be a rational
learning process, and myth, imagination, knowledge, and the memory of
things must not have seemed so very far apart. The senses, morals,
things individual and social, symbols, words, images, things familiar
and bizarre were to be drawn together in one's own memory mosaic even
as a shared orientation had to be maintained by certain general rules
for remembering.
The Ad Herennium claims to take its lessons from nature and from
the intrinsic nature of memory as it prescribes methods for stirring
the emotions and shocking the moral sensibilities, yet significantly,
it does not offer any particular set of moral injunctions. It may
rely on a sense of ethics, but it is not a treatise on ethics.
Nevertheless, the teaching of memory skills took a dramatic turn in
that direction with Cicero in a way that lasted through the Middle
Ages. For him, "virtue" was a habit of the harmonious mind which
contained four parts, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance. He
took memory to be part of Prudence rather than standing on its own as
a simple tool of rhetoric. The expressed reason for this was that
memory traces the record of the past and of what is good or bad, and
strikingly here it has lost its little independence to be attached to
virtue and lodged within the moral order. As we have noted in
passing, Cicero maintained the importance of a contemplative side of
life in leisure, but this contemplation directed toward virtue is
bolstered by the memory which is now a property of that special
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reflective virtue itself, m this way, as Yates indicates, the
class 1C al artificial memory had been moved from the province of
rhetoric and art to ethics. Although Plato had sought to control
memory and fantasy before him, Cicero had subordinated it within a
system of ethical priorities which was ultimately taken up by Thomas
Aquinas and those who followed him. 10 Of course, in every culture or
group affiliation there is a different arrangement of the elements
that memory is charged to keep for the sake of order and the agreeable
constitution of the familiar world. But where the group assigns a
particular place for memory in maintaining that arrangement its
ontological basis changes accordingly. That is, to the extent that
memory is valued for its own sake or for the virtue of its art beyond
certain immutable truths, it admits creativity, emotion and an
imaginative independence of mind. Where it is a means to faith
subordinated within Prudence it assumes a devotional attitude toward
particular imagined truths. And where it is a vehicle of reason
trained to employ symbols which are supposed to correspond to natural
objects it is subordinated to the accurate reflection of the empirical
world. Each reflects a different status, use and content of memory in
the prevailing orientation.
Once it was lodged within Prudence, then, the imaginative
artistry of memory gave way to a fixed imagery made suitable to the
teaching of universal lessons. So it was first in the religious
appropriation of memory and the adjustement of its techniques —
rather than in science -- that jarring emotions and subjective
invention had to be purged from understanding. The mechanism of power
had learned a particular lesson and now began its deliberate posses-
sion of the mind stripped of emotion and imagination, and in this
Nietzsche's harsh comment on "mnemonotechnics" seems particularly
apt:
In a certain sense the whole of asceticism belongs here: a
few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present,
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' fixe«
of freeing these ideas from the ^petition of al7 nthTideas, so as to make them 'unforgettable' [11]
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Although Nietzsche seemed to associate all memory with political
and moral power we may suggest that there is something distinctive
wh 1C h occurs when memory is lodged within Prudence. m Augustine's
Confessions, the search through the "fields and spacious palaces of
memory", is the search for God, and memory becomes the particular
faculty which has access to divinity. 12 For Aquinas, still indebted
to the classical principles of the artificial memory, the rules of
using places to remember acquired a "devotional intensity" that may
not search so freely. The concern is no longer to mark images with
one's own sense of "difference" in order to remember better or to
charge them with affects, but rather to draw them into the fold of
things divine, and to bind them there by a '"cleaving of affection'"
into a "devotional atmosphere." 13 The "fixed" images are not to be
the strange places and the bloodied or deformed faces that might have
filled the ancient poet's head, and not even the widely disseminated
"repulsive mutilations" which fixed memories for Nietzsche. 14 Now
there should be a less jarring and more familiar schematic pattern of
images, more comfortable representations of paradise or of hell, some
horrible to sure, but familiar nonetheless and more directly represen-
tational in a symbolic religious language or a moralizing memory
hieroglyph. At the outer reaches of Yates' account we will find that
21 fi xing mora 1 lessons memory must ul timately make the strangest
th1n 9 serviceable to the familiar order
,
rather than making things
memorable by marking them with oddity
.
By Aquinas' time there were the beginnings of a moral injunction
that distinctly fuses principles of how to remember with what is to be
remembered, and it is one that must reconcile the use of imagination
with representational imagery, and metaphor with particular messages.
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Even Scholasticism which had denounced metaphors and poetry asbelonging to a lower level of imagination, had to admit the use of
artificial memory techniques in the pursuit of its "rational pur-
Poses
.
Says Yates, "To move, to excite the imagination and the
emotions with metaphor ica. seems a suggestion utterly opposed to the
Scholastic puritanism with its attention firmly fixed on the next
world, on Hell, on Purgatory, and Heaven. Yet, though we are to
practice the artificial memory as a part of Prudence, its rules for
images are letting in the metaphor and the fabulous for their moving
power." Here too, memory has been assigned to a particular place
within the framework of a larger teaching which preaches its own
abstract lessons by the use of contained and prescribed metaphorica
even if it is just the devotional "atmosphere" of memory images which
is to be fixed.
A new dimension had now been added to the ancient artificial
memory which appears all the more striking in the order of its
development. The practice began with principles of space, imaginary
location and the march of the rememberer through time. To this was
added the stimulation of senses and emotions, rules for constructing
images and for enhancing their evocative power. That was then
subsumed in a hierarchical moral order which remolded the same
elements and drew them into line. As a part of Prudence, memory
formed an essential tie between the soul and God and religious
revelation which, since Augustine, recast the remembered past to its
own end. Here the role of sense, affect and image is no longer to
mark the contents of memory with distinctiveness, but, as for Aquinas,
to tame them to become familiar and accessible to religious lessons
more broadly disseminated than the rhetoric techniques of old. As the
Aristotelian principle of understanding by universal s was being
revived into the Renaissance, the spatial grounding of memory
techniques seemed to shift to the skies and to abstract mappings of
the religious cosmos. 16 Now monasteries referred back to the
classical artificial memory, but devised their own systems of imagery
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for popular use, drawing charts and symbols filled with religious
Pictures or depicting the spheres of the universe, including embossed
maps of Europe and locations for the firmament and the signs of the
zodiac ranging from Purgatory to Paradise and giving each its place. 17
Lessons for all of memory were taught to rely upon the divine symbols
which were to replace the personalized architectural inventions of the
old system. The new designs to be followed as guides for memory were
now presented in dozens of memory treatises assigning visual alphabets
and hierarchical mappings of the places and beings of Heaven and Hell
to which one might affix the lessons that needed learning and locate
them properly in the religious cosmos. A long project was begun which
aimed at discovering the best and most proper order for memory and
finally to devise a universal mnemonic system of carefully presented
imagery, a cosmology and more than a cosmology to be instilled by the
restructuring of memory itself.
Now, as these efforts were no longer kept to the monastery they
signaled the beginnings of an elaborate, if never well defined, mass
pedagogy. In an early printed book of 1482, for example, a secular
aspect of memory instruction was revived for public teaching as it was
supposed that in the rules for making images in the mind, "simple and
spiritual intentions slip easily from the memory unless joined with
coporeal similitudes." 18 Beginning late in the 14th century, memory
treatises were written in Italian rather than the Church Latin and in
the same period the "invisible art of memory" became a visible and
concrete art intended for public dissemination. In Yates' example,
the painter Lorenzetti presents good and bad government and the
attendent virtues, "after the manner of a composite memory image," in
the Palazzo Communal e at Siena, commissioned between 1337 and 1340.
Elaborate figures represent Peace, Tyranny, War, Avarice, Pride and
Vain Glory, in a composition which orders and fixes their images and
does not merely represent them. Similarly, says Yates, it is in
the numerous charts and drawings of that period that the, "vast inner
memory cathedrals of the Middle Ages have been built," and the
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Once memory had been dislodged from specific if imagined places
and removed from the rhetorical domain of private invention, it could
become a tool for public lessons and even for the artfully directed
genesis of traditions. Inasmuch as memory retained tradition it was
no longer entrusted to the elders of the tribe or village or to the
orator, it had to be used by inspried artisans and scholars to settle
the matter of conflicting versions of the past. Extraordinarily
detailed imagery could record and teach the ingredients of a new order
whether by the myth of the "perfect crime" which justifies some
version of state "justice" in Foucault's rendition, or by the careful
mapping of the religious cosmos, or in the images of a painting. To
some degree, the order of memory could now be directed by people in
positions of power, yet the conflicting forces of a diffuse and
"abstract" state and competing religious cosmologies each struggled to
rule in the same domain. Again, as Robert Sack describes it, there
was competition to claim the arrangement of mental spaces and the very
design of the universe that might be depicted in memory:
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The urgency of Augustine's work unfolds in this as well
particularly in the pursuit of universal vessels for images that could
match the complexity and abstraction of the imperial state power
Indeed, the design of the cosmos and the traditional canons of the
Church and State alike are in some sense tributaries to a single
universal pedagogy that silently absorbed the techniques of artificial
memory, m this, of course, religion does not appear as an opiate of
the people in its use of memory and imagery, but it solicits active
participation in a universal cosmology as it now provides an ethical-
spatial framework for understanding. Religion began to propound its
beliefs as if it were a cure for societal dislocation and did not
behave like a narcotic, or like a superego for that matter. It seemed
more like the carnival guide offering a map to the dizzy patrons who
have stepped off a carousel, a detailed map which promises to reorient
them. Even today in the vertigo of whirling opinions and conflicting
world views, religion offers the promise to find God and quite
literally to find oneself, and it is for the same reason that the
medieval graphic arts presented elaborate diagrams to give order to
memory and identity as well.
With the Renaissance however, there was another transition in the
use of memory techniques. The many attempts to combine different
symbolisms into a universal mnemotechnics seem to have overflowed the
limits of any one system. Once again the memory arts were opened to
diverse possibilities and to investigation in their own right. As
Yates tells us, with Quintilian in 1470 a "lay mnemotechnic" was
developed for the first time in the form of a "success technique" for
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general use. The location of memory within Prudence was disrupted
by its more practical application and by attempts to incorporate all
knowledge within a general hierarchy of memory images. The imagery of
the Jewish Cabala was revived, and the ancient Hermetic symbolism of
Egypt, Classical Greek and Roman deities and myths were unearthed by
careful historical study to be marked on the maps for proper memory
use which must now included an possible orders to provide guidance
correctly. In this period the charts designed to direct memory became
so complex that, as Yates argues, the memory tradition had all but
deteriorated, and even its practical application seemed in doubt.
Memory, one often feels in reading the treatises [of theRenaissance] has degenerated into a kind of cross-wordpuzzle to beguile the long hours in the cloister; much oftheir advice can have had no practical utility; letters andimagery are turning into childish games. Yet this kind of
elaboration may have been very congenial to Renaissance
taste with its love of mystery. [24]
Nevertheless, this amusing exploration indicated both a new
freedom in the pursuit of memory arts, and an attempt to enclose them
in a higher, universal and all inclusive knowledge comprised of all
possible symbolisms and all prior attempts to direct reflection. This
great effort is perhaps best represented by the so called Memory
Theatre of Giulio Camillo Delminio as it was widely discussed in
educated circles throughout Europe in the sixteenth century.
Camillo's idea was to construct a kind of reverse theatre in which the
solitary spectator would stand at the center of a stage and view the
auditorium. Although it is said that only a model and design charts
for the theatre were ever completed, the galleries were to be filled
with painted, carved or otherwise embossed images of characters and
signs representing all of the knowledge of the ages. 25 The viewer
was to be confronted by a semi -circle of visages containing the "order
of eternal truth," which were to be constructed in tiers around the
seven pillars of Soloman's house of wisdom. The planetary gods,
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Jupiter, Mars, Saturn, Venus and so on, were to rise fro. thebalconies in depictions to be marked by their emotional qualities and
sitting beneath their planetary signs. The memory of the solitary
witness of this great creation would thus be "geared to the universe"
and to the universal symbols inscribed on each character, and would be
inspired by their images where ordinary symbols might not succeed, it
is said that beneath the figures there would be boxes or drawers
containing writings pertinent to each, and that these would be
available should the reflective soul choose to wander among them. 26
The theatre has been described as an "amphitheatre for the king
for the purpose of marking out the divisions in memory," and Camillo's
years of effort were even temporarily underwritten by the French
Court. This brilliant if misbegotten attempt to combine the
knowledge and memory systems of the ages marks a small success in
freeing mnemonic technique from the strict line of religious pre-
scription. However it would also bind its own reconstructed imagery
to specific fields of knowledge seeking to become another universa-
lizing lesson in understanding. Here memory is no longer fixed to
places of origin or to moral imperatives within Prudence. It is not
let loose to aid the poetic recitation and it is not only a vehicle
for learning the Christian cosmos. The Memory Theatre acknowledged
the importance of the solitary subject as it was then emerging, it
combined occult influences and philosophical teaching from Plato to
Cicero, but in the end it was an attempt to universalize and fix a
proper order among these many elements and to discover an abstract
universal symbolism which might provide its orientation to the same
individual. In this period memory had been freed, but for the purpose
of teaching new lessons, as a technique and a cosmology at once, and
it had been abstracted in a way that it could be used to create new
orientations for living. As they may be applied to teach any lesson,
memory techniques were now becoming a flexible principle of political
power.
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f mnem ° niC techni ^s, as well as the.p to arrange all knowledge in a universal system of memorappear to mark a change in the way that power disseminates absPrinciples. If the symbols of learning no longer have to be fixed
a Place or to a City of God or within Prudence, then those symbolsthemselves may have sufficient evocative power to instill a variety of
other teachings. They can now be used to teach numerous cosmologicallessons with competing claims to universal legitimacy, m this
connection, Habermas has suggested that different learning levels are
attained by entire societies which correspond to the type of political
legitimacy that has been historically achieved in each. So for
example, he has tied a "classical type" of legitimacy to the idea of a
teachable knowledge of an ordered world," much as we found it in
Plato's attempt to produce a myth of the origins of power or in
religious efforts to give order to the cosmos and memory. He says
that, "corresponding to this is an alteration of the position of the
subject. Myth was taken for true in a naive attitude. The ordo-
knowledge of God, the Cosmos, and the world of man was recognizable as
the handed down teachings of wise men or prophets." 28 Following from
this in a rather smooth progression, societies proceeded through
several learning levels to a reflective modern legitimacy based upon
agreement where those who make agreements," have taken the competence
to interpret into their own hands." 29
From the point of view of memory, however, we may find that there
were numerous lags in the course of that development. We might
emphasize, for example, that the "classical type" of legitimacy which
was teachable, was preceded by a given order of understanding which
was not teachable in the same way. That is, like early mnemonic
orientations wedded to places, legitimacy was taken for granted, and
only with the kind of disruptive private imagery that developed with
the artificial memory could an "ordo-knowl edge" be taught and not just
acquired. It must have taken a long time before a fixed cosmology
could be promulgated and learned in the fully modern sense of
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learning. The subjective receptees of knowledge had to be made
ready for such abstract lessons or to be freed in order to receive
even the most strict religious cosmologies. They could not simply
proceed from one learning level to the next and to new grounds of
legitimation, but must have lapsed first into periods of disorien-
tation. The teachers of teachers and the authors of memory treatises
took the order of understanding into their own hands prior to any
agreement that would establish modern legitimacy. They had to tear
mnemonic orientations from their roots in locations and mythology and
to seize control of the rambling symbolism of artificial memory in
order to make maps of their own cosmos. They had to move memory from
rhetoric to religious ethics to a lay cosmology and create vessels
within it which would be suitable to their new lessons. At each level
of social learning, an old orientation had to be undone and the
relativistic artificial memory tradition would reappear with all of
its random image making, only to be replaced by a new and more complex
prescripton of order and imagery.
Those busy renaissance monks who puzzled over the inclusion of
archaic symbolisms which admitted no order in themselves, had to make
them all the more abstract to fit their universal lesson schemes.
They asked where one should locate alchemical symbols, biblical
images, planets and their gods, alphabets, numbers and the zodiac in a
comprehensive temple of memory. With questions like this, the
foundations of the Church and Science were bound together in the quest
to weave new legitimate orientations out of cosmological abstractions.
The roots of "rationalism", which writers like Oakeshott find so hard
to locate, were everywhere, 30 but it began to thrive with applied
pedagogic techniques and the search for universal symbols. Here, as
well, arguments concerning the universality and truth inspired the
quest for modern political legitimacy. As the cumulative abstractions
of science finally became a successful world view, the abstraction of
memory and its general application in diverse techniques had reached
an apex at which it could become a tool that was fully suited to the
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Significantly each of the historical phases in the order andapplication of memory does not completely overwhelm its predecesso
and we find that at any one time all n* «.
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all of the numerous devices are
where n force. Especially ,„ periods of epistemo,ogi cal
onfusion, that is, the earliest technics emerge again in an alteredfonn and if the general use and format of memory is changed, the
omponent parts remain much the same. There is not steady progress inthe learning levels attained by a society or at least not in the
reformulations of mempry that are designed to receive its lessons
Each attempt to fix a universal order is subjected again to periods of
relative chaos in which the imaginative imulse of the classical
art,f, call memory has revived. So, even the historical progress toward
modern abstraction and reason has been a halting one, and "abstrac-
tion does not necessarily further the cause of reason where it is
Primarily a means of disrupting the extant places of memory and of
changing the dimensions of a common imagery. Again, all of the
applications of memory remain somewhat active in every period as they
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speech, as elsewhere, and another variety of memory will strive t0
reactivate the intention behind the words as the meaning of the textis ^experienced. When we read again or repeat something from memory
n U seems rote and meaningless, every means contained in memory may
o,n the search to revive its inspiration. So, too, when the paticu-
ar cosmo ogical order of lessons in any given historical period hasbecome exhausted, the same impulse drives memory to reveal all of its
assets, to place imagination above apparent truth in the pursuit of a
new orientation.
Accordingly, in the seventeenth century, following the lively
reactivation of the ancient symbolisms so well represented by
Camillo's theatre, another transition in the use of memory occurred
Descartes, Bacon and Leibniz had each studied the classical art of
memory and made use of its lessons in their works. 31 At first glance
these arts seem to survive only as technique for them, but there is a
significant rupture in way that they were now applied. Bacon had
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precluded occult and spiritual influence and Bacon was especially
concerned to discover the connection between the power of
.nenoni
mages and the observed nature designated by the.. Guided by
efforts, Bacon was dedicated to find the proper relation between the
symbol and the thing it is of. 34
Like Bacon, Descartes was anxious to distinguish his thinking
from the arts of Pamon Lull which were so much concerned with the
-n^ory tradition. His interest was to develop a rational method for
solving questions concerning quantity, and a use of symbols and
numbers stripped of their qualitative and occultist connotations. To
accomplish this, however, he distinguished a "corporeal memory" which
is "outside us" from an "intellectual mawy" which is within and nay
reveal quantitative dimensions. 35 He sought a universal key to the
order of memory and the proper designation of the symbols by which the
sciences could be remembered. His idea for organizing the "right
order" of images is that they should be "formed in dependence on one
another..." based on their causes; "that out of unconnected images
should be composed new images common to them all..." 36 m this
manner however, he referred to the ancient arts only in order to purge
them of an abundance of occult elements and to justify a universal
system of mathematical symbols.
Leibniz retained more of the memory tradition, although he was
also directly concerned with the construction of general symbolisms
which would have a universal and historical validity. The symbolic
memory image, which he called a note, was to be joined by a quality of
likeness or differentiation to the thing to be remembered. 37 Hence,
Leibniz did not leap to mathematics as the answer to a universal
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filed the old images and symbols, and in this the teachings of the
memory tradition had al, but collapsed. The memory image which hadlocated things ,n imaginery places by peculiar markings or within an
ethical hierarchy is replaced by a symbol and its correlation to
things in nature. with Leibniz, the end of that manory tradition is
near. As Yates suggests, there is a final shift at this time from
memory as a "method of memorizing the encyclopedia of knowledge of
reflecting the world in memory, to an aid for investigating the
encyclopedia and the world with the object of discovering new
knowledge." Now, and with these uses, memory had completely
shifted its posture from being a locus of meaning and moral lessons to
becoming a means of discovering order in natural history, mathematics
and the like. It could now become a tool for replicating the "order
of nature" and of ordering knowledge with new finality. The princi-
ples of memory had become abstract enough to integrate any order, to
fit any scheme of things and to learn any lesson, but especially those
lessons affirmed in rationalized apprehensions of nature where the
accuracy of menta1 representations would reflect and verify experience
over and above any of the more imaginative devices of memory.
To be clear about this I want to reiterate that I am not talking
about a change in the nature of all memory, or a smooth progression
toward scientific abstraction, but rather a change in the application
of techniques of memorization, their place in the new hierarchy of all
kinds of memory. What seems to have happened is the marriage of
memory arts to a technics in search of truths about nature. Memory
had moved from Prudence to nature and its localities from those fixed
151
in imagination to those given in experiences of a new kind and «.
remembering self has acquired a new range of power In L unfolding !ft at experience. Yet memory has a,ways operated on the margin
chaos and order, and it has always invoked princip,es of diVeren
(
d Ity and distance) and familiarity (nearness, in time, space
cho 1Ce of ,mage to construct a meaningful orientation. „' Z modern
era, as tor Simonides, aspects of these principles remain within theformat for memory that is generally shared and they must be secretly
rearranged if science is to flourish. where the predominant use of
memory now seems to have uprooted the old art in favor of scientific
categorization it has not taken over every aspect of recollection
For example, marking the past with oddity in the remembrance of
di starting events is still an almost automatic device in many
experiences that are not recalled in a scientific attitude. Henry
Williamson for example, recalled the events of the first World War
thirteen years later in visions of chaotic waves of men bunching
together and melting away, in colors of grey and red. "What assists
Williamson's recall," says Paul Fussell In offering his example, "is
precisely the ironic pattern which subseguent vision has laid over the
events. In reading memoirs of the war one notices the same phenomenon
over and over." Although this "irony" in the recollection of
certain mass events seems to have a special place in a modern mnemonic
scheme as we may discover, that kind of memory still embellishes its
objects with markings of absurdity and difference. This has
certainly been superseded as a means of learning by prescribed
tabulations of nature, though still it proceeds from the strange marks
of difference toward familiarity and similitude like the early
artificial memory. In times and events where a given code of meaning
is threatened, memory may resort to the old technigues and to creative
assimilations of chaotic elements. The use of memory is subject to
historical lapses just as it is subject to individual ones.
Within the realm of memory techniques however, the use of such
bizarre devices gave way to a more positive adhesion of the things to
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be remembered to the familiar markings of universal symbols ~ thosefamiliar to a system of knowledge which they also affirmed. That is
under the religious guidance of Prudence, the use of memory had
changed in the very attempt to lay hold of chaos and of elements which
are not yet so well ordered within thought. With Cicero a learning
process was initiated which altered the very locus and function of
memory to make it serve a particular system of knowledge. 41 For him
memory was part of Prudence but he had also taken pains to distinguish
a "true" and "historical" past from an "imagined" one and had begun to
designate which was which for the purposes of instruction. Memory was
no longer an art in its own right when it became the repository of the
one time order of religion and now of science. Thus the "stream of
books" that eventually entered the 17th century as Oakeshott comments
-- discussed the 'art of poetry', the 'art of living'; the 'art of
thinking'
- and it was impeded by a kind of rationalism which
ultimately turned them into a "technique of success" or "your mind and
how to use it."
Hence, the culmination of that change in the pedagogy of the 18th
century, reveals what Foucault has called an "analytic of finitude"
which is, "in short ... always concerned with showing how the Other,
the Distant, is also the Near and the Same." 43 The point is that in
periods where memory is most under the sway of mass pedagogy, that
recollection no longer proceeds from random difference to familiarity,
but from classifications and similitudes to ordered differences and
managed distinctions. Chaos and oddity are subsumed in the repetition
of familiar and prescribed images — maps and classifications which
have influenced things much beyond the reach of science. Just as
concepts of space and time became abstractions fitted to new systems
of life and work, memory techniques became part of abstract systems of
mass pedagogy. And if the birth of the political state had required
abstract "universal istic world interpretations" 44 in Habermas' words,
the pedagogy of power was learning how to perfect these and to deliver
them into a reworked memory even as it tended to lapse on occasion, to
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grow random or even creative for a time.
Perhaps at this point we may speculate further on a general
ZTe\ZT-Tory of predom1nant uses of m— »- *~and th artificial memory to Leibniz, predominant uses and contents omemory have been changed. They included, D the place or 1 ecu
evocative imagery marked by difference, 3, a moralizing frmj^ of
am l,ar order in Prudence 4) the incorporating of a universalhistory of symbols, and 5, the teachings of abstract universal
symbols for the conprehension of nature. Although each of these
elements may have always been in evidence somewhere they have been
9-iven different enphasis in successive periods in a manner that has
changed the memory "art" and allied it with different forces in mind
and society:
1) In a pre-classical period, the locus or place was once
primarily associated with a real place of ancestral «s and the
past presuppositions of community life. Since Simonedes, and with
the discovery and dissemination of techniques of artificial memory in
rhetoric, the randomly chosen or imaginery place is substituted for
the physical place. Next there is a prescribed religious cosmography
of locations. With science an abstract and uniform conception of
place and space is introduced and represented by numbers, locations
within classifications and geometric space. 2) The use of evocative
^agery was at first tied to traditional images then employed in
private inventions, and then used to teach moral lessons and to
inspire a devotional attitude. Finally its use is minimized in the
selection of abstract and mathematical symbols to correspond with
nature and it is of limited use as a technique for recording the facts
of nature. The marking of memory images by distinction, adding a
horrible mask or striking quality is replaced by newly familiar and
universal symbols which now seemed proper as Bacon and Leibniz would
have preferred. 3) The use of memory to teach a public cosmological
and moral lessons became systematic as it was taken up within
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Prudence, and again this is displaced to . la
»*«. of the wp od » a la;,9e ;9rt by universa-incorporation of different symboli„ nto the
loosened imagery during the Z^Zc^TTuniversa, symbolics, but this in turn c d/d 0 T«e ?symbolisms of mathematics and science whi 1' thS . 9eneral
employment in a vast mass pedagogy.
From this sketch of the uses of memory it is poss1ble t0 make af eints on what might be suggested for the periodi at^n 0
e 'of
5 1 h3Ve ment1 °ned r69ard t0 the ^^cal
ran i« n
Sarn,n9
1
that Hab6rmaS "" r^> "ere is no smootht s tio from one level to the np*t h,.+ *um ex , but rather a series of lan^e*and ,ags as old orientations are unraveled, new learning te h
are acquired and new cosmological orientations are proposed. ll ZlPhase where a new use of memory has emerged there has been a distinc
tive new polarity among concepts of space, time and creative process-
ed quite literally a different place where memory technigue;
flourish l„ each period an of the contents of "natural" and
artificial memory" have returned to be rearranged and assigned new
emphasis. Hence, beginning long before and extending until well after
major antithetical" transitions in social systems, the techniques for
receiving, and teaching new lessons are already being assembled -
there is a seedbed of patterns for the use of memory which allow a new
order of knowledge to emerge.
Such lags are not in themselves "antitheses", but mnemonic
disorientations in which syrabols and images have been freed and then
refashioned, often returning to the principles of a classical memory
art. Even as the prevailing tide instructs memory in the ways of
Prudence or science and reason to constrain imagination to their own
representational devices, another current of memory resists and seeks
out the peculiarities that do not affirm that familiar world. In this
way there have been partial regressions that Habermas does not fully
explain, and periods when earlier orientations have exhausted their
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lesson and may give leqitimarv t„ m ,
teaching any
standing. ' "
t0 W,dely
"
arted sc^« of under-
Today in America for example self-proclaimed fascists andnsmen scramble to invent familiar symbols, to invent
d even mythical "nations" of origin. Tney designate pa 'p
» reat i: " S T° " ' " ~c ions
.
uch an endeavor is not merely the step-child of
consciousness" brought on by reification, but a Utterly CJ
~nc orientation, and „e are fortunate, in a sense tTat
adherents have not studied and applied the lessons of the article
-cry. Yet ^se miscreants are not fn ^
c
fort and regardless of political persuasion there is an undercut
doubts within the individual mind today. Superstitious specula-tes and fantasies that are not so well repressed as in the past
must still contain the imaginative attempt to reconstruct an order of
memory which is underway for the mainstream and the political left as
we 1 It is possible that we are in a new phase of disorientation in
wh,ch mnemonic imagery has been freed once again from old prescrip-
tions while the boundaries of the unreal and the unfamiliar stand out
less clearly and are not uniformly defined. Perhaps it is a sensi-
tivity to this modern problem that motivates Foucault to anphasize the
interruptions",
"discontinuities" and "transgressions" in a history
of power and ideas, while others search for a past which seems lost to
memory.
In summary, changes in the applications of memory techniques
have been accomplished at least by changes in the conceptualization of
space, time, creation rest and leisure. Once freed from a particular
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h fT;e \zztM:rmy has been added to the— -
of life. NevertheUss, the old aspects of memory remain a part ofthought processes of Individuals even if they are not emphasized
=on o„ed ,„ . public pedagogy a„d ^ there has enUctlve use of the principies of memory which has tenuously affixethem to new imagery. This seems to have occurred in the course ofong historical transitions as cosmological orientations have beendisrupted from piaces, from Prudence, and perhaps yet from science.
A Note on Identity
So far, my claim that there have been different phases in the use
and nature of memory has only been substantiated in the most general
way, but still I believe that it already has certain implications for
political theory where it attempts to assess changes in identity if
for example, theorists today speak of a modern identity which has been
depleted of tradition, has lost meaning or subjectivity, has col-
lapsed, become one-dimensional or narcissistic, what might they mean
by this? What makes up the "identity" that has been so disrupted?
The consideration of memory does not lend itself to agreement with the
few who claim that there was once a uniform bourgeois subjectivity
that is now lost for ever, any more than it affirms the idea of a
historically transcendent self which is always capable of choice as
existentialism sometimes seems to claim. The study of memory at least
makes the matter more complicated as it suggests that identity is
precariously achieved in the intersection of mental agencies and
shifting reflective or capacities with mnemic poles which are set in
socially agreeable conceptualizations.
In the historical consideration of the arts and pedagogies of
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memory we may find that there hac
-a, abstract1on> yetr;2- iz::*::: presses
elements proves to be enormously fluid An !
""^
~er,„g may be asslgned to ;jff
-
; cir;:;r;;:; kn rnumerous authorities - bv »tn,„ vessels and ept by
rhythms and offer thei 1 I 7 *° *" °f *" an"Stra1
rhetoriticians who Zu[ t cr a Je ° T 9ener3t1 ° n -
writing and recitations, by ^1l^t " ^^ exegesis or upon maps of the cosm * * '
~
£ * content
PHers, statesmen and historians who provide a new « r )evocative symbols. Among these there is , , 7 *
-J,
-
identity that would de^iMr 'IT ^JETti
3 to be our own." But in every phase of the struggle the a
-Pulse within memory must be summoned once more to undo the
prescription, and rather than the steady mergence of the ratio
9eo s .dividual, „e f1nd . ser1es of , ^ J"
•
1 7T< ,ncl,nat,on - Each order of—» «"« «•»" t
rent
* °' t0 ^ US °W" » adefere feature
- the creative, the mythic, the fixed cosmological
or historical, abstract symbols or private fantasy - so that ifprudence and faith gave order to m»ory at one time, a psychological
-awareness of fantasy and of scientific historical genesis mayfind its own centrality in the modern period under a new directorship
Especially in this period we must consider the fluid interior of the
struggle over identity.
Psychoanalysis tells us that the "I" or ego which centersidentity incorporates various agencies of the mind be they uncon-
scious, preconscious or conscious. Today however, many psycho-
analysts, like Robert Stoller, are no longer satisfied with this
portrayal. They press the question by asking: who is watching in the
mental act? Who is acting? Where is the "I" that dreams, fantasizes
or "runs" a fantasy? They are disturbed if the ego seems "split" andm a fantasy or a dream "I" am a participant, "I" am watching, "I" am
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the other character in it too or »T" am •
i,colf
uu
'
1 am ignorant of whprp t asel f
-deceived " rpnrocc^ ~ ne e i stand,a, repressed or enjoying some detachment 46 m n
"M.
-
entity seems sue, a slippery matter that tT e'a k J"'"s grand as a socia, identity seems absurd. However f h
9
any changing mnemonic orientation makes up ^7\lll TlTargued, it has to do with fixinn , ^entity as I have
the possible poles of ml " L aSSi9nin9
a ;t :
' n a particu,ar cuUure
- The^ ,n^ * —re m r fantasy enters
"consciousness" nay act ually be very differen
: 35 " 1 «'"*'<P ^tween fantasy, imagL ^Tacts is historically altered in ,k 3 „ •
r
in changing schemes of memory
cousness, ego, se,f and might mean very djfferent J~['Hnguirt, psychologists and anthropologists frequently remind us.Cr.Ho s inverted theatre of memory is a wonderful metaphor for
one such period and style. The physical theatre is also a mental
stage although the attempt to fix its elements is made in a Kind of
architecture and not in philosophy or theology alone. The "I" ,j kethe King for whom it was to serve, stands at the center, but also
roves the galleries where specific images ascend in a quasi-historical
conception of time. The mode, more closely resemb!es a modern
conception of the mind than did the memory maps which preceded it and
particularly because there is a circular design which admits a kind of
self-reflection in which the solitary observer has earned a special
place. However, it is not quite modern as its poles, images and
resting places are designated by archaic symbols which are believed to
bear their own intrinsic force within the mind. It allows motion and
a degree of creative selection and the "I" may even retain its own
private past as it roves the theatre, but this private past is of
little importance within the vast gallery of the symbols and truths of
the past societies represented. In a nearly modern way, this "I" is
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both the center and the vanishing point for prescrinti
techniques of orientation. It i Lh /h c™«Pts and
its own past and destiny But ,et T ^ ^ ^^ ° f»«-in . l me explain further
Stoller repeats the metaphor of the theatre
"for th. „describing mental processes in order to assert the shi
? ^ °'
identity. He argues that +h
ifting nature ofjr there are a number of "scriots'' *cdifferent authors at various level, «f
that the re are nu.erous,
"independent streams
r&
~us but
-
are wimu
' and
— ~-se,f. Scnpts> part , cu]aply thQse ^
repeated and privately constructed fantasies are both h
and co-J^ a.ended the.es of Identity They are TretteT
so.et1.es less consciously, hut Just as .uch as the Zr'y
^
th.MJtaSOa, m this, however,
.e.ory is located within thself and serves the self as such. It is not ,
-ory and imagination in the retentive skills of a particular art
ut of uniting fantasy and personal ^ory at the fulcru. of modern'identity which is now an ideologically and psychologically se"
conscious self. Thus, at Stoller's
.ost unorthodox
.cents, there "is
no ego for this 1s only , WQrd> and ^^ ^
multiple fantasies stands in its place and this is a rather ti.ely
"ggesuon. What locations would this »p find in Ca.illo's
theatre? Are not the rules for certain scripts designated there? If
so, then the scripts which co.prise the self are subject to so.e
degree of public construction, and no matter how bizarre the private
fantasy ,t must often respond to conventional conceptions even if it
intends to violate the., or to beco.e excited or .e.orable in doing
so.
3
The modern "I" then, is not merely a series of scripts but also
of standpoints and perches within a fantasy or image. It is made up
of permissible perspectives which are made permissible by private
agencies like repression, but also by reproducing (or violating) a
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of public mental theatre in which the roles and distances of
sn^srr- Thus> we might °ffer them- ^ -exua fantasies of someone in a tribal society might be different
.
ose of someone in our own for more reasons than would a
they watch themselves engaged in some act which is exciting inntasy or imagine that they participate directly in it, what kind of
"re 1
"
Wh6ther ^ fant3SiZe at a11 ^ be ^-cedby prevails perspectives in social imagery. Fo r this reason too itis only after years of analysis that stoller's patient, "Bell" comes
to recognize herself, her "I", 1n all aspects of her repeated sexual
fantasy, and only then does it begin to lose its power over her itis as if she has learned to move about in the gallery of the memory of
her fantasy and to permit herself a more extensive series of perspec-
tives than she, or a forbidding society, would formerly allow She
used to watch herself being victimized by others but now she sees
herself as an agent in every element of the vision. The "I" then is
not only like a series of scripts but also like a revolving stage
within the psyche whose actors and elements are partly private
memories and fantasies, whose art of theatre is instructed by the
rules of memory as they are publicly taught, and as they are oriented
in common conceptualizations and the images associated with them. And
in this, it is not only the activities of superego or repression that
limits Bell's mobility in the memory of her fantasy. Even the kind of
place there is for the self, its mental size, as it were, in cultural
mnemonic patterns may influence the shape, scope and role of fantasy.
Of course this kind of claim needs to be demonstrated historic-
ally in a way that I cannot attempt here, but in examining past
examples we might look for something other than the sheer disruptions
or continuities in sel f
-concept s as they seem to have acquired
historical form. There is certainly remarkable continuity in the
human psyche as Freud always maintained and we might even discover
that certain "private" fantasies have always been the same in essence,
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or we may agree with some mQdern h . stor . ans t^
self-merest, an avid sex life, similar taboos and so on 71
where such things nave had continuity we may disTove thi thl Za so had a different place and a different Stance wlthTnatre of memory. Historically,
,„ other words> w lookthin,, wh,ch are taken for granted, i gnored or not included on
age of ,dentity; the things made distant or near, odd or
Even the metaphors which describe memory may rev eal differences inperspect,ve over time, where memory is likened to the wax tablet, thebuilding the map or the "mystic writing pad" as Freud called it 50the movie screen or computer, each image not only reflects thetechnology available to the imagery of self, but indicates whether itis conceived as something static, as a recipient of information, an
actor or really an author. Each win reflect the place of importance
that memory has acquired in the service of art, virtue, or in the
order of nature or the self.
Precisely for this reason we should note again that the possible
polarity of memory is never so fixed a* its metaphors. Psychic spaces
are not in fact places, and need not be like places. Mnemic time is
not sequence or clock time; mental activity and creation are not
automatically governed by the rules of work and free time even if
people are convinced that they are themselves, and their "I" finds
itself in seeming so. The "I" today locates itself in a different
configuration of time, place and creation from the "I" who once
studied Simonides or followed Augustine. It is openly reflective,
self-consciously psychological and utilizes memory as its own device
which may even influence the most private fantasies that orient
identity. Some things appear closer to consciousness and others
further away. The "I" may admit more sexual fantasy and less
religious cosmology and it may even involve a different relationship
among things like psychological "defenses", condensed scripts or
fantasies in a culturally defined cosmos. That is, identity may
select the material of its orientation from different sources be they
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worldly controus or private Inklings, and this has .implications where memory is no longer dedicated T ™virtues. Now depending on what is allowed t h
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°PerateS b* ""ting theof mental spacial ization that also confers priorities
, among its
own objects and methods, and this has implications for the legitimacy
of politie.1 power as we,,. If, as Habermas says, the grounds of
egn^macy of the modern state had to "break with mytho,ogica,
thought
,
and came to rest on "abstract" and "universal principles" 51
it had to break with old myths of origin in such a way that the
physical and mental distance between the centers of power and their
members could be bridged. In order to achieve the necessary sort of
conversion relationship" with its members, to reach the 'fluid
penferies' of empires, these sources of power had to generate a new
mnemonic orientation and a new sense of what was near or far, present
or long past, what was the center and what was important or unimpor-
tant to recall. If administrative power cannot reproduce motivating
meanings in modern society as Habermas maintains, it can at least map
out and weigh old ones and may be prepared to find the necessary
scholars and explorers to construct those maps. The abstraction which
entered into the history of memory techniques helped to accomplish
some of this as it dislocated myth, random imagery and conceptions of
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space and origin, t0 replace them gemetrU
abstract time, "proper" histories and clocks But as
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tation
Groups, Classes and Memory
in the attempt to show that there are historical dimensions to
7ZZ T' ' h3Ve n<>t anytMn9 *"» e,~ t0 «h. tory of the memories that actually occupy peoples' minds, and thisdeficiency deserves further cogent. I have suggested only that there
are certain concepts which are crucial to memory that have changed
and, as if they were an another axis of a graph, that the techniques
and predominant uses of memory have shifted in similar ways That is
certain public lessons have been taught and the techniques for
teaching them have changed, but it is still far from clear how these
lessons were received by the various peoples to whom they were
addressed. At least it is likely that the prescribed modes of memory
were absorbed much more slowly and much less completely than the
scholarship about them suggests. If the capacity of memory, and notjust the techniques of memory, has actually changed over time and is
in some sense historical, then it is also subject to the distinctions
of class, group and age especially in the more diverse societies.
Thus, the most important axis in the history of memory is also the
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rs,rt - ',r; <may still make educated guesses about them.
It bears repeating that Halbwachs' version of the "collect™,
ZZ makes many compellin9 d,st1nct1ons *** ^emembrances a life of their own. The collective memory a suchbund within an identifiabl e group which shares experience or
-11- of experience, limited in space and time and tied to thinterests and life span of the members of that
mmguishes this group manory amphatically from 'the h
current of continuous thought," without periodization,
apposite. The study of history involves its own rules of scholarlyinvents and the interests of spectators who are no longer parti"
cipants in the continuous collective life that they examine 54 By
now, however, it should be clear that while this distinction is
theoretically significant, it is not always compelling in the life of
the group which must also obtain a sense of its own continuity in
time. That Is, a sense of history that is informed by scholarship is
not kept entirely outside of group experience and there are patterns
of memory and conceptual referents in recollective activity that
survive beyond the immediate group and the life span of its members
and behind its particular reminiscences. Even Halbwachs is inclined
to reintroduce historical awaness of that sort within personal
reflections of a certain sort as we shall see later on.
For the moment, there seem to be several distinct varieties of
memory entwined in modern identity. Today there is historical
priority given to the use of certain kinds of memory which tends to
overwhelm its contemplative and imaginative side. There is a
collective memory in Halbwachs' sense of the term, and there is a more
individuated experiential memory. Neither, however, is immune to
fantasy, parochialism or nationalism, nor are they immune to the
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ous partitions within popular conceptions of "history." If forbwachs, doctors and lawyers have professional group lories Jlt 1r repertoires of group affiliation there may also be more
asses of experiences that affect the*, and it regains to be see
tain group influences become more profound than others,
ere are epl stemic patterns of recollection tied to prevalent
„es
conceptualizing and ways of learning, and leaning u agains
ere is shared Knowledge of historical and traditional expeMen
that were not partlcipted in directly. These may all combine together
aecordmg to collective the.es of ™Phasis which direct reminiscence
and just as modes of reflection combine to achieve a certain structure
n group life, there are overlapping groups of greater or lesserimportance that affect the identity of any individual within it
Once again, there are bound to be age or generational differences
in ways of perceiving the past and all the more so in a rapidly
changing society. We know from psychoanalysis and cognitive psych-
ology that the capacity of memory develops slowly and is concerned
with different things in the phases of infancy, childhood, puberty and
adulthood. The young and the very young may always have a certain
limited immunity to collective prescriptions of memory and of mnemonic
content, a certain freedom like the early artists of memory. As long
as they create much of their own imagery, the vivid residues of
private imagination are resistant to the prevailing myths of society
and the emphasis they give to certain sorts of memory as Schachtel has
pointed out.
Recent studies Indicate that the disruption of war and its
atrocities affect the manner in which the generation which has endured
them may counsel its children to remember or to forget. Again, the
older generation in circumstances like this may attempt to influence
the views of the young by curricular emphasis in education or by
making their own reminiscences more, or less known. Beyond historical
instruction, they may quietly urge the young to cherish "these as the
best years of their life" or to await a later time which promises to
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be better. As well, the different groups within one generation ma
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cular tra-a wMch disti
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vet 1 2 T '" °f h0SPUal -^ ^ericanerans, for example, reveals a chaotic mix of clarity and forgetness perusing to their experiences
,„ war which had also 1
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ne recr
as
r
their memory
- Not just the
Ho gl t ,n later life may have influenced their apparent con-fusion, and sealed their fate as a group. 55
in diverse populations the mix of ethnic cultural and religious9roup,ngs ,s bound to leave pockets of various legacies which remain
outs,de of the mainstream to preserve distinct conceptions of their
origins and identity. Here the selective adaptiveness of memory ismost stnking. ,ndeed, there may be two kinds of success for people
assim,lat1ng to a new culture, one as they retain identity by cleaving
to the vestige of old traditions, and another in their willingness to
forget. It may yet be demonstrated that the groups which assimilate
most successfully are those which adopt a selective retention of their
Pasts emphasizing certain acceptable features while diminishing
emphasis on others. In such diverse societies there is therefore a
publ lc need to teach a memory lesson that counsels against the
peculiar imagination of youth and the difference of the outsider,
which by their very nature are thought to introduce disorder to the
adult mainstream. In this sense prejudice is a part of mnemonic
reorientation which is so powerful that it may lead a people to
despise themselves and their own origins in favor of a selective new
nationalism, a new nationalism of the sort which might appeal to an
international citizenship in the recollection of "the plight of all
working people" or of "all freedom loving peoples" in an appeal which
is real enough. Yet in assimilation, the delicate balance which must
be struck between the memory of particular traditions and those of the
larger society may diminish the importance of memory overall, leaving
it to private, free-time or limited group engagements such that it
does not disrupt the homoginizing continuity of the present.
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The matter is somewhat different with distinctions of hThere does not seem to he historic,, evidence tc e th, IIoco-economic Cass is ah,e to member hetter or to retai trations more than another. Nevertheless th«™ ,
-at different classes may ^TlZ^ ^Z^TT
^erent things at different times. By v/rtueT^ZTZmembers of an upper class may be better able to Ml + •
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G3Zia Rabinbach *™ut hey are not necessarily the 'bearers of culture' even ifparticular tradition that they tend to recall i, th« a
Analyst* of 'vi, •
S e domi nant one.
t h t , \
C0nsC10us"e«" argued that hy virtue of beingbrun of domination, the working classes may acguire a distinctiv
conscousness of their circumstance and come to value a certain
retrospective knowledge most highly. „ this has been true in periods
of upheaval, it seems equally true that working classes may adjust allthe more vigorously to the demands of productive labor in other
periods, or even at the same time. In the writings that address
class consciousness, it is as if these people stand on a precipice
from which they may see more deeply than others into certain aspects
of the past and into the losses which the present has created for them
as they look down one side, or may topple forgetfully into the demands
of the present on the other. Nevertheless, the resistance of labor to
the demands of industry has always been infomed by both historical
knowledge and references to experienced changes within the personally
memorable past. The success of organized labor resistance has always
depended on those who make sense of a history of labor's oppression
and engage their formidable and stubborn memories to identify how it
has been at work in recent experience.
In this way there are certain streams of past experience which
seem to be the mnemic property of working classes in struggle.
Equally there have been certain techniques of industry, although we no
longer recognize them as techniques, which were designed to divert an
awareness of the same experiences. It must be remembered that it took
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very long time for the patterns of industrial labor to break downhe so called •natural" rhythms of work. By the 19th century
Europe, what the upper classes perceived as a "woefully deficient"
ability of the working classes to adjust to the calculated pace of
machinery was for many of them an unwillingness to forget a moretolerable tradition of labor. In the 18th century they would not
easily relinquish "Saint Monday" as a day for marketing, personalbusiness and reflection on the events of the weekend, as E P
Thompson has shown. Even the joys of celebration at the time of theharvest, he argues, should not only be understood as an acceptance or
a response to new economic stimuli, but also as, "a moment at which
the older collective rhythms break through the new, and a weight of
folklore and of rural custom could be called as supporting evidence as
to the psychic satisfaction and ritual functions- for example, the
momentary obliteration of social distinctions-of the harvest home." 56
In this way a certain nostalgia for past modes of work and living
may well have had the quality of a "deception" which made present
conditions seem to be more tolerable, but the same nostalgia was also
an expression of resistance to them. While some might consider that
sort of resistance to be retrograde and ineffectual, it is important
to remember that we do not know what these people thought about on an
"idle" Saint Monday or what evocations were felt in the nostalgic
moments of harvest festivity. At the very least their reflections
could dwell upon something different than they did once the new
disciplines of industry grew wiser and more pervasive, until the time
when there was "hardly ever time to dream" as the poet Mary Collier
put it in 1739.
Industry used very concrete means to disrupt the rebellious or
threatening reflections of its laborers, as we know. The lessons in
punctuality in the work house and schooling of the old and young
alike, were coupled with powerful moral assaults on "idleness" and
"time wasted" which were equally lessons in forgetting. In many
places public functions were curtailed, sports, and meeting places
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legally banned In such a way that even the location, kPractices might he retained were harshly «,„ S i°" TlZduring the 18th and 19th centuries a previous rhvthm of
was not only disrupted but Mm. * °
f tlme and work
y u c q, time, or access to the control of h»became the property of ruling classes by their literal Jonotimepieces during the work day. The time of y h ' Zparked out around work and what Thompson calls a "new
as flrm iy stalled. ,„ var1ous 1nd(JStries ^^ Jshortened and watches were taken away fro. laborers to "expropri
...all know edge ofW
. Clocks in factories were often s
he w rrrV" b3Ck " "i9ht " — - lengtheno k day. Aga,n, not only was time made
"quantitative" and anew principle of calculation and punctuality applied to work, but itbecame an explicit instrument of donation in those instances which
went hand 1n hand with the delimitation of space, and a firm patron-izing counsel against traditional practices and rhythms which dictated
a new and obedient amnesia, still, as the strike placards that
survive as evidence from the period indicate, working people were
quite well aware of the manipulations which were Imposed on them As
Thompson suggests, in most cases the new disciplines took several
generations to achieve even a partial success, and the memory of a
resistant consistency of the past may very well endure even as it is
being deliberately transformed.
Thus, the techniques which have been imposed to contain time and
memory and the responses of people to them, may be two very different
things. As in each of the phases wtien the old memory arts were once
revived, two kinds of memory may exist side by side and two sources of
identity may combine or remain in conflict. It is likely, however
that the very persistance of the systematically limited occasions for
reflection, the rapid pace of work and the pressures of new conditions
of poverty diminished the overall importance of certain kinds of
memory. There may be some sociological credence to the claims of
laboratory psychologists who have proposed an "interference theory of
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forgetting", 60 especially when the interference u
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_ su* r::;;;;;terns of distraction and reflection to which an older st le
d
s
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nces ™ °n-
-
w «,„ ^ „cede to mode n pressures it ma« k« ~may be premature to conclude that +ho
controlling strategies of distraction have succeeded iev
ens,„n In th id adjustoent ^^ ^
-ay still be zones of reminiscence left behind which are not entirely
out of reach, and there may still be class differences in the
revelations that seem to occur only within personal memory, while the
retention of the particular traditions of common labor pratices that
once fueled resistance has certainly eroded, there are still con-flict^ dimensions of personal manory that have not fully adjusted tothe modern clockwork pace of labor, and those seemingly personal
dimensions may acquire special features dependent upon class experi-
ence.
The limited interviews that Lillian Rubin conducted among
American working class families in the early 1970s are suggestive in
this respect even if they do not provide a broad data base. Unsur-
prisingly, Rubin reveals that many of the people that she interviewed
retained memories of a rebellious youth in conflict with parents,
police or the courts. For example, she quotes a twenty nine year old
welder who says with some pride, "I was always in a lot of trouble.
In fact I was considered incorrigible and I was sent to juvenile hall
and made a ward of the court when I was thirteen." 63 For the most
part however, Rubin was struck not by the displays of pride, but by
the denial and guilt over childhood anger that surfaced during the
interviews as it seemed to reveal a "tortured combination" of varied
feelings about the past. She suggests pointedly that this reflects a
class difference in reminiscence as young middle class adults in the
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ch1, dhood and the anger that accompanies « V^JZ «'
:J VZ:mi ' « -*i c,J h hood
"nenc T ^ 3 qUiet "-^nation" that .castsexperience In the memories of adults. As one twenty five year oldhousewife says for example, Y
u'TU^ 1S, What you make ™ Vii we mad the bes Tf
You c.n'Wri'^ -re nice.
Although this woman is not necessarily denying guilt and anger
there is an avid condensed attempt to balance the memories of good
things and bad things and to judiciously select a "fair" presentation
of the past which justifies both the past and the present. It does
not seem that she does this only for the audience or for the benefit
of the middle class interviewer, and instructive cliches like "life
is what you make it" may be directed at herself as well, as 'if she
needed to be convinced again. Most significantly, the bad memories
the good ones and justifications are taken together in a precarious
balance of conflict that requires further justification. This is not
a glorified past but a tenuously resigned one that has been recon-
structed with a special emphasis that Rubin's interviews seem to
reveal repeatedly.
Immediate pressures of the present which make it impossible to
plan for the future also diminish the importance of recollections in
doing so. Therefore the present may acquire an emphatic importance in
place of the reminiscences that might foster impossible dreams for the
future. Says a refinery worker,
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And a truck driver with a similar background,
lr,^Wt0fknolfewhlre 1 I'd , hey0tU J1-"'* th1 "k about
for'it? m fact I don'? think i kTT so. how cou1d 1 Pla"
wasn't even sure about Jh. t
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it didn't hav
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T°m°rrOW just di °"'t exist,
Nevertheless, Tories, even if they are dories of fantasy shinethrough this apparent collapse to the present. As one young
.other
I started working when I was twelve as a kind of livebaby-smer-housekeeper for a family with three 1 ittl e Id
o
3 Lr 'if/Va" taSy ' fey Save me a kind of an deaf what a different kind of life could he 1U» »™, i...H « 11k. they gave me an idea TLStitfi cJSd'SS
Such memories may adjust to a demanding present or make it more
tolerable at the same time that they rekindle an awareness of its
inadequacies. Like the reminiscent celebrations of the harvest in the
18th century, but still unlike them, memory may adjust to new terms of
identity in the same breath that it resists them.
There seems to be little room in the circumstances that Rubin
describes for the extraordinary constructions of the rhetoritician'
s
art of memory with its imaginary figures and buildings, and yet, even
as the actual architecture of furnishings of that life-setting
mitigates it, there is something of comparable ingenuity that remains.
At the worst we find the suggestion that even physical settings may
strip away memories and that the prefabricated mass dwellings of the
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modern period may hold different <=„
bilia th.t ,1 /
and fewer memories than the memora-
! no
^ h3llwayS of a traditional bourgeoisieAdor even argued that German functional architecture prior to theSecond World War reproduced a modern unresisting gUa It
7
^habitants, making them "alert and unconsci^It The cl Idimensions of the problem are more starkly portrayed by the nov
Toni Morrison who offers the example of a household setting whe
r
1 «re „ bought "on time" and the stark surroundings seem
contain no special memories at all:
There is nothing more to say about the furnishinas ThP.
lessness, greed and indifference. The furniture had a^H
W-JTit^HtS
or^e^in"^ d * ^ Sbirth in one of thAeVX
^thTon n sf^peeled paint places, because that's what the baby when he
n
eale f° Pul1 himself up, used to pick loose There were
cherished
65 PleCeS
*
Certa1nly n0 dories to\1Occasionally an item provoked a physical reac-
n 1 trac"t
1
a'Tfaht °n^ Vr1tat1<0n 1n the ^PPer InteTtlai c , lig flush of perspiration as circumstances
surrounding the piece of furniture were recalled. [70]
Yet again, the words and thoughts of people themselves reveal a
complex and combined memory imagery which does not correspond directly
to the physical settings. It is not always so free of conflict or
accepting of circumstances, and it is not so blind to the broad range
of past and possible experiences. The settings and pressures of
industrial life may tend to devalue the recollection of certain
experiences but cannot entirely erase them. Indeed, if there is a
collapse to the present, it is filled with conflicting orientations,
not sheer amnesia or repression, but a more conscious balance of
recollections and images. However unconscious the motivation may be
to do so, there is a selective use of memory which responds to
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not guite capture the multiple ale ^t a Tand balanced within it. warenesses that re represented
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bered t„ f,,t V remembered, and how well it is rea-, n ac most psychological studies concentrate only on aspectshe utter with mtle regard for bow "retention" .. Wh
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usual 1, measured in short term memory - „ related t0 ^« 9eneral patterns of recollection. Aga1n individuals o^ vas vary greatly in this retentive ability for many physio,ho og,ca and social reasons. Vet it is probable Z theT re
memory
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of sailed labor has been degraded in the twentieth century, it ispro ab y fa,r to say that the need and opportunity to engage certaink nds of memory 1, not very great in most jobs." Now indeed, it is
the short-term retetive uses of memory that crowd the stage within the
*o er
n
rationalization" of the labor process - uses of memory thatlight be common to much earlier organizations of labor and whichironically, have little to do with the expansion of reason. In this'
the sk,lls that were once acquired in apprenticeship are not parti-
cularly displaced by the world view of science as it sought tod!scover the proper correspondence of symbols and nature to beinst,lled in memory. Rather, those skills are displaced by a
primitive short-ter™ retentive ability that inclines memory to
correspond to certain tasks. It does not eliminate imagination and
the personal past from the task in the manner of reification, but
separates them, or suspends them around the guiding memories that
accompany an action rearranging the internal stage of memory. Where
emphasis is given to that sort of practical memory, imagination and
the recollection of the personal past are left to fantasy and
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daydreams as if they provided a kind of internal «,. *
work that is readily replaced by tel evi si^>n at hn
oment during
least, memory still provides an lulu»T ' "- tM ' "
Certainly there arp rlaccss and occupational differpnrpc «.u
applications of this oractirai *•
a rr e ces in the
un i p c l retentive memorv hut ,• *- ^
tently valued in virtually every Cass and a«iv t d y
-dnative self-reflection or religious
the occupations of daily thought, it is short-term rete
. 1that is most valued in the taOrt nf i,K„ • memory
the olots nf rn- '
ln 9ames or 1n followingp o contemporary fiction, m education too, the tradition,!
;::,°
f a^ ^ -* «• -Placed by the rote leT^gt ela room, ^ m ^ ^ ^ g
-dividual pupil is aeldo. called upon to recite something that
STnilTIT "ather 10 C°™ent °" "-""» that «
I r; ^ thU S,
'
9nalS 3 9reatei
" nationfor *e rational processes of students, while on the other hand,
short-term retention has come to be valued for its own sake
If this is true of the education required for task oriented
labor, It is also true within the kind of rote learning that is still
applied to the professions. what one memorizes in order to acquire aprofessional certificate is widely regarded as something different
from the more vital knowledge that comes from experience, yet a
mnemotechnics for success has assumed an important place in middle
class life and if an advanced practical memory is culturally valued
anywhere it is valued here. Where the proper training is lacking in
formal education
- which has emphasized too much freed™ of thought
to seem useful to the more functional pursuits - memory 1s reeducated
to become Instrumental to professional success in hundreds of primers
on improving it, lessons on speed reading to Improve functional
retention, and special courses for board and professional examina-
tions, and as any young doctor or lawyer will tell, augmented memory
is essential to initial success.
In another vein however, it is likely that the same middle class
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educate offered
,„ universities generates a distinctive locus for
-ory, not only a certain world view which has become cu turaO-nant, hut a Mnd of mne.onic cosmology for group ide
shared genera, knowledge, no .after how deficient it may he, i kel
1;:;°:: zzi rciations dependent °n ^ «««
v that
15 SUb5tantlal Pr°° f
°
f «« '* —slikely 1f asked simply "when was a better time of ,ife - those
"th IT"" Shared hl
'
St0riCal edUCati °n be
"<™ Htcely'to saye moV or the "so and so administration" rather than "when [
was e, even and we moved to Tulsa."
, do not mean to suggest that
middle class memory is somehow more historical here, but whether or
not that ,s the case, common poles of historical reference are likely
to d.ffer with education to a specific shared knowledge. Even the
middle class fascination with "trivia" today may serve to affirm this
aspect of an oriented memory.
There is some data to suggest that the nature of reflection in
free-time differs by class and with different activities-somewhat
more reading in middle and upper classes, different T.V. programs,
etc. as witnessed by a spate of studies from deGrazia to those which
are currently conducted for advertisers. We can only speculate as to
what memories may filter through these periods of time or whether they
are to be characterized accordingly as "free-time", a time for
contemplative leisure, or "depol i ticized time" as Frank Hearn chooses
to call them. Further, the degree of satisfaction that certain
groups find with their lot in life is likely to have implications for
memory as for whether it is filled with nostalgic longing or distaste-
ful reminders. Some of those who have moved upward economically from
impoverished ethnic roots may tend to identify with a present home or
location as if it were the site of their origins and even the
provincial and rootless attitude attributed to the "nouveau riche" may
indicate one class difference in the nature of memory. To cleave to
the present because one needs to however, may have very different
reflexive connotations, and dissatisfaction with circumstances of
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should be clear that > ™u , ,
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». ™~ry itself is assigned aspecial place of importance within the dominant order of understand-ing, in the mnemonics of rhetoric, within Prudence or scientific
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—scious sense ofdentity and the rigors of the task. Thus, the elements that actually
came to fill the many minds, are recalled in a scheme that variously
values imagination, devotion to belief, accuracy and retention, which
variously distributes the perspectives of the "I" among them and which
only allows certain kinds of reflexive freedom. The group is
reluctantly bound to an arrangement of memory that determines the
shape of the familiar world, and of what must be left outside of it
Even in extremely diverse societies memory must provide a
cohesive orientation for all. It must preserve the sacred places of
ancestral origin, or replace them with Imaginary places that inspire
as much dedication, using every means that was once available to the
artificial memory to produce common points of reference, a mythical
history and shared, familiar imagery, m every culture as in every
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mind, all of the elements of the memory arts survive in «„
With varied „phasis, memory L^ZVZ^hem it engages a selective and string imagery to diss! nlamiliar scenes of mental life, it reflects the spools andTe
s
a given moral order, it engenders the learning devices best su ted
conditions of , abor he they technics of shlt-tel Zt Jn or
omplex artl stry of mind, and it locates the self among all of theseMemory centrally regenerates and receives cosmology in a l g
.enta! architecture that defines the spaces of i den ty. Thus
aractenst,c design of that internal space will be shaped accordln
to the place that memory itself has been assigned within the large
order of understanding
- whether its predominant use is in rhetoric
and art, In securing virtue, in science, in practical tasks or in
securing a psychologically self-aware sense of the self, ultimately
the mental spaces that the self may occupy and the very efficacy ofits imagination is determined in such arrangements.
Accordingly, the history of the predominant uses of memory does
not reveal the steady advance of achievements, but it presents a
series of rearrangements and realignments which may cast doubt upon
the idea of social progress in general. First memory was obliged to
receive a tradition unequivocally. Then it was forced to serve the
creative arts and rhetoric. Next it was subordinated within the
virtue of Prudence, and thereafter charged with devotion to religious
lessons and cosmologies. With the inqulsitiveness of the renaissance,
as in every subsequent reconsideration of the order of nature and its
proper mental representation, memory had been fixed again. But
quickly it was bound to universal symbolisms or drawn into the service
of an accurate reflection of the world as science had discovered it.
For long periods of time that cohesive order of memory has prevailed,
and memory itself has actually seemed to belong to that order, to be
nothing more than its natural reflection. Yet at crucial moments when
the internal arrangements ascribed to memory have become troubled or
obsolete, that faculty seems to retreat back within the imaginative
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So today, the creative mechanisms of the artifir^i
rpturnorf ™™ ficial memory havee rned once more, not as mnemonic devices but »« coif
means of securing identity. Where traditional „ «h
sel ^"n^ious
3 m, guidance fails that
a t,ve memory would produce stable
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perspectives that satisfy the need for orientation. On he one haour notoriously »,„str»enta,« society it seais that miry «
i the t to th; tasks of modern ubor and fi " dS ,ts
on T ;h
deVKeS
°
f retenti0
"
s
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sil^ I ^ h
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°
f mCT°ry C3nn0t^ "vi ion of the world bv it^lf . , 3m oy seit. Secretly, an imaginative memory seeksto restore that much of identity, to select or contrive secure places
and appropriate images suited to a modern, psychologically reflective
sense of self. This seeking, creative memory is engaged beyond the
all important retention of routine tasks and entertainments - and it
is in the semiconscious daydreams which accompany them that selective
memory now makes its bid for orientation. Order is no longer restored
in the memory lessons designed by monks or in the symbolisms of
science, but on the seemingly private stage of memory where strange
personal fantasies, media imagery and trivia quietly blend to recreate
a common and familiar order of things. Thus, where social theorists
determine that modern culture has lost its bearings with regard to the
past
- that we have lost our moral grounding, tradition or reason -
they may miss the fact that an old artistry of mind is at work again,
and that much of what seems lost is also being rearranged.
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PART II:
THEORIES OF LOST MEANING IN SOCIETY REASSESSED
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CHAPTER IV:
TRADITION AND RATIONALISM
THE PROBLEMATIC OE MICHAEL OAKESHOTT'S CONSERVATISM
t
.
echn1cal progress r «^ ;ccess and
t on remains, that Industrials, secularism, individualism and s
loss of a particular way of life with all of its conflicts anHcont,„„ ties that is so often mourned, and it is not
*y h
1
consistency which modern memory tends to attribute to
P tlon
,„ li 9ht of its absence. This peculiar sentimentality isapparent 1n America when young adults seek to return to their ethnic
origins after experiencing a more genera, sense of
Often, they seem to find equal comfort in a folk tradition theforeign cultures of their own family background or in their given or
adopted religions. Odd though it may see., the same impulse arises in
the view of history that so readily discovers a former golden age when
a uniform, perhaps even an equalizing tradition seems to have spread
evenly over everyone from the lowliest peasant with fidelity to Ood
King and country to the nobleman or bourgeois - no matter what God'
King or country might have meant to each of them. Despite the eclec'
tic influences that really made it up that traditional consistancy is
often cherished in modern memory for its own sake with the same sort
of reverence that is given to a truth derived from statistical
averages. Tradition acquires an abstract mythic importance beyond its
elements, and every particular tradition is subordinated within the
narrow space that all legacies fill , n the modern orientation
-185-
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toward the past. Where this is the r3« it •
,.„.,,..
case n ,s increasingly difficultto determ,ne what a tradition is, was, or yet might be
traditLTV"" !
6
*" " inqU1>ed 1nt0 th* ""ure ofradit ons, he or she wou!d have met with the stilted explanations ofthose who simply held the orthodox view and would be offered descrip-tive counts on the elements of a Christian or French consistency ofbell f and practice, a British tradition, or even, for a brief sjan
an American tradition. The native speaker must have provided
examples, finally interrupting the flow of questions with a reverant
silence that would mark the persistent inquisitor as a renegade or an
"pertinent alien. Tradition needed no elaborate explanations andleast of all could anyone explain what it might be in general - there
was only "our" tradition. It was not the self-conscious
"consistancy"
of everything tradi tonal not a Judeo-Christian or Protestant ethic or
a natl0nal1st1c fervor of the sort that is so obviously a contrivance
of selective memory.
Today, that supposedly cohesive "tradition" is often discussed as
if it were devoid of context and it is usually impossible to say when
it began. The word is one of the most used and least precise in the
modern lexicon and it seems to arise in connection with every
reference to an old way of working and living, but especially in
evocations of the way things were supposed to have worked well, of
happier days in an agricultural clime, the wondrous skills' of
craftsmen and the like. It is thought to reflect a venerable choice
of reading or entertainment, music and attire, a cuisine or table
manners. And often with no conflict or seeming contradiction at all,
the trappings of modern life "traditonal ly" appear alongside the
elaborate etiquette of royal courts and religious ceremony as they
might at a modern costume ball. In retrospect, all manner of beliefs
and policies seem to have been designed to fit one another simply
because they coexisted. Hence, the value of tradition is now often
perceived in the apparent consistency of that fit, in the retrospecive
homogenization of different groups and classes who all seemed
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to have been glued together by the consistency that f ,,edwith unquestioned allegiance to such beliefs „ J ' ^ ethinqs we call trad-i+i™ ^ l,ces ' and thosn ition today seem to refer to a "cimni« •
cohesive time of Hf fl u simpler and moren life wherever it might be found.
Certainly there have been periods anH , i*
u .
B
" n a5 and cultures whpro c „rh
cohesiveness could be maintained against changes in
"
ucProcess against the incursions of foreigners or be converted
nationalism to further the conguest of other peoples Buttradition fondly refers to a simp!e and cohesive past, i as bel
f
too flexible to seem "conservative" in *Lu in every case. At timoc
consistency of tradition was deliberately pieced together ^ the
crest upon a banner in a designation of memories, ranked and exag-
"tTatt on"
" *°
h °ld
°"^ *rad, t, „as revered in the attempt to preserve Creole cuisine
against an onslaught of tourists in Louisiana, or another with Ho ChiMinh claiming the scepter of emperors, and variously a tradition couldbecome a directed principle of power or of resistance to power
However, at the moment that notion of tradition was deliberately
evoked as a source of local or national pride it had also been
transformed, and those who inquired into its meaning would no longer
be met with stilted references and silence, but with the articulate
repetition of slogans proclaiming that this thing or that was at last
our tradition." Once they were argumentative^ secured, as Habermas
suggests, principles of industry and democracy disrupted previous
hierarchies, manners, customs and habits and threw them into question
The future could no longer be guided in the well charted footsteps of
the past and the consistency of life could not remain implicit or
unstated if it was to change in progress and still remain predictable
enough for industry to advance. Principles of equality and economic
progress challenged whatever traditional cohesiveness there might have
188
been with new myths, and one set of unquestioned assumptions about thePlanished as a new, more rational and se! Conscious one took u!
Today there are many people who remain outraged by these chanoe,and share a sense that they have been robbed of a legacv bv
nameless criminals. Nevertheless th„ , \ \ * Y "rta,n
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, e current delusion that a wholetrue way of life once ruled better everywhere, now also sufferinternal conflict. There are , 4..
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"9 Actions who each claim a hold
on such a past, and even those who defend that vision most ardently
T these matteJar
0
:Tj^l ZT^t^l
retrospective search to define tradition and to rescue i edangers Self-proclaimed traditionalists and modernists each charthe other with the unpardonable offense of "abstraction" and each
seeks to regenerate the aspects of living that seem once to have beentree of abstraction and modern arbitrariness.
By virtue of their special stake in the past, the "conservative"
theorists who make that attempt offer a particularly strained mixture
of analyse language and reverence for the 'natural rhythms' of former
times. But despite their awkwardness, or perhaps because of it they
effectively challenge a more "radical" efforts to appeal to the same
past, and they force the question of what has been gained, what has
been lost, and where and when was it ever in residence. The death
knell for tradition is heard as both camps now ask what it once really
was, since in the asking they abstract it further from memory and
practice. All attempts to claim tradition keep it alive by the very
means that extinguish it like an exploratory surgery that turns into
an autopsy. However, there is one theorist who has traversed those
dangers most elegantly by charging nearly everyone else with the same
crime of abstraction. In defending the virtue of tradition Michael
Oakeshott might have championed his own fairly consistant British
heritage and left it at that, but he wished to distinguish the
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Any claim that tradition has been lost or overridden by otherinds of knowledge is steeped in a series of difficulties. F i rs t of
a tradition must be bracketed as a special kind of knowledge and it
.
st be demonstrated that it is distinct from science, from ideology
or from personal retrospective understanding. One must dichotomi
one must establish a standard of judgement or set of criteria for the
things that qualify as being traditional. One must therefore be able
to designate a traditional type of retrospective knowledge as a
specialized kind of memory and this is precisely what Oakeshott has
attempted to do. For him, tradition is a memory which must be a
present form of knowledge, and it is not knowledge that consciously
concerns the past. It survives only in actual life practices like the
collective memory that Halbwachs describes, but it is not so self-
aware or flexible as that, and it endures beneath and beyond the
deliberate teachings of specific groups. This tradition, somewhat
like the world of facts for positivists, is quite beyond self-
conscious interpretation and indeed it is a given which is spoiled by
the very attempt to interpret it.
So far I have offered no standard for defending such a category
and the memory of myth, or of abstract systems of orientation, seems
to be as potent in the formation of identity as the accurate recol-
lection of past experiences or of some "true tradition." There are
still no grounds here for claiming that the membership of one group or
political persuasion remembers better or in a better way than another,
or that one kind of memory would best direct them if they could. I
have only suggested that many different things may assume guiding
importance as the memory of groups and individuals negotiates among
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ror uakeshott, however, tradition tmi«
represents only one kind and one posture of understanding.V
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,ne trad1t1 °" al k "°«l^e, is the full body of
un e fconsclous" practices of a people which have not been subjectedto interpretation by historians or declared "in principle" to be 1 wprecedents or the forma, requirements of a religious creed. e yconation of principles that has determined those varieties o
self-consc 10us understanding has meant the ruination of tradition ase sees t. Beyond this, tradition has an isolated force of its ownt precedes a self-conscious present and sustains its own virtue apartfrom ,t. It ,s not simply a manifestation of an earlier organization
of memory and earlier self-conscious interpretations of the past but
something quite beyond the usual foibles of personal memory* and
interpretation
- a special kind of memory that has evidently been
lost.
Beginning with his early and somewhat faded work, Experience and
its Modes (1933), and continuing into his notorious Rationalism in
P°1ltlCS ( 1962)
'
Oakeshott consistantly attacked what he called the"
"arrests" in experience that result from the piecemeal understanding
of scientists, political ideologues, historians and philosophers.
From the first it appeared to him that the world presented a "whole of
experience" which was abruptly cut short in every abstract, self-
consicous attempt to grasp it. 1 Only this whole of experience would
suffice as the measure of any one variety of knowledge, and its
adequacy or the very 'coherence and satisfaction' offered by each mode
of understanding, would be achieved only insofar as it addressed the
whole. By this account, most contemporary means of conceptualization
are abstract and arbitrary. Hence, the historical conception of the
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t e Oakeshott might succeed in upsetting the heganony of a doming
kind of reasoning. But something else was smoldering here. At firstIt appeared that the "practical" interested and present knowledge of a
received tradition, and the more "technical" knowledge of science andistory were on equal footing within the elusive whole of experience
both being partial and deficient. Yet as the argument developed in
Oakeshott's later work there were increasing differences between the
two. Ultimately practical knowledge and technical knowledge appear as
enem,es. Practical knowledge is not communicatively secured in the
way that it is currently for Haberaas and it is radically distin-
guished from technical knowledge which can be discursively fomulated
as rules for how to conduct an activity - it is the skill and ability
that grows within practices - an "idiom of activity" and a knowledge
of proper behavior. In fact, pratical knowledge is quietly received
over the genertaions, it is unspoken and it is more whole because it
is lived experience that is not subjected to abstract understanding. 6
In the end for Oakeshott, a practical knowledge of tradition comes to
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TO be a bit more concrete about this, it is the received
nowledge of skilled artistry, particularly the kind of learning that
S acquired in apprenticeship that Oakeshott co.es to admire as thebest illustration of tradition. He adopts the example of an ancientChinese story from Ch^ ^ to make his ^ ^ ^
hurt e wheelmaker was said to have disagreed with the venerable Huan
of CM
1 on the importance of reading the lessons of bygone sages. Hehad denounced the readings on the grounds that the sages were now
quite dead and their knowledge just as irrelevant as they. For this
Impertinence, Huan threatened the wheelmaker with death if he would
not satisfactorily justify the unorthodox attitude. To save himself
from that end the wheelmaker responded by arguing that the knowledge
needed for his own craft could not be learned in books; the depth of
stroke and the steadiness of hand which he must know come only from
the heart and cannot be put into words. 8 For Oakeshott, then, it is
this sort of practical knowledge as it is received and kept alive in
human activity that is the essence of custom and tradition, and he
does not seem to find any irony in the fact that he must now derive it
from a bygone sage as well. Technical knowledge on the other hand,
offers "rules, principles, directions, formulations", 9 and only the
appearance of certainty, and even when the two kinds of knowledge seem
to combine they are never the same thing.
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D°1U1Cally infl3med *s prmcples which have not been tested in the fires of long
primp ed political movements Invariably disrupt that tradition!
continuity Politics is now the domain of the rationalist who would
"pose a uniform, condition of perfection upon humanity," giving
sovereignty to "technique" in every sphere of life and offering onlythe most abstract justifications. 10 Yet despite this condonation
not every kind of reason is evil for Oakeshott. Some sort of coherent
government Is needed to navigate the inevitable changes in society and
to bridge the conflicts that arise within or among various traditions
For this he favors a variety of politics that operates in respect of
md lg inous traditions without abstract principles, and a system of
government that can mediate conflicts by way of enhancing their
underlying coherence - a system that derives its strength and
authority from a "concrete knowledge of the community." 11
Hence, Oakeshott becomes a philosophical traditionalist and a
most unusual kind of political conservative. Like Lukacs and with
similar roots in Hegel, he attempted to make a totality of social
experience into the measure of our time and a means beyond it. Like
the Frankfurt School he decried a technical rationality that had
seized the present, but unlike any of them he resolved himself in
favor of the quiet received knowledge imparted by tradition.
Tradition can be like the blood in the veins of a way of life and it
is the tried and accomplished. It holds with survival and stability
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"° °f hiSt°riCal ^ »m these dements, since historians can only translate, cannot
1 a! ? C3USeS " d ?r0t W"™* lay claim to thelegends and practices of the past," a„d no amount of class conscious-
ness could regain those elements without corrupting them. Neverthe-
less this tradition claims all of accumulated and forgotten under-
standing, without heed to the many different ways it is remembered
and ,n the end perhaps it claims too much. In his zeal to revive the
credibility of the lost arts of understanding, Oakeshott not only
makes the wheelmaker the equal of the sages, but he makes him their
superior. This is not at all because the wheelmaker produces the
economic values of society or has a special possibility of obtaining a
new consciousness, but because he is already possessed of a special
enduring and unselfconscious knowledge. We must wonder whether this
is really the only sort of remembrance that can provide instruction
with the endurance and vitality of tradition.
So the question of what a tradition is and of just how it
constitutes a moral directive within memory and society has not been
settled. As Neal Mood has said, tradition is Oakeshott's "most
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Weak"t in9redient"- He wants to make it solidnd m ly efficacious, and not abstract like natural law or
-or, principles, and yet it seems odd that, "while re ect ngmysticism of natural law he xrran+* » •, "
l'"s tne
tradition ,„ I
P al ™°St mystical conception ofMitto . m tradition. Oakeshott wishes to find a moralimperative which has .ore substance than the modern tor onto
religious myth. A traditional and habitual morality he savs
"Ot spring from reaction upon mora, principles and reprZ'uan unselfconscious exploitation of the genius of th. Th
mora! conduct, it does not amount toZ^^JTZ Umoral principles are too flippant, tradition is also fluid because itcannot be fixed to definite origins or events. It shou i d not^to a self-conscous myth of origins any more than it should beenumerated in abstract principles. Thus, for Oakeshott, tradition
"ever "founded", again, it grows continually in living contexts
™
IfU seems to provide moral ideals they can only make sense as they are
a sediment" within religious or social tradition and life activity
Otherwise, moral ideals become idolatry and are potentially adangerous obsession. 16 Simply put, if traditional knowledge is not
subjected to too much self-conscious examination it retains the
character of a moral artistry from the past. Traditional moral life
of this kind is a "habit of affection" and an automatic morality which
has no need of myth, rationalistic principles, historiography or
written lessons, and in that way it is like habits grown wise with
experience. But if moral principles are too restless and abstract
and tradition also shifts and changes, we must assume an almost
mystical faith in its dumb genius and we cannot know precisely where
this genius without agency is buried.
In an excellent essay submitted in honor of Michael Oakeshott,
J.G.A. Pocock also takes issue with this rather polished notion of
tradition. For him the given practices of a society are passed on in
ways that are either more, or less self-conscious and are almost never
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so raref,ed as Oakeshott would find then,. 1 * He argues that traditions
contam the conserved "self-images" of a society which are given in avery great variety of received
"transmissions" over time." There is
a distinct conceptual, and not merely a habitual root to these trans
missions and they are not unsel fconscious as Oakeshott maintained.
Societies, says Pocock, exist in time and they form guiding images of
themselves based on a conception of time and on the specific images of
ways of life that emerge within it. 20 Tradition is therefore a
variable thing, but it must always involve a sufficient awareness of
the continuity of social activity in time. This awareness~i7^T is
extrapolated from among different views of the past in such a way that
even "very simple societies" are to some degree self-conscious about
their traditions.
In this way, says Pocock, "the concepts which we form, and feed
back into tradition have the capacity to modify the content and
character of the tradition conceptualized and even the extent to which
it is conceived and regarded as tradition." 21 m opposition to
Oakeshott, tradition is conceptualized in a way that it never just
comes from the "heart" no matter how lyrical Oakeshott meant to be in
borrowing the phrase, and this conceptualization is always and
everywhere active to the point that no pure tradition can be distin-
guished from it. Indeed, the very quiet continuity of insti tutiona-
lized practice that Oakeshott calls tradition is invariably compounded
with certain myths in practice, like the myths of the Greek polis, and
those myths, in turn, create sacred or epic origins quite self-
consciously. 2 According to Pocock then, Oakeshott errs in presuming
that there can be some unpolluted transmission of traditional know-
ledge and the presence of myth is a case in point. Most traditions
claim an origin or consciously invent one and they are not merely
inherited or presumed. A question arises as to what past practices
qualify as tradition and how far back within one kind of experience a
people may go to find the derivatives that ground their traditions.
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So here we have the debate: Oakeshott wants to see tradition ,
.continuity of received knowledge providing moral guidanc f •which is unselfconscious and without myth or orla^T ld ,
'
ever free of conceptual, zation, and it must contain a measure of
or society and a continuity of sel f-cnn«<-in,. c ^
Trarfit^n «. * .
onsc ous identity in time.ditio therefore, Is a highly selective matter and it should notcorrupt Rococo criticism to add that if there are many pasts whUh
comprise It it engages many capacities of memory as well, some which
e .ore and some which are less self-consciously creative, and thereis no simple way that traditional memory can be rarefied in theory orpractice. J
Tradition, li ke the corrupt study of history and every other
consideration of the past is a matter of the present for Oakeshott 23
Yet, it is what it has survived to be without a lot of interpretation
since it is adaptive to practices. But if this is so, and if some
sort of interpretation is required to keep it present, then to a
considerable extent tradition is whatever it is taken to be. As
Oakeshott insists, when science blends with historiography to examine
the social past, it searches for impossible causes and origins within
what is really continuous experience, and it makes a "monsterous
Incursion" into the past. 24 However, it is no longer clear why
"tradition" does not produce similar distortions in keeping current,
and it would not be saved from a similar fate by being unselfconscious
even if it could be. Further, if the mind and memory could be a
passive receptacle as Oakeshott must assume in this case, how do we
know that they would receive all of the gifts of tradition? For
Oakeshott as for his critics, Pocock and Wood, tradition is very much
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zzizr rr tothe considemion *special status. TradUion involves a thematic, selective social
retard within it. There are not even any guarantees that wrecord those practices that work host, and it would be a grave sto grant this faculty of traditional mem0ry the status of „ rProcess of selection. A "traditional » style of triage for Ixal em y survive despite the fact that it was .ore the exception than the
li e E T Pr3Ct1CeS ™ " ^ 66 m°re 0f the W «.t people"k. to re^ber the practice than the way it ever was, and it 1pers,st not because it is tried and true but because it has been
chosen in such a way that the choice only seeas to be unselfconscious
now.
As a living aspect of the present tradition must change, and
where its proponents self-consciously resist change they corrupt as
much as they preserve. Even to the limited degree that Oakeshott
admits that it may change in slight "deviations" made in faithful
sensitivity" to its legacy - and no matter how slowly that change is
tempered by experience, it is not completely beyond the conscious
deliberation of individual minds. 25 if Pocock is correct when he
argues that people make a sense of origins for themselves and
establish myths and markers in the experience of time that are
continually reconceptual ized, then the crack opens wider and we may
expand the argument. In the most orthodox Passover service, or royal
ceremony, or manner of making wheels, tradition and change have
resided together and new addenda to a prescribed memory have been
chosen. The oldest ritual either was once self-consciously contrived
or must now in the present be made to seem unyielding to new circum-
stances with deliberate care, and it never merely survives as it was
or changes dormantly without moments of awakening. Someone must
contribute by rational or aesthetic judgements made in retrospect and
those who do, are no more the villains who spoil tradition than they
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P lce *- Here, indeed, the question must be
rpened for if traditions and even habits do involve conceptuali-
zations then they must involve the two other kinds of things that
Peter Winch has identified in criticizing Oakeshott. First those
conceptualizations must involve rules that are shared in the 'activi-
ties and communications of a group since, "the very existence of
concepts depends on group life." 26 Yet, unlike the unsel fconscious
habits that Oakeshott praises, the central feature of these rules is
that they can be formulated even if they are not; they indicate a
right and^ wrong way of proceeding and they are not learned simply by
copying. Secondly, then, the learning involved in traditional
activities must also involve reflectiveness
, or if it is ever to adapt
*As Alasdair Maclntyre warns in After Virtue: A Study in MoralTheory, Second Edition (Notre Dame : University of Notre Le Press
^onc
W
e
e
n?
re
nf
aP
t' 'h-J
6 mi
l
led
k
here by the idea^^ uses to which
5h2Ji.*. P rJ r* dlJt1 ?" has been by conservative political
cSn?r^Hnn ,
Cha
;.\
c
.
teri stically such theorists have followed Burke in
conmct
9
Ro?h
ltl0
r
W?h rKer° n and the Stabim* of ^dition withonflic . B t contrasts obfuscate.
. .Traditions, when vital embodvcontinuities of conflict." pp. 221-222. y
200
It requires at least, "the possibility of reflection " 28 it
certain self-awareness of maTOry.
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In that case, however, we seem to be in a bind w
that habits and traditions could not be more fix d1 th
concepts within then,, and not more stable 1 h Sh,ft1n9
that Cflu • Di than the whims of a memorvthat self-consciously assigns importance to its events stST Useems certain that traditions do endure and that there i's
ty of rules that allow one to appjy criteria without necebeing able to formulate criteria, as winch tells us. 25 We fl„ tIIIthe durability of traditions depends upon their status as ru
l
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are liable but not formulated
- resistant to the manipulation!
consciousness and selective memory, but not to the extent of becoming
unse f i 0 hab1ts
. Thus> wUh1n puies bja «2
fixed, this characteristic durability of the traditional deserves
examination.
Now, If we are to identify the enduring quality of rules and
traditions, or that continuity in time that informs the community as
Pocock understands it, it must turn upon the shared concepts that are
most jealously guarded and and most deeply embodied in a receptive
apparatus of memory that allows practices to endure. That is
traditions must be fixed, or joined within the polarity of concepts of
space, time and genesis that fosters an orientation in memory. But if
they are conceptually fixed, that alone does not account for the
unselfconscious constancy of tradition that Oakeshott valued so
highly. Beyond the common poles of conceptualization - and even
beyond rules in a sense - there must be a means of weighting down the
elements that count as traditions, for they do, after all, persist as
if they could be isolated, constant and dumbly received. In order for
it to be this way, we may suppose that a traditional practice must
offer a bit of order to memory, it must draw together the elements of
memory which are self-conscious and changeable - as they were in the
ancient memory arts - with the elements which are habitual, and those
which endure like unforgettable objects stored in memory. In other
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words, for southing to count as a tradition it must have one foot inthe merely habitual and another in the more self const 1
-orv. It must make its reappearance in ?~
I^t at 1S fonmulable hut not formulated - precisely beca tconcerned to provide orientation in both domains together
Further, there are always aspects of memory that straddle thosemams, but in order for the, to constitute
'traditional" guid
ey mu st forge the unity in such a way and with sufficient agree.Illt be elevated in importance above all other sorts of m«ry and
- itT„".
mi9ht perta1n t0 the practices ^Trad ions are not just rules and they are not simply old practices-they are venerable practices and a "traditional way of life' Uconstituted Insofar as a "traditional" memory heads the hierarchy of
-any kinds of memory. That specially instructive memory might
predominate in the skilled activity of making a wheel, or it may bethe primary source of guidance In the "simple societies" to which
Pocock refers, but in either case it is a resolution of several types
of memory that are fixed by virtue of agreeable concepts, rules, and
within a hierarchy of differently valued reflexive abilities. In the
same way that we found that the prevailing Instructive uses of memory
may be variously fitted within rhetoric, Prudence, science, certain
tasks or practices, or in a psychologically informed sense of self or
in the creation of myths, it is a hierarchical arrangement of memory
that determines which sort of content will endure as a guiding memory.
The hierarchy determines which elements of memory will be unself-
conscious and enduring yet memorable at once, whether they start out
as myths, habits or scientific principles. Therefore, in every action
that might be considered to accompany a traditional practice, there is
a series of evocations and a set of familiar associations that reflect
an instructive order of favored memories. There is a particular means
of following rules that is accessible to consciousness but not con-
scious and which generally harks back to a time when unselfconscious
memories were most favored as means of instruction. But it is the
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me. t is a certain sort of memory - a practical attitude towardthe past, not a scientific, technical or contemplative one - whichprovides one means of following rules.3° And 1t „ , certa1 „ kJ J
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skills, artistry, family and institutional practices, and
the two are taken together. He does not explicitly acknowledge thatit is the retention of that content within a "practical'' sort of
memory that provides the particular sort of "coherence" that he
admires. For this reason he does not see how many other sorts of
retention and content might also acquire the endurance of that
particular combination to achieve the weight of a tradition. He does
acknowledge that there is a broad scale of possible attitudes toward
the past which is currently headed by the attitude of the self-
conscious historian, but he does not see how very fluid that scale can
be. Hence, where one sort of tradition is comprised by a practical
memory of how things are done, that does not suffice as the measure of
all other continuities of practice that might ultimately count as a
tradition. It is possible for a self-conscious and technical attitude
to 'sink in' and provide enough order for memory and practice to
become a guide for right behavior. Even the abstract and rather
mystical notion of "tradition" today may be a step between the mythic
creations of a self-conscious memory and the unquestioned endurance of
certain notions that will ultimately make them venerable, and it is
not clear that rationalism now rules in every domain.
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in any case, it should be clear that people's traditions, liketheir self-concepts, contain a rather mixed stream of elements. It isnot the age of these elements, but their status within an entire
orientation that gives them a venerable weight since people always
create new myths, origins and principles as well as receive them
'"d
"o
d
;-
th1
,
S
.
1S
..
Why
°
akeSh0tt h
" d1ff1CUlty 1n locati "9 ^e origins
of Rationalism which he would like to cite as a relatively new and
corrosive force. For him rationalism must have had a decisive
beginning particularly because it was the great virtue of traditon
that it has had no specific beginnings. Most often he suggests that
modern rationalism began with Descartes and Bacon, but he also finds
Us source among the ancient Greeks and in Machiavelli. 32 Perhaps
rationalism also has no beginnings if it is not a historical force per
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"Strained by what groups arelli g to snare, and it is both habitual and rationalistic in a
undamental sense. Oakeshott has not sufficiently isolated these
rms and his bulk categories of "history",
"ideology",
"science"
tradition",
"custom", "habit", etc. are not adequate to disc se thevarious pathways of retrospective understanding which combine
creative rationalistic side with an unselfconscious and traditional
Consider the singular experience that occurs when returning to along forgotten place which triggers a rush of happy memories. That
sensibility which we generally identify as nostalgia is too self-
conscious and makes too much of a comparison between past and present
to be a part of Oakeshott's tradition, it is a shade between a
contemporary rationalization and the presence of the past, but is this
not where a great deal of the continuity of experience resides? Upon
returning to this place one may set about making wheels in the way
that it used to be done, recall the skills and lessons learned there,
sing the old songs, seeking out and choosing the old places to walk.'
If this sort of return is made regularly and even daily, the distinc-
tion between past and present may blur and fade along with the feeling
of nostalgia, but many of the same applications of mind persist.
Whether the return is a belated one or a repeated one the attitudes
which accompany it are not merely habitual, they are not held in the
grip of tradition and they are not just a self-conscious and rational
reminiscences, but they are all of these things - a preponderance of
influences and capacities on the stage of memory which cannot be
divided up so neatly.
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observance of rules, each Earned and kept in different sorts of
n-emory. It U not only dependent upon habit, someone must teach it
and someone must always maintain it deliberately or it will be
forgotten, and it ultimately succeeds as a tradition when the habitual
sort of memory only heads the hierarchy while others must bow to it.
Oakeshott really must be appreciated for his remarkable persis-
tence and clarity in awakening themes that are always in danger of
being buried by philosophy. Even as he contends purely with a world
of ideas, and for him there is no other world, it must be emphasized
that this is not the usual idealist world of abstractions. He is
driven by a desire to make that world concrete, whole and coherent
and to stamp out abstractions with no more remorse than his materia-
list critics. He wants to return the standard of lived human
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There is also truth to Oakeshotfs idea that something li ke
ratlonaHsm purges former meanings by replacing them with abstractprinciples like the abstract symbolisms that replaced the artificial
memory, and that this has moral implications. As he says for
example, "In our eagerness to realize justice we come to forget
charity, and a passion for righteousness has made many a man hard and
merciless." Moral ideals scarcely fill such a "hollowness in our
moral life." Nevertheless, if there is a certain consistency to the
sorts of experience that generate morality which has been lost, there
is a problem in identifying those persons who ever had that experience
and how it may have seemed charitable and full for them. For
Halbwachs that sort of consistency could reside with all of the
different groups that individuals enter into in many combinations, and
for collective memory it could also rest on a self-consciousness based
upon illusions. If memory plays a part in retaining this consistency
it may "enlarge or compress" a framework of understanding as if to
present it in a "uniform light". 35 But for this reason as well, it is
not clear why we should fully accept Oakeshotfs vision of a uniform
consistency of tradition which has been disrupted in one long fell
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Oakeshott is too absolute about things which are elusive Hisfirst attempts to elucidate a "whole of experience" concluded as Heoo indicates in an "endless striving for unattainab
*
tion
,
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forms of knowledge and that the limits to each in grasping a legacy
re part of a pattern in retrospective thought that divides up their
oma.ns He might have offered a lesson for social reflection tofollow, but he was too busy insisting that those fields were by their
nature incapable of grasping broader experience, and too intent upondefining their problem as being one of "abstraction". He wanted to
close off the random avenues of escape for abstraction, and conse-
quently he was caught in a position where he could not or would not
discuss other means of expanding retrospective knowledge since they
also must seem abstract. In Experience and vts Modes, we are directed
to pursue the "whole" or nothing. 37 All other knowledge is defective
as a social guide, save the traditional knowledge that is emphasized
in his later work. Yet, if he had not abandoned the problems raised
by a conscious pursuit of the "whole", and had not leaped to elevate
tradition over rationalism, and "unselfconsciousness" over critique,
he might well have offered critical and not conservative resolutions
to the same problems. Then, he might not have lost sight of the means
by which knowledge may strive to embrace life experience and those in
which "practical" knowledge may become discursive and reflexive as it
can for Habermas. A standard of "totality" is admittedly a weak
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shot can only define tradition as he does by subtracting
things, but significantly people do not make the same subtraction intheir daily lives any more than they might switch off the creative
capacities at work in artificial memory. For all of his concern about
experience', Oakeshott misses the complexity of experiences as they
are lived, felt and thought about. When we to look inside of custom
myth, religion, artistry or the "good" prejudices of the child we
would find that there has always been room for deliberating imagina-
tion, just as it persists side by side with Winch's 'rules,' and some
abstraction has always constructed elements that are later taken for
tradition. It is not abstraction that distinguishes tradition from
ideology or science, but the kinds of elements that are included in
each and the ways that they are recalled. Once people begin to
remember selectively they construct certain facets of their own
continuity in time, and the creation of laws and principles has
already begun. Abstraction is as old as memory and older than the
wheelmaker's skills, and it is only a very specialized modern
orientation toward life and nature that makes certain abstractions
dangerous in the way that Oakeshott fears they always must be. It is
an unfortunate reduction to call all of this "rationalism", and to
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on become part of what is assumed to be traditional as it envelops
other tradUlons, and there is no simple and direct transmission from
the past in such newly "agreed upon conventions." 40 Privately we
move among different sorts of time without much thought, and that
movement occurs within the boundaries of corcnon time. Habitually we
may measure the depth of stroke as we carve something or glance at a
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The problem becomes more acute when we examine Oakeshott'sunderstanding of changes in society. At the same
cept of tradition becomes a solid basis for diagnosing
nge he wants to argue that it is not a fixed and rigid thingthe contrary, tradition enab,es a certain kind of freedom from tP-er that is exercised through ideology and rational as it al
a ows a 9Ball OTOunt of change
_ ^ ^ there ^ <a
mvent,veness at the heart of every traditional way of life
Tradition is free to change in accord with new circumstances as it
"'J " 11fe «- "* something calculated orapplied. Nevertheless, if tradition is adaptive and may change and itis also is standard for judging change, there is a paradox in
Oakeshott s reasoning. On the one hand it is a standard of morality
and politics, but on the other hand it can only be found within them
and ,s only an internal measure of conduct. Says Pocock, "his basic
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position ,s that the existing arrangements of society contain their
to he evaluated by some standard existing outside themselves."" Howthen could we understand the meaning of an internal measure beyond
s-mply assuming that it exists? If tradition is part of existing
social arrangements and changes with them, how can it be a standardfor measuring the onslaught of rationalism?
The paradox sharpens when tradition comes under the scrutiny of
theory, and especially when it becomes an explicit theoretical
foundat10n for Oakeshott. He maintains that any principle imposed
upon society is doctrinaire but in order to make his claim he must
ins, st that tradition provides a standard outside of some aspects of
socety which may be used to judge what is doctrinaire. In this way
tradit,on can only serve as a standard for judging what is doctrinaire
when ,t ceases to be unselfconsciously what it is. If tradition
remains to be only what is lived and practiced, it cannot step outside
of society, or predate it, or be discovered in a manner that will
suffice as a standard of judgement. Further, if tradition is part of
societal change and is taken as its measure at the same time, it
cannot conduct a self-examination and it fails utterly to disclose
when tradition itself may become a power directed against other
freedoms. Oakeshott does not quite create the kind of "rationali-
zations purporting to elicit the 'truth' of tradition" that he
hates, but he makes a standard out of it anyway which is potentially
just as dangerous.
As Hannah Pitkin points out, this internal measure provides a
theory of_ tradition but with it Oakeshott cannot do tradition, he,
"does not teach us how to create a traditional society. Indeed, he
does not think one can be created." 45 We cannot take any of this
theory as advice because change should not occur self-consciously. To
act on Oakeshott' s ideas would involve a conscious appeal to tradition
and to a bygone social continuity which would be ruptured in the very
act of the appeal. Still, however, change must occur in the minds of
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people for Oakeshott, and if that is at all true then we can only make
the kind of judgements that he does by a very self-conscious under-
standing of tradition which, especially today, must be revived and
recreated by conscious and reasoned memory.
So, to isolate something called tradition in theory does not give
us a very sound basis for further judgement especially when tradition
is at once the final judgement. We would find a similar paradox if we
were to measure forgetful ness by the lost content of what is for-
gotten, in fact, however, when we say that something has been
forgotten, just as when we say that traditions have been lost we are
referring to lost content that we cannot quite grasp; we a're also-
referring to the process of forgetting and to the attempt to retrieve
what has been forgotten. Indeed, we struggle with the problem
self-consciously. When we seek to measure what has been lost in that
way, we do not make a standard out of the missing content, but we seek
to compare what we can still grasp of the way that we understood
things before something was lost, with the way that we do now. We try
to mentally recreate the context which once held the things that are
nearly forgotten. We cannot make those things our standard any more
than we can make unsel fconscious tradition into a foundation of
theoretical judgement, and yet as we barely recall old habits, we may
compare them with new ones in an attempt to conceptualize the change.
In this way, loss itself is always a theoretical matter, as the notion
of something lost is at once an attempt to understand what has been
lost; to sort out our mental processes in time, and attempt to reclaim
what we may. Loss is only perceived in the attempt to find or to
remember
. 'Lost tradition' is a very self-conscious invention and it
is an equally self-conscious perception of change. If tradition
changes for Oakeshott, and it has been lost to rationalism, and it is
a standard for judging the loss all at once, it cannot be unsel f-
conscious at the same time. Rather tradition is three different
things each of which is conscious in a different way: it is the lost,
213
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.ore
conscious and to be articulated. Especially when we take t
unque,t,oning dumb quality of tradition as a historical standard to
disclose the horrors of rationalise, then It Is suddenly an abstract
theoretical principle and i-ediately the term ••tradition" refers tohree distinct things, one which is like habit, one which has thefacility to adapt to change, and one which is an applied measure that
refers to a preferred past way of life. The first cannot be known
the second contrives and the third is a contrivance. Oakeshott
conflates the three in a way that anyone who cherishes tradition above
all else is doomed to repeat.
He teaches us quite correctly that if we wish to measure the
extraordinary changes that have occurred in the assumptions of a
society, we would do well to identify which aspects persist unques-
tioned in lived experience or a kind of living memory of the flesh.
If such things are alive however, they are alive as they are used, and
as they are used they involve a selective memory that may also be
directed toward the many things which are not simply assumed in
society, not just habitual or customary. Thus, in place of tradition
the only standard which might capture the historic complex of changes
in the multifacited legacy of experience must be the comparison of
whole selective world views of a people in which the shared division
of the past into different sectors may be revealed as the condition in
which a certain unsel fconscious tradition is fixed and esteemed. On
the ground of tradition as Oakeshott saw it, we can only engage in
wishful thinking about what has been lost, when what we need to know
is how the retention of past practice has been altered to fit within
new common ways of understanding and acting.
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"Tradition", like "rationalism", designates a variably important
part of a way of life but it is never a whole way of life. For that
reason, Oakeshott is mistaken in assuming that tradition is the place
where many substantive elements of a past life come together and
coalesce. At best, and only once it is defined in the manner that he
has defined it, tradition is itself one of the many streams of
elements that really come together in the shared memory orientations
of identity. It may stand at the border between the habits and
self-conscious life choices of a group as it continually reshapes its
identity but it cannot suffice as a measurement outside of that
identity. To the extent that continuity, or a myth of consistency has
clearly been maintained for many people we may critically comment on
its loss, but that only makes sense as we struggle to grasp the
"whole" of identity and its past orientations which are not simply
presumed and habitual, and not necessarily "rational." The critical
retrospective stance from which this must always be done may have
respect for the venerable weight of repetitious memories, but it
cannot duplicate them to become truly traditional or 'properly'
conservative.
Though we may not be able to grasp the "whole of experience" as
Oakeshott realized, we may come to understand how thought and actions
only make sense to people within a mnemonic constellation of identity
for which tradition is a fluid component. If, with him, we want to
enhance understanding of the great changes that have been introduced
with political systems like Communism, Fascism and Liberalism then it
will be done by unveiling new consistencies in belief. To do this we
must dissect tradition with some reverence and examine the habits,
customs, artistry and change that Oakeshott condenses under its wing.
We must examine how such things are recalled and how certain contents
within them have acquired new depths of conviction. Where Oakeshott
does begin to reveal these elements it is because he is doing much
more than he claims to do. Indeed he has done it by committing his
own abstraction, by supposing that tradition can be a pristine
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-on and rationalism taken together, and retained together in theminds of the many.
individuals in Oakeshotfs scheme may have some "free choice-hut his version of freedom is a paradigm case of how free choice has
often betrayed a larger freed™, when an entire modality of social
reflection is so closely prescribed that it simply accepts the given
there may still be free choice for individuals, but such complicity
with tradition is a directed free choice which may leave very little
to consciousness. It is not necessarily the kind of choice which
creates options or affects the course of identity. Certainly where
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ski". He favors the leadership of this aristocratic class over any
newcomers to politics and especially over the poor whose unruly
passions lead to pernicious political principles and ideology. Thesepass 10ns alone are enough to frighten him as Pitkin indicates 49 Not
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;°7n°ther With°Ut ^ r6SPe« » - ^ can dot l be ause he does not see how they rest together within a hierarchy
of different kinds of memory which determines their weight and value.
Nevertheless there must really be two traditions that he cannot
acknowledge equally, one of ruling class power and the other o^
working class life processes and the demands that arise within them
and his favoritism for the traditional leadership of an upper class is
only justified by the tautology that: they who have governed bestgovern best; and power is, what the powerful have claimed that it is
Where theory makes a standard of only one sort of past or one kind of
memory this is a likely outcome.
Certainly the working classes were once more thoroughly excluded
from politics than they seem to be in the Western democracies, but
since Oakeshott is writing at a time when neither the lower classes
nor aristocrats control the political machinery, there is no "tradi-
tional" reason why he should advocate the tradition of one as a better
power over the other for the present. To be fair, and in face of
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c asses and oddly enough it is see of Oakeshotfs inimical Marxist
who c erish these traditional skills far more than aristocrats or
traditionalists.
0*t*ott prefers to foster the myth, or at best the partialtruth that power is a traditional skill which ought to be subject toinheritance and deserves a special place over other skills By
suggesting this however he misses the interplay of forces that
establish who will have power and how it is retained and wielded
After all, power may be a most self-conscious thing in the hands of
leaders just as it may be a composite of skills. It may also be ah^hly abstract set of tactics which are created by ruling classes as
"luch as it is simply lived by others. He can omit these elements from
proper political power only because he blames "abstraction" for
ruining a tradition of power and because he does not see that it is an
abstract and selective recollection that constructs tradition in the
first place and has made it the vessel of power for millennia. Of
course, it is also not true, as Pitkin points out, that the poor are
always more passionately driven to make their place in politics by
abstract ideological principles, and it is the ruling classes who have
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een
.asters of this sort of abstraction. 5 ' AUhough Oakeshott triesto exempt the., aristocrats and indeed traditiona, ists
no .ore innocent of selectively distorting past tradition
are workers or radicals, they just do it in different ways
Oakeshotf
s
attempt to ground a conservative political persoecive in tradition reflects the modern tendency to sLe ^"SJto oust, f,
-
power upon a vision of the past. Once there were paterna-
; °
f k1n9S>
"
He3Venly CU1es or *« "ncep-t of na ura
.an" that sufficed, but since Hegel's dialectical
Spirit, Marx s adapts "Species Being" and liberal relativis. such
cla,.s have lost their convincing power. Now a
.ystical tradition
appears to be the
.ost secure and defensible grounding for conserva-
tls. w,thin a context of rapid change. But it is a tradition that hasbeen torn fro. its own place within a fomer hierarchy of instinctive
pasts in order to justify a particular sort of political leadership
today. With industrialization and
.assive shifts in population, with
the first and second World Wars pitting Individuals against inco.pre-
hens,ble circumstances, with political administrations, science and
industry all making various claims to legitimacy something certainly
has been lost, yet what that is remains unclear and it is arbitary and
opportunistic to claim to be its heir.
As more complacent traditional orientations to life have been
disrupted, the efforts to ground new ones have been speeded up today
so that we can now see how similar efforts were always undertaken.
Within those very efforts Oakeshotf s work is pivotal and exemplary.
His is among the last great attempts to justify a conservative legacy
and to locate and claim it, and his failure is even more suggestive.
It crystallizes a modern Western desire to have things two ways — to
recall and implement tradition without debate and at the same time to
defend it as a moralizing standard of continuity — to have the old
and make it new. But as a kaleidoscope of past meaning shifts more
rapidly and the elements come into focus or fade, it seems increasing-
ly difficult to believe that this is possible. Perhaps the most
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significant truth that Oakeshott reveals is «,.
h ave accepted his argument as va / ^ «•
longer, n Is not !-,.„«« u- 6 and cannot any
accent th. " ^
bee
"
l0St but *• ability top e given myth of consistency as a leoacv fh„ V
sufficient restrictions to guide a clpfex\ £ "ZZZ 'l
-a,ns a myth that is charge, with sad nostalgic lodging ^1
eot th
tan9ied for that attnude to
«•»• - np ings as they are, it is on different grounds. Today th"notion of an uncontested tradition has become a diminished polemodern orientation toward the os<t u„ 1L ,
nature st a „Hc <= !
anthropology about human
stands for certam, and no quiet tradition can replace it wherechanges come so quickly and legacies are so nebulous
Between neo-conservatives and certain Marxists today there aredifferent self-conscious attempts to reclaim the past, and as
traditionalist Oakeshott would still condemn them both in a way that
remains somewhat instructive. From his early work onward he sought atotal Ity of l,ved experience but this could only mean the survivingder,vat,ves of the past. His totality could only reside in thepresent residues of such , past> MU ^ Qf ^
Lukacs could only be discovered in the future. If Oakeshott's
totality required too little self-consciousness and LukScs' too much
then between the two there might be some point of balance. Oake-
shott's could only reiterate the past and Lukacs' only overthrow it
and Oakeshott may have reified tradition while Lukacs rationalized
total, ty. Neither was able to base their claims on expanded retro-
spectre knowledge sufficiently or in place of "totality", and neither
could fully explain the selective apprehensions of the past which had
founded a rationalistic or reified domination.
Today one must wonder about precisely what has been lost and what
we might wish to reclaim from it and of course there are more cautious
liberals, Marxists and conservatives who are doing just that. They
must ask whether we should lament the loss of unselfconscious
knowledge, innocence, habit and custom, or press beyond it. Now, if
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it is not traditions that have been
-«. -
.. ;-r »to approach such faded pasts lies in . h- , UaKesnott - the only „ay
of thi„ gs past, presentTnd lt e Cr
Habermas suggests with particular sensitivity to
" "
experiences. It must mean
.
.TS^'T? " ^not only the philosophical preoccupation „ «>»"«ces -
simplified form be it th
P OCCU l
««! experience in some
,.j 14, uaiiea traditional exDeripnrpand it must mean a concern for loss that is «if •
P nence
'
a-Pt to find. Purther, if J s^ tt"g" UsTcIrtain I
^iirr:: oakeshott makes « - -—
~"
Oakeshott is extremely cautious about the enterprise of thehistorian and he is esDeciallv r»-,-t^»i *
i<m,t<. .
P^'a' y critical of the scientists attempt to
1
sol ate elements of the past „ ke the causal elements of an ex eri
"j;Ty ,r sapproves of efforts to »- s
*
s c ab trac methods and therefore the historical endeavor can neve
seem?; '
1nClUSlV6 M
^selve
.It eems however, that it is not tradition which he should praise inposition to history, but the gualities of an inclusivewh seeks to grasp more of the whple without assuming causes an
withou reducing the importance of Lived experience. Again, if he hadpursued the idea of knowledge seeking after the whole he might have
advocated an expansive retrospective knowledge which is both self-
conscious and more fully appreciative of lived experience. Instead he
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believes that he has seen enough unsatisfying attempts to rfn >mremain skeptical about the possibility for an t,i
th,S t0
If we fully accept his cautions against selert^ ,
:;
the
;r: r
accept ^ t0 the po1;t
«
t^ t:t:z
^ arter all. We could only do what k~
ought to in his eyes. Whereas the -„ I ,
hlSt°r1an
k.,u , „
were practical man reads the oastbackwards" and is favored by Oakeshott s < ho •
oa<t .....
u K n as he, recognizes only thosees events which he can relate to present activities,"" the gohis onan excludes nothing. For such historians,
"nothing
as 'non-contributory- and they assume, "neither a practi ! norsclent f1c, nor a contemplative attitude."" The pas is re e^d i
own salce and not to be applied or used,
just be practical people and forego other aspects of our conscious-
ness, and cannot be disinterested historians as we fashion our own
ways of living, then despite Oakeshott we must land somewherein-between. The only proper course open to us that will avoid
resignation and avoid ideological fanaticism is a creative and
expansive historical inquiry which regains cognizant of traditional
interests and practices, and cognizant of passions and needs, and ofhow they are remembered. As Pocock suggests, it is necessary that we
begin a dialogue that involves, "a constant discussion and redefini-
tion of the modes of continuity and authority which link past to
present and give the present its structure." 56 Only this sort of
dialogue about tradition (and not the force of tradition itself) can
prevent the past from becoming a sectarian tool of present interests.
As Alasdaire Haclntyre puts it, "a living tradition then is a
historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition." 57
It is this argument that we must undertake in a particular way that
brings to light our own selective interests.
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Oakeshott'
s category of tradition and any one who relies on such
a notion, will not provide the expansive accounting of the currents of
social memory which would contribute to this task. It omits too many
tributaries in the makeup of cultural consistency as it derides
abstraction, self-consciousness and passion. As people are con-
strained by circumstances to accept certain rules of behavior they may
well perceive by themselves that some traditions have been summoned up
to silence others, some to inhibit or to direct thought, imagination
or instinct. With this awareness they may select and measure only
certain aspects of the very things that they are already constrained
to accept and Oakeshott seems oblivious to that awareness and that
struggle. If there is a deeper wisdom of the heart which directs a
way of life it is not tradition as such, but a cross webbing of
various kinds of experience some of which is very old and some new,
and a chorus of instructive memories which are always mixed and
chosen at the same time as they are delimited in their own ranking.
Again, the diagnosis of loss which seeps through the dichotomy
between tradition and rationalism, obscures the subtle ways that the
past has actually been kept alive in the present. As Oakeshott
focuses attention on what has been lost and not upon how it is still
present, he misses the real loss, the loss of the mnemonic propensity
to accept the given as_ traditional. He cannot recreate tradition and
worse, he obstructs ways of seeing through the processes which
generate tradition in the first place which establish the conceptual
poles and hierarchy of certain kinds of memory making them more fixed
and more esteemed than others as a means of determining the moral
directives for a way of life.
We should learn from this that theories of the loss of something
past may generally present a diagnostic roadblock and a catchall that
freezes understanding and possible recollection. Neither the
prevailing attitudes of the Western world nor the "new conservatism"
of America can be written off as rationalism. They cannot be
adequately assessed as individualism run wild, as the abuse of
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tradition or as a new narcissism which has purged itself of the past
and become isolated from traditional meanings. To draw such firm
conclusions we would have to accept some limited notion of tradition
as a measure or some happy vision of the past and too many theorists
who are conservative and radical do just that. We might discover much
more, however, if we realize that it is the links to the past, and the
ways that themes from the past are altered to fit the present which
are definitive and not the rationalistic erasure of tradition.
Then we would be asking more focused questions directed at the
details of experience which would instruct us to combine a reflective
memory, research and debate with certain built in safe-guards against
dogma. If tradition is not a force in its own right but a mode of
retaining specialized mnemonic contents to direct identity and a way
of life, then we must look at it from a direction that is the opposite
of the one that Oakeshott has taken. We must ask how it is concep-
tualized, how it is a party to power, how it is impassioned and
selective and how it plays the mnemonic trick of appearing so fixed
and solid as a legacy. We would have to ask what things now qualify
as the elements of a given cultural consistency, how the transmission
of past practices are received or recalled, how the duration of
certain beliefs seems to make them "traditional" while other new ones
achieve the same weight, how broadly shared they must be, and how the
media may enter into and direct them? We would have to ask what
tradition is as opposed to "collective memory" attached to the lives
and experiences of the members of a group. Does it rest upon a mass
conservative impulse or an instinct like the "compulsion to repeat" in
psychoanalytic theory? Is it freely manipulated at times by political
or economic interests? In short, what are the conditions of an
apparent mnemonic continuity and repetition, are they wedded to
certain conceptualizations (such as those of places, time and
creativity), and pointedly, if tradition is like a memory of the
heart, what fulfills its function today or displaces the need for it?
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To what degree may self-conscious researches of a cultural legacy
displace more unreflective ones?
In America the need to ask these questions has become acute. It
may not be the loss of tradition — of one repetitive organization of
memory wedded to practice - that affects us today, but the absence of
a coherent orientation of memory overall. If a musing, psychologi-
cally self-conscious private memory, and a tendency to produce new
myths are paramount among our current means of apprehending the past
as I suggested earlier, there is also no precise hierarchy of elements
in which a particular consistancy might be called traditional. Today,
instead, we feel nostalgic about a consistancy that has no clear
content and we might praise almost any tradition that becomes
venerable by virtue of the mystery that surrounds it. In some measure
nostalgia, which is selective memory par excellence, has come to
replace traditional guidance by effecting a unity between history,
fantasy and the self. So we seek to create a new myth of traditional
consistancy and a new fixity of memory that will provide orientation.
As we selectively search the past there are numerous "traditions" that
may be charged with reverence for our own "attempt to find." Yet
perhaps in the confusion, it is precisely this self-conscious sifting
of memories that will begin to assemble the necessary ingredients of a
new order of memory that bears the force of a tradition for better or
for worse.
Now when one observes the audience at a play or a concert it is
readily apparent that the old customs have dramatically transformed
and not just by rationalism. In local American theatres, erstwhile
television watchers may sometimes be seen yawning and stretching in
the front row or even to rest their feet on the stage, and one
reported to me that her "eyes were bored". They may wear all manner
of clothing as they proclaim the advantage of being "casual." Custom
may have transformed in discernible ways as the minds of its partici-
pants are filled with new imagery. Weddings are still more confusing,
from the expectation of attire to the understandings of the meaning of
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the ceremony and marriage itself. Will the wife stay at home or go to
work? If she stays at home is it "traditional", "religious" "primor-
dial and instinctual" or a convenient modern choice of one way of
dividing tasks. Such things are actually discussed and there is a
strand of "tradition" to buttress every choice once it has been made.
In America one must wonder how many traditions one may belong to, what
is a patriot with immigrant ethnic pride who is a Catholic, belongs
to the Masons, identifies as a liberal and who misses Walter Cronk-
heit? Are there traditions which groups or families make for
themselves infused with the instructions of law or public education,
advertising or media mini
-series? Are children still fond of cowboys
and indians or have these virtually traditional adversaries been
displaced by "bionics" or "the Hulk" and equally new enemies? Has
nationalism now grounded itself on different memories, are the old
principles which once separated "us" from "the enemy" still in force,
be they ideological or traditional, when it is perceived that "we"
fight "them" for the oil, and not so much for a principled way of
1 i fe?
The superimposed repetition of events in the mass media may
replace other aspects of cultural continuity. If the repetitiveness
of television fosters a kind of cynical complacency about change in
general, could it supplant the older complacency of an accepted
tradition, however imperfectly? There is confusion about all of this
and the villain is not rationalism per se, but rather more eclectic
sources of identity. Even if we wish to mark off some older consis-
tencies in belief to maintain that they, and not this new jumble, are
the true tradition, we would have to sort them out from the elements
of a contemporary mnemonic constellation. Since tradition must be a
matter of the present we cannot proceed backwards to identify what it
was once in order to dissect the present, and it cannot serve as a
measure any more than a "collective unconscious" or "totality" or a
"natural man" or an "absolute spirit" will suffice. These questions
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can only be approached from the point of view which seeks to under
stand how myth, a sense of legacy and selective abstractions combine
in particular orientations to form a widely shared nexus of memories.
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CHAPTER V
A NOTE ON THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL:
LOSS AND PROMISE
, MIMESIS AND MEMORY
The notion of loss should not wholly make sense to a dialectical
thinker and it is surprising that Oakeshott began with Hegelian
idealism and ended as a conservative prophet of doom. For him the
verdict on Western society had been given and rationalism had sealed
its fate. Although similar conclusions had been reached by the
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, notably Horkheimer, Adorno
and Marcuse, the signs of such a catastrophic loss to society would
not be so neatly explained. Dissatisfied with the experience of
Soviet Marxism, horrified by the experience of Fascism in their
homeland and by the intrusi veness of technological progress and a
"culture industry" elsewhere, they sought to reinstate the questioning
philosophical background of Marxism that might reveal a common thread,
a common rationality at work in all of them. It was not just the life
circumstances of the working class that had suffered the worst effects
of these developments, but the capacities of mind and body overall
that had been subjected to the imperatives of an instrumental
rationality geared to the expansion of industry and affecting every
aspect of life and society. In this view, tradition could not be the
measure of loss or promise since it was always and everywhere another
restricted expression of the same human capacities. Instead, it was
the long dialectical development of reason itself from Greek myth
through the Enlightenment to its applications in modern technology
that offered very different grounds for the measure of hope and
despai r .
*
It was not tradition that had been tragically lost, but the
promise of reason that had never been fulfilled. Thus, for the
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School the dominations of
contemporary society do entail a particular loss that is like, but not
-231-
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precisely the same as the alienation that was suffered in the
relations of capitalism for Marx. A systematic mode of thought and
practice had combined science, positivism, instrumental and techno-
logical applications of reason to seize nature and humanity alike. It
had moved within individuals to claim them for a special brand of
conformity that was bound to the task, requiring that they share a
simple, factual apprehension of their condition without posing the
questions that arise in deeper reflection, in negative or critical
thinking. The loss was not engendered in a historical stage of
rationalism as it had been for Oakeshott, but in the delimitation of
subjectivity itself. It was not that traditional learning mechanisms
had been abandoned they had been turned to another purpose making
people more imitatively unselfconscious than ever. This imitation, or
mimesis as it was called, was both the precondition and the worst
result of that instrumental domination. It inclined people to
replicate the "objectivating" demands of the present within themselves
-- to accept and imitate the world in its immediacy. It entailed a
psychological adjustment that the critical theorists revealed by
augmenting their Marxian analysis with psychoanalytic insights
concerning repression. It is that notion of mimesis that I wish to
consider briefly and particularly where it does not stand up well to
the broader considerations of memory.
Evidently critical theory has presented us with something of a
paradox concerning reason. For Horkheimer in 1947, the ancient
philosophical aspect of reason that had made it the agency of ethical
insight in classical times had now eclipsed. Now, "reason as an organ
for perceiving the true nature of reality and determining the guiding
ii 2
principles of our lives has come to be regarded as obsolete." Rather
than preserving its interest in the truth, reason had become a means
of generating a particular order of truth, and indeed, reason had been
hypostatized as an ideological principle complete with specific
scientific portents for the future. It had become a recipe for a
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that ^rans the theoretl cal activity of the specialist are elivated tothe rank of universal categories categories which now contained a
camoflaged Utopia" of their own. 3
Nevertheless, this could not be undone by restoring an unself-
conscious tradition, but only by a wholly different exercise of
reason itself:
...we are the heirs, for better or worse, of the Enliahtenment and technological progress. To oppose these by reaves"sing to more primitive stages does not alleviate the llml-nent crisis they have brought about. On the contrary
P
™ch
bTbaHc%o™s ofT W""* ^asonable to utter^Dar ri forms f social domination. The sole way ofassisting nature is to unshackle its seeming oppositeindependent thought. [4] 9 °PP° ,
On the one hand it was reason that had given rise tc the unthinking
instrumental ism of mimesis, but on the other hand there were three
sources within reason itself that might provide the independence of
thought necessary to resist it. There was the eclipsed classical
legacy of reason and questioning science that might sharpen the
philosophical edge of contemporary criticism and expand the concerns
of Marxism; there was the rationalistic individualism of the bourgeois
revolution that still presented critical promise, and there was the
"self-knowledge of present day man," which at certain moments as
Horkheimer suggested, still contained a rudimentary, "critical theory
of soceity." 5 In early critical theory at least, there was still some
hope that a special independence of thought might revive a different
aspect of reason allowing that, "the denunciation of what is currently
called reason is the greatest service reason can render." 6
Yet it was precisely this double nature of reason that became the
dividing line among the critical theorists themselves. For Horkheimer
and especially for Adorno, reason had finally obtained an almost
unitary historical force that was inseparable from the damages it had
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wrought, and that left little hope for independent thinking outside oftheir own critical philosophy. In the less cynical anti-rational i sm
of Marcuse, the human instincts might yet emerge in certain public
expressions against the onslaughts of technological rationality, while
later, 1n the positive rationalism of Adorno's pupil JUrgen Habermas
the critical possibilities of thought could still be found within a
"practical" variety of reason, in the rudeiments of communication if
not in the instincts. Each assessed the ravages of reason differ-
ently, and while they shared certain dialectical premises of Marxism
they wished to ground criticism in the undisclosed tensions that ran
beneath the class conflict which had failed to engender liberation,
and that analysis turned on the elusive promise of reason.
At bottom, however, reason was only as promising as the "self-
knowledge of present day man" that Horkheimer had momentarily praised,
and in this the problem that critical theory faced was not only
dialectical but circular. The transformation of reason had closed off
the possibilities of liberation, yet it was primarily within reason
that the latter might be found. If there was to be any way out of the
circle it would only be found in the analysis of the individual - the
limits to individuality as they had been set and moved again in the
earliest heroic myths, in the dilemma of Hamlet or in the teachings of
Luther and Calvin. 7 A way out might be found in the analysis of the
promises of bourgeois individualism that once inflamed the masses, but
more particularly in the human capacities that those promises had once
cherished. It would be found, perhaps, in the broader play of human
needs, senses and even instincts that had been subordinated to reason
and individualism in mimesis. Thus, the weight of the problem
presented by the most instrumental reduction of reason, rested on the
assessment of mimesis and the historical limits that had been set for
the individual human capacities, limitations, it might be said, which
had been posed for memory and reflection as reason had collapsed to
mimesi s
.
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Since these limitations to the individual capacities seemed
absolute and the loss irretrievable, critical theory took up a
peculiar attitude toward time, history and individual pasts. The
extent of our assimilation to the demands of modern rationality could
not be measured effectively from within its own progession, but only
from a perspective that seemed to stand outside of it. This presented
the same problem that had left Oakeshott at an impasse since it
required an attempt to measure loss on the basis of what had been
lost, only now there was a means of escaping the dilemma if this
special branch of "critical" reason could be distinguished from that
of rationalism to lead the way. Theory itself would assume a historic
mission and if our reflexive abilities had been destroyed in mimesis,
criticism would now have to reclaim a legacy of freedom and challenge
us to revive the appropriate concerns, and even in a sense, to revive
the appropriate memories. If the historical closure of liberating
possibilities was so complete, then the proper posture for dialectical
criticism was to step outside of the historical stream to look
backward, to set itself up not just as an informative theory, but as a
dialectical force -- a negative philosophy that would deliberately
violate the closure. Thus, without exhausting the analysis of mimesis
and without fully considering the loss to memory which it must entail,
the critical theorists assumed an oppositional attitude toward the
present that led them to make a selective analysis of the past. They
effectively challenged the narrow selectivity of contemporary
understanding, but on the historical basis of what they presumed to
have been lost, and it is possible that they moved too quickly beyond
the analysis of the present because it was deemed strategically and
historically necessary to do so.
The critical theorists had shared the abiding concern for
historical truth that Marx had shown before them, yet in stepping
outside of the modern closure of reason they would seek to generate a
philosophical history of the very elements that had been suppressed --
a counter-selective history of reason, freedom, individuality,
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essences and instincts. This required a certain latitude of Agina-
tive thought and even, as Marcuse argued, a bit of fantasy 8 The
prevailing scientific rationality that claimed "the truth" as its own
Played its cards too close to the chest, and critical theory could
only pry them loose by examining the universal categories of truth
that had been left behind or taken up from past philosophy, if modern
applications of reason now seemed to possess a universal sense of the
truth in the form of the "facts" of science and history, it must not
be forgotten that they have biased the facts in a most self-serving
understanding of the truth; "they continually translate the past into
the present," in a way that is highly ideological. 9
For that reason it was important to revive the ethical questions
of philosophy concerning universal truth in the inquisition of the
"facts" and the ideology of present society. It was necessary to
reverse the most fervent materialist inclinations of Marxism, to
research the old philosophical universals of idealism, where they
were "supposed to create the universality and community in which the
rational subject participates with other rational subjects." 10 As
Marcuse put it, "in a soceity whose reality gives the lie to all those
universals, philosophy cannot make them concrete. Under such
conditions, adherence to universality is more important than its
philosophical destruction. Critical Theory's interest in the
liberation of mankind binds it to certain ancient truths." 11 Critical
theory would strive to reveal the historic unity between universal
categories and the ideological principles that guide a way of life, to
show how they have been and might yet be constituted on different
grounds than those of science and technology.
Nevertheless, the reexamination of ancient truths was not an
exercise in wishful thinking that would simply reinstate them. It was
always cognizant of the historical demise of such truths, which had
been partly due to their own inadequacy. Whatever hope might be found
in them, it must be culled from that history as if there were two
pasts discernible in two kinds of memory, one of philosophical promise
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the other of historical limitation. In order to perceive both, the
analysis required a most unusual attitude toward the past, a perspec-
tive which jostled between the past, present, and future as if it must
stay free in time. It attempted to be historical, but history as it
had already been rendered for the present could not be the measure of
its truth, and as Horkheimer put it, "if the proof of the pudding is
in the eating, the eating here is still in the future." 12
Hence, critical theory articulates a vital strand of past
possibilities which reaches from the past through the present in order
to dispute what the present mode of reasoning has taken to be the
"facts." It sets itself the task of making countervailing claims upon
the past, but in doing so it may have oscillated from the past to a
horrifying prospect for the future without dwelling on the present
sufficiently to reveal every dimension its special captivation of
reason, memory and instinct. It looks backward from possible futures
in order to escape the present, but given its understanding of the
present, the possible future where it sits is often the blackest of
all. Thus, critical theory offered a prognosis for the future based
already on the worst portents of the present. The present was viewed
from that standpoint -- virtually beyond time as an absence of the
fulfillment of the promises of the past and as a collapse of the very
capacities which had once been revered. But it was not viewed as a
selective redistribution of memory which might have revealed less
ominous prospects for future reason as well.
Mimesis and Memory
While Oakeshott feared that a particular brand of unsel fconscious
understanding had been completely forgotten, the Frankfurt School was
more concerned to reveal the obstacles that had prevented access to
the legacy of several kinds of knowledge and experience. From the
point of view of memory the tables have turned dramatically as
critical theory sought to revive many pasts, while Oakeshott and
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others had only lamented the loss of a particular one. Still the
losses that the critical theorists would reveal are discussed in terms
of "reification," "repression," "mimesis," "negation" or "eclipse" -
categories which are at once ideological, political and psychological
— and it is not entirely clear who, or precisely what has suffered a
loss in the process. In this we are confronted with the loss of
reason to reason, a certain reduced state of consciousness, a loss to
humanity or of community, but seldom a loss to memory. Since that
analysis seems particularly closed and hopeless as it works backward
from mimesis, we might therefore consider how it remains more open at
the points where it does take memory into account. It is still
possible that at the moments when we are taken to be beings endowed
with memory it is not irrevocable conformity that drags us down, but
rather that a certain selective elimination of the promises of
philosophy, history and personal experience befalls our memory and may
be differently revived in memory.
Accordingly, on the rare occasions when the critical theorists do
represent mimetic closure in a single example, we are likely to find
the faint suggestion that such a dialectical development in history
has really been resolved in mnemic tensions that affect the entire
psychological makeup of identity. In this way for example, Adorno
characterized the displacement of certain past conventions by a new
bourgeois style of "tactful ness" in conducting social relationships.
He suggests, for example, that Goethe had once understood the use of
tact as a means of preserving the conventions that were most endan-
gered, but that it now reflects the demise of conventions and of the
sort of memory applied to them. As he observes:
The precondition of tact is convention no longer intact yet
still present. Now fallen into irreparable ruin, it lives on
only in a parody of forms, an arbitrarily devised or recol-
lected etiquette for the ignorant, of the kind preached by
unsolicited advisors in newspapers, while the basis of agree-
ment that carried those conventions in their human hour has
given way to the blind conformity of car owners and radio
1 isteners. . .[13]
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Here the problem is not just that self-conscious rationalism has
replaced tradition, rather a new and emphatically imitative conformity
has taken hold of the mass of the people which, again, is every bit as
unselfconscious and blind as tradition was for Oakeshott. Signifi-
cantly, the focus here is upon the transitional sequence in which the
loss was experienced, and in that there are three distinct stages.
There was a "human hour" when a certain basis of agreement and
convention coalesced. Next, there was the tactful parody of conven-
tion which has been subjected to an arbitrary recollection that
preserves and ruins it, and finally even this confused memory is cut
short in blind conformity, in the historical regeneration of mimesis.
Indeed the more that we pursue this single example, the more it may be
argued that tactful ness remains with us, and that it still persists on
some basis. The arbitarily devised etiquette of today refers to
something, and the parody of forms still reflects a confused tension
in memory that is arguably as much in evidence today as blind
conformity.
Instead of offering such revealing examples, however, critical
theory far more frequently presents us with a caricature of loss that
does not allow so much room for dispute. As Horkheimer describes it,
"the crisis of reason is manifested in the crisis of the individual,
as whose agency it developed," yet that agency is described sparingly.
The predominantly technological exercise of reason in the modern world
is characterized as if it were the machinery to which it so often
refers, and now, "the machine has dropped the driver, it is racing
blindly into space." 14 The more that social and political power is
mediated by a power over things, the more the individual mind is,
15
"transformed into an automation of formalized reason." To be sure,
the very "doctrine of progress" that inspires this forward motion has
become part of the arbitrary memory to which Adorno referred, but
16
Horkheimer sees it racing into the future in ways that "forget man."
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There is only a vague allusion to memory in a process that must
radically curtail memory.
In modern progress, continues Horkheimer, even the highly valued
characteristic of self-interest has not led to individuality, but to
conformity. The older conception of the individual who might, "think
of himself as opposed to outward reality," as "shaping reality in the
image of truth," has vanished, 17 and finally,
The Monad, a seventeenth-century symbol for the atomistic
^!°m1C*n1n^ vidua1 J of bourgeois society, became a socialtype. All the monads isolated though they were by moats of
self-interest, nevertheless tended to become more and more
alike through the pursuit of this very sel f-interest.[18]
This sameness of character that pardoxically gains its hold under the
doctrine of individualism, must vitiate convention as well as an
earlier conception of individuality and also the distinctive personal
experiences that might comprise a unique identity, although it is
seldom addressed on all of these fronts.
While there is unquestionably some truth to Horkheimer'
s
characterization of the problem it is not always clear how much of it
is a new historical development and how much it refers to a rather
general human propensity to conform that is not new. In his own
argument individuals always proceed from birth onward to give up the
"hope of ultimate self-realization," in favor of "getting along," and
this can be achieved, "solely by imitation." 19 Yet that timeless
inclination seems to have acquired historical supremacy as well. As a
historical development, it follows that the propensity to imitate has
undergone a transformation: it must have fleetingly involved that
"parody" of earlier forms that Adorno referred to in the example of
tact, an alteration of prior content which was still present and yet
denied. So we may argue that mimesis does not gain historical
ascendency as such, but that there is a struggle over the content of
conformity that may always result in new forms of mimesis, some
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perhaps which are more impenetrable than others. The picture changes
if a historical transformation could not have simply heightened the
longstanding propensity of people to conform, and modern mimesis
assumes a different character if there is no reason why that inclina-
tion would have been more at home in individualism than it was in
traditional society. Instead, it seems although it was not put
this way that the historical transformation must have initiated a
selective reorientation of memory to a new standard of conformity, and
perhaps this is not the same thing as mimesis.
As if to settle the matter, Horkheimer identifies the historical
change as the forgetting of certain mental abilities. Now, he says,
"the individual subject of reason tends to become a shrunken ego,
captive of an evanescent present, forgetting the use of intellectual
functions by which he was once able to transcend his actual position
20in reality." But again, this forgetting amounts to the irrevocable
loss of the reflexive abilities themselves. It is a mimetic surrender
to the present, and no longer "forgetting" in the sense that what is
forgotten might eventually be recalled. If there is any doubt at all
that this has happened, then we cannot be sure if we are experiencing
the historical victory of mimesis, or simply another arrangement of
the content and of the capacities of mind and memory. Accordingly we
must wonder whether "intellectual functions" as such can ever be so
thoroughly "forgotten," and whether they were ever so potent in the
first place. We must ask whether mimesis has really obliterated
certain mental capacities, or whether a particular content has simply
receded in the contemporary patterns of memory only dulling certain of
our reflexive functions, and the entire weight of the problem turns on
the difference.
The question is sharpened where critical theory enlists psycho-
analysis to identify the changes wrought in mimesis, and here it does
appear that mental functions are actually impaired just as particular
instincts are enlisted to maintain the current dominations of society.
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In order to explain psychological aspects of the transformation,
Marcuse has supplemented the debilitated historical dialectic of
Marxism with the suggestion that a tension remains between a Freudian
"pleasure principle" and the particular historical form of the
"reality principle" that is now in evidence. For him, industrial
society has effectively suffocated "those needs which demand libera-
tion," to bind the psyche and its motivating instincts. 21 "The
people," he has said, "enter this stage as preconditioned receptacles
of long standing; the decisive difference is in the flattening out of
the contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible, between
the satisfied and the unsatisfied needs." 22 In this process he argues
that we have become so utterly flattened out that the psychoanalytic
concept of "introjection" - of taking aspects of the given world into
the psyche may no longer apply to us. He contends that this is now
the case because introjection presupposes a "private space" within the
individual into which the outer world is drawn, and that it is
precisely this space that has collapsed in the modern period:
... this private space has been invaded and whittled down by
technological reality. Mass production and mass distribu-
tion claim the entire individual, and industrial psychology
has long since ceased to be confined to the factory. The
manifold processes of introjection seem to be ossified in
almost mechanical reactions. The result is, not adjustment
but mimesis : an immediate identification of the individual
with hTs society and, through it, with society as a
whole. [23]
Mimesis now describes a psychological imperative of contemporary
life; a new "immediacy" so thoroughly impressed upon us that our needs
and desires become "one-dimensional." Significantly the theory rests
upon a historicized version of Freudian concepts which turns the
"reality principle" into a "performance principle of expressly modern
24demands to conformity." It turns an excess of modern culturally
induced "repression" into "surplus repression," and it even turns
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the comforting, sometimes erotic satisfactions of mass technological
society into the deceptive outlet of "repressive desubl imation" that
stifles creative ability. 26
For Marcuse, the point is that the Freudian categories have been
historically outmoded and the onus seems to have been laid effectively
on his critics to prove otherwise. Nevertheless, the repression that
is central to the thesis, whether it is in surplus or not, is a matter
that concerns memory as much as it concerns the instincts. If
something has changed for human beings who still possess a faculty of
memory, we must wonder once more whether it is the content of their
memories that has been altered, or whether a mental function like
reason or introjection has itself been undermined so thoroughly. That
is, if mimesis is not so overpowering that it eradicates memory, then
repression may not be the best model for understanding the historical
entrapments of identity as I will argue further in Chapter VIII.
Indeed, we must wonder why so much repression is being applied to
beings who no longer possess the very private space that needs
repressing in Marcuse' s own account. Perhaps it is an adjustment of
memory and not mimesis which has the upper hand, and the conformity in
question may require more subtle and self-conscious attitudes toward
the past than that thesis implies.
Even as Marcuse sought to reconcile psychoanalytic insights with
historical materialism he remained a defender of Freud's instinct
27
theory and he was not just another Freudian revisionist. For that
reason his account of the imitative impulse took another turn. It did
not belong exclusively to the present any more than it might have
belonged to a specialized traditional form of knowledge, and as Freud
intained it was an instinctual inclination that had always resided
thin the psyche. This mimesis has the character of an instinct that
seeks solace in the conformity to groups and organizations, and it is
linked to the "compulsion to repeat" that led Freud to postulate a
oo
"death instinct." So it is that when society demands more con-
formity and more mimesis, the aggressive components of the death
ma
wi
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instinct and the deadening compulsion to repeat may similarly be
heightened. For Marcuse, mimesis destroys autonomy and spontaneity as
it finds comfort in the superficial reality of the given society, only
now at the instinctual level of Freud's compulsion to repeat it is
inclined toward a "state of inertia, absence of tension, a return to
the womb, annihilation," for society as a whole. 29
As it destroys autonomy, mimesis may also unleash general
destruction as if that were the price of protective conformity. It
may turn violently against change as easily as it turned against
people who were through to be threateningly different in the mimetic
repetitions of Fascism. Says Marcuse, "Hitler knew well the extreme
function of repetition: the biggest lie, often enough repeated, will
be acted upon and accepted as truth." 30 But even if it does not
become destructive in that calculated manner, mimesis destroys the
critical functions of the mind in ordinary repetitions that have the
force of the instinctual compulsion to repeat. If this is the case,
however, we must begin to wonder how a force that seems instinctual
may come to reign in the more conscious choices of a society, to
affect the very terms of its rationality. Where this happens, once
again, mimesis must affect quite conscious memories as well as
instincts in group life. Then it is possible that the repetitiveness
that mimesis seems to demand may have a different function for the
group, than the complusion to repeat has for the individual. As we
shall see later on, what is destructive for the individual may be
constructive for society, and it may be that the stasis or state of
inertia toward which social mimesis aims is that of a coherent and
productive orientation in memory as much as it is an instinctual
quiescence or distructiveness. Further, not all repetition qualifies
as an irrevocable instinctual construct within the psyche, and in
society certain repetitions may reflect a more current and fleeting
balance of memories in which the instincts are secondary. The
question remains as to whether mimesis is a problem of memory itself
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or of a psyche that is structurally and instinctually deprived of
memory.
By implication, this question remains somewhat unresolved in
Marcuse's work. Inasmuch as he defends and employs Freudian cate-
gories, we find that his work still confronts us with a model of the
psyche that involves conflict between pleasure and reality, and the
image of beings who possess no "private space," no spontaneity, no
memory, and essentially no psyche at all. In that irresolution, of
course, Marcuse had opened the door to visions of the complete
psychological collapse of the faculties that make autonomy possible,
and that extreme is best articulated as a matter of memory loss by his
student Russell Jacoby in the phrase "social amnesia." Here the
thesis of reification has gained new life as it is now a potent
synthesis of social and psychological obstructions that seem all the
more insurmountable. "The general loss of memory," says Jacoby, "is
not to be explained solely psychologically; it is not simply childhood
amnesia. Rather is is social amnesia -- memory driven out of mind by
the social and economic dynamic of this society .. .amnesi a -- a
forgetting and repression of the human and social activity that makes
and can remake society. The social loss of memory is a type of
reification -- better: it is the primal form of reification." 31
In Jacoby' s argument this development has reached fruition in the
therapeutic endeavors of modern psychological practice that press for
individual conformity, and in them there seems to be as little concern
for the repressed aspects of the individual's past as there was more
generally for the historical past that lived only in the "parody of
forms" in Adorno's assessment. In modern psychology as Jacoby
portrays it, we no longer find the ambiguity concerning human
potentialities that ran through Marcuse's work, or through Freud's for
that matter, and instead there has been a theoretical erasure of that
whole domain of understanding which characterizes a new psychological
view of the individual. In that view, the entire domain of the
"unconscious" which includes repression, introjection and the
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instincts is systematically ignored along with its individuating
critical promise. Therefore it is logical that if we expand the
thesis in one direction, as Christopher Lasch has done, we will return
to a rather more psychological version of the position that Oakeshott
held: the loss seems absolute and irrevocable as psychological
processes and the current theories about them seek only to conform.
At moments for Jacoby, this state of affairs reflects the worst
prognosis offered by Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse - mimesis
condemns us to "memoryless repetitions," the "hex of bourgeois
society" from which even the social critics may not escape. 32
Nevertheless, in having confined his analysis to the field of
psychology, and in taking certain of its modern revisions to be the
vanguard of that dismal fate for the individual, Jacoby leaves some
room to reinstate that other Freudian self who can be found in the
background of Marcuse' s analysis. He would still preserve the
psychoanalytic portrait of the psyche in conflict which is being
erased by the "conformist psychology" of the neo-Freudian and
post-Freudian schools of psychology, and he would restore those
concepts that once revealed the extent to which, "the individual did
33
not yet exist." Forgetting is both a psychological and an ideo-
logical defense of present society here, and for Jacoby what is
forgotten, the most dangerous instincts and unexamined histories,
tends to rule unchallenged. His point, however, is to transcend the
rule of the forgotten by remembering, as psychoanalysis attempts to do
for the repressed individual, and there is still a grain of hope left
for that. 34
Once again, where the social dilemma posed by conformity is
expressed as a loss of memory -- and especially when the Freudian
conceptions of the psyche in conflict are preserved -- amnesia, like
repression, cannot be absolute and another door has opened for
analysis. On that account we are compelled to consider how much is
forgotten and by what means, in a way that may take us beyond the
bleakest assessments of Marcuse or Jacoby. On closer examination it
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will appear that the mimetic impulse that is with us from birth is not
the same thing as amnesia, and is further still from the social
amnesia that may involve more conscious and selective alterations of
memory. All three may require that we make similar exclusions from
memory, but they do so by different means and with different degrees
of severity. Now we find among the last disciples of the Frankfurt
School like Jacoby, that the peculiar retrospective posture of
critical theory may lead it to reveal a hidden hand. That unusual
exegesis of the past must still contain the shadow memory, or the
memory of the wish for what might have been. The most pessimistic
moments in the analysis of social amnesia must contain the challenge
to remember what has seemingly been lost.
Taken as a whole, then, the litany of losses in critical theory
preserves a certain dialectical tension. The analysis is unable to
close since it invariably involves the attempt to find what has been
lost, and we are almost surreptitiously confronted with the lingering
presence of a "human hour" in history, an old transcendent capability
of reason, creative instincts within the individual, an ego or hidden
needs that speak to unrealized possibilities. On the one hand it may
seem as Jacoby expressed it, that "the individual that had subsisted
in the corners of the market is el iminated by social capital." On
the other hand as Adorno wrote, the "social power structure hardly
needs the mediating agencies of the ego and individuality any more,"
and the fact that social forces now incline to reduce the efficacy of
the individual dramatically does not mean that they have succeeded in
every way. Even Marcuse's chilling assessment of this situation in
One-dimensional Man is prefaced with the comment that he is discussing
—
"tendencies." While the collapse seems absolute at one moment, it
is qualified at another to the point that it is difficult to discern
just where our society stands in the process, and of course there is
more than a little inconsistency among the theorists themselves as
they examine particular examples on those grounds.
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In 1944, for example, Adorno spoke of the "end of the family" in
Germany as if it were a more global occurrence. This eventuality was
of special concern since the family had not only been the most
powerful agency of bourgeois control, but was also the last place
where individuality laid its meagre claims, and now both aspects
appeared to have been lost. 38 Nevertheless, Horkheimer revived the
theme of the family again in 1968, as it was plainly still a bastion
of authority that had not completely waned, and portrayed it as being
only deficient in the exercise of its functions. 39 Taken together,
the "end of the family" in these analyses refers to a process of
diminution and not finality, and it refers to a possible future on the
grounds of other possiblities contained in the past. Hence, the
process is still under way for Jacoby in 1975, as the economic and
social ineffectiveness of the father (presumably as much in Germany as
in America), has continued to erode the important conflict between the
childhood ego and the once powerful family, and as the "'mental'
household" of the individual is being undermined. 40 It is only at
certain moments in the analysis, and for other commentators who
abandon that sort of dialectical ambiguity, that this tendency becomes
a social-psychological fact with the finality of an ending. But even
such topical ambiguities must be faulted where they do not answer the
questions that they raise. As the analysis looks forward and backward
from mimesis, we must continue to ask whether it is society that has
reached such an impasse or critical theory itself that has the air of
final ity
.
By the same token, the ambiguities of critical theory may lead us
to ask further questions concerning what constitutes the ending of
experience and what is merely a reduction of experience. Where the
lanquage of the analysis does not refer us to the elimination of
individual capacities it speaks of their " restriction" and it is not
certain that this restriction is the result of processes that are
entirely hidden, unconscious and beyond our grasp. In this light it
is confusing when Marcuse speaks of the restriction of some greater
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human experience as the precondition for the restriction that occurs
in mimesis, or speaks of the already "mutilated individual" who merely
accepts the given empirical world:
But this radical acceptance of the empirical violates the
empirical, for in it speaks the mutilated, "abstract"
individual who experiences (and expresses) only that which
is given to him (given in a literal sense), who has only the
facts and not the factors, whose behavior is one-dimensional
and manipulated. By virtue of the factual repressions, the
experienced world is the result of a restricted experience,
and the positivist cleaning of the mind brings the mind in
line with the restricted experience. [41]
Here the very fundamental experience of the empirical world has
suffered the preselection of "factual" repressions and it seems almost
as if the world itself has been repressed in advance of the indivi-
dual. From this we do not know the nature of the restriction that
must affect the experiencing individual who still possesses many kinds
of experience within memory. It seems that such people must be
repressed a priori, but they must themselves repress and select their
memories if there has been any larger experience at all or any greater
empirical reality that has been violated in the restriction.
Accordingly, I want to give special emphasis to this tension in
the concept of mimesis even if it means splitting hairs. There is
room to be critical of the idea since it is not entirely clear to what
degree the individual has approached its demise and not at all clear
what the inner workings of a phenomenon like mimesis must be. Here we
may «take an important clue from the criticism of Oakeshott. For him
there was a positive side to "imitation" as it became a "selective
42
conformity to a rich variety of customary behavior." As I have
indicated, the operative (and contradictory) word in this statement is
"selective," and if habits, customs, and imitation stand against the
encroaching powers of rationalism, it is because they involve a
selective faculty that is not entirely unsel f consci ous , just as it is
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not only a property of the rationality at work in mimesis. Because of
this, conformity to tradition or otherwise may alternately appear as a
Strategic means of resisting or accepting change, and if it is
selective and involves judgement as we have seen, then "imitation" may
occasionally be a more reasoned posture than either Oakeshott or
Marcuse would admit. Perhaps there are different kinds of mimesis and
a more subtle arrangement of thinking involved in conformity than we
have supposed.
This becomes evident when we return to Horkheimer's proposition
that adaptation and mimesis are chosen to a certain extent in the
interest of the progress of society: "Conscious adaptation and
eventually domination replace the various forms of mimesis... To
adapt oneself means to make oneself like the world of objects for the
sake of self-preservation. This deliberate (as opposed to reflexive)
making of oneself like the environment is a universal principle of
civilization." 43 Rather than a historical resurgence of mimesis, it
seems that we may still find a certain amount of adaptation going on.
And if it seems "deliberate" but not reflexive for Horkheimer, it may
still involve the very sort of reflective activity that occurs in
following rules, as Winch argued in opposition to Oakeshott. So it
may be that this adaptation does not eradicate the human capacities as
such, but subordinates the usage of certain kinds of reflection and of
the memories that might fill them. Indeed, if we are still capable of
enough reflection and memory to knowingly follow or disobey a rule,
then instrumental reason and the mimesis that it demands may only seem
to "mutliate" the individual within whom a far more complex selective
"adaptation" is actually at work.
Once more we may find that there is a hierarchy of different
kinds of reflection that instructs our adaptive orientation in
society, one which has suffered the ascendency of scientific ration-
ality, of positivism and certain assumptions of empiricism to be sure,
but not to the exclusion of everything else. It is a hierarchy that
places the acceptance of those kinds of reflexive activity at a higher
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premium than the unsel fconscious acceptance of traditions, makes
functional retention a priority over habit, and devalues the more
meditative sorts of reflecion that once might have inclined one to
make a freer use of memory, and in accordance with the current demands
of labor and culture it may select the memory of particular events to
illuminate a restricted set of present meanings. Hence, Oakeshott's
exclusive scheme of tradition and the instrumental reason of the
Frankfurt School must both require a measure of unsel fconsci ous
imitation and enqage certain rational faculties, although the two are
called upon in different proportions with different emphasis. In each
case the entire hierarchy of reflexive capabilities, the host of dif-
ferently valued uses of memory remains active. Now, to a surprising
degree the meaning of what is excluded still stands before us even if
it is 'restricted' to a past that is generally disregarded, and the
various means of reflection remain at our disposal even if we are
dissuaded from using them. Inasmuch as we do have access to all of
this, we must make a limited choice to reiterate an adaptive scheme of
reflection, and it does not simply overwhelm us. Indeed, it is for
this reason that the theorist who identifies mimesis as the dominant
mode of experience can only do so by implying that experience remains
divided and contradictory within itself, that internal conflict is
'contained' or 'repressed' in mimesis. It is not that all pasts have
collapsed before an inexorable present to seal our fate a priori, but
that the limited perceptions of the present are informed by memories
that are selected with some deliberation, and that allows for a bit of
hope that we may yet have different perceptions a posteriori .
In Marcuse's rendition of mimesis above, the operative moment is
the individual's "identification with his society," that has become so
immediate that it is now much more than "adjustment." Yet as long as
this involves a heightened proclivity to repeat and imitate, the
individual cannot only be an automaton, and the process of identifi-
cation with particular cultural themes is not fully explained.
Similarly, the tactful subject to whom Adorno refered may certainly
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give way to blind conformity, but he or she is also creating a parody
of the forms of convention, and parody is a much more subtle affair
than the imprinting of behavior. Tact, and even the destruction that
it wreaks, is a strategy for modern survival although Adorno does not
wish to say so, and it involves self-preservation just as adaptation
did for Horkheimer. My point is that the several phenomena referred
to in the ambiguous discussions of mimesis are themselves too
equivocal and much too clever to be taken for the end of the human
capacities of individuation. If we observe how the modern rationa-
lizations of authority make use of old beliefs and seek to elicit
certain memories, it is evident that people do not simply imitate
whatever is placed before them. They must be convinced to imitate
what is given, and even if they are now most susceptible to being
convinced, they will only selectively adopt it.
Further, the meanings that politicians and the media invoke to
define a modern way of life are not randomly chosen and they are often
starkly opposed to the sort of notions that might seem to fit most
comfortably within a technological rationality. Very often they
involve reversal
s
of old meanings that are cautiously put forward and
cautiously received as a process of mnemonic and discursive alteration
proceeds. In critical theory such reversals are noted where "freedom"
is thought to become the watchword of unfreedom; a doctrine of
equality shrouds inequality, and the credo of tolerance masks
systematic intolerance in periods of historical transition. But if
this process requires mimesis, where the memorable roots of identity
are at stake, the mimetic content must also be slowly and carefully
chosen. There may not be free choice in the process, but people must
still at least be tricked into conformity. As in the mnemonic
"cleaving with affection" that Augustine prescribed for the teaching
of religious lessons, comforting and familiar imagery may be invoked
to direct public understanding and this is a clever device for
generating acceptance. It is a step between persuasion and manipu-
lation that makes a parody of old forms and a caricature of old
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images, and it is a step that must be taken if domination is to reach
into the depths of the psyche.
Because it is assumed that domination is now much more advanced
than this, the critical theorists have preferred to limit their
comments concerning the creative and strategic aspects of power that
effect such a reversal of meanings, and they have kept the same
polemical attitude toward them that they have toward the past.
Nevertheless there is a veiled suggestion that the workings of power
require a measure of subjective complicity and even perhaps, that the
"new immediacy" that Lukacs also identified requires a somewhat
calcuated reaccl imation of the concepts of space, time and creative
process that are so crucial to the orientation of memory. Conse-
quently, it is not surprising to find that in extreme cases of human
confinement, imitation is revealed to be a most subtle strategy.
Oddly enough, in an analysis of this which is even less concerned
with the inner workings of subjective complicity than the Frankfurt
theorists, it is Foucault who offers the most concise statement of the
problem. In discussing the 19th century design plan for the optimal
prison, Panopticon, he indicates that,
This architectural apparatus should be a machine for creat-
ing and sustaining a power relation independent of the
person who exercises it; in short that the inmates should be
caught up in a power situation of which they themselves are
the bearers. [44]
Here, not only is there a conscious plan to exercise domination that
is to be forgotten once the structure is operational, but what is
forgotten remains present as it is borne along by those within its
confines
.
Foucault does not mean to lay the blame for captivity upon the
compliant inmates here, as if it were some choice that they might make
or reverse freely. Rather, the situation is contrived in such a way
that they must imitate to survive, forget themselves within it and
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comply with the discipline that is generated by its very design. The
memory of its function is displaced onto them and kept alive precisely
in the forgetful attitude that is fostered among them. One implica-
tion of this that may be beyond Foucault's scope, is that the inmates
must do the forgetting. They are well able to recall the reason and
the terms of their confinement and what it was like to be at liberty,
but they choose for the sake of sanity and survival to be "caught up
in a Dower situation," and as its bearers they must regularly remind
themselves to forget those very things. As the inmates cease to be
self-conscious, give up such memories or confine them to rare moments
of privacy, they accept the routine in its "immediacy." Thus the plan
for the prison which will never be known to them in detail remains
efficacious; the regulation and the proximity of deadly authority that
are part of the structure come alive. It is omnipresent, unnecessary
to recall, and yet the inmates must adapt their conceptual orientation
to its design continually, limiting themselves and their memories to
that world with some deliberation and only then are they mimetic
participants.
If the example of total confinement seems to be an artificial
measure of society — since, after all, these inmates were once free
--we may find that the same sort of adaptation to the immediacy of
the present is part of a learning process that all must share. Even
the imitative behavior of infants that the critical theorists refer
to requires the cognitive functions of differentiation and judgement
that are already a step beyond mimesis. Piaget has made an inter-
esting series of distinctions along these lines that may clarify the
point. In childhood development, he argues, the essential mechanism
of sensorimotor intelligence involves a "schematizing assimilation"
that is at work in the most simple operations with objects and must
precede their mental representation. A "scheme of assimilation" he
continues, does not only admit the represented objects within the
developing mind, but it, "is constantly submitted to the pressure of
the circumstances and can differentiate according to the objects to
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which it is applied." in this way objects and operations must be
assimilated and differentiated to be imitated in thought or repre-
sented there, and it is this combined activity that he calls "imita-
tion." 45
So this imitation requires a creative act of intelligence that
combines two elements. It creates a certain equilbrium between
assimilation and differentiation, an "accomodation" that admits
objects into the cognitive scheme of things so that then a thought or
an action can be modeled on the object itself in imitation. In short,
we imitate memories which we ourselves have differentiated in an
applied scheme of assimilation and we originally take them into
ourselves in a manner that does not admit a simple correspondence
between the given world and our cognitions. Beyond introjection , and
far beyond the mimesis that Marcuse found in place of it, imitation is
accomplished here by preparing the necessary "symbolism" and it
persists in that way with the acquisition of language regardless of
the historical circumstance. Where that imitative symbolism does
respond to circumstances it functions in a deferred form within
memory; only the "mental picture" is retained as "interiorized
imitation." 4^ Insofar as such memories are comprised of symbolic
assimilations ^nd differentiations there is the possibility of
recalling and reapplying the process of differentiation itself. Much
as inmates might recall the reason and nature of their confinement or
the world outside, this ordinary process of imitation involves an
exclusive application of selective memory that is not merely mimetic.
Already in childhood, the imitative aspect of learning is a
capacity that assimilates, differentiates, constructs and holds
images. If we accept this much of Piaget, then the social analysis of
mimesis cannot fully explain the delimitation of human faculties
unless it reveals a mass regression in development, and instead, there
must be aspects of selective memory and mimesis which function
together to secure the complex reorientations demanded in the
restrictions of modern society. Further, as long as individuals are
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both the aqents and the recipients of the lessons that instruct their
activities
- as lonq as they must 'assimilate' memories to a larger
scheme
- there is never mere mimesis. Their captivity contains a
parody of captivity, as the forgetful ness that it demands also
contains the fleeting memory of a greater freedom.
The notion of mimesis should stand at the gates of confinement as
a warning. It can only be the end point of an ongoing reduction of
experience and the fulfillment of the most obvious expectations of
power, but it is not complete wherever it contains the conscious
element that is, in Horkheimer's words, a "reaction to pressure." 47
Therefore the notion of mimesis really embraces several things at
once: it is an instinctual inclination to sheer mimicry that is never
quite borne out, a mnemonic representation of objects and actions, a
convenient repetition of traditional and habitual practices, and a
forqetful strateqy for survival that may only imitate mimicry. It may
involve the unconscious curtailment of critical faculties, an
effective plan to induce acceptance or instruct memory, or a more
conscious inclination to select the elements that occupy the mind in
accordance with those instructions. It may qenerate an order of
understandinq that conceals contradictions althouqh it rarely
eliminates them, and especially where it accompanies the modern
emphasis upon rationality, it must also make sense to people.
With the claim that imaqi nation has failed, critical theory has
offered one of the most vital challenqes to imaqi nation in the history
of social thouqht. Yet the amnesiac collapse to the present that it
records is more likely to reflect the forqettinq of particular thinqs
and a less severe adjustment of our frames of reference around the
present. In this way for example, certain sexual impulses were qiven
expression as traditions were corrupted in the so called "sexual
revolution" of the 1960s and '70s. Traditional values were radically
altered but people did not dispense with them completely any more than
they adopted a truly liberated 'new' sexuality. Rather, those chanqes
made sense to people in an accomodatinq consciousness that oscillated
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between the past and present seeking to find proper guiding referents,
and it has resulted in confusion more than conformity. In such
oscillations, what appears to be a mimetic pattern of identity is
nearly chosen, or more precisely, it involves a prescribed and
creative activity of memory. It does not obliterate the reflexive
capacities so much as it limits their referential spheres of opera-
tion, and by engaging those very capacities, mimesis is done and
undone daily as it is also threatened at every turn.
There is still a sense of irony in certain strands of popular
culture that attests to this, especially when we consider the
uncommitted attitude of the audience. While several television
programs celebrate imitation, like the game show that requires its
contestants to guess the most popular answer to a question, or those
that parade the styles in vogue; there are others that ridicule and
parody conformity as much as they confirm it and in each case the
audience may be a bit cynical if not resistant to it all. Certainly
today there are rich traditions of thought and practice which have
been overwhelmed by such banality. But the problem lies in the
numerous sorts of reaction and in the distillation of the particular
ingredients that seem to generate conformity, and not in the pro-
clivity to banality alone. There is still a struggle over the content
of our guiding meanings that fosters skepticism and disbelief as much
as it breeds acceptance. Just as the patterns of a kaleidoscope might
be shifted to assemble the original colors in a more simple design
that seems to draw the eye closer, the assimilating scheme of memory
may seem to collapse to the imediacy of the present, but the colors
remain and they may yet be arranged in different designs.
Habermas, Progress and Crisis
Once more, Habermas has inherited the theoretical dilemma of the
Frankfurt School somewhat uneasily and he offers a very different
vision of loss and promise. For him the current predicament in the
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West is one phase of crisis in the advancement of the abilities of
society to solve its problems. If a Marxian dialectic of progress
seems to have stalled it is suffused with the deep imperative of
society to develop those abilities logically like the growing
individual, proceeding through maturational stages which may yet allow
a new universalizing morality to emerge. Therefore, if the guiding
meanings of tradition and an earlier variety of reason seem lost, it
is not because the capacity to generate them is ruined for all time by
instrumental reason and mimesis. Reason is not the villain, but the
division of reason into two camps in this oarticular phase of social
evolution. The problem is that "technical reason" has been applied in
so many vital spheres of life and in the administrative functions that
would govern it, that it now supersedes the "practical reason" which
once formed the communicative basis and traditional motivations for
society and generated legitimacy. The motivations of the past are not
lost so much as they are misplaced, abused and deflated as the ability
to reformulate them is thwarted in crisis. On the one hand Habermas'
understanding of crisis reveals the sort of conflict between the
presence of the past and current interests that we have found wanting
in earlier critical theory. On the other hand, that crisis is viewed
as a phase in the "developmental logic" of society, as one stage in a
dialectic of progress which the consideration of the variations in
memory may not so readily affirm.
As in precedinq critical theory, Habermas' "theorems of motiva-
tion crisis" suggest that modern society has retained only the shell
of the old privatistic motivational patterns that had flourished
before and during the bourgeois era. Capitalist societies, he argues,
always, "fed parasi tical ly on the remains of tradition," but could not
reproduce the same motivations themselves. A pre-bourgeoi s tradition
has therefore been, "non-renewably dismantled," by a process that,
48
"destroyed motivational patterns of privatism." At the same time,
however, the loss is not precisely what it was for Marcuse, Horkheimer
and Adorno. Despite the fact that this tradition has found no
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functional equivalent in the modern ethos, it remains relevant and to
some degree necessary to the motive formation that continues to take
place now. Old motivational patterns of meaning remain necessary even
as they decay, and there is a resulting conflict over legitimate
meaning in society that has now reached crisis proportions. Such a
crisis — which Marxism might consider to be merely "superstructural
"
— now endangers the very fiber of society and it has moved to the
forefront of the dialectical concern.
For Habermas this capitalist crisis therefore results from a
series of developments in different spheres: from the scientization
of professional practice, the growth of the service sector of the
economy that has subsumed more and more types of interaction within
the 'commodity form,' from increased administrative regulation and the
legalization of politics and social intercourse generally, from the
commercialization of culture, and the scientific and psychological
influence upon child rearing. 49 In the wake of these developments,
the traditional beliefs that once formed whole explanatory cosmologies
and complete theoretical world views have been scattered and have lost
their interpretive control over life. Whereas such interpretive
schemes once explained nature, history and ethics together, the parts
have now been sundered as they suffer from a pluralism of competing
beliefs. But this new pluralism has not only undermined the claims of
the old unifying world views to be "true," it has split the domains of
the "rational" and the "practical" such that people now tend to look
for the values that might be capable of guiding life only in the
rational domain. It has dislocated guiding values from their genesis
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in the "practical" concerns of life. Moral conceptions have been
cut from their roots and they have been given over to the ruling mode
of reason which cannot regenerate them, they have been devalued to
become merely "common sense." The inspirational Utopian content of
tradition has all but vanished and yet the dialectic of meaning
formation has not stopped dead in its tracks. There is still an inner
motion that may allow us to take human interests to heart as we strive
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toward a new rational society of a very different kind. 51
Again, Habermas explains this forward motion in two ways, and it
rests upon somewhat independent strands of reasoning that arise in
disparate theoretical frameworks. Not only does he wish to demon-
strate that the "superstructural" problem of legitimacy and moral
motivation has become paramount within a dialectical scheme, but its
status may be explained according to the "inner logic" of individual
moral and cognitive development as it has been presented by Piaget,
Kohlberg and others, since he believes that the same logic applies to
the progress of society. For Habermas, that is, the historical crisis
that is now manifest has placed questions of conceptual and moral
guidance at the center of dialectical concern, and the logic of the
development of those very faculties within individuals reveals the
nature of the crisis and the prospects for its resolution in this
phase of social evolution. We must direct attention to this logic of
development if we are to sort out the merits of Habermas' assessment.
That analytical device — which is really more than a device for
Habermas — hovers behind the thesis of Legitimation Crisis
,
and the
importance of a developmental model of society that reflects indivi-
dual maturation is detailed in the essays combined in Communication
and the Evolution of Society . There it is hoped that the "evolution
of world views" might become, "explicable through formal structures of
thought for which cognitive psychology has provided a well-examined
ontogenic model, a model that enables us to place these structures in
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a developmental -logical order." The theory of stages is linked to a
theory of communication that reveals how latent competencies in
society have not yet reached their full bloom. These are the special
abilities to resolve conflicts which are properties of individuals and
society alike, and which might be discovered in the "core domain" of
law and morality that has both an institutional and psychological
reality. In this, there is more than an analogy between individual
and social developmental schemes and in many respects they are
"homologous." 53
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Significantly, Habermas does presume that there is a logical
correspondence between the developmental processes of individual and
society which leaves the promise of new synthetic attainments ahead of
us. However, it should be emphasized that this prospect is not quite
a historical teleology even if it appears to be at times. He wants to
reveal an observable structure in the patterns of normative change in
society to the great extent that they have a logic of continuity. But
this does not constitute a force in history by itself, and it is
dependent upon circumstances in a way that is not fully explained. 64
Even as he argues that individuals prefer to solve problems at the
highest levels of competence attained by them, 55 and as societies have
similar inclinations, they may not always be able to do so. Indeed,
the ambiguity concerning human potentiality that was implicit for
earlier critical theory has become explicit for Habermas, and it is
here that the concerns of memory arise most sharply. If the logic of
development in society is not a guaranteed progression -- if it moves
ahead, but suffers regressions as we shall see in a moment -- then we
will want to know the precise mix of ingredients, of different pasts
and extant capabilities of reflection, that comprise the present
orientaion and constitute its crisis.
That is, we will want to know precisely what it is that causes
society to lag behind in its development and whether we have under-
stood the nature of those failings properly. For Habermas it is the
prevalence of administrative functions in the many spheres of life
that most often accounts for the inability of society to produce new
meanings and new moral competencies appropriate to its stage of
development. Yet perhaps there is something in the nature of social
progress itself that is resistant to the fulfillment of such logical
expectations. In other words, it is not clear whether these lags in
development are merely temporary aberrations due to intervening
causes, whether they are part of the scheme of social development
itself, or whether the 'logic' of development that applies to society
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is as stable and consistant as it is for the individual in the first
pi ace.
Especially if memory plays a different role in securing that
consistency for society than it does for the individual, then we may
have reason to question the equivalence of their developmental logics.
If society cannot incorporate the past into its present course of
action with the same facility as the individual who may reflect openly
upon prior states of being, and if it recalls only vague Utopian
visions where the individual recalls specific adults as the ideals
toward which to steer its future, then we may be talking about two
distinct kinds of development dependent on different regimes of memory
that suffer very different lags or crises. Of course, many others
have questioned Habermas' logical scheme for the evolution of society,
but with consideration for memory we must ask -- as we asked of the
continuity of tradition in Oakeshott's work -- just how the develop-
mental consistency of society is like that of the individual. To what
extent do the individual and society perpetuate themselves by related,
though not identical means with reference to two regimes of memory?
We must suppose that they are as integrated as they were in our
initial discussion of Halbwachs and Wollheim, and also as distinct.
Accordingly, an important clue to the nature of this consistancy
may be found in Habermas' account of the entanglement of disruptive
forces that affect the individual and society both at comparable
stages in their development. As he explains it in Legi timation
Crisis
,
the dysfunction of the components of a cultural tradition are
likely to be, "reflected at the level of the personality system," to
the extent that it may even prevent a "conventional outcome of
56
adolescence." In such circumstances there is no longer an innocent
acceptance of childhood convictions for the adolescent, but a
reflective rebirth that follows a period of, "doubt criticism and
57
examination of beliefs," tending toward withdrawal and protest. The
mediating experiences of lengthened education, improved schooling, an
egalitarian family structure and the loosening of sexual prohibitions
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in the modem period have all contributed to the adolescent tendency
to retreat from society and to challenge it on explicitly normative
grounds.
In this it seems that there is a conjunction of social and
personal crises owing to the lack of traditional guidance and certain
institutional advances. There is a psychological 'regression' that
now occurs in adolescence, which embodies a most particular for-
getting, and it is a far more troubled forgetting than that associated
with mimesis or reification. It is a forgetting motivated in part by
a dim awareness of the past as of new capabilities that are implicit
within the current stage of social development. But for the same
reason the forgetting remains different for the adolescent than for
society as a whole. The intensity and character of the memories in
question are different for each, even as the 'regression' seems to be
part of a single process involving both. Indeed, we may suppose that
the phase of normative sel f-refl ection that currently plagues
adolescents is precisely what has become so much more difficult for
the larger society to obtain. The memories in question remain less
acute and offer themselves less as evidence of hypocrisy for the adult
society that selectively recalls them according to its own interests
so that its lapses in progress may be all the more prolonged and its
continuity less assured than that of the individual.
While Habermas seeks to establish a positive model of moral and
cognitive development for the individual and society alike, he
discloses another phenomenon which is of special interest to the study
of memory. This notion of progress also forces the question of
regression and of the nature of the forgetting necessary to advance-
ment. In the progressive schemes of Piaget and Kohl berg for example
we must notice the fact that the development is not smooth and its
outcome is not guaranteed as there are many exceptions to the rule.
In the metatheory of social evolution the movement from one stage to
another is also problematical as, "the resolution of stage-specific
developmental problems is preceded by a phase of destruction and, in
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part, by regression." 58 Like the period of doubt that grips the
adolescent, it seems that there are natural lapses in the cultural
process of consolidating new meanings that are not simply due to the
intrusions of administrative actions. Within development itself there
must be pauses before the storm which allow new patterns of orienta-
tion to emerge; lapses into the formulations of earlier stages in
which an adolescent might regress to an earlier narcissism, or a
society to a more superstitious or seemingly traditional state of
being of which it has a less perfect memory.
Thus, the individual and the society that experiences regression
must each search among the residues of its different memories for the
elements that might now provide instruction. In either case there is
a dependence upon memory that does not allow new competencies to
spring into being unencumbered by the past, but society, more than the
individual, is inclined to appeal to the past for justification and
its 'regressions' are more deliberate and complex. Especially where
modern society seeks to be rational it has unique difficulty in
reflecting upon the past. It is more susceptible to chronic periods
of doubt than many individuals and tends to return often to that
regressive state of confusion that seems to characterize early
adolescence. It is especially in these lapses that selective memory
takes its toll on progress, and insofar as it is a progress in "social
evolution," we may suppose that there is not natural selection but
mnemic selection of a different order.
Although Habermas reveals a level of integration for memory and
culture that was obscured in the thesis of mimesis, he addresses the
matter somewhat ambiguously as well. On the one hand, he suggests
that society is propelled by its own ineradicable memory of normative
attainments:
In organized capitalism the formation of this bourgeois mode
of legitimation crumbled, while at the same time new and
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increased demands for legitimation arose. However the
moral system can no more simply erase the memory of a col-lectively attained state of moral consciousness, once
practical discourses have been permitted, than the scienti-
fic system can retreat behind an attained state of cumula-
tive knowledge or block theoretical progress once theore-
tical discourses have been institutional ized. [59]
In the moral system of society then, memory sticks and its
persi stance requires progress. But as orientations change along with
new modes of procuring truth and legitimacy, the memory of the old
does not lead comfortably into the new. The forward motion of society
is obstructed and it is not the language of regression that seems best
able to explain the obstruction. Rather, says Habermas,
...there exist cognitive dissonances between traditional
wo rid-views in the process of dissolution and the impera-
tives of the scientific system made binding through genera-
lized formal schooling and congealed to a behaviorally
effective syndrome in a kind of positivistic common con-
sciousness. [60]
In this, as we have already noted, there is a conflict within memory.
Significantly, the language of "cognitive dissonance" does not imply
either the outright loss of the faculties of memory as Marcuse
supposed, or the inevitable loss of particular memories. It suggests
skewed motivations that are comprised of competing memories which are
equally conscious. It implies the need to rationalize them, or as we
find in psychological texts, the need to formulate a "strategy for
dissonance reduction." *
Yet not only is society caught between a persi stance of memories
that generate progress and this sort of dissonant conflict, it may
face another difficulty, according to Habermas, where it suffers major
62
" retrogressions:
"
... retrogressions in evolution are possible and in many
cases empirically corroborated; of course, a society will
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not fall back behind a level of development, once it is
established, without accompanying phenomena of forced
regression; this can be seen, for example, in the case of
Fascist Germany. It is not evolutionary processes that are
i rrev ersable but the structural sequences that a society
must run through if and to the extent that it is involved in
evol ution.[63]
Here, however, we do not know the relationship between dissonance and
retrogression or whether dissonance itself might cause such severe
changes. It seems instead that retrogression is "forced" by events
that occur outside the normal course of social evolution. Hence,
there is a somewhat tautological suggestion that the development of
society proceeds, "to the extent that it is involved in evolution,"
and we do not know how society does become involved, or by virtue of
what sort of connection to its ineradicable memories. Inasmuch as the
changes in society are reflected in memory this presents a grave
difficulty: To what extent are guiding memories ineradicable, how do
they suffer dissonance and precisely what sort of circumstances compel
them to lapse into retrogressions?
For Habermas, a "dialectic of progress" can be discerned as new
problem solving abilities develop to address new needs and new problem
situations. Yet for him a dialectic of abilities is not the same
thing as a dialectic of actual achievements. 64 Thus, the changes in
the development of productive forces that Marx identified may trigger,
but do not bring about the necessary "moral -practical consciousness"
to transform society. Rather, the "endogenous growth of knowledge" is
its precondition, and a sort of seedbed of cognitive potential for
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solving, "crisis inducing system problems." For this reason, the
relationship between problem solving abilities and actual practices
today is not precisely known.
From the point of view of memory the theory bears out the notion
that we are suffering conflict and confusion rather than the closure
of mimesis, but the depth of that conflict has yet to be measured.
Now it might be measured if we extrapolate certain elements of
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Habermas' scheme without embracing the entire thesis of develop-
mental-logical progress in society. In this effort, it would seem
that change is produced in part, when new competencies that develop
logically and in a somewhat independent way, come into conflict with
particular pressures of social domination which first produce the
skewed memory of cognitive dissonances in the moral problem- solving
spheres of society, and then may lead either to retrogression, or to a
new synthesis of stage appropriate memories applied to practices. In
other words there is a "logic" of changes that is not a develop-
mental-logic of progress as such, and comrncn variations in memory may
greatly affect it. From this point of view there are indications that
we are in a period of extreme dissonance today where memory, far from
being obliterated, is filled with competing frames of reference, and
we do not yet know where it will lead.
To get some further indication of this, we must look within that
dissonance to the less severe and more immediate lapses in social
memory that Habermas has not addressed so far. Currently there may be
a series of small changes that are taking place within our mnemonic
orientation that alter the referential imagery of concepts like
marriage, progress, property, reason and individuality, as the
polemics of the "new conservatism" would seem to suggest. There are
quite sudden shifts in identity that run deeper than the usual
currents of style, and specific past events or entire episodes like
the Indochina War may come to be recalled differently for many people
who seem to change their minds about them in a few short months. In
such a period large numbers of people appear to suffer personal
alterations in memory that do not involve the irrevocable losses of
amnesia, and do not lead to wholesale retrogressions, but involve
lapses in the content of specific conceptualizations that do not admit
developmental progress either. We need to assess how much is really
lost in this and how much is only in retreat, and we may yet discover
a pattern of themes within the present "motivation crisis"
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that reveals the extent of its confusion, the nature of its dissonance
and of the focal disruption of a general retrospective orientation.
In this we may discover the extent to which our society resists
becoming "involved in evolution" as it is set forth in Habermas'
developmental scheme. Once again, as the dialectical progression of
that developmental-logic is cumulative and in that sense dependent
upon memory, it may also be undone by the numerous tricks and failings
of memory. In certain respects Adorno's comment on the Hegelian
system may also apply to this, as he says, "Dialectical progress is
always a recourse as well to that which fell victim to the progressing
concept; the concepts' progressive concretion is its self-correc-
tion." To the degree that a self-correcting operation is directed
toward the past in the progress of particular concepts, we will find
that progress is affected by the nature of our recourse to the past
and that dialectical changes are not always logical ones. That is
especially evident when the social conditions of crisis induce
dissonance which inclines people to unearth common strains of
experience that would otherwise remain buried. Such a selective
process will have its own coherence that is not quite explained by the
notions of dissonance or "forced regression" from a developmental
imperative that Habermas employs, and it may proceed by a different
'logic' in the life of the group than in that of the individual. Each
may have its own range of operations in the restoration of distinctive
pasts -- as society may only appeal in limited ways to certain general
features of the personal past, and the individual only to special
aspects of a historical past -- each meets different obstacles and
applies a different "consciousness" in its development. Perhaps more
for the group than for the individual, the retrospective effort to
ground identity allows sel ective memory rather than a logic of
development to take the helm, and the variable mnemonic response of
groups to new conditions has a coherence that does not necessarily
confirm that logic.
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Therefore, in order to determine how the more fleeting activities
of memory affect the course of social development, it might be more
appropriate to look to the model of short term adult reflections than
to the logic of the full course of childhood development. As
Halbwachs argued for example, the progression of our daily states of
consciousness may also seem logical, they may "follow one another in a
continuous current like so many waves pushing one after another." Yet
at the same time, "memory forces us to stop and momentarily turn aside
from this flux so that we might, if not reascend, at least cut across
a current along which appear numerous branchings off..." 67 Similarly,
when historical dialectics meet consciousness, and then are introduced
to a developmental
-logic as in Habermas' scheme, it should be apparent
that the consistancy of time and cumulative learning does not flow
through us, save by rather devious machinations of memory. Even where
social evolution does proceed logically from one kind of system to the
next, there is a special dependence upon a changing memory which
serves as a myopic guide focused only upon particular features of the
past, and if the development of society does have an internal logic it
is often led across that current by more circumstantial directives to
memory
.
While the individual acquires new abilities in a fairly smooth
progression interrupted only by brief periods of introspective
conflict, the comparable conflicts in society are expressed, and they
may call up a vast range of supporting memories as the coherent
grounds for public arguments. In this, society has a less restricted
tendency to move across the currents of memory. Once again, that is,
society lacks two elements which are crucial to the logic of develop-
ment in individuals, and it lacks two sorts of memory that would keep
it on the same track. It lacks a precise personal recollection of its
own antecedent stages and knows them* only selectively by means of
traditional lessons, myths or history, and it lacks a clear model of
anticipated maturity that the image of parents provides to the
individual who actively strives toward adulthood. Society must secure
270
its continuity by different means that include a more self-conscious
formulation of goals and Utopian promise, or a more rigid obedience to
the 'lessons' of the past. As society has less assurance of contin-
uity
— and as its conflicts are not integral and intrapsychic but
external and communicative, especially in a democracy — it must often
seem to pause before proceeding to a new stage in its progress. In
those pauses it must contrive its own continuity as if by an artifical
memory, reconstructing past lessons and creating future models that
refurbish an entire mnemonic orientation which is always at risk.
Therefore, we must open the consideration of these pauses even
further, and especially where they reflect a deeper crisis we must
still wonder where the proper metaphor for them might be found in
individual experience. In some measure they may be like the sequen-
tial shifts in the cognitive-moral scheme of childhood development as
Habermas proposes. In other respects they may be more like the
movement within the daily flow of thoughts that Halbwachs described
which are subject to lapses of memory. Yet perhaps they are also like
the periods of reflection that accompany adult changes, or like the
regressive phases of latent conflict described in psychoanalysis,
which appear to be more severe than a logic of progress admits and
subject to a greater variety of diversions that are potentially
pathological. While Habermas does consider the last of those in
passing, offering praise for Anna Freud's theory of the defense
mechanisms, even then, he prefers the more recent attempts to treat
the defenses as a "transgression of moral commands" in a
CO
developmental -logical order. 00 Still, what is missed in making this
choice is that the preferred model may be too logical and too
teleological to account for the lapses in social progress where a
variable memory is involved.
In the earlier psychoanalytic model, for example, we find that
aside from the competencies which are acquired one after another in
development, an altogether different "competency" is also achieved.
The individual gains competence in the use of the very defenses that
may thwart his or her own progress. In Habermas' scheme it appears
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that regressions are foisted upon the advancement of society by
external conditions like those which produced Fascism, but it is quite
possible that there is an internal dynamic at work that belies
progress, an inertia in social development that operates like certain
psychological defenses to promote the illogic of regressions. In the
latency period of the individual, for example, the transition from one
stage tc another is particularly troubled. At this point, in Anna
Freud's assessment, the ego may employ "indiscriminately all the
methods of defense to which it has ever had recourse... It represses,
displaces, denies and reverses the instincts and turns them aqainst
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the self..." In the calm at the beginning of a latency period the
child may appear to be "comfortably stupid" and to resist abstract
thought in general as well as questions of moral abstraction. 70 Here
it is the guidance provided by parental ideals and the norms of
surrounding culture that determine the 'normal' course of progress
through latency. It is external forces of a sort, that keep that
development on track; internal impulses and not forces external to the
logic of development that are the most likely causes of its derail-
ment. Thus, if lags are discovered in the anticipated course of
development for individual or society, they involve "self-corrections"
and defensive reformulations of past material. In those lags a
selective memory heeds current impulses and interests, it fashions a
seemingly external model for progress as much as it heeds an internal
imperative of development. A dialectic of progress must take account
of this as Habermas has only begun to do.
The role of memory in the process of change is all the more
striking when we observe how individuals cope with conditions of
severe social crisis that seem to be imposed upon them, especially as
they effect transformations in adult identity. The particular nature
of the assimilation of memories necessary to progress is then revealed
to be a determining factor even for the kind of progress that there
will be, and the dialectic of social change appears to depend upon
consistencies and ruptures introduced through memory. As Paul Fussell
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has argued, for example, the disruption that the experiences of the
First World War produced in the former orientations of life, was so
severe that it violated the "Hegelian hope of synthesis involving a
dissolution of both extremes." 71 The memory of such events had to be
obliterated or competely reassimil ated in a new scheme and it did not
proceed dialectical ly, nor did it reflect a clear developmental
progression.
In the wartime experience of Wilfred Owen, such dissonant
experiences are painfully recorded. In January of 1917, he says,
"There is a fine heroic feeling about being in France and I am in
perfect spirits," but some sixteen days later the experience has
utterly changed as it had for thousands of others, "I can see no
excuse for deceiving you about those 4 days. I have suffered seventh
hell..." Fussell maintains that these common but disparate exper-
iences encompassed such great extremes for so many people that they
could not be assimilated, and indeed as he suggests, there is "no
dialectic capable of synthesizing these two moments in Owen's
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experience." When it is multiplied so many times, the private
memory of such general horror seems to arrest dialectical synthesis in
a way that might now recall the laments of the members of the
Frankfurt School during the Second World War. It appears that
occurrances of this kind may certainly force temporary regressions in
the development of society as Habermas suggests, but they may also
bring about more complete and sudden transformations in the orien-
tation of a people, changing the prospective course of social
development itself. Where selective memory is engaged to assimilate
the experiences of a crisis it may be at odds with the developmental
imperative that is implicit in dialectical progress.
Where the inability to remember casts its shadow over the
continuity of progress, social transformations often appear to be more
abrupt and thorough than they are dialectical. Here Foucault's
conception of change has particular merit as he argues, for example,
that the classical period ultimately suffered a "mutation" in the
273
"entire Western episteme." 73 For Foucault, certain cultural themes
may persist beyond their time as if in a state of suspended animation,
but then they are suddenly and definitely pushed out of the limelight'.
It is not regressive states of crisis, but mutations in the epistemic
orientation of society itself that cause them to be forgotten. This
happened to the belief in magic for example, and, now that science has
supplanted it, "there are themes with scientific pretensions... that
are not (or are no longer) part of a culture's epi stemol ogical
framework." Contrary to Habermas, Foucault focuses upon those
lapses as if they were the rule and not the exception to a process of
change. Yet whether they are the general rule or not, he attempts to
"detect the incidents of interruptions" in the accumulation of
knowledge which decisively, "cut it off from its empirical origin and
its original motivations," 75 and this reveals one prospect for the
lapse of social memory that may give pause to the consideration of
progress. Foucault is willing to speak of "discontinuities, gaps,
entirely new forms of positivity and of sudden redistributions." 76
Change occurs by "transgressions" which are pointedly non-dialec-
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tical, and even if we do not accept the thesis entirely, it points
to a very real and sharper dissonance than we find in Habermas'
developmental scheme.
Now, if we consider how memory is involved in the process of
social change without yet attempting to show how much it is, then the
process appears in a different light that allows us to appreciate how
Habermas' developmental -logical scheme and Foucault' s transgressions
may each play a part. There is a certain consistency to a progress
that assimilates the past, and there are ruptures where that consis-
tency is dependent upon the convenient present biases of memory.
There may be general dialectical imperatives at work in those changes,
but they do not appear to rule always, and indeed there are "regres-
sions," "gaps" or "lags" that are not sufficiently explained by
historical materialism, by a developmental -logical scheme of progress,
or by the notion of epistemic transgressions. Much as all of the
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methods of psychological defense may surface during the latency period
of the individual, there are many forms of resistance to social
progress involving alterations of memory that may change its course
and determine its very nature.
Hence there are several quite different prospects for the
transformation of society: 1) Change certainly involves a dialectic
where conflicts in the productive apparatus demand that elements of
past experience be regenerated in new forms; a process of contra-
diction and renovation which, however, is subject to periods of
stagnation, progress or the selective recrudescence of past cultural
themes that form different admixtures affecting its course. 2) There
may therefore be lasting regressions that may even occur within
seemingly clearcut stages of pol iti cal -economi c development, or
stagnation and the kind of forgetting that tends toward mimesis. 3)
There may be transgressions that involve leaps to utterly new
epistemic forms that require a different sort of forgetting. 4) There
may be a logical imperative of stages in the acquisition of new
competencies that results from cumulative social changes and the new
means of understanding embedded within them. But this continuity also
suffers lapses and lags depending upon the capacity of a particular
mnemonic orientation to assimilate or evade the past. Within the
different cultural, moral, technical economic and political spheres of
society change may variously assume these forms and it may appear that
our current period is one of severe conflict, regression and_ trans-
gression that is neither stagnating in mimesis nor progressing
smoothly.
In different circumstances, that is, a dialectic, a leap or a
regression may occur in society and each involves a different kind and
degree of forgetting. From the point of view of memory, all are
possible permutaions of change and loss which may be mixed in
different ways and the distinctive theories that address each of them
might reveal new prospects for effecting change if their postulates
could be synthesized as much in theory as they already are in the
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ordinary reflections that guide peoples' lives. 78 Today's crisis
involves the disruption of a mnemonic orientation and there are a
plenitude of theories about it because there are numerous conflicting
tides in motion. There is an undercurrent of dislocation and
reconstruction within memory where formative events are taking place,
alternatively banal, forgetful and clever reformulations of meaning
whose outcome remains uncertain.
Thus, we must also reconsider the notion of loss in every theory
of society where it is appled. the past is not utterly lost to
rationalism, or forgotten in mimesis and social amnesia. It is not
invariably swept up in the developmental progress of society if it is
subject to the reformations of selective memory. Society may progress
in a series of steps that build from past to future or it may seem to
regress, and it now remains to be seen whether that regression might
follow the path of the psychological regression that leads to with-
drawal, stagnation and narcissism, or to new formulations of mnemonic
orientation.
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CHAPTER VI:
THE MODEL OF NARCISSISM: CHRISTOPHER LASCH
AND LIFE WITHOUT CONFLICT, TRADITION OR MEMORY
The diagnosis of pathological loss reaches its greatest heights
in Christopher Lasch's Culture of Narcissism
. In that work America
does not only appear to have lost its traditions to rationalism and it
has not just become one-dimensional and mimetic, but it has generated
a particular psychologial illness for which the prognosis is bleak.
The few questions that had remained open for the critical theorists
and the residual tension between the past and the present that still
informed their analysis is even more remote to the analysis of a
narcissistic culture which has lost its interest in history and
tradition along with the memory of the private sorts of experience and
good models of authority that might once have informed a way of life.
Following the political turmoil of the 1960s, argues Lasch,
Americans have adopted a kind of post-counter-culture fascination with
the many techniques of "psychic self-improvement" which is evident in
the popularity of certain eastern religions, jogging, health food and
numerous psycho-therapies. In this, Americans have "retreated to
purely personal pursuits" to become narci ssi stical ly self-involved,
and generally there has been a "retreat from politics and a repudia-
tion of the recent past."* At first glance it would seem that this
merely confirms the old individualist ideology. For Lasch, "the
contemporary narcissist bears a superficial resemblance in his
sel f-absorbti on and delusions of grandeur to the 'imperial self so
often celebrated in nineteenth century literature.' The American Adam,
like his descendants today, sought to free himself from the past and
to establish what Emerson called "an original relation to the
universe."" Now, however, Americans have become utterly dependent
upon the institutions of the modern welfare state, and the alienation
and general lack of competence that it produces has disrupted anything
-281-
282
like an original relation to the universe. The new circumstance
undermines the old arrangements of authority, weakening the authority
relations of family to produce passive, sel f
-centered and withdrawn
personalities of the narcissistic type.
It is not so much that the individual psychic functions have been
reduced to "mass reactions" as Marcuse argued, but the entire society,
dependent as it is, has acquired the attributes of that particular
obsessive pathology -- a pathological narcissism far more troubled and
complex than individualism or simple self-love -- which is "the
psychological dimension of this dependence." 3 In this state of being
the American experiences enormous insecurity which can only be over-
come in narcissistic fantasies,
only by seeing his "grandiose self" reflected in the atten-
tions of others or by attaching himself to those who radiate
celebrity, power and charisma. For the narcissist the world
is a mirror, whereas the rugged individualist saw it as an
empty wilderness to be shaped to this own design. [4]
Significantly, there is a particular historical dimension to the
transition from individualism to the new narcissism that compounds the
psychological severity of the problem. Now, Americans are plagued by
narcissistic anxiety, depression and a sense of emptiness in the
special sense that they are inclined to live only for the present. In
their response to dependency they have become disinterested in the
future and cut off from the entire past so that they repudiate recent
history and suffer a disturbance of private memory as well:
Americans seem to wish to forget not only the sixties, the
riots, the new left, the disruptions on college campuses,
Vietnam, Watergate, and the Nixon presidency, but their
entire collective past, even in the antiseptic form in which
it was celebrated during the Bicentennial... To live for
the moment is the prevailing passion -- to live for your-
self, not for your predecessors or posterity .[5]
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In this case the loss of the past occurs in several dimensions so that
psychologically, the narcissist who fits the pattern, "finds it
difficult to internalize happy associations or to create a store of
loving memories with which to face the latter part of his life." 6
Thus, while Lasch would reveal the cultural preoccupations of the
moment in the absence of a historical interest and in living for the
present, he also attempts to be true to the diagnostic model of
pathological narcissism as they arise from the psychoanalytic
investigations of Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg. He offers a
historical account of changes in the American psyche, but the
pathology that he discovers there still finds its origins within
childhood development and the family.
At the formative level of such personal experience, for Lasch, it
is the institutional replacement of traditional authority relations
within the family that has devastated the psyche en masse . On the one
hand the demands of work have weakened the authoritative presence of
parents within the home, and on the other, the institutions which have
come to replace them have also suffered a decline in their authority
within an "ostensibly permissive society." 7 So it is not just
traditional morality or practical reason that is lost, but the
structural components of the psyche that once engendered a moralizing
conflict. The absence of authority that arises with weak parents and
weak institutions has created a common psychological milieu that
undermines the healthy development of ego ideals and the superego
which psychoanalysis had found to be so important to the healthy
maturation of an adult ego.
Nevertheless, and by means that remain a bit mysterious in this
analysis, the decline of authority has not lead to the weakening of
the superego in the general population. To the contrary, the masses
of people have compensated for the loss by creating their own
imaginary masters and by strengthening their superegos with primative
childhood fantasies of the worst aspects of parental authority as the
narcissist might do. That is, in the absence of strong parental
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models of authority or clearcut institutional ones, Lasch postulates
that a powerful imagery of authority based on infantile fears has been
injected into the superego on a mass scale. In the psychoanalytic
language of narcissism, he contends that without suitable "ego
ideals," an abnormally harsh and punitive superego has grown up within
American narcissists, and that this has been fashioned from fantasies
derived from the destructive and aggressive impulses of the "id."
American superegos, he suggests, are filled with, "fantasies charged
with sadistic rage," rather than "internalized ego ideals formed by
later experience with loved and respected models of social conduct." 8
While we may question the premise that there is simply no one in
authority left to love and respect sufficiently, it is this that leads
Lasch to conclude that Americans as a whole are unable to form
adequate ego ideals and a healthy superego. These American narcis-
sists are said to have suffered an arrested development of that moral
agency and they have difficulty integrating the "rules of social
intercourse" or morality that are not well grounded in this society to
begin with. Surprisingly, this does not lead to a conflict among
berserk individuals lacking in the social graces and instead Lasch
argues that the self "shrinks back." A falsified and inflated
superego beats back an amoral self as it combines infantile fantasies
and popular media imagery as models for conduct, and it is for this
reason that the themes of psychotherapy are promoted everywhere in
America to assist individuals in their "struggle for composure." 1 ^
Therapy functions in place or religion and although it is not a
religion in its own right, it may similarly quiet the masses. A
therapeutic vision of the healthy personality now links together
images of success which are no longer so concerned with genuine
"achievement" as they once had been, and elevates the interest in
notoriety, celebrity and a new "mode of making it" instead. 11 In
other words, there are new therapeutic images of success that contain
individual cravings as they replace the old models of the superego and
certain ideological precepts at once.
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Thus, within Lasch's premise that the superego can find no
healthy models, we find the somewhat debatable suggestion that the
newly refurbished superego which has developed "at the expense of the
ego ideal" now absorbs public images of success uncritically or
without moral conflict. The sadistic version of the narcissistic
superego is founded upon infantile fantasies of terrifying authority
along with 3 public imagery of celebrity and Americans do not appear
to suffer the old conflict between id, ego and superego where the very
structure of psyche has been rearranged. Instead, they are in
conflict between raging infantile impulses on the one hand, and
grandiose images of success which bear their own authority on the
other and presumably these Americans grow up with images of success in
place of a conscience in truly narcissistic fashion. 12
Nevertheless, and because there are still some rules of conduct
that are born within the new sadistic superego, Americans do persist
in a certain state of conflict. They suffer from "anxiety, depres-
sion, vague discontents, a sense of inner emptiness," and they
collapse under the weight of it all to seek immediate self-satisfac-
tion and "peace of mind." Even love is reduced to the new therapeutic
ideal of fulfilling one's own "emotional requirements," and such
feelings are cut off from one's parents and a sense of legacy once
attached to them, just as they are cut off from one's children and all
emotional attachments to posterity. For Lasch this leads to boredom
and a deadening of emotion overall. These narcissists are, "like
animals whose instincts have withered in captivity," and they complain
of an "inability to feel." They may even become thrill seekers as if
to jog their atrophied memories of feeling because they can, "no
longer remember what it feels like to be inundated by desire." In
short they are defended against their desire by an ill formed and
forbidding superego they rage against this defense and defend
against the rage until they have all but exhausted themselves and they
are "outwardly bland, submissive and sociable." 14
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At last, it seems that we have an argument with enough
psychological subtlety to account for the loss of tradition or of the
critical capacities of reason, without dismissing the fact that
different aspects of memory do persist in conflict. But ultimately
social narcissism still entails a collapse to the present that may not
reflect the depth of that conflict sufficiently. Here, the general
pattern of shared selective memory would appear to hang upon a
deficient formation of the structure of the superego and the struggle
over the integration of the past is given over to the faulty integra-
tion of the elements of the psyche itself. There is something that
remains unsettling about this analysis, and it is not at all clear
that the descriptive symptomology of narcissism is the best means of
addressing the social disruption of memory that it claims to reveal.
In this connection, we would do well to notice that Lasch's
presenting case the generalization of American attributes and
interests has been rendered historically in light of what it no
longer contains. If Americans live for the present, then we are given
to suppose that they have lost a sense of tradition, an interest in
history, legacy and posterity and not only that they have failed to
integrate their parental models adequately. Where parental authority
seems absent in this analysis it is in the context of a historical
failure of the family and general weakening of public authority. If
desire and feeling have diminished it is in the inability to recall
youthful feelings of intense desire, and if morality has lapsed, it is
in face of the loss of traditional and ideological precepts as well as
in a weakness of the component parts of the superego. The presenting
symptomology of cultural narcissism is one of living dispassionately
for the present, in fear, isolation and with feelings of emptiness
that are partially filled with inflated fantasies and media imagery,
and this may well fit the clinical picture of that pathology. Yet in
Lasch's social analysis we find that narcissism is characterized by a
historical loss and a certain inadequacy of memory that the clinical
literature does not particularly identify with that condition. It
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begs the question of whether the psychological condition is equivalent
to the social one by condensing a historical loss and a psychological
loss into a single causal nexus. Thus, and while we do find a new
configuration of memories at the cultural level today, and we do find
many of the descriptive characteristics of narcissism, it is not clear
that they are the result of the failure to integrate the same salient
features of the superego that are found wanting in the narcissist.
In defense of his argument Lasch repeats the psychoanalytic claim
that pathology represents a heightened version of normality, 15 and to
be sure, narcissism begins as something normal that may become
pathological in individual development. By generalizing narci ssi snuas
a social problem however, he has gone beyond this to the point that
normality has become a heightened version of pathology. We must
question whether the losses and forgetting that do seem to be part of
our current way of life can only be explained by the historical onset
of that particular pathology, and whether the entire culture has
actually been afflicted or has merely laid emphasis upon something
1 i ke it. In order to determine which is the case we must turn to the
psychoanalytic theories that inform Lasch's work to reconsider the
grounds for the diagnosis.
Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg have combined the arguments of
traditional psychoanalysis with those of object relations theory to
indicate the particular developmental failures that result in
pathological narcissism. Although there are suggestive disagreements
between them regarding the timing and import of the events in
question, both indicate that it is early, and for the most part
preoedipal fragmentations of the psychic structure, that form the
basis of the healthy integration of the self and which may occasion-
ally become too severe. Briefly, as Kohut describes it, there is a
primary infantile narcissistic self that inevitably encounters
shortcomings in maternal care. The preoedipal infant must then
fashion an exaggerated "grandiose self" and equally exaggerated
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"idealized parent imagos" in order to restore a semblance of the
initial happy state, a fantastic self and an inflated image of parents
that must soon become more realistic if the ego and the superego are
to develop normally. Such archaic selves and the objects to which
they are bound must undergo a transformation - they must be idealized
and differentiated so that other psychological structures are allowed
to form, and so that they may be restored within those structures in a
less exaggerated fashion. In other words, the grandiose self and the
idealized parent imago of the infant encounter certain realities, are
pared down and become less inflated on their way to finding a healthy
reintegration within the nascent ego and superego. The idealized
parent imago is "decathected" in the process so as to become more like
a real parent to be introjected in the normal development of the
1
6
superego.
If this does not occur, says Kohut, and if a psychic predisposi-
tion toward a faulty resolution of these elements is reinforced by
particular early traumas such as the sudden loss of a parent, then
pathological narcissism may result. In that case there may be a
regressive revival of the idealized parent imago and the grandiose
self of unrealistic proportions, and this leads to many of the
symptoms that Lasch describes ranging from delusions of grandeur and a
fascination with celebrity, to feelings of emptiness and a lack of
empathy. For Kernberg, who Lasch more commonly cites, the general
dynamic is quite similar although the pathology does not result from a
regression or fixation at an infantile stage of development but on a
failure in the "refusion" of the self later in early childhood when
the boundaries of the ego have become more stable. 17 Yet signifi-
cantly, for Kernberg and Kohut alike, the development of this
pathology depends upon the nature and timing of narcissistic wounds
suffered early in childhood and not only upon the general disposition
of authority within the family or the "distance" of parents from their
chi ldren.
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Once again, Lasch maintains that the "distance" of American
parents from their children as it is brought on by the demands of
capitalism and the general weakening of authority, is sufficient
grounds to produce pathological narcissism. Certainly, as Kernberg
indicates, "chronically cold parental figures with covert but intense
agression" are common to the background of narcissistic patients, 18
and if there are more parents of that sort it is reasonable to suppose
that there have been general changes in the formation of the superego
that may also account for the increase in narcissistic disorders that
seems to confront psychotherapists. 19 Yet it is in a rare individual
example that Lasch offers the case of one of Annie Reich's patients
whose father had died a few months after her birth. Here he suggests
that, "without the correcting influence of [her father's] everyday
contact," the woman in question had fostered the fantasy of a
"grandiose phallic father" in place of him, leading her to pursue a
"phallic kind of success." 20 Evidently the woman had suffered a
specific, very early narcissistic injury which does fit the clinical
pattern of the pathology, but it is not sufficient grounds to suppose
that the emotional "distance" of American mothers and fathers produces
the same effect, or that the pursuit of success among American women
commonly shares the same incentive.
»
Such parental "distance" is not tantamount to the death or
abandonment by a parent in a critical preoedipal stage even if it may
make the developing child more susceptible to a devastating psycho-
logical injury. Further, as Kohut reminds us, neither the severity of
the superego nor its excessive idealization in narcissism necessarily
corresponds to the general behavior of parents. And for Kernberg as
well, the parent's absence or inaccessibility might make the superego
more severe, as in the case of certain sorts of depression and in
various "borderline conditions," but it does not automatically lead to
2 2pathological narcissism. If the severity and early timing of
psychological injuries involving parents are crucial to the onset of
this pathology, the social conditions that Lasch describes only
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provide their most rudimentary setting. Further, in those conditions
it must be noted that the disappointment and deficiencies that are
encountered much later on in life may produce analogous effects
without such severe character disturbance. Indeed, when a well
integrated adult psyche finds so little confirmation, it may also
generate regressive, "narcissistic defenses" and encounter feelings of
emptiness which do not reflect a flaw in its basic structure. The
distance of parents may certainly affect the basic formation of the
ego and superego, but there are other "distances" which affect the
mnemonic composition of later identity and the integration of many
pasts within a_ sense of the self
, without preventing the fundamental
and healthy "integration of the self" as Kernberg terms it.
There is, among others, a healthy distance of parents which
contributes to the process of individuation. In psychoanalytic
considerations the discovery of the fallibility of a parent is crucial
to the formation of the ego, and in moral
-cognitive schemes like
Kohl berg's the development of moral autonomy rests upon the differen-
tiation of "self" and "other" in a similar kind of distance that leads
to more comprehensive conceptions of obligation. Of course, this
might have culturally specific connotations. On the one hand, we
might find that a healthy distance of parental authority once led
American youths to question authority and to work through moral issues
consciously. On the other hand, a more traumatic "distance" of
parents may have led the German youth of another generation to spy on
their families or to adopt extraordinarily harsh superegos with
allegiance to state authority and the Fuhrer. One may recall the
inadequacies of a distant parent and remedy them quite consciously
within oneself, or one may replace distant authority figures with
exalted images or refurbished ego ideals. It would be premature to
suggest that Americans have taken the second of these two paths, and
even if they have, it would not necessarily bear out the diagnosis of
narcissism. Further, if a society seems to have narcissistic
attributes it may not be because of an absence of parents in infancy,
but because of a subsequent inability to adopt them, their traditions
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and characteristics as models for identity, and to that extent it is
the later integrations of memory that must be taken into account If
memory is a "distance sense" that adopts adult schemata in Schachtel's
phrase, and if it confers the qualities of distance and familiarity
accordingly, then it provides the background against which later
narcissistic injuries will be sustained. Thus, certain orientations
of memory nay replace, relocate or revive lost objects of love and may
even endure the general distance of parents without becoming
narcissistic.
More pointedly, it is the differences between Kohut and Kernberg
that call attention to the problem of integrating the self at another
level. If Kohut identifies the source of pathological narcissism in
the most primitive preoedipal psychic structure and argues that it may
be regressively triggered by specific traumas later on, and Kernberg
sees the problem as arising in a subsequent pathological development
of the self that is not strictly regressive, then it is possible that
analogous (if less severe) difficulties in the integration of identity
may arise even after that. A failure to amalgamate the fundamental
components of the self may be echoed in a disintegration of identity
in adolescence or adulthood that is particularly affected by the
variables of cultural circumstance. In this we may discover that
specific failures in a shared mnemonic orientation are analogous to
structureal weaknesses in the psyche. They may evoke early "narciss-
istic vulnerability" 25 and cause people to enlist the "narcissistic
character defenses" which flourish whenever there is a question of
7 ft
self-esteem/ 0 but this is not pathological narcissism. Rather, it is
a dilemma in the orientation of identity concerning the components of
the later self which seeks once more to restore the foundations of the
established ego and superego. It may be a healthy narcissistic
response to a shattered world and it presents difficulties which are
less fixed and far more circumstantial than those of pathological
narci ssi sm.
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For this reason, the distinction between normal narcissism and
the pathological variety must be emphasized as it was for Freud. In
his assessment, a healthy, primary narcissism reflects a dominant
tendency of libidinal energy and it is in the interests of restoring
that state of being against odds that the ego and superego are
normally established. The superego is "regressi vely produced" as an
incorporation of ego ideals is a "substitute for the lost narcissism
of childhood," and for Freud the narcissistic impulse may take
several paths. As he says, according to the "narcissistic type" a
person may love, "(a) What he is himself (actually himself), (b) What
he once was. (c) What he would like to be. (d) Someone who was once
part of himself [a child]." 28 And similarly for Kernberg, "the self
is an intrapsychic structure consisting of multiple self representa-
tions," and normal narcissism entails different varieties of the
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"libidinal investment of the self." It follows that there may be
many instances of normal narcissistic love in different phases of
life. If we wish to maintain a diagnosis of cultural narcissism as if
it had befallen a nation of orphans who have signed up for every
conceivable popular therapy, we would have to be certain that they are
not pursuing a normal and healthy self-love by some other means.
Indeed, many of the symptoms of pathological narcissism may arise
from a healthy narcissistic impulse to flee from the numerous cultural
enticements to behave 1 ike a narcissist and which do not inhibit the
basic integration of the self even if they do affect the self-
perceptions of mature identity. In pathological narcissism, says
Kernberg, "the normal tension between actual self on the one hand, and
ideal self and ideal object on the other, is eliminated by the
building up of an inflated self concept within which the actual self
30
and the ideal self and ideal object are confused." Among Americans,
however, we may not find such a severe "fusion" of the components of
the self and instead there is a more precarious oscillation among
them. Inflated self-images tend to be rebuffed by realistic doubts,
and where the authoritative cultural models for identity are in danger
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of collapsing, people may strive to secure the same old psychic
structure that once depended upon the healthy integration of self
objects by other means. They may do this by employing a public
imagery of ideals that are similar, although of a different order,
than the exaggerated grandiose self of the narcissist.
Again, they may flee from a mortifying emptiness which reas-
sembles that of the narcissistic personality disorders only to
reinstate the healthy narcissistic developments that they have
experienced at other times in life. They seek public ideals of
character that only resemble the fusion of ego and ego ideals in the
grandiose self of the narcissist while their basic psychic structure
remains intact. Where this is the case, Americans may seem to be more
like neurotics as Kernberg describes them, without necessarily having
a particular private neurosis. That is, even as they may seem to be
fixated at a level of narcissistic goals and conflicts, they preserve
the "structural integrity of the self and the superego and ego
ideal." 31 Unlike the pathological narcissist, they may also be more
like the normally narcissistic child who does overreact to "criticism,
failure and blame," in moments of frustration, but is simultaneously
capable of expressions of, "genuine love and interest in his objects
at times when he is not frustrated, and above all, with the capacity
to trust and depend upon significant objects." 32 For such Americans
-- disturbed in the orientation of their instructive memories,
oscillating between a narcissistic defense and a pursuit of genuine
objects of love -- the prognosis is very different than for the
narci ssist
.
If the fundamental structure of the psyche has not been com-
pletely altered by modern social arrangements and it is the terms of
mature identity that have changed instead, then we should not apply
the model of a severe pathology that is cut off from the surrounding
world in every respect. We should not begin with the diagnosis and
deduce the symptoms as Lasch has done, but should concern ourselves
with the nature of the particular "defenses" at work in fleeing from
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the circumstantial difficulties of a collective situation. There
cannot be a single psychological response to the losses suffered by a
whole population and every conceivable defense may be called into play
to stave off the crisis in identity that they bring. The same or
similar symptoms might be explained by a range of less pathological
defensive patterns on the one hand, and by a collective response to a
"narcissistic" wound to the aspects of a "national identity" on the
other. We may find that even where narcissistic injuries appear to be
the issue in the more general concerns of identity, that most people
do not regress, fuse or inflate the components of the self narcissis-
tically, and that they suffer different losses and recall different
things to replace them than the individual narcissist does. They may
revere heroes like the narcissist, but where those heroes include
political ^extremists, violent criminals or assassins as Lasch
indicates, they are heroes who have a peculiar social import beyond
what is necessary to the narcissist. When common fantasies of
omnipotence assume particular defensive proportions and people seek to
emulate the attributes of a tradition which seems lost to them, this
is also beyond the ordinary scope of narcissism. If they pursue
therapies that promise to provide them with the particular strengths
that seem lacking in their lives it is not necessarily because of that
structural weakness of the psyche.
Thus, in attempting to discuss an entire society we are faced
with a series of questions concerning the derivation of a condition
that may only resemble narcissism. How severely has ego development
been disturbed, by what means, and is the mass "distance" of parental
and institutional authority severe enough to justify the clinical
diagnosis of narcissism for many individuals? If it is not, and there
has still been damage done, then do people now form specific psycho-
logical patterns of defense to protect themselves against that damage?
Do they privately seek to restore a healthy narcissism in face of
threatening circumstances, and if so, how do they compensate for the
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damage by selectively reformulating the mnemic background of identity,
and what aspects of this identity are commonly shared?
At this level we must ask whether something like a "national
identity," (and not personal ones), has had exaggerated 'narcissistic'
features in the past that have now been wounded, and whether the
"psychic" protection of the self is different if it is also a protec-
tion of group identity. Might people now seem inordinately self-
absorbed because they are fleeing from the melancholia that they might
suffer as a result of those collective wounds, and in various ways are
they privately resisting both the wounds and the pathology of an
inflated national self-image? Finally, then, there may be compensa-
tions for those wounds to a collective identity that seek to avoid
private narcissism, to fill the gaps in a wounded identity by other
means than remodeling the superego. It may be an embedded pathologi-
cal narcissism, or; a wounded healthy narcissism, or the attempt to
restore an exaggerated personal or national self-esteem that sets
Americans searching, testing therapies, making new heroes, or elevat-
ing one or another apsect of their past identities in the attempt to
consolidate new ones. Perhaps the depth and locus of the wounds to
identity may be determined from the nature of the compensations that
have been put in place, and it remains to be seen whether we can dis-
cover the nature of societal defensive responses to narcissistic
trauma and the selective memories that are fabricated to cope with it.
In society the model of narcissism might still reveal patterns of
identity if enough clinical and historical data could be appraised,
but in this, the model must be applied to particular instances most
cautiously. For example, the Mi tscherl ichs suggest that narcissism is
the key to understanding the inability of modern Germans to mourn the
losses of the last great war. They propose that the pre-war mentality
under Fascism contained a "grotesquely exaggerated narcissism" which
was severely damaged in defeat and by the recognition of the innum-
erable losses of war. Nevertheless, they maintain that the German
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people largely became so defended against the recognition of those
losses that they were never able to acknowledge them in a healthy
process of mourning. To have done as much, they say, would have led
to a "complete deflation of the sense of worth, an outbreak of
melancholia, and the danger of confronting this has not been nipped in
the bud by the process of denial." 34 Significantly, the determining
factor in this assessment of a national response to the losses of war
is not narcissism per se, but a mass defense by denial, to a wounded
nationa1 self-esteem. While the latter had been drawn within the
psyches of many individuals to affect their sense of self and the
relationship of egos to superegos, the response to this "narcissistic"
injury was not equivalent to the full blown pathology.
In consequence of the damage to national self-esteem, the egos of
individuals need not cut themselves off from all aspects of the past
to the extent that Lasch suggests, even if they distance, deny or
completely forget certain of its realities. The egos of the many may
struggle to forget the disturbing experiences that caused the wound,
but they do not become pathologically narcissistic just because a
dynamic of narcissistic defense is at issue. Instead, in the
Mitscherlich's analysis, they achieve a kind of forgetful and
defensive stupor designed to compensate for guilt and wounded pride:
The burden of guilt which they faced was so irreconcilable
with the self-esteem essential for continued living that
(narcissistical ly wounded as they were) they had to ward off
melancholia. But in doing so a submoral condition was
reached in which only biologically based self-defensive
mechanisms could bring relief. Time not only heals wounds,
it also lets the guilty die. [35]
The societal "defenses" that come to the fore in this case are
not a narcissistic withdrawal of love from the outer world in an
unselfconscious reaction. Time spent in forgetful ness that "lets the
guilty die" is a very different syndrome, and for a society it may
involve a combination of the most primitive, regressive defenses and
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conscious strategies of defense which are reinforced by legal and
institutional choices, both affecting an injurious adult memory. Had
individuals become completely narcissistic, or if the footing of a
nationalistic self-esteem had been regained this might not have been
necessary, but in postwar Germany neither was achieved. While the
Mitscherlichs do not fully stress the distinction it seems clear that
a nation cannot love itself or defend itself against guilt as an
individual can, although it may selectively recall, pace and reempha-
size constitutive features of its identity in a manner that affects
individuals profoundly. While the bandaging of wounded national pride
involves the egos and superegos of the body politic, it need not
inspire a narcissistic regression where it generates compensations for
the conditions that might produce narcissism, and it is even a last
ditch effort to prevent self-invol veent from running wild. Unlike
narcissism this defensive attitude may be quite temporary, just as the
melancholic self-enclosure that would result if it failed might also
be temporary. The compensation may not result in withdrawal but in
many active, outgoing efforts to selectively reassert aspects of adult
identity, to modify painful memories which remain accessible, and to
avert narcissistic mortification.
In this vein, the difference between a narcissistic pathology and
the collective attempt to restore a damanged self-esteem is borne out
in the management of guilt. Properly speaking, although Lasch does
not emphasize the point, the narcissist who suffers from an over-
estimation of the superego does not readily experience guilt, and is
more likely to experience a sense of devaluation of shame or no guilt
at all. But Americans, who have suffered a less severe blow to
their collective self-esteem than postwar Germans and have not
summoned the same defense against guilt, still find it necessary to
manage guilt in public forums and media displays. Where a society
manages the culpability for its offenses and failures and finds
institutional means of dissipating responsibility of the sort that
were so often effective in America following the Indochina War, it may
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only simulate the relatively guiltless experience of narcissism. If
guilt is not undone by the grandiose selves of the many, those who do
experience it will find more self-conscious means of becoming
detached. If they feel more guilt than the narcissist they may be
restored to a similar condition by assertions that the blame lies
outside of themselves. They may compensate for it in their occasional
good deeds, and the parade of moralizing spectacles and pledge drives
in America is not particularly the work of narcissists. In America,
the flight from guilt results in a different sort of appeasement and
people may find an uneasy variety of vindication in place of the
emptiness and lack of empathy of the narcissist. In the face of guilt
they aggressively maintain their innocence by every institutional
means available and we might argue that in America guilt is modified
but still felt intensely.
Where guilt remains a factor in the restoration of collective
self-esteem, so many defensive strategies are brought to bear that the
diagnostic value of the model of narcissism loses its edge. Indeed,
there are two central defensive inclinations which suggest that there
is a conflict in restoring common orientations of identity, but
nothing so uniform and resolute as that model suggests. When a
healthy individual suffers a narcissistic wound for example, it may
lead to "identification with the aggressor," or it may lead to an
altruistic concern for others. Identification with the aggressor is a
common defense in the formation of the superego as Anna Freud reminds
us, but "narcissistic mortification is [also] compensated for by the
sense of power associated with the role of benefactor.
. .the passive
experience of frustration finds compensation in the active conferring
of happiness on others." As it is linked to the compensation for
guilt, the flight from narcissistic injury may tend in either
direction without resulting in pathology. On the national scale such
compensation might conceivably lead to an identification with the
aggression of a "new right" militarism, or with the celebration of
philanthropy and the "helping professions" of liberal America. Thus,
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and even within the framework of the narcissistic defenses
, we would
have great difficulty pinning down a national character type as Lasch
has attempted to do. If Americans are responding to a wounded
self-esteem of national proportions, or if they are defending against
the conditions that might produce narcissism in the individual, there
are many variations to the response. At this level, defensive
patterns of identity and a selective emphasis upon special features of
the collective heritage are more at issue than the pathology of
narci ssi sm.
As the concern for memory directs us to examine the elements of
past experience that have been included or forgotten in mnemonic
orientations, the model of narcissism may indicate where certain
common defenses are at work, but it does not allow us to diagnose a
social ailment. That diagnosis might lead us to suppose, for example,
that there are no more healthy egos or good models for the superego
because we cannot find proper expressions of the ego in some public
corollary to the mind or locate consistent images of authority there.
In fact, we are not narcissists even though there are many of the
conditions in society that produce narcissism and even though we
employ seemingly narcissistic defenses against them. Rather, in the
flight from narcissistic mortification the full repertoire of
psychological defenses is called upon in ways that may lead to such
diverse American phenomena as liberal philanthropy, private altruism,
authoritarianism, physical abuse, highly focused activism, a fervent
defense of the family, casual sex, a cult of celebrity, neurosis,
depression, narcissism, selfishness or empathy. There is no single
American character type but many common, often conscious, ideologi-
cally charged and strategic responses to shared conditions. There is
a deeply contested selective memory and not a single repressed
pathology. Hence, there is reason to believe that even the latest
dramatic shift from a politics that once appealed to conscience to a
politics of self-interest, will proceed to shift back and forth again
rather than drifting steadily to the right.
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Essentially what I have argued so far is that Americans may be
descriptively narcissistic in important respects, but that they do not
share the etiology of that pathology and that their attitudes toward
the past must be considered accordingly. The conditions of their
upbringing do not bear out the fusion of the elements of the ego and
superego that produce the grandiose self, even if they do produce
self-involvement and a preoccupation with particular inner conflicts.
Now if it is not narcissism that troubles Americans but an analogous
problem in the formation of adult orientations of memory and models
for identity, then even the descriptive symptomology of that condition
may miss certain features of conflict that arise among us. The
symptomology must be examined more closely, especially where Lasch's
evidence for it is largely derived from the public media.
For Lasch, and coupled with an inflated sense of self, the
American narcissist embodies the following traits:
dependence on the vicarious warmth of others combined with
fear of dependence, a sense of inner emptiness, boundless
repressed rage, and unsatisfied oral cravings
... pseudo
self-insight, calculating seductiveness, nervous, self-
deprecatory humor ... the intense fear of old age and death,
altered sense of time, fascination with celebrity, fear of
competition, decline of the play spirit, deteriorating rela-
tions between men and women. [38]
It is difficult enough to see how these characteristics are only or
primarily American, and it is tempting to offer counter-examples, but
if we can accept the proposition that they do find a special home here
we will also notice that they are not quite as they seem.
At the heart of the narcissistic pathology as Lasch and the
psychoanalysts describe it, there are swings from a grandiose sense of
self to a feeling of inner emptiness. Lasch identifies the feeling of
emptiness in the "outwardly bland and submissive" character of
Americans and traces the "void within" through the confession of
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certain autobiographers who do seem to express a common experience
Nevertheless, as Kernberg reminds us, the emptiness of the narcissist
is an emptiness without longing, and due to the lack of empathy that
accompanies that condition, it is characterized by boredom and
restlessness but not by feelings of loneliness. 39 The emptiness is
not filled with the variety of conflicts and desires that might arise
in an identity crisis since it is a structural constant within the
narcissistic personality. In America we would still have to search
for examples that would fit that model, and we may find more frequent
expressions of intense longing and an almost morbid sense of lone-
liness. If not in the cases reported by private therapists, then in
lonely hearts columns, personal advertisements and in complaints to
media therapists, the emptiness of painful solitude is as evident as
that of boredom. Ever the self-sufficient characters of popular
fiction may seem most enviable to people who do not share their
restless condition, and behind the blandness of a certain American
character we may find sharp internal conflict, pronounced guilt and
longing that are not simply the figments of the narcissistic emptiness
that is characterized by a lack of empathy.
Conversely, where Lasch finds a cultural corollary to the
grandiose fantasies that might relieve the emptiness of the narcis-
sist, they are not precisely those fantasies of magical power, of
flying, destructive capability or world conquest that Kohut finds
among such patients. 40 Instead they are fantasies that the narcissist
might also share, but of a particular bent. They are fantasies which
are also filled with the manufactured illusions of the media, now
associated with celebrity and the character traits of certain heroes
-- often strong and resolute public figures who display their
confidence in circumstances that would undermine them. Again, for
Lasch, the superego holds up such "exalted standards of fame and
success," and those attributes have come to be valued for their own
sake in place of moralizing ego ideals. 41 But we may still find that
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there is a moral dimension to the heroic fantasies of Americans that
changes the balance between grandiosity and emptiness.
In circumstances where the heroic example of presidents and
soldiers has been tarnished there may be a profusion of different
kinds of heroes who seem unscrupulous at one moment an highly moral
the next. Yet it is not simply "fame" or "success" that accounts for
their popularity so much as the fact that they have somehow survived
an ordeal that might have made them bitter, and instead- have main-
tained a moral posture any moral posture in spite of it. There
are gamblers who break the bank and remain greedy and fun loving -
miraculously still themselves. There are mythical cops who are moral
dispite the constraints of the law, or doctors who violate bureau-
cratic policies and risk financial ruin to save a patient. The mere
fact of remaining physically intact in face of 'unjust' injuries has
come to represent an enviable moral cohesiveness of the self, and it
is often not the moral fiber of the hero but the amorality of
circumstances that affirms the heroic virtue of this resiliency.
There are athletes who overcome crippling infirmities, and the news
media make welcome heroes out of ordinary men and women who have
suffered a great impersonal wrong -- they have been held hostage,
caught in sniper fire or endure a dread disease.
It is not the grandiose fantasy that fills the American void so
much as the wish to be able to maintain an enduring polarity of the
self against mounting odds. It is the moral continuity of oriented
memory that is the background wish fulfilled by many of our heroes,
and it is for this reason that the most successful characters in films
often have one foot in the present and the other in a mythical past
that seems to have been informed by precise traditions or codes of
honor. Hence, medieval knights turn up in future fantasies with
swords, horses and a glib contemporary sense of humor. The same time
machine effect projects characters of a contemporary American sort
into former places and times where the background of moral certainty
provides them with the opportunity to make resolute choices, and
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despite the inversion of time we are assured that those heroes know
where they stand with regard to the past and future. Thus, if there
is a common narcissistic core to the American character it is a most
unusual one. Its emptiness is filled with a sense of the missing
past, with moral conflict and loneliness for which there is no clear
remedy. Its grandiose fantasies are fueled by the particular traits
of groundless in time and resilience in face of amoral adversity.
The American hero is cut out and pasted into numerous altered
circumstances as the moral ground and figure are shifted in different
genres of fiction. In this there is a struggle to supplant attributes
which seem lost to identity, but not a structurally deficient psyche.
As Kernberg suggests, the narcissist may certainly exhibit sudden
shifts in the course of analysis in which the analyst is alternately
revered as a "God-like image," or completely devalued as the repre-
sentative of a "hated and sadistically perceived mother image." 42
While there are indications that the American "fascination with
celebrity" reflects a similar opposition between good and bad objects
of interest, there is also a difference. In the American media, there
are far too many confl icting themes and characters to represent the
repressed material of a single psychological disturbance, and they are
more likely to represent normal oscillations in the individual attempt
to consolidate identity. The very fact that absurdly romantic visions
of love are presented side by side with those which are manipulative
and indifferent, and that both appeal to Americans sufficiently to
justify their advertisers' expense, suggests that the juxtaposition
itself contains a certain appeal. There may be a desire to balance
one model against the other at_ once
, and not to shift abruptly in
one's identifications as the narcissist might.
As we shall see, a society that suffers a disruption in the
content of certain guiding memories will seek to restore the depleted
imagery with oppositional images of good and evil and it will seek to
balance them. If Americans seem to celebrate amoral "success" it is
against the background of longing for moral certainty and it is in
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those oscillations that we find successful villains and successful
heroes in close proximity. It is not their success, but the lack of
ambiguity in their moral stance that makes them fascinating. So too
the myths that are presented to American children today are often
truncated, like "fractured" fairy tales with comical endings, and
where the emphasis is on good and evil characters, the moral of the
story is often set aside. A hunger for the balancing images of good
and evil resembles the deeper 'mirror hunger' of the narcissist, only
here, thematic juxtapositions may appease the longing for instructive
memories. The American "fascination with celebrity" is not just the
substance of "narcissistic dreams of fame and glory" where it masks a
self-conscious balance of inner conflict. 43 Just as Americans may
experience loneliness, guilt, outrage, and a simple wish to be like
others instead of the emptiness and grandiosity of narcissism, they
may become fascinated with more closely bound oppositions for the same
reason
.
Similarly, if the narcissist depends upon the "vicarious warmth
provided by others" in spite of a lack of empathy for them, Americans
may do something similar. Yet it seems that there is a peculiar set
of attributes that Americans pursue to attract that warmth and they
are not necessarily the same attributes that narcissists would
cultivate in themselves. Americans may strive to be tough, self-
sufficient, financially successful, thin and healthy as Lasch
suggests, but they do not necessarily believe that those are the
qualities that will win them love and admiration. They also preserve
the memory of a different model of conduct which stands opposed to
this and is more commonly thought to secure affection. Indeed, the
image of success that might elicit vicarious warmth is perpetually
challenged by the memory of another set of lovable characteristics.
It might be demonstrated that Americans only superficially desire to
be the star, to be the prettiest girl or the handsomest boy in the
class, and that they more frequently cultivate the attributes
associated with being "cute" and "nice" instead. Those equally
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superficial qualities do not refer to an image of success, but to the
memory of childhood posturing that elicits a very different kind of
warmth, and it may be for that reason that the rare public figure who
seems to be cute, nice and successful is often most admired - like
Johnny Carson or John DeLorian - regardless of their moral fiber. It
is for the same reason that Americans say, if only half-heartedly,
that money (or success) can't buy happiness (or love).
Like the narcissist, Americans may pursue notoriety or fame and
also cherish the mediocrity and anonymity of being lost in the crowd,
but with an unusual degree of ambivalence. Unlike the narcissist
there is a more immediate and self-conscious conflict about those
pursuits and we often hear of Americans who would love to win the
lottery but are wary of the rewards of instant success. Further, for
most Americans the dream of wealth and success is only a dream and
they cannot depend upon the "vicarious warmth of others" because it is
so seldom obtained. They may consciously pursue a fantasy of success
with equally conscious doubts, and they know the image of success to
be a fantasy that seldom seems as real to them as it might for the
narcissist. They say, "I wish I were..." or "I wish I had..." with
alarming frequency, but they have difficulty subsuming what they wish
within a grandiose sense of themselves.44 Where there is an immedi-
ate, self-conscious conflict that evokes opposing memories of love and
success, the emptiness and boredom of the narcissist is more often
replaced by the kind of ambivalence that leads to depression. 45
Thus, Americans may share the narcissistic "fear of dependence"
upon others, but they must still depend upon them for more than
tribute and vicarious warmth. They are often as torn between
independence and dependence as they are between the appeals of the
single life and the security of marriage. While the ambivalence of
certain Americans about being "committed" in relationships seems to
parallel narcissistic withdrawal, it is not quietly taken for granted
as it is in the worst of those pathologies. Not only is there a sharp
internal conflict for the individual who is faced with this dilemma,
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but there is seldom a balance between equally narcissistic parties in
any one relationship, if 0ne is a narcissist, the other is probably
not and the question of commitment may be openly disputed between them
as it is commonly in cultural discourse. So too, the "calculating
seductiveness" of Lasch's American narcissists is much too carefully
defined in public imagery to suggest that it is just another manifes-
tation of the pathology, and we may find that in each case where love
is elicited or dependence is resisted there are oppositional models
for identity at work that generate a very different kind of emotional
paralysis than that of narcissistic withdrawal.
Indeed, in Freud's discussion of the matter, the seductive appeal
of the narcissist was not the result of calculation, but of the
self-satisfied indifference that is present in that condition. 46
Where the narcissist is calculatingly seductive - like certain women
who Kernberg discusses - it is a most particular manifestation of the
pathology. That quality is certainly reflected in the so called
"vixens" of evening television serials who possess a vicious,
self-interested ability to crush the hearts of their equally calcu-
lating mates. Yet where this might provide one role model for a
general audience, it is not without serious competition from other
quarters. When people actually behave as those characters do they are
rebuffed, and the advertisements for the same television serials even
refer to them as 'the men and women you love to hate.' If we take the
mass media as a source of evidence for narcissism as Lasch has done,
we will also find that there are as many characters who exude empathy
and goodwill. That evidence suggests that Americans enjoy the close
opposition between two character types that represent competing
aspirations within themselves while neither reflects the actual
disposition of their own character.
The narcissist may exhibit ruthlessness and expl oitati veness in
relationships with others, yet Americans are prone to condemn or even
to ridicule this very tendency in themselves. If those traits are
really valued among young urban professionals, they are parodied
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almost everywhere else and indeed the very
"self-deprecatory humor-
that Lasch finds among American narcissists contains a suspiciously
precise awareness of the same unhealthy narcissistic inclinations
The self-parody includes jokes about the "me generation" and a
ludicrous variety of narcissistic characters - comedians like Joan
Rivers, Rodney Dangerfield, Phyllis Diller or Don Rickles who seem to
maintain their popularity, and there is a secondary narcissistic
character in every comedy series who is ridiculed, like Ted Knight on
the Mary Tyler Moore show. Again we find suggestive indications that
Americans do not suffer the structural deficiency of the psyche that
produces narcissism. They do not necessarily fluctuate between
feelings of emptiness and grandiose fantasies so much as they
experience self-conscious inner conflicts about their identity which
are suffused with guilt, loneliness, and longing. In dreams or in
humor, the narcissistic personality appears to be only one paradigm in
American self-awareness
,
one pole in the conflicts surrounding love,
dependency, money, success, power and failure, but it does not account
for the rest.
Significantly, the inadequacy of the model of narcissism is most
apparent where it attempts to account for a general loss of interest
in the past and a failing of memory. For Lasch, Americans have
suffered an "altered sense of time." Again, they are bound to the
present because of their inability to love others -- to mourn the lost
love object of the past or to create enduring bonds with others that
may be carried into the future -- and especially because the future
itself seems so forbidding. They have, "the sense of living in a
world in which the past holds out no guidance to the present and the
future has become completely unpredictable." 48 In Lasch's view,
Americans tend to repudiate the recent past, to cut off their own
happy memories as a source of continuity and they are the very
embodiment of a 'live for the present' mentality. There is certainly
an element of truth in that observation, but still it does not capture
the complex American attitude in time and memory.
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With this claim, as I suggested earlier, Lasch has already
introduced a historical dimension of the problem that is beyond the
ordinary scope of narcissistic pathology, and even if that is
admitted,, he tends to overstate the case. In America, there is
probably no more pressing reason for living in the present than there
had been for the Germans who were unable to mourn the losses of war in
the Mitscherlich's example. There, again, something like narcissism
was at issue only selective defenses were employed in order to protect
a failing national self-esteem. It was not the narcissistic rage
against lost love objects which, in Lasch's words, "prevents them from
reliving happy experiences or treasuring them in memory," 49 but a need
to dislodge the pressing memory of painful experiences, to make con-
scious efforts to find substitutes for them in order to appease latent
guilt. If this cannot be effected by a narcissistic disinterest in
the past, self-esteem must be boosted and innocence proven in the
media, the courtroom or in the courts of occupation. Where the
narcissist is cut off from the flow of time, no amount of public
censorship can equal the task and a society must rearrange the past
convi ncingly
.
It is not that lost love objects and a threatening future make
the connection to the entire past untenable, but that the disturbed
standards of collective orientation and self-esteem make some features
of the past seem threateningly incongruous and others most welcome.
Where the past in the form of tradition "holds out no guidance,"
Americans do not repudiate recent history, they turn to it repeatedly
to find selective justifications for the present. They do not simply
forget the Vietnam experience, but revise and repatriate the memories
which would now make them seem innocent of its faults. They nostal-
gically recreate a heroism that seemed lacking in that war -- in films
like Apocalypse Now or Rambo -- and where lessons that were given in
tradition or ideology have failed them, they seek to draw lessons from
recent history in a contentious and selective bid to reinstate the
grandiosity and instructive content of a national self-esteem.
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An "altered sense of time" among Americans is exhibited in this
most complex involvement with the past. They share the common modern
willingness to replace traditional lessons with those of history, only
they have a special inclination to fictionalize history to suit the
thematic interests of their present. Where portents of doom and
nuclear horror are offered up in the media they may certainly induce a
sense of hopelessness and of being cut off from the historical stream,
but the same awareness makes it vitally important that we redistribute
the past as well. Television is especially efficient in weaving a
sense of continuity where the fears and conditions of modern life
might otherwise fragment a sense of time. Not only does that medium
generate reliable means of pacing day to day activities for many
people at once, but it provides a common frame of reference among the
topical priorities of the recent past. Television "time" imposes a
measure upon the "historic" events of the recent and memorable past to
give them a certain form and emphasis. It highlights and repeats
special events so that their actual sequence may be stretched out or
collapsed, and in that way the taking of hostages in Iran may seem
very recent as it is recalled in similar situations, or the invasion
of Granada may fade from memory.
The self-contained record of certain television events is
constantly updated in special presentations in rapid-fire collage
images of the "last decade" or on newsworthy anniversaries, and as the
same scenes are replayed an event seems recent because -- in tele-
vision time -- it actually was recent. If a personal experience of
great importance may seem like it occurred only yesterday, a media
event probably did occur yesterday in a "recap" or "rerun," and for
this rason the Kennedy assassination, the Beatles on Ed Sullivan, or
the evacuation of Vietnam seem almost mystically present. Certainly
Americans may have a sense of the incongruity of such different
perceptions of time when their private recollections are punctuated by
the recreations of the media, and this may be enough to produce a
certain cynical complacency about change in society, yet it is not
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precisely the same withdrawal and disruption of continuity that Lasch
finds in the narcissist. It is different because it invokes an
organized attempt to produce continuities and to fill the emptiness
that the narcissist is unable to fill. As the narrow repetoire of
important events in the mass media is repeated, it wards off a more
threatening awareness of past and future possibilities just as the
practice of chanting might ward off evil thoughts. Similarly, the
quasi-medical and therapeutic chatter about what's good for your' body
and mind is peppered with poignant replays of past events, and even as
they are fictionalized for television they do allow us to feel that we
are in touch with the "historical stream."
Finally, Lasch finds that the narcissistic collapse of the
American sense of time is revealed in a growing disaffection for
children and the elderly, and to be cut off from the historical stream
means being detached from one's predecessor's and one's progeny. Of
course, the model of narcissistic indifference does not quite capture
the peculiar isolation of the generations here either. On occasion,
even narcissists are excessi vely . bound to their children and regard
them as extensions of themselves, 50 yet we may find that children,
like the elderly, may also become extensions of the thematic conflicts
that inform adult identity in quite another way. Where the pace of
changes in society has come to be measured in the distinctive styles
of each generation, and where the market and the media bestow an
extraordinary credibility upon middle aged adults, the very nature of
youth and old age is continually reassessed. Especially in a crisis
that affects the guiding meanings of identity, those adults find
themselves in an ambivalent condition. On the one hand they are
vulnerable and childlike or " "i nf antal i zed" in the therapeutic
jargon -- and on the other, they are powerfully adult and "entitled."
Where adult identity is subject to such oscillations, children and the
elderly may serve to evoke fearful memories of vulnerability and
obsolescence, and may themselves be regarded with ambivalence. They
become caught in the attempt to stabilize an adult orientation -- the
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adult memory schemata to which Schachtel referred - so that the
elderly may be viewed as helpless children even when they are notincapacitated by age, and children fetishized as charming innocents
or regarded as little adults who scheme and ought to be punished as
adults or may even be subjected to adult sexual interests
Here the lack of empathy that stems from the irresolution of
adult identity is very different from the narcissist's inability to
empathize with others, and it may involve a peculiar thematic
disturbance in the images by which those others are recalled. Now in
America it seems that they may be recalled with adoration or overt
hostility, and the extremes of idolization on the one hand, and abuse
on the other are indicative of a most particular problem with empathy.
Americans do not abuse women, children or the elderly because of
narcissistic withdrawal which, for all of its repressed rage seldom
resolves itself in violent acts. Ambivalent extremes seem as common
here as indifference, and Americans cherish those persons who
represent passivity and innocence just as they may dispise them for
evoking the memory of their own vulnerabilities and helplessness.
Such vulnerable persons are often embraced with extreme and artificial
displays of affection, with pats on the back and baby talk, and from
the same uncomfortable distance that they are frequently abused.
When one potential American parent declared, "I don't want
children, they're too small and demanding," the statement may have
seemed to confirm the disinterest in children that Lasch refers to,
but the tone of voice scarcely concealed a measure of remorse. A well
rationalized life choice had apparently weighed the memory of a wish
to have children and the dependence of childhood against the concrete
difficulties of meeting the present terms of adult success. A fragile
adult identity had contemplated the prospective child with a mixture
of longing and disdain. The final resolution is not pathological, but
an arguable position that may be challenged internally, or externally
by the many Americans who still do wish to have children. Similarly,
when another American says, "we'll have to put mother in a home," it
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Night be explained by a narcissistic break with the continuity of
time, or by the "intense fear of old age and death" that accompanies
that pathology. The elderly mother may certainly serve as a threat-
ening reminder of the aging process and she may seem as dependent as a
child, outmoded and useless, but she may also represent the enduring
bonds of affection that are carried within the memory of her and of
her own world of reference. She may seem awkward and embarrassing at
the same time that she is also loved, and the ambivalence that lies
behind the statement will seldom allow the decision to be taken
1 ightly.
Because there is a moral dimension to this ambivalence that
extends beyond narcissistic indifference, we may discover that it is
not so much in the distancing of small children or the neglect of the
elderly that Americans secure their identity, but in the paradigmatic
conflict between young parents and their morally awakening adolescent
children. As the normal adolescent is caught between a childhood
memory of the implicit promise of a pure parental morality, and a
budding awareness of the accomodations that must be made in adult
liberal
-capitalist society, that conflict becomes the arena in which a
general absence of moral guidance and the very terms of adult identity
are most severely tested. Whether adolescents ultimately prefer the
prevailing image of success and the cynical means of acquiring it, or
would rekindle the underlying values of society that do not tend in
that direction, they point to the hypocrisy of trying to maintain both
at the same time. Today, adolescent conflict reflects adult uncer-
tainty and precisely where it seems to lack a moral dimension it
provokes an almost haunting search through memory for moral guidance
which is more than simple nostalgia. Adults become fascinated with
the task of measuring a refurbished memory of their own youth against
that of the present. For this reason, writers for the media seem to
have great difficulty representing adolescent conflicts without
echoing, or artificially recreating the moral conflicts of their own
generation. They often instill a sense of moral certainty in their
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youthful characters
- the "Fonz" is no rebel without a cause ~ just
where the absence of such certainty might better reflect the genuine
challenge that youth poses today. Now where it seems that there is
moral paralysis, it is a very different kind than that of the
narcissist. It is the sort of paralysis that is caught in ambivalent
extremes of moral conflict which makes selective appeals to the past,
it fetishizes or ridicules the adolescent identity crisis, it does not
know how to embrace children or the elderly and it is mired in love,
resentment, affection and rage all at once.
Where traditional means of guidance have failed to sustain a
collective sense of identity, and where specific wounds to a national
self-esteem have evoked the memory of "narcissistic" vulnerabilities,
there has been a contentious attempt to heal those wounds, to appease
guilt, restore morality and to secure pride and innocence. In this,
Americans cannot completely cut themselves off from others or from the
past in sustained narcissistic reactions without encountering a sense
of uneasiness in themselves. And where they try, there are still
others who will charge that this is hypocritical. As we found earlier
in the quotations from Lillian Rubin, even the expressed recollections
of Americans concerning their own past are often ambiguous. There is
guilt, a feeling of attachment to the past and withdrawal, as happy
and painful memories mingle in conflicting reminiscence. Those
Americans may live for the present in their own special way, but it is
not the way of the narcissist, and it can only be sustained in
carefully balanced and highly selective renditions of the past. So,
where Lasch states that, "the narcissist has little interest in the
future because, in part, he has so little interest in the past," 51 we
find instead that Americans are preoccupied with select elements of
the past and they are deeply concerned about the future.
In Lasch' s analysis a wide range of theoretical questions about
historical change, a shrinking ideology and the relationship between
individual and society seem to be neatly laid to rest. The psyche
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that has been wounded in infancy emerges as a social type, and it i
type for whom conflict over the guiding memories of the past have been
given over to a structural inadequacy of the personality. For all of
Lasch's apparent concern for the psychological process, we are pre-
sented again with a portrait of minds without process, much as they
were in the analysis of reification and of mimesis. If the analysis
holds, intra-psychic conflict is a thing of the past, culturally
determined grandiose images have supplanted the superego, historical
change must cease and there is only room for lament. The monolith of
narcissism casts its shadow over history and culture, and history can
be little more than the unfolding of that pathology.
All of the tensions that are usually present in critical theories
of society are therefore absent and even if the time to question them
has come and gone, the model of narcissism begs the question. There
is no dynamic of desire that confronts a frustrating human condition,
no seething unconscious that must be vigorously repressed to fit a
reality principle, no mode of production capable of precipitating
class conflict, and no deeper reality that stands opposed to appear-
ances when the grandiose illusions of the narcissist are the reality
of social life. Those criticial distinctions have certainly failed to
explain a modern inertia, but the thesis of cultural narcissism over-
states the case. It hints that a tension remains between the past and
the present, but quickly retreats from the implications that follow,
and in attempting to portray a narcissistic collapse to the present
Lasch has missed a crucial point. Americans are in conflict about the
past and they are struggling with virtually every aspect of the past
to reconstruct an orientation in time and memory. They are not cut
off from history so much as they are concerned to rearrange it and to
find a locus for their own memories that will give them order and con-
tinuity. The historical past may appear to them inaccurately, like a
time line for children with important themes and events displayed in
vivid pictures, but it is a sense of history nevertheless. Indeed,
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the past is still recalled in opposing images that resist a morbid
narcissistic condition.
Americans excuse themselves too much and far too consciously forthem grandiose self-images to have succeeded on the narcissistic
model or to have failed and left them empty. They express guilt too
frequently and they proclaim their innocence and moral indignation too
emphatically to suggest that they have lost a more poignant inner
conflict to that pathology. So when they look inward, it is not
simply with "pseudo-self-insight," and they find more than a void
within them that has been left in the wake of tradition. They find
the memory of their own fears and insecurities to be as fresh as their
awareness of the conditions that have affirmed them. They remember
their own longings, the promise of their parent's dreams of success or
of success for them, and neither their memories of vulnerability nor
their fantasies of success have been submerged within a structurally
deficient psyche. Rather where the crisp imagery of tradition once
provided a means of reconciling such conflicting legacies within
them, these Americans must look to the less secure content of their
own daily musings to find order for their memory.
Different pasts press in upon the present to linger in the
background of memory, and now, rather than being cut off in narcissism
they must be revised to suit new requirements of identity. According-
ly, where the narcissist fashions exalted self-images against
repressed guilt, Americans emphasize specific themes and images to
assuage expressed guilt -- particular sorts of heroes and compensatory
memories that would restore self-esteem to adult identity. Beyond
narcissism, Americans search for meaning everywhere, in every medium
that will allow them to indulge their confused daydreams and con-
flicting memories. They search in old books and magazines, in
television, in therapies, in the amoral competition of sport where
their "play spirit" has become so serious, and there is a substantial
difference between the claim that they are a dim and narcissistic
people, and the prospect that they are a disoriented and lonely one.
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In the end it appears that the American is not like Narcissus
alone with his mirror, but is wandering within a labyrinthine hall of
mirrors each reflecting different pasts that are laden with conflict
Taken together, the hall of mirrors composes a region of selective
memory that surrounds and penetrates the modern consciousness, and it
is not the structure of a psyche wounded in infancy that determines
its space, but an arrangement of memories that offer limited instruc-
tion to adult identity. Here, if something seems to have been lost,
whether it is tradition, ideology, the promises of history or of
youth, it is also evident that the elements of an instructive past are
being reassembled. If only on the surfaces of those mirrors, twisted
and selective memories are assembled and an inner world of common
daydreams expands to fill the void left by the instructive pasts that
have failed. Here, too, there are numerous refracted images that
stare the confused American in the face. They seem to be somewhat
fixed although they are not grounded in a secure tradition, they
contain fantasy although it is not the grandiose fantasy of the
narcissist, and instead of that we find tightly juxtaposed images of
moral conflict that offer their own provisional guidance.
In traversing the hall of mirrors that instructs them in their
daydreams, Americans do not find only absence and emptiness. They are
confronted with a profusion of images which seems at once to be more
vast and more superficial than the informative legacies of tradition.
The older, well grounded arrangement of pasts cedes to a flattened
imagery of opposition, there is a peculiar condensation of memories,
but not the collapse of the psyche in mimesis or narcissism. In place
of sacrosanct visions of peace, marriage or justice we find a
selective memory of relative peace and a frightful fantasy of global
annihilation, a juxtaposition of marriage, divorce, the singles scene,
sexual fantasy and rape is promoted in the media, and images of legal
justice are infused with those of corporal punishment and vengeance.
Frightening images are recalled in a manner that reveals them to be
distant and familiar at once as visions of the slaughterhouse might
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hover in the background while eating a roast, or visions of dread
disease accompany the healthful pursuits of the body. That hall of
mirrors does inspire the kind of self-interest that arises from fear
and confusion, but it is not necessarily that of the narcissist It
condenses and disperses pertinent memories in which the ordinary hangs
next to the extraordinary and things half known replace those which
were traditionally secure.
As this region of selective memory presents its conflicts in the
manner of a daydream, they are more nearly conscious than the latent
conflicts of the narcissist or for that matter, of the traditional
individualist. Selective memory responds to feeligns of loneliness
and guilt and produces a particular variety of cynicism to modify
them. This is not the cynicism of the empty narcissist, but one that
emerges in a stark awareness of painful or unlikely alternatives.
Almost nothing shocks the American whose emptiness is filled with
narrow selective memories that reflect every contingency. He or she
may say, "Sure, I know that" without deeper reflection, and with
little sense that knowing it has made a difference. Hence, poverty,
oppressive working conditions, avaricious military adventures,
personal failure or inadequacy comes as no surprise, and a sense of
injustice is dulled even when people are not utterly complacent and
withdrawn. But at the same time that their options seem to be
prescribed in a balance of selective memories, Americans are not the
victims of an irrevocable pathology and the shape of their under-
standing may change to acquire a new depth. In the end it is not
tradition that is lost to rationalism, the capacity to remember does
not cede to mimesis, and the psychic structure that has endured
conflicts over the past does not collapse to narcissism. Instead, a
variety of things past are lost and reclaimed in the selective memory
that would provide orientation to adult identity.
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Mimesis, Narcissism or Mnemonic Conflict in Two Model, fnr w,^
Identity ~
The suggestion that we are currently experiencing a far more
severe conflict concerning memory and tradition than that implied by
the thesis of mimetic conformity or narcissism may be borne out by way
of example. In contemporary America that conflict is well revealed in
the "deteriorating relations between men and women" that Lasch
identifies in general pathology. But beyond narcissism, there is a
particular "dissonance" of the sort that Habermas described, when
sexual identity is established in frames of reference that seem
dramatically opposed to one another - that contain strange images of
the conventions of marriage on the one hand, and ideals of sexual
liberation on the other. If those contrasting images do not pose a
dialectical antithesis or promote a "transgression" leading to new
forms of understanding, they do not quite stagnate in narcissism
either. Rather they present a polarity of equally valid and equally
barren visions of human conduct fashioned from selective memories
which may still determine the course of change. This polarity of
models for sexual identity has several sources. It emerges in the
theoretical debates surrounding the women's movement and in the
competing renditions of tradition that arise there. It persists in
the conflicting public visions of possible lifestyle that fill the
media, and within the different patterns of forgetting required of men
and women who pursue these visions. Still we may find that each
expression of the conflict has borrowed from the others to the point
that a single common scheme of memories tends to define our options.
The feminist debates offer the most articulate expression of such
a conflict, though they have raised much more complex questions than I
can address here. At stake is the degree to which our relationships
are determined by nature or convention, the prospect for a new mutual-
ity of purpose among men and women, a new sense of individuality and a
different morality that arise with the promise of the liberation of
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women. There are treatises concerning the role of the state, of the
economy, of child rearing and sexual practices that might effect this
transition. Recently, feminist debates have returned to consider how
much and on what grounds the "family" may be defended and consequently
how we might speak of a tradition of the family. 52 m this, at least,
the very nature of retrospective understanding is at issue and it
appears that visions of the traditional family have been called up
from numerous pasts. It would seem that there is unquestionably a rich
tradition of family loyalties and commitments just as there is a
history of oppression, yet the two are symbolically locked in conflict
as history, tradition, ideology and politicized personal experience
become the contested background in the pursuit of oriented memory.
Perhaps there is a common core of memories and another conflict deep
within the public awareness that might inform this conflict.
In the scheme that Habermas has presented, it is particularly the
"familial-vocational privatism" of the early bourgeois variety with
its interests in consumption, leisure and "competition through
achievement," that has been a central motivating feature of modern
society. But again, it has suffered from the development of more
egalitarian family structures, child rearing techniques that promote
the socialization process and a loosening of sexual prohibitions made
possible by birth control and treatments for venereal disease. 53 For
Lasch as well, the pervasiveness of industrial demands and state
functions in the public sector has combined with these developments to
create a "heartless world" that has eroded family ties. Not only had
cohesive families once resisted the disruption of parental authority
that produces narcissism, but the family remains the last haven
against impersonal social control. In an argument that has won no
small amount of criticism from feminists, Lasch finds praise for the
family as it has existed in numerous historical arrangements taken
54together. Family-vocational privatism, its antecendents and its
modern variations present a common legacy which might also be divided
in a number of ways.
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Consequently, and depending on where we identify the "tradi-
tional" roots of the family, these corrosive modern developments may
now be extolled as means to the liberation of women, or condemned as
offspring of the very privatism that destroyed the communitarian
promise of an earlier time. That is, feminists generally attack an
early bourgeois paradigm of the family and defend certain forces that
have corrupted it as enhancements of freedom. Other feminists defend
a vision of the family that is best located within the non-bourgeois
community, and they remain suspicious of the sexual experimentation
and the intervention of state functions which purport to free women
from the home. In the debate it appears that there are three parts of
a "tradition" that are not fully differentiated. It is not clear
whether the contested tradition is one of prebourgeois communitarian
family life that still survives in places, or an early bourgeois model
of the nuclear family as an economic unit, or a vision of the family
as it is now afflicted by capitalist crisis. The competing interests
that affect contemporary memory set those phases apart, find different
themes of promise within them, arrange them in sequence or combine
them in one continuous history of patriarchy, and wholly distinct
theories concerning that past have been generated in the process.
It is especially difficult to extract contextually rich visions
of the family in all of its changing dimensions where the current
interests of memory reflect an older ideological conflict that
continues to cloud the picture. Our recollections of the family -- as
a historical entity or even in our own experience -- are still shaped
in the tensions surrounding "individualism." On the political right
this has been reflected in the conflict between the traditional values
of the small community with its restricted family life, and the
substantially male independence of the market place. And on the left
it is reflected in the tension between progressive legal and economic
advances in individual freedom, and a commitment to the goal of "total
55
community." But today, even as longstanding ideological divisions
continue to shade our understanding of the family, we find that rather
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common public visions of family life and its alternatives present a
more immediate source of difficulty. While the future of indivi
dualism remains at stake, it is not to the old ideological dispute
over the place of the individual in the community that people turn for
guidance, but to imperfect images of a 'life style' that they may
easily adopt, composite models of an obligatory, even legally
reinforced family life, and of the free spirit who pursues a variety
of intimacies while resisting that family life.
For this reason, feminist attempts to locate a tradition, to
revive ideological debate and to produce a compelling public vision of
men and women sharing responsibilities in a new kind of community,
have fallen before a more simple dichotomy that informs the public.'
At first it might seem that this dichotomy is well represented in the
disputes over abortion, among the advocates of a "right to life" and
their "pro-choice" opponents. But a more subtle and unfortunate
reduction has occurred where the "right to life" mentality fosters a
simplistic vision of the family, and arguments for sexual liberation
have been unfairly conflated with a popular fascination with the theme
of "casual sex." Caught between the rhetoric of principled movements
and the caricatures of the media, people seem to think that their
choices lie somewhere between the single life in which men and women
"equally" pursue numerous "intimacies," and an updated, abridged
vision of traditional family life. Although few of them whole-
heartedly pursue either extreme, and neither rests upon a factual
memory or an accurate history, each model is a selective contrivance
of private experiences and popular history which remains locked in
memory as a source of instruction. Precisely because this polarity is
derived in the public search for instruction each model has been
reduced to its simplest terms, each is a selective memory that is
moved by fantasy to generate a "parody" of the forms of tradition and
promised freedom, and neither allows us to confront our deepest
associations to the matter sufficiently to turn imitative conformity
into reflective choice.
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Thus, for the most part, the public does not really know the
tradition that is being attacked and defended without the aid of such
contrivances. We cannot actually remember it and the historical
discussions that might reveal its attributes are still too sketchy and
obscure. Even a sophisticated analysis of the family as being
patriarchal and bourgeois, or as the seedbed of communitarian values
may readily be confounded by the simplified public images that are
cast according to contemporary interests. In turn, these interests
produce a barrier to retrospective understanding because economic and
moral crises generate a simultaneous longing for traditioanl stability
and a celebration of new liberties. They prevent us from seeing
beyond the early bourgeois family as it was already in a state of
degeneration, because it is at that juncture that the same contempoary
interests arose and in that historical period that the modern division
between public and private life which affects our memory was itself
grounded. In other words, the present, common polarity between the
"right to life" vision of the family and that of casual intimacies
forms a hybrid of the old f ami 1 i al
-vocati onal privatism and_ the forces
that have destroyed it taken together. The "tradition" to which we
are inclined to refer, contains a composite image of the family as it
seems to have endured that transformation and crisis so that in the
media at least we find a confused presentation of seventeenth century
"career women" and their "liberated" husbands, and the common view is
not much less cluttered.
Again, this is a selective memory fashioned to respond to the
pressing modern division between the public world of work, enter-
tainment and state influence, and the private sanctuary of the home.
It is not a memory of a time when the categories "public" and
"private" made little difference to the activities and relationships
of families, and men and women were subject to different constraints
that also produced a tradition. Instead, the current composite vision
of the nuclear family contains a principle of enduring marriage in an
achievement oriented economic unit, a vision of the home as a place to
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escape in privacy, to engage in certain "free time" activities and to
unwind, a precarious ideal of monogamous sex sanctioned by peers,
in-laws, religion and the law itself, with distinct male and female
obligations at home, in work and in the rearing of children.
Nevertheless it is a vision that arises in opposition and that private
family is scarcely imaginable apart from a public world that provides
a different kind of escape - without the possiblity of divorce and
the alternative prospect of the single life. Even within the feminist
debates, the criticism of the oppressions of the "traditional family"
is levelled in light of public liberties now in existence, and against
a model of the family in crisis which reveals the freedoms that it
does not possess. While it may be hoped that such a family never
returns, we must not suppose that our "memory" of it is adequate to
reveal all of its faults and promises. Conversely, any critical
defense of the family must also rectify the memories to which it
refers and extract itself from the hybrid vision of the decaying
family that is so much preferred today. It may be difficult to give
historical substance to any one vision of a familial tradition until
we have sorted out the ingredients of its mnemonic composition.
This becomes most necessary in light of the dilemma that remains
unresolved in Habermas' analysis. If he has correctly identified the
failure of contempoary society to generate new motivational meanings,
then we must suppose that a collage of memories is being consolidated
to stem the crisis, a composition of differently weighted traditonal
,
historical and personal elements that balances opposing themes and
continues to provide a kind of guidance. My contention is that there
is a certain core of memories which have long been attached to notions
of the family and have now been rearranged in such a balance. While
"tradition" has become the object of struggle among competing
interests, it is not tradition itself, but an arrangement of memories
within it that is more deeply at stake. That is, the orientation
provided in traditional families required certain sorts of memory even
if the participants were only dimly aware of them, and the same
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mnemonic foundations have surfaced in the contempoary desires for
"commitment" and "intimacy" that have become so self-conscious in the
crisis of today. The mnemonic requisities of commitment still linger
in the background even if they are twisted or diminished in the pat-
terns of forgetting that are necessary to the simplistic conservative
notions of the family and the practice of casual sex. There is an
'integrity' of former experience and rich memories that still pertains
to the forms of obligation in which they are currently cut short. And
there is a struggle over these that is hardly narcissistic.
We might suppose that commitment means a bond of love, trust and
responsibility, the enduring concern of two people within a community
of common interests that might sustain the life of a child. Yet today
we find that commitment is touted in the religious or contractual
obligations of marriage, in "open marriages," and most self-
consciously, perhaps, in brief relationships as if the very utterance
of the word were essential to their intimacy. In each case now, as in
earlier times, there is an inescapable core of sustaining memories
that inform a deeper interest and desire: 1) In commitment there must
be a memory of one's own vul nerabi 1 ties in childhood and maturity
sufficient to motivate a desire to assuage them and to produce the
empathy that might embrace another person, or sustain the nurturance
and concern for children. A shadow memory of the fears of childhood
is present to commitment along with adult fears concerning isolation,
pregnancy, illness and death. 2) Because those fears may return to
haunt us, we seek to be known and protected enduringly. Commitment
implies the memory of persons that continues to embrace them as they
change throughout the course of their lives. Whatever fetishes we
make of the persons we know -- as a loved one is reduced to a series
of images, a parent or a grandparent seen only as a type of character
those reductions are resisted by the inescapable profusion of
memories pertaining to them which are necessary to commitment. 3)
There is the unavaoidable memo ry of the 1 egacy of a_ community which is
conveyed to us in childhood and in numerous cultural myths and
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practices. Whether we accept those lessons completely or not, they
are locked in memory and instill responsibilities that are still a
matter of public virtue which instructs the manner in which we
remember different persons and lays to rest the memory of our own
fears.
Again, such memories are disturbing and demanding, and today they
are never fully present to our actions just as they were not fully
realized in traditional relationships. Core memories of vulner-
ability, of whole and enduring persons and of conventions are
distanced differently in every kind of commitment, but they cannot be
eradicated and each must claim them in a distinctive pattern of
exclusions. Yet if commitment is to entail a vision of community and
"social compact" as Jean Elshtain describes it, 56 or if it is to
provide the '"female sustained' non-market values of a nurturance and
compassion" that Barbara Ehrenreich has referred to, 57 it must awaken
the same mnemonic requirements — precisely those which the fascina-
tion with casual sex and the new conservative vision of the family
would variously deny.
Significantly today, the self-consciously touted notion of
commitment often becomes a kind of nostalgia for 'enduring love.' It
is cherished for the sake of the "relationship" that is often seen as
something quite apart from the persons involved in it. It may not
acknowledge vulnerabilities and it may seem to be at odds with a
deficient moral legacy of the community. Inasmuch as the contrary
visions of casual sex and the new conservative family inform these
commitments, the character of "intimacy" in both only echoes the same
core of memories. 1) Infantile vulnerabilities are dismissed as being
childish, and adult fears -- like those concerning the prospect of
pregnancy in sexual activity -- are distanced in memory so that tough
and independent adults may proceed as a market oriented family, or in
the pursuit of casual pleasures. 2) Other persons are perceived in
static images, in sexual fetishes or "roles" that appear to be
unchanging as men and women search for the ideal mate, or become
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husbands and wives, and the memory of persons as they might change in
enduring commitments is restricted. 3) The memorable legacy of a
community assumes the character of a legal contact or of a vague
mystical imperative that seems to hark back to nature. The covenant
is replaced by abstract principles of social obligation and they may
be satisfied in natural, if temporary, arrangements between "equal"
consenting adults, or in a contract of marriage coupled with a "right
to life of the unborn." However, in each case the reduction seems
uncertain and people proceed with moral trepidation. The inescapable
memories at the root of commitment have been refashioned but not
eliminated, and internal conflict is fueled by that richer memory of
vulnerabilities, needs, persons and communitarian responsi bi lties.
Evidently the tensions between the two simplistic models of casual sex
and family life are suffused with a deeper tension between the
caricatured visions that they both promote and that common core of
pertinent memories.
Of course, the conditions of earlier marital arrangements
required that men and women forget themselves in ways that were at
least as stark and painful. By means of deliberate evocations of
immanent starvation, ostracism, the threatening forces of nature, of
the consequences of illegitimate birth or of an irreligious death,
they were admonished to adopt patterns of work strictly divided
between the sexes and equally strict observances of faith. Within
those patterns they were to fashion limited comforts, unspoken
loyalties and a division of tasks that would diminish economic and
sexual vulnerabilities and provide a degree of protective comfort. As
they were compelled to abandon the desires and expectations that might
endanger that arrangement, the family was moulded against the memory
of the very things it would forget. The core memories of commitment
persisted even as they were subsumed in the compelling evocations of
the time.
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At first it seems that contemporary adult casual sex with its
self-conscious self-involvement now addresses an entirely different
set of concerns since it admits the very desires, and risks the
dangers that the family once kept at bay. The limited protections
that it offers appear to conform to a more privatistic pattern and to
be of a different caliber. Yet those casual relations must still
contend with a very similar background of fears and expectations, and
people who prefer to engage in them must still disperse the memory of
comparable vulnerabilities. They must still fear exclusion from a
moral community and fear the danger of losing the continuity of their
own existence as it might be insured by having children or in being
known as persons. They must fear the vulnerabilities aroused in
sexual activity with regard to their own adequacy, the possibility of
pregnancy or of having their aberrant desires become known, even if
their economic survival does not depend on it.
Where sexual contact is the preliminary and central interest in
short-term relationships, the vulnerabilities that generally arise in
physical intimacy and the concerns for mutual responsibility that were
routinized in marriage must be assuaged by different means. Whereas
certain fears might be slowly buried in the sanctions of marriage, in
casual sex it must be the more immediate fear of expressing fear that
makes everything seem "OK." In the former, questions of fear and
responsibility are laid to rest in the strictures of the relationship
itself, in the latter, they must be resolved in the structure of each
interaction. While the long-term relationship will most likely
involve the inability to express certain things, the brief rela-
tionship where sex is paramount depends upon not expressing the same
things, and must repress or deny them for the duration if it is to
remain "casual." In this, the tradition itself becomes threateningly
evocative precisely because the persistant concerns of vulnerability
and responsibility cannot be completely forgotten.
Where casual intimacies supplant commitment, the vulnerabilities
that may be aroused in making love -- the naked, infantile surrender
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and the reality of pregnancy - must be pushed aside by so many
emotional and mechanical devises no matter how "tender" the act may
seem. And in homosexual relationships as well, similar issues of
responsibilty and concern that might surround the prospect of
pregnancy otherwise may still be anticipated in sexual acts and be cut
short when they are casual, even if the infant in question is only an
echo of one's own infantile memory. Such things must be subtracted
and forgotten for a time or only mimicked, leaving participants with
the kind of bravado that has been associated with "traditionally" male
indifference. Even when the preference for casual sex appears to be a
well reasoned and principled declaration of independence, that
intellectual understanding of the situation does not easily catch up
with the realities of the act. There may be a lag between under-
standing and desire which reverses that of the male adolescent when,
as Anna Freud suggests, "his lofty view of love and of the obligations
of a lover does not quite mitigate the infidelity and callousness of
which he is repeatedly guilty in his various love affairs." 58 Now a
lofty view of independence cannot quite escape a different memory of
love.
The apparently narcissistic and mimetic quality of casual
relations therefore depends upon a complex forgetting which effec-
tively divides and nearly relinquishes an inescapable core of
memories. First it must isolate and forget the vulnerabilities and
private fears that were once modified in the conventions of romantic
love and marriage, then it must forgo a memory of certain enduring
persons and a desire to be known that way in favor of independence,
and it must disregard the threateningly evocative convention of
marriage for all of its success and failure. That is, where visions
of marriage which might have averted certain worldly dangers -- and
visions of romantic love -- which might assuage private memories of
vulnerability -- had once been joined together, if only in the early
bourgeois imagination, they are now quite often seen as separate as
they are each restricted in memory. Such memories are abridged and
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divided up, but they are not completely forgotten and they hover in
the background of casual pursuits to increase their incentive Now
indeed, where the full-blown tradition with greater access to the
memories associated with commitment might have once posed a challenge,
the piecemeal images of romantic love, of marriage or even of
pregnancy may be alternatively recalled in the fantasies accompanying
casual relations. That casual pleasure is derived in a provisional
forgetting, but the forgotten dimensions remain in sight as a
distrubing, sometimes titillating source of conflict.
For this reason it appears that two tiers of conflict are
tenuosly resolved in casual heterosexual relations. Commonly the
conflict between the independence of those activities and the
dependency of marriage is resolved in quasi
-dependent intimacies. Yet
more deeply, there is a conflict between the persistant memories
associated with commitment -- of vulnerabilities and the desire to
appease them in romantic love or marriage -- and the immediate
comforts of physical intimacy. And the second conflict is seldom
resolved at all. Further, there is one more opposition that reveals
how tenuous the balance of these elements has been, and how compelling
the core memories that we find hidden within the notion of commitment
contine to be. That is, men and women must play different parts in
the forgetting that accompanies casual sex, and women are forever
closer to the elements that it would require them to forget.
As adults today, men and women have been well exposed to the
legacy of conventional marriage if only in the lessons of their youth,
and there at least, the mnemonic associations of marital fidelity to
sexual acts and pregnancy remains firm. In order for sexual activity
to really seem casual and independent those associations must be
broken, sex extracted, and the questions of pregnancy and fidelity set
aside. Yet the prospect of pregnancy cannot be dismissed and the
reality of which women are cyclically reminded cannot be severed from
its sanguine associations to mortality and to the dangers of isola-
tion. Whether or not sex is undertaken as a procreative act, in
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heterosexual relations and at the level of its associations, it is
al so a procreative act.
If we admit that such things cannot be completely forgotten by
those who engage in sex casually, the distance from the activity that
they acquire in memory must also be different for the sexes. To the
extent that men have seemed to remain exempt from the responsibilities
of pregnancy, it is the male paradigm of distance from those associa-
tions that women must adopt when the have chosen or been encouraged by
a cultural milieu to opt for casual pleasures. Yet as the fears
associated with pregnancy may seem to vanish, the question: "What
happens if I get pregnant?" cannot be very far away no matter how
effective the means of birth control may be, since it is not a
question that arises only in the voice of the present, but from the
lessons and associations of youth. The unanswered question surrep-
titiously revives the deeper core of memories within commitment, and
the associations of fidelity and pregnancy to sexual activity is
hidden but not broken. The ultimately female reality of pregnancy is
absent for both sexes in this casual intimacy only that absence is far
more difficult for women to sustain. Despite this, there seems to be
a degree of collusion in forgetting for both sexes as they must roll
up their eyes against the exhortations of the conventional past and
their own experience. Finally, the past eludes them both and they
imagine that they have been "equally" promiscuous where they cannot be
equal, self-sufficient and independent where feelings of dependency
are most aroused.
Such activities may be rationalized today since they may involve
a kind of intimacy and caring that avoids the dominations of the
conventional arrangement. The mixture of intimacy and formal free
market equality may appear to fulfill the requirements of commitment
without its worst abuses. In piecemeal memories it does provide for a
sense of being known, a place to express vulnerability, and for a
sense of belonging to a community of like-minded individuals. In the
repetition of sex with different partners, one may find confirmation
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of the fact that he or she is "worthy" of intimacy. The repetitati ve-
ness of the scene may even seem to involve a greater intimacy
precisely because the nature of intimacy is always and immediately in
question. Still, casual sex involves a pretense that nullifies and
abridges the memories associated to the act rather than meeting the
needs aroused in them. That intimacy is not commitment, and the
peculiar "dissonance" that emerges where an older memory remains in
the background also entails a moral conflict that does not necessarily
lead to greater freedom. If it is any kind of liberation, it is only
the sort that is born of carefree forgetful ness it mimics the
innocence of childhood without acknowledging the fears of that time.
Thus, casual sex involves a moral regression as it distances and would
forget the very awarenesses that must remain present to general adult
memory, and which befall men and women quite differently.
If society is progressing morally as Habermas suggests, then it
would seem that the moral lapse involved in this kind of forgetting
may nevertheless become entrenched. For example, in the debatable but
useful model of moral stages that Carol Gilligan has discerned in
female development, the paradigm of casual sex would seem to cause a
regression that compounds the problem. According to Gilligan, women
proceed through moral stages that are characterized by, 1) individual
survival, 2) a stage in which goodness is seen as self-sacrifice,
and, 3) a stage in which women can revive a degree of self-interest
that is now culturally discouraged, and proceed to a morality of
non-violence as the resolution of a balance between self and others. 59
Where this developmental scheme applies, we might argue that in casual
sex women must nearly digress from the second stage to the first and
are prompted to do so by the prevailing patterns of indifference that
only men could "traditionally" afford. On the other hand, men may
readily preserve the illusion that casual sex is a fair, equal and
therefore moral practice among consenting individuals as if by
applying a different moral scale. Instead, they more nearly adopt the
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moral sequence of stages that Kohl berg has offered which place a
higher premium upon the liberal principle of equality and a morality
of rights which Gilligan has criticized. 60 indeed, if women seemed to
advance toward a legalistic morality of egalitarian self-interest on
that scale, they would regress in the scheme proposed by Gilligan
at best, in casual sex, they would persist in self-sacrifice bolstered
by the strange idea that individual survival is somehow served in the
process. In casual sex it appears that it is partially the nature of
the forgetting that prevents morality from being expressed in a
"different voice" for men and women. There is a different forgetting
and a different regression or advancement for each as a different
order of memories informs them, and yet the substantive core of
memories that is distanced from the activity provides them with a
common domain of moral grounding.
Still, if there are any final moral qualms at all, men and women
do not necessarily appeal to those memories to resolve them. Instead,
abstract ideological principles of equality, freedom and independence
may seem to provide a mutuality of purposes that replaces conventions
and appeases the disturbing memories that raise moral questions.
Legalistic principles of equality which certainly ought to apply to
men and women in the market place and may even inspire more equitable
intimacy in sexual acts, mistakenly supplant commitments and displace
an extant awareness of unequal risk in the same activities. The
interest in individual survival that Gilligan identifies as the first
stage in the moral advancement of women, is regressively wedded to
liberal individualism in a comfortable and forgetful fit.
A woman may wish to engage in the casual intimacy that has
blended with "independence" and an "equal" lack of commitment. But it
is she who must be willing to abort a pregnancy or go it alone, and
she who is least able to forget the prospect of parenthood that is
only expressed negatively in casual sex as a remote and undesirable
contingency. Of course, even when women adopt a liberal juridicial
sense of equal reponsi bi 1 ity for the act -- assuming half of the
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burden
- they still carry more than half of the burden and men,
already once removed from the eventuality of pregnancy, may become the
executors of the lie of equality. Equality is obtained at the expense
of reponsibility for each sex by a different route: his lie is that
in treating her equally he has accepted half of the responsibility,
and in casual sex he may easily treat her as an equal without
confronting the terms and implications of equality, and without
greatly changing himself. She must lie more circuitously to avail
herself of the same pleasures. With greater difficulty she must
forget the vulnerability of pregnancy along with traditional issues of
responsibility and obligation, and to be "equally" independent she
must adopt his attitude of limited responsibility as her own. She
must change dramatically in sealing off the memory of biological,
experiential and traditional lessons, and deny the reality of her
implicit burden in the male terms of remoteness that have been recast
and legitimated in the language of equality. In this, she may achieve
a semblance of economic equality, but the same selective memory that
applies in casual sex will prevent the formation of a new kind of
mutual responsibility that acknowledges the different vulnerabilities
at stake, and she remains its victim.
Now it should be clear that the forgetful union of casual
intimacy attempts to dismiss the very ingredients that it cannot
completely dismiss as it cuts its pattern from the old cloth. The new
intimacy does not escape but only masks the oldest inequalities
between the sexes. In resisting the constraints of marriage it does
not forget but vividly recalls the form that the f ami ilial -vocational
scheme has assumed in crisis and restores it in the process. What it
does forget, are the core memories implicit in commitment the
content that has been stunted in virtually every conservative and
radical rendition of "tradition" as well. Thus, in different ways men
and women displace the memories of childhood vulnerabilities that are
revived in sexual activity. They keep an early and indelible memory
of the biological reality of pregnancy apart from these activities.
334
They displace a moral awareness (or stage of awareness) of the
self-sacrifice to persisting persons that is necessary to mutuality
and enduring responsibility. And they provisionally forget tradi-
tional obligations, not only their formal and restrictive aspects, but
their implications of belonging to a moral community. They keep a
caricatured memory of the family, of romance, independence and sexual
gratification. Memories that are personal and memories that are
shared, are arranged in a pattern which sustains the notion of
equality between temporary partners and works like a short-term
contract.
The sexual parity that briefly arises in casual indifference can
only appear to be equality in its amnesiac moment. It cannot be a
liberation for women by itself so long as there is irresolution
between the old and new meanings of commitment, and for that matter,
as long as there is memory. The point is not that the memories which
have been abridged in the process provide a better model for us today,
but that they possess a content which, if it were recalled, might
enhance an awareness of deeper need's and the prospect of mutuality and
responsibility in our relations. This is especially necessary where a
restrictive memory continues to motivate so many people who profess to
believe in sexual equality but claim to be secretly "traditional" as
they hold out some strange notion of tradition as their private wish
for the future. Even this tentative glance at a few of the elements
that have been reduced in modern memory should indicate that the
tradition cannot be reinstated just as it cannot be replaced by a
simple extension of the notion of equality. Yet it is still possible
to reclaim the elements of commitment without all of the enforcements
of "traditional" marriage, and that would be no casual matter.
The difficulty in accomplishing this is compounded by the fact
that we do not find the actual tradition of the family in extreme
opposition to the cultural motif of casual sex, but a simplistic
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vision of the family as it is promoted by the conservative movement
for the "right to life of the unborn." Certainly most people who
uphold "family values" and even those who oppose abortion do not often
subscribe to that view, but because it does attempt to address certain
realities of pregnancy and childrearing it has gained credence in our
shared understanding. That image of the family is secured within a
vacant memory that is commonly hungry for order, and there its virtue
lies in its simplicity whether it becomes a model for living or a
target of disdain. That image of the family affects memorie7~of
personal experience as they are seen to conform or deviate from it.
It is a highly selective and extremely functional model which
organizes the memory of personal, traditional and historical pasts,
and precisely as it integrates those elements efficiently or sanctions
them morally, it may claim to transcend all contexts and eventua-
lities. But like the attitude that is maintained in casual sex -- and
in complementary opposition to it this vision of the family also
forgets the core memories of commitment and would stifle them in
formal obligations.
Indeed, the conservative notions of the family that arise in the
"right to life" movement seek to revive the traditional form of
marriage by way of a legal sancti f i cati on of pregnancy, and this
requires that the content of tradition be forgotten in an unusual way.
In the protection of pregnancy by law the conservative mentality would
undo the contemporary crisis, it would restore the distinction between
the public and private spheres of life which seem threatened as women
gain greater liberties in the public sphere. But in this it would
restore one particular, conveniently selected earlier incarnation of
the division between public and private spheres -- a time when the
crisis had just begun and when women were expected to remain in the
home which men would leave to work in industry. That attitude
generates a hybrid notion of "tradition" taken from that epoch,
excluding all previous arrangements in which women may have worked or
conducted their affairs differently. Further, it is a "tradition"
336
that has now been contrived to address a public sphere, and it
contains the very division of public and private, male and female that
had precipitated crisis in the actual relations of a former time. It
selectively recalls that bit of the familial history, an ideal of men
at work and women at home, without considering the fact that the same
explosive division generated the very public freedoms that it has come
to fear so much.
•
Now, as if to undo the freedoms won in the public sphere this
attitude stakes its claims in the public sphere where it would legally
prohibit abortion, refuse equal rights, restrict divorce and even
child support, restore prayer in the schools and curtail the liberal
media. But this misdirected attempt to regenerate the form of a
tradition by legal enforcements cannot restore what has been lost or
forgotten about commitment or even the particular form of obligation
in marriage. It is an attempt to instigate an "administrative
reproduction" of those meanings which fails instantly. Instead, and
by substituting the involvement of the state and its abstract legal
rights for all that was once supposed to be associated with birth and
enduring committment, it accomplishes the opposite. Rather than
reinstating the responsibility, intimacy, obligation or religious
community that were to bind a couple in marriage, it removes such
things to the level of the law, and at best it requires a reponsi-
bi 1 ity tc> th_e ]_aw and not necessarily of one mate to another. As this
mentality hinges upon proposing universal laws to replace the old
beliefs it more nearly transgresses them than the casual sex it
abhors.
By linking pregnancy and law, this selective reconstruction of
the family dispenses with a host of vulnerabilities. Again, the
various worldly fears that might have motivated a marital arrangement
do not need to be considered, and the personal recollections of
vulnerabilty that might have inspired commitment are also laid to rest
as they may be considered a childish and threatening subject matter
which ought not to be discussed. Accordingly, this vision of the
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are
as
family restricts the manner in which the persons involved
themselves recalled. They do not have to be known or loved
changing entities where formal obligation is the fabric of their bond
and the conflicts that occur among them in the changes of marriage or
the maturation of children must be considered highly dangerous to that
formal model and be ignored or suppressed. To preserve that model,
the members of this family are best recalled in their "roles," in
frozen frames that affirm their masculinity, femininity, maturity or
immaturity in a hierarchy of authority that may only parody the form
of tradition and certainly stunts the memories which were once
confirmed within it.
Similarly, of course, in the right to life movement the very
conceptualization of the fetus as "unborn infant" is infused with the
imagery of the public debate rather than older and deeper mnemic
associations to infancy and parental responsibility. The fetus is
represented in isolation — out of the womb as in a biology text —
and vulnerable to the external world in which it should later be a
child. It is not generally represented within the person of the
mother, to whose vulnerability its own is inextricably bound. That
isolated fetus is now itself a selective memory that does not appear
to need the enduring care that must arise from adult commitment so
much as it needs "rights." Hence, abortion can only be regarded as
"murder," and not as the painful decision to abort "my child" in which
the vulnerabilities of all persons concerned must be weighed. The
last irrevocably human thing is revoked when the intimate associations
to pregnancy are disrupted and it becomes a clinical, religious or
legal fact. A general reduction of memory furthers the abrogation of
interpersonal conflicts that is fostered in these images, and they
generate little more mutual responsibi ilty between the sexes than we
find in casual relations.
Conversely, the decision to abort or continue a pregnancy where
both options remain open may involve a reflection concerning the
elements of traditional obligation and of the persons concerned
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precisely because it is still a decision. In the process of making
that choice either way, a degree of responsibility may be shared which
could never be instilled by a law-like code. Indeed, it is only with
choice that the fears and vulnerabilities which necessitated a
tradition in the first place can now be reconsidered, genuine
commitment reinstated and its mnemic sources kept alive. Today, that
is, the ancient fears of ostracism, of nature and mortality which were
particularly acute in the event of pregnancy have been modified by
developments in science, economy and law and do not necessarily
motivate a rigid family structure. A comparable source of commitment
will not be found in legal reinforcements of that family structure,
but only in the choices that compel us to face the memory of a more
modern and related set of fears.
However, if laws were to pass guaranteeing rights to the unborn,
casual sex would be mediated by a formal yet ultimately casual law.
The law would be casual because it would void interpersonal responsi-
bilities no matter how strictly it could be enforced and it would do
little in place of them to sustain the life of a child. If this were
to happen it is the so-called male model of indifference that would be
generalized through law and not responsibility, and we should bear in
mind that the very societies which most vehemently oppose abortion do
not necessarily balance the scales by providing family services", or by
requiring men to marry in the event of pregnancy. As it presses its
resistance to casual sex and every other alternative through the law,
this mentality affirms the very reduction of memory that makes those
alternatives possible.
Thus, in America it appears that the extreme models of sexual
freedom and the family have polarized to produce a common mnemonic
scheme, and together they affirm the same forgetting. The former
emphasizes principles of "equality" and "independence," resists the
form of marriage and displaces the motivating memories of commitment.
The latter emphasizes the "rights" of the unborn, religious concep-
tions of birth and the form of marriage, but forgets the content of
339
a
the same obligations which might have suffered in facing the old
mortal dangers, or now, in a reflective decision making process. Both
attitudes reduce the memory of vulnerabilities, of other persons and
of the conventions of community - and just when the two seem to be
locked in conflict, each providing a distinct mimetic model in
opposition to the other - they both utilize the expedient devises of
selective memory to cut a single pattern together, to invalidate
common background of motivating memories which are most unsettling to
the present. Together, they leave us with impressions of formal
obligation and fleeting love, and only with the empty slogan of
commitment.
In this polarity of themes, the "distance sense" of memory has
provisionally fulfilled all of the orienting functions that we
discovered earlier in order to stem the current crisis and to meet the
complicated demands of the present political economy: 1) For both
models selective memory secures a sense of origins by referring us to
a particular phase in the fami 1 ial -vocati onal "tradition" where public
freedoms and private entrapments were first at odds, and it summons
personal recollections to affirm it. 2) It produces a mythical
1ma 9 ef7' in this case of "privatism," in which only two models for
living seem outstanding. 3) It generates guiding themes
, of formal
obligation and of sexual independence, which now enlist ideological
principles in place of responsibilities and allow a kind of juridicial
innocence or exemption from responsibility to prevail within the sense
of self that emerges from the conflicts of interpersonal involvement.
4) It receives and fosters those themes as moral lessons suited to
market oriented individuals or families, and, 5) It offers both
options as equally valid strategies for survival in crisis. As the
models of casual sex and the rigid family persist side by side they
present an organizing foundation for the structure of pertinent
memories. They do not repress or simply "lose" a tradition, but
rearrange a background of elements that we might readily recall, and
they produce a tension among them that may herald more than
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narcissistic withdrawal and m0re than a regression in the
developmental progress of society.
Further, and because the elements of this polarity affect memory
together, we find that people are commonly caught between them. They
do not choose but combine extremes in many subtle ways that are not
merely imitative. For example, Robert Stoller describes a patient who
is convinced that her highly active sexual fantasies will land her in
Hell. However, she has learned from a religious friend that "good
works" may later earn her "days off from purgatory" and as if to heed
the lesson, she incorporates the idea of "suffering for others" into
her fantasies and recalls the masochistic scenes of pain and pleasure
again and again. The result is fairly functional. In fantasy she
has tentatively resolved the traditional themes of female self-
sacrifice with unrestrained erotic stimulation to create a kind of
compromise for her own psychic survival. Within the masochistic
fantasy she remains the somewhat virtuous victim of faceless perpe-
trators. Her own excitement is contingent upon the rewards and
punishments that respond to a rather simple model of conventional
rectitude and momentary release from it. Despite this inner conflict,
of course, she might still declare herself to be vehemently in favor
of sexual liberty or against it and wish to marry or remain single.
But she is still bound by the simplistic options that memory affords
her as they remain locked in conflict. She may seem to move back and
forth between them and to be prevented by the very force of that
motion from moving within to examine the content of her own desire.
In this her choices will be strategic and for the benefit of her
psychic survival more than they will be imitative or pathologically
narcissistic, and it will be difficult, though still possible, for her
to achive a new and more reflective stage of moral "competence" and
self understanding.
The Frankfurt School has argued that the prospects for change are
bleak since reason has eclipsed and the human capacities have been
generally reduced to mimetic conformity. For Lasch, all interest in
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the past has ceded to narcissistic withdrawal, while for Habermas
conflict and crisis have only slowed the pressing evolution of
society. Yet where the selective faculties of memory continue to be
active as well
- where they compose distinct and instructive
paradigms out of personal, traditonal and historical pasts - they
also play a part in crisis. In the crisis we make complex choices
that are not mimetic or narcissistic. Selective memory has rendered
expedient options that modify the effects of crisis upon identity,
and it genreates tenacious patterns that may profoundly affect the
course of change and alter the developmental progress of society. But
it has cut those patterns from a common core of motivating memories -
accessible memories and ineradicable associations that generate their
own deeper source of conflict which may make the same patterns
tenuous. Where memory is obliterated there is no hope of change, yet
where memory is only restricted, the restrictions tend to falter even
as they remain stubborn. This is not necessarily a more hopeful
observation but it might instruct criticism to look in different
places for the elements of reconstruction and it may incline us to
seek new competencies in another way.
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CHAPTER VII
SELECTIVITIES OF MODERN MEMORY ANO THE DIVISIONS OK THE PAST
The suggestions for memory criticism must now become much more
elemental. Although the display of mnemonic techniques and the
relation of memory to conceptualizations of space, time and creation
may provide some historical ground for amending the theories of lost
meaning and lost subjectivity, it is not at all sufficient to replace
them. I am still left with the enormous task of explaining how
something systematic, something that is really more clever and more
subtly involved in the details of experience, is proceeding to
generate meaning beneath the "rationalism" or "narcissism" of
contemporary society.
While there is not very much data that will help to expound this
claim, it does have an intuitive basis that might be reinforced
theoretically. That is, when it comes to memory I must appeal to
intuitions, but at least they are intuitions that are gleaned from an
empirical sense of one's own reflective processes in a manner that
allows a measure of certainty. By such intuitive reflections we know
that the divisions in our own memory are set apart rather abruptly so
that they designate different pasts. The personal past for example
must generally be distinct from the historical. In this it is appar-
ent that there are all kinds of different pasts, each solidly distin-
guished and having a unique status, each having a peculiar emphasis
and content that marks it along the horizon of the whole past as it is
commonly perceived in our culture. So too, there is a background of
mental life which seems to have many voices calling from far off and
offering their instruction, and it is only in listening to them care-
fully that the force and detail of the current orientation toward the
past will really make sense. If we listen to the quiet murmur of
those voices that seem to address us so privately, we may find that
they have a special public coherence that the theories of lost meaning
have continually missed. It may be that the instructive whispers of
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our presumptuous memories provide more of a basis for meanings than we
had thought, and more of a locus for a self-conscious sense of
ourselves within history than we had imagined.
In our accustomed daily thought, all things are not equal. There
is not simply a profusion of different memories to draw upon, but a
cogent series of distinguishable pasts: of history
, of tradition of
reJMojon, of childhood
,
of special skills or facts
, of yesterday's
events, and so on. They are distinctions that we scarcely question
and every sort of past seems to describe its own containable world.
Each region of the past seems so well contained in fact that we are
inclined to think of memory as a functionary of the sensible rules
belonging to the past itself, as a merely personal retrieving device
that moves obediently between properly separated vaults of knowledge.
Yet, as we reflect upon the careful demarcations that make the past
coherent, we will find that they are not so well assured and that each
division is suspect. Intuitively, we should recognize that people are
just as capable of making an almost random use of their memories, that
they often seem to endow that faculty with a great deal of flexibility
in order to compensate or affirm a present sense of themselves.
Hence, they frequently introduce a bit of chaos among the most solidly
fixed divisions in memory and some more migratory agency of memory
appears to make its own selections from the same material.
But even though people might make convenient use of those divi-
sions of memory it is not an easy thing to violate the righteous dis-
tinctions among them. There are rules that keep them apart and
although we might inject them with fantasy or reshuffle them a little,
their distinction is the highest imperative of our cultural orienta-
tion, of our sanity and reality. In the West, for reasons of science
and the earliest of childhood lessons, it appears that the first rule
of memory is to distinguish fantasy pasts from substantive past reali-
ties. The second rule that follows is to distinguish between one's
own personal experiences, beginning with childhood (whether or not
they involve fantasy), and the experiences of "history" or
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"tradition," and ultimately, the rule is to separate knowledge of the
past that has been lived and directly experienced from all of the many
pasts that have not been lived by the persons who are remembering
The rules of memory seem to carve a narrow space for the present
individual out of all time and experience ~ a sphere of personal
recollection that rises above it all to provide some sane comfort. In
the West that is, the precondition for defining the narrow sphere of
personal, lived memory that we think of as our "individuality" is a
subdivision of all of the pasts which are not lived into a clear
supportive scheme of history, tradition, ideology, the religious past,
mythology, and all the memory of fantasy and experience that has been
lived. Personal identity is secured by making slight adjustments in
that scheme of orientations which also places limits upon the creative
efforts of memory that would change it.
To some degree this creative function of memory draws elements
across the borders of the past in order to reconstitute them. It is
selective and compensatory as it is brought to bear to induce present
confidence, calm or even to enhance pleasure, and it is quite capable
of binding the elements of memory together with fantasies. This crea-
tive function of memory is not just "imagination" as it is obliged to
be as accurate as it is inventive, and it seems to have its own moti-
vations beyond the excercise of creativity. Especially when the fami-
liar divisions of the past do not provide sufficient guidance, this
selective faculty will make its own claims upon the past to satisfy
its own insistent interest in orientation. Under this pressing influ-
ence it becomes apparent that the divisions of the past are neither
sacred nor factual, and indeed that the paradigmatic modern dis-
tinction between recent "history" and one's own "personal past" is no
more an intrinsic quality of time itself than it is an agreeable
convenience.
It is by reason of this characteristic inclination of memory to
mix and secure these regions of the past that we all know people who
regard themselves as "historical types" of one kind or another and who
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have a stake in renovating the past by fantastic feats of memory
More commonly however, and with a great deal more subtlety, there are
people who favor a general period and style which may be found within
the historical or the lived past giving them a degree of courage, and
a means of depicting one particular self-image among many possible
images. It is not only mental patients or children who imagine that
they are Napoleon, musketeers or fairy princesses, cowboys or space
heroes, great lovers, adventurers or professors, to blot the memory of
their weaknesses with another sort of memory which they may or may not
wholly believe. Certainly the cherished modern distinction between
historical and personal pasts suffers in these creations, and yet that
distinction is quietly reiterated at the same time and in the same
play of memories. The imperative of maintaining our orientation
preserves the distinctions among our pasts in the same efforts that
cause them to adapt and change their guise.
In lieu of traditional and religious guidance today it has become
increasingly important to that orientation that people find their
place in time "historically." History is so general and impersonal,
however, that we tend to generate private resumes for ourselves which
mix fantasy with the memory of past events and desires as a tempered
adult imagination turns them into wishes for the future. In the
contempoary version of this process many people manage to deny the
part that fantasy plays for them by arresting periods of their own
development instead. They may freeze and repeat the imagery asso-
ciated with a formative period in their own lives, embellishing it
with a coinciding knowledge of the historic events or significance of
that time so as to bind history and personal recollection in a
privately enhanced orientation. So we can find many Americans who are
identified with an actual or mythical past, be they "toughs" of the
1950s, or "introspective souls" of the 1960s, with more than a little
nostalgia. They may cling to such partially lived histories because
their adolescent crises occurred in them, or simply because they have
discovered that they value the qualities that have come to benow
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historically associated with those times. Even if it is only at
certain hours, they may drink those images in gulps as if they really
could contrive their own pasts. Our seemingly present lives gorge
themselves on distortions of past experience, and like those reduc-
tionist historians who would only discuss the highlights of the lives
of famous persons, we may similarly review our own. Once again the
division between the personal and the historical pasts becomes impre-
cise when we do this, and yet our ordinary memory relies upon it like
a crutch which provides our sense of all other pasts - of tradition,
habit, skill, personal experience, yesterday's events, and so on --
with a crucial point of reference that maintains their distinction.
In order to maintain this delicate structure our Western orienta-
tion offers ceremonious distinctions between that which is a memory
and all of those "not-lived" pasts that inform it. But it is particu-
larly in the ceremonies and rituals that we have developed for addres-
sing the past that we may see how its aspects are rigidly set apart
and also secretly blended. We have lived through those rituals and
remember them knowing that they also bear a memory that much predates
our lives. Something about them is inviolable and yet, ironically, it
is often the very ceremonial atmosphere that we attribute to each
event of that kind that makes it something of our own. The somber
religious atmosphere, the sincerity of the commemoration, the joyful
belonging at a national celebration are each of our own remaking. The
very sanctity of these ceremonious occasions is engendered in the
exaggerated atmosphere which may be the means of their undoing. It is
almost by a sleight of hand that we preserve the status of the not-
lived past as an instructive reality of the sort that religion has
provided, as even the historical past may become a vivid ritualistic
memory of brightly colored costumes and exemplary personages.
Now the fields of academic study lend their divisive weight to
those ceremonious distinctions so that psychology, history, anthro-
pology, economics, physics and literature each contrive to secure
themsleves a distinctive place, drawing from pasts which are often
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just a whim apart. Finally there is so much at stake in preserving
those formal divisions of the past that it is difficult to see the
degree to which a modern identity depends upon violating them and
creatively mixing their ingredients. In this way modern identity
forges personal memory and a limited historical knowledge in nostalgia
as it responds to a painful present, and nostalgia restores the
accurate perception of an event memory in precise historical contexts
mixed with elements of fantasy. Recent history and fantasy are
distinguished in the same breath that their distinction is violated to
provide instructions to identity. Just as the most rigid of religions
have their outlets, their exceptions and confessionals where
blaspehmies are forgiven, so the strictly enforced divisions in our
now secularized mode of memory have a margin for creative error. Not
only is memory an intrinsically creative actor in the apprehensions of
the many pasts, but this society sanctions its specific creations. On
the borders of the academic disciplines and beyond, certain creative
renditions of the past are condoned. Both in the media and in the
"privacy" that characterizes the great portion of our mental life,
dreams and daydreams labor selectively over the past resisting an
absolute assimilation to the categorical demands of society as they
have been given to us.
It would of course be a mistake to regard the acceptable divi-
sions of memory and this creative inclination as being opposites. The
two aspects of memory are most complementary to one another as
identity is forged in oscillations between them. On one hand, the
carefully divided past restores order to the confusions of a creative
capacity of memory, and on the other hand that capacity repairs the
fraying edges of the divided past in its turn. Whole societies may
respond to crises in meaning by the same cycle of reparations vir-
tually adopting the attitude of the rejected lover who muses regret-
fully over better days or hardens himself by the memory of past
embi tterments . In the most rational of societies, a fabricated
consistency of themes from the past will still serve to assuage the
353
sickened soul, and modern memory still dresses the wounds of disorien
tation with patchwork recollections. No matter how rational and
disinterested it may seem, the grand order of retrospective thought is
preserved by a selective interest of memory, and every particular
consideration of the past is returned to a place within the framework
that provides antidotes. Consequently, our "rational society" ought
to be subjected to the same scrutiny that Enlightenment philosophers
applied to religious doctrine. Both conceal compensatory interests
which are most human creations, and in order to disclose these fairly
we must be suspicious of all the divisions of the "past" that have
been selectively rendered and which enter our present thinking
unannounced.
We should therefore be vigilantly aware of the fact that our
"rational society" rules over the past by an even more fundamental and
suspicious division. Not only has it divided the varieties of lived
and not-lived pasts, but it proclaims that the past and the present
are absolutely distinct in the first place. That is, the selective
and compensatory tendency of memory protects itself by means of the
extraordinary illusion that all remembered things and historical
things are purely "of the past," and that they are not woven selec-
tively into the present. Accordingly, the scientific attitude toward
the historical past claims to have interest only in a remote and
"factual" quality of the past, and yet that very remoteness is scarce-
ly ever distinguishable from the sentiment of pastness that we attri-
bute to our memories. In other words, the illusion of an utterly
distinct past is maintained by an attitude of scientific remoteness
and detachment, but also by the peculiar sense of pastness that accom-
panies the experience of memory. In the attribute of pastness, his-
tory and memory secretly blend once more, and even after the most
careful researches, the historian may still restore that quality to a
work. That past is not "a memory" but it is nevertheless experienced
through memory as if it were a memory and possessing the qualities we
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find in memory.*
But of course that inclination to portray all aspects of memory
as something entirely past is a charade, and it really only refers to
a very small portion of all that is within memory. indeed, the
greatest portion of memory is not experienced as memory, and most of
memory does not seem to possess a quality of pastness at all. Just as
words call upon familiar images that are not noticed in passing, the
most present sensibilities also contain transfigured pasts. The
assurance of familiar things, and indeed, the quality of "familiarity"
itself is little more than memory enfolded within the present in such
a way that we do not recognize its pastness. Further, the extra-
odinary tacit power of those enfolded memories arise from the very
fact that we do not distinguish them by a quality of pastness or in
any other way. They gain force by virtue of their secreti veness and
exert a quiet selectivity that whispers its own deceptive assurances.
Memory governs best when we are least aware of it as_ such. In the
extreme case, this is what distinguishes the impact of personal
recollections and academic historiography which do know themselves to
be "of the past," from the secretive memory that works through habits
and traditonal beliefs and does not acknowledge its pastness. The
latter is the more formidable force. Hence, potent memories are
relatively disguised in ways that give them power like the individual
repressions that will be discussed in the next chapter, but these are
especially well disguised by their silent partnership within the whole
divisive order of the past as it is commonly perceived. For this
reason, even that small and highly visible portion of recollection
It is said that the experience of "deja vu" results from an unsolicited
and instantaneous effect of memory, as if the brain chose to remember
an experience of the moment lending it a quality of pastness . As such,
that quality might be considered in isolation, and as something which
influences the experience of many pasts including history.
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that we consider to be "our memory," which we "use" in deliberately
calling up the well divided "past," is itself an obstruction to the
awareness that less solicited memories continually impress their
prescriptive order upon us. Our own ability to remember deceives us
into thinking that we control much more than we do.
At the center stage of recollection "our memory" reaches out
self-conscicusly to a bit of the material of the past. It seems to be
in control as it brings that material tantal i zi ngly into view allowing
that to masquerade as all of memory. Yet beyond the center stage, of
course, there are things which are repressed and unconscious from the
start. There are also things that are selectively ignored, and even
much more that is repeated so often that it has submerged in
awareness and seems to lose the impact of its meaning like some
redundant chant. There are familiarities which are really memories
and a plethora of thoughts and creations of the moment that lean
heavily upon memories but do not proclaim themselves or their
pastness.
By reason of the same disguised presence of memory and the
secrecy that lends it power, beliefs are really believed only when
they are taken for granted, and not as strenuous acts of memory that
evidently call forth material from the past. When we do recall our
most consoling beliefs we may certainly remember their foundations and
the reasons behind them with some effort, but we cannot subject them
to very much scrutiny if they are to remain beliefs and we do not
confuse those memories with the beliefs themselves. In "belief," we
must accept the tangle of our associations to what is believed, to
"freedom" or to "God," without subjecting them to the deliberations of
"our memory" that would give our sel ves a measure of control over
their pastness. Only by denying that much of memory can such believed
things remain more grand than ourselves. God and freedom cannot
merely be things of the past that we remember. Indeed, the sacredness
of the sacred lies in the illusion that it is not recalled and has not
been subjected to the same scrutiny and arbitrary consideration that a
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private memory might be. If beliefs are to retain their familiar
virtuous consistency they must not appear to be creatures of^oTyT
but they are nevertheless selectively recalled.
For this reason a philosophy that justifies freedom is not a
belief in freedom even though it may contribute to one, and belief
remains as one of several specialized kinds of memory that are unaware
of themselves as memory. Faith, in kind, follows upon beliefs as an
affirmation that their knowledge is not subject to memory and as a
means of securing a glimmering presentness for that knowledge as "my
faith." It is a willingness to trust a tangle of associations that
are not necessarily repressed, but are definitely not expressed as
being one's own and open to scrutiny. Consequently, religious and
ideological belief have this much in common: they are selective
applications of memory that elect not to be memories. They have
achieved their important place within a larger orientation by making a
series of affirming subtractions to preserve their own spheres of
association. They subtract other kinds of apprehension, or declare
that they are not historical, not empirical knowledge, not personal
memory, not doctrinaire knowledge or fantasy, and that they are not
matters which belong to the past at all. But in denying every other
past, they set themselves up against the others to affirm a culturally
acquired division of the past.
In certain respects and like beliefs, there is still another case
of memory that does not appear to be memory which is discernible in
the familiar experience of emotions. Each seemingly private emotion
that appears to be entirely a matter of the present will have shared
memories at its core which also uphold a public order of memory.
Fear, for example, involves the perception of a present aanger and of
the worst possible outcome of events, but in the moment of danger our
perceptions may seem quite calm and unafraid. Fear more often comes
over us slowly. In a fast moving accident we might only experience
fear after the fact. That fear contains the dawning realization that
we should have anticipated danger, and it may be applied to the future
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as an anticipation of danger with the same sense of several possible
courses of events. In the present, or for the future, fear must
contain the memory of a contingency that seemingly might occur or has
occurred. Thus, the trauma that is experienced in the face of danger
is only recognized as fear when incidents or anticipated events evoke
a string of associations to earlier states of being - to earlier pain
and earlier fears. Though this primitive process may not be con-
scious, fear initiates a desperate search within memory for what to do
in response to danger and it is only ameliorated as the proper
memories are found. Consequently, the eyes might grow wide with
fright, but they roll back in the posture of remembering as fright
turns to fear.
While we experience an initial shock in the present moment, we
"grow" afraid in associations that redefine that moment in a way that
is culturally specific. Americans might fear that there are sharks in
the water while tribal fishermen elsewhere might fear the gods of a
taboo place, and if either were dropped blindly into the water, they
might turn in "fear" to look for different things. If that kind of
experience builds to a "panic," it has gone another step. In that
case, the pattern of associations concerning a danger has seized the
emotional state so that it might endure in more communicable forms.
By then, the mnemic associations to a danger have entirely supplanted
immediate perceptions of the same, so that those associations
demonstrably determine the extent and content of the emotional
response. The menagerie of legendary terrors that accompanies the
life of the group now enters that experience with its host of images
and hidden messages. Then, however, the danger becomes a known
quantity and calm returns to the means of perceiving it as soon as the
emotion has been so riddled with its old associations. In this way a
long standing danger like the threat of nuclear war may even be
divested of its emotional content and its most horrific associations
as its associated memories endure to be welcomed within the overall
mnemonic order as something familiar.
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Now it should be fairly clear that modern Western memory has
obtained a rather consistent series of rules and divisions within
which one's own deliberate memory of things past is only a small
portion. At least the following elements are distinguished from one
another with regularity:
Things Conceived In Presentness but Containing Memories
•Lived Experience of the
Things Familiar i persons and
places of belonging-
repetitious practices,
ceremonies or images
—
skills i habits i present
knowle dge i fantas ie s
i
things unconscious* •
»
-*Hy* memory of events
i
fantasy pasts
i
} childhood!
instructions recalled} lessons
i
milestones in the course of life
Memories Neither Present Nor Past
Mot-lived Pasts
Pertinent to. Identity
-Religious notions History
t
-Traditions Myth,
-Ideology
-Prejudices
-Self-images
Religious
and other
legacies
y&ailiar CustoaaM
Things Outside of Attention*
Unfamiliar or left Behind...
Things Having Pastness or Conceived as Memories (shaded)
Minimally, we tend to acknowledge such elements as distinct aspects of
mind which are really also variously delimited memories. Yet as the
delimitations befall them and each is subjected to the different
faculties of mnemonic process, their boundaries begin to waver and we
find that each is curiously interrelated with the others.
Each acknowledged region of memory is distinguished in time, by
importance, centrality, or in relation to the self; by attributes that
seem to change magically as we shift our attention. So, beneath this
general selective division of memory we rely upon much more subtle
selecte attitudes to guide us through sucy fluid content. The
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differences between one's own past, the historical past, beliefs and
so on, also lies in the nature of the evocations that each calls
forth, while discerning special qualities and attaching identifiable
moods to them. Among those qualities, and as well as pastness, there
is the comfort of familiarity, the awesome distance of a belief the
centered clarity of what is "mine." There are tonalities of the
evocative voices that fill each category of the past. Each divison of
memory is bound by a field of analogies which preserve a store of
familiar images which belong so comfortably together they stand in
almost the same relation to one another in ordinary memory as onomato-
poeic words to their referents in speech. Thus, for example, when we
read a novel after having seen a film that was made from it, we may
find ourselves struggling to regain that tone and texture that we
would have found upon reading it fresh. We might seek to rediscover
that underpinning of images that the film has superceded, the vox
fam11iar1s of our comforting memory which consists in the powerf^
impressions of unity between words and images as we recall them.
Within the flow of thoughts of daily life that are stimulated in
numerous interactions, such memories may seem to appear spontaneously
as if they were ours alone. As often, we may seem to "fall back" upon
long standing beliefs or assumptions that are shared by our community
whenever we have need of them in suitably evocative circumstances.
Indeed, we may often think that we are reminiscing freely as scenes
from the past have simply drifted into our awareness, but for the most
part we have called them up from hidden depths when a certain circum-
stance compels their evocation and has set us to the task of shuffling
and redividing our associations in a manner that ultimately will
affirm the familiar order of their categories. It is for this reason
that one day will seem so much like the next, and a sense of tedium
outweighs the sense that experience is really quite varied, since
ordinary memory generally prefers such continuity. In this way we
might fatuously content ourselves with the "atmosphere" that we
discover upon sitting by a fire or walking along a familiar path
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through the woods. As that sensation seems to be intensely private
and present it involves evocations that are neither, and the region of
personal present memory is quite evidently propped up by another
Associated past events which are pertinent to the groups of our
belonging repercuss through those evocations into the present
atmosphere. The evocative moment seems to magnetically draw assoc-
iations into the foreground of a mental vision which we assume to be
our own, but which includes a structure and content of pasts that are
beyond our own immediate experience. In this way evocative patterns
recur in daily life to form those "fleeting" impressions that
continually reaffirm our social being. Those shared selections are
disputed and reinstated by the expedient evocations that accompany
everyday activities, and the thoughts that "fill our heads" also
contain admonitions that seem to precede us as we move through the
day's events. So too, when we encounter the regularities of work, the
planned spaces of our activies or the atmosphere of a President's
"fireside chat," our selective evocations may be quietly and consis-
tently manipulated.
With more far reaching impact than any manipulation, however,
there is a resolute obligation that each one of us feels toward
certain patterns of evocation. In every repetitive series of memories
we have derived clear responsibilities regarding how we are to
remember and what we are to recall. Therefore, as the most fleeting
atmospheres and impressions may bear the stamp of an entire orienta-
tion, they also contain a responsibl ity to recall specific series of
associations along with implicit lessons of obligation that concern
group life. When we awake from sleep for example, tightly packed
impressions prod us in shocks to regain ourselves. In awakening,
there are often dream thoughts, thoughts of comfort undisturbed and
the thoughts of the tasks ahead which all seem to be embattled. The
anticipated routine of the day may be recalled, the reward of
breakfast, and so on, until the obligation to rise from bed is finally
victorious. As they did for Proust in the example above, the pieces
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of who we are fall together in the reminders of routine obligation and
the people we are obliged to. Repetitious memories awaken our resolve
to face the world with specific expectations as dream sensations
harden to the moment that is now, convincingly, the present at home.
The day is laid out ahead of us in dreamy reminiscences which
have lost their pastness to be cast as anticipations, and our
obligations within them begin again each time we emerge from dreams.
If the anticipated routine is in fact repeated on this day, then
habitual evocations will combine with fresh impressions. Each
experience may strike our awareness with new fascination, with renewed
interest, or it may escape from view in boredom and disinterest. This
way too, one tree may remind us of a childhood playground, a newstand
of the war, and at the same time, both welcome and disturbing memories
may earn a comforting place in our ranking of reality. We would not
wish for too much of the playground or too much of the war, and they
must be recalled in some reliable proportion, within the limits that
allow our obligatory routine to continue.
As this day and the many days proceed, there is a mnemic flux
that seems to guide them unnoticed toward fulfilling an obligatory
routine and a familiar scheme of divided memory. Yet that scheme is
not only a series of neat divisions among the past complete with
special contents and atmospheres. Those regions of the past must be
continually distinguished by acts of memory, and each belongs to a
different kind of mnemonic activity. Properly speaking, the past is
divided by means of special kinds of memory that are active in our
daily thinking, we know each past by the kind of memory we apply to it
rather than by a set of elaborate criteria and designations. That is,
we do not normally survey the differences between the many kinds of
past like philosophers who wonder over the nature of history, tradi-
tion, childhood, etymology, and so on; rather, we accept them as the
offspring of the different types of memory which come to us when they
are needed.
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The past „ divided for us according to the distinctions among
the abHUies of our memory which seem to be natural and irreducible
and which provide the contents of the past with their
"atmospheres -
In that way, the quality of pastness that characterizes my own
remembered experience seems to be the property of an utterly different
sort of memory than the pastness of a historical event that I know
about. Accordingly, our selective apprehension of the past must
follow the sensible rules which keep the different pasts apart; the
vast range of possible evocations provide the material for that
selectivity, and the distinct kinds of memory provide it with tools.
In our daily experience we must make use of these tools continually
and we must strike a balance, at least, among the following sorts of
memory, in order to affirm our place within the divided past.
Virtually every day we experience:
1) Incongruous Memories: These are normally unconscious and appear to
be senseless, unsolicited and almost dream-like recollections when
they do become conscious. They may strike us strangely as if they
were intrusions from another life that is now mostly forgotten or
repressed. They contain an ambiguous mix of reality and fantasy that
has been enfolded in the bits that reach us, and they may just as
easily join within our sense of the real, or of the fantastic.
Significantly, these memories have been admitted to our awarness
despite the restrictions of psychological repression and are open to
the selective operations of more conscious mental processes. We may
selectively pursue them, deliberately set them aside or banish them in
order to focus our attention in the momentary pursuits of orientation,
and they may come to us unwittingly, or be indulged as a source of
insight. These memories form an outer limit, or a boundary for
identity, and it is by virtue of their presence that we obtain a sense
of conviction that we have control over our own thoughts and identi-
ties. It is by deliberately containing them that we establish the
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important margins of difference between fantasy and reality, all past
experience and the present in our scheme of the past.
2) Re-cognitions : 1 While we barely acknowledge the recognition of
things that are familiar as a type of memory, it is a sort of memory
which guides the routines of daily life with ceremonious precision.
Recognition contains buried expectations that seem to lose the quality
of pastness that we associate with memory, and yet the recognition of
familiar things is only possible by means of selective evocations from
the past. That simple familiarity contains the central elements of
our most sacred and compelling adjustments to normality since we may
fail to recognize things that are consistently before us. Recognition
establishes the margin of distinction in our scheme of the past
between what is fantasy and what is real (known or meaningful); as
between what is familiar and what is different or unfamiliar.
3) Repetition, Habit : Although it also loses the quality of pastness
and seems to be only a mechanical activity of the present, the
repetition of thoughts and deeds is also a mnemic activity. Repeti-
tion and habit are the most ensnaring manifestations of memory having
severe social and psychological consequences. As Freud suggested for
example, the neurotic "repeats instead of remembering." 2 And yet,
this "symptom is, in a sense, a memory." Normally repetition and
habits also replace the need to engage in other sorts of memory and as
they adamantly disperse our momentary awareness of the past they
displace the need to reflect meditatively about it, and therefore they
tend to assure one prevailing version of reality. Still, repetitious
thought and action selectively recalls pertinent experience by the
most non-reflexive means available to memory to demarcate the familar
and the consistently lived present and set it apart from things
unfamiliar and aberrant. Here too a special past is enfolded in a
memory that is unaware of itself as memory and is therefore among the
most potent in governing our activities.
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4) Continuous Shared Beliefs: Within recognitions, repetitions, and
habits, as in our attempts to make sense of our more incongruous
memories, we fall back upon the guiding memory of general beliefs. 4
While these shared beliefs may not appear to belong to the past
either, and rely upon the fact that they do not seem to be subject to
personal memory, they still beckon memory to reach within them seeking
principles for moral or conceptual guidance. These beliefs become a
portal which allows interaction between the guiding memories that
appear to be a part of personal experience, and those of tradition,
religion, ideology or myth while also keeping them separate. As they
endure and are repeated within a group they earn a special place among
present truths, since they are not facts and do not owe very much to
historical incidents. They may be indebted to specific knowledge
(that the world is flat, or round, for example), but they are no
longer equivalent to that knowledge, and they stand upon the margin
between past and present as something "time honored" and enduring.
Many beliefs therefore refer to a distant time but also reiterate the
current divisions among the past, and the way that the past is divided
itself becomes a belief. Further, when beliefs supply principled
guidance they allow a submerged order of memories to play upon us
unseen. Each time we reexperience the belief we repeat the host of
mnemonic regularities and disparities, and even as beliefs would
differentiate themselves from the limiting states of all other pasts,
they reiterate the divisions among them in recalling another, distinc-
tive sort of past.
5) Willful, Centered Imagistic Memory : In moments of willful
conceptualization we summon up scenes or single images of events that
5
once involved us. As in a still photograph, we can recall the place
that we actually occupied within such events, and with some effort, we
can imagine ourselves occupying different locations within the same
scene and different points of view. However, this creative ability to
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rove within a memory does not inevitably transform the factual quality
of past events into mere imaginings, since we might, after all, have
roved about the original physical scene of the events recalled, and
since, as we do this in memory, our wandering is supplemented by other
factual memories. Yet in memory we always acquire an additional point
of view which facilitates this imaginative movement; we observe
ourselves watching ourselves within the remembered scene in a way that
provides us with a vantage point from which to selectively apply our
attention. Hence these "centered event memories" fulfill a double
function all at once: they truthfully ur accurately render past
events, and they imaginatively relocate ourselves within them and
provide us with a place of belonging outside and observing them. It
seems that we might do something like this in "historical" thinking
once we have ascertained the facts concerning an event. Yet in those
revealed scenes we apply our creative energies to the contrivance of
the scene itself and not only to the effort of altering our perspec-
tive within it. In centered memories our imaginative efforts are more
strictly confined to the latter task.
Now as memories -- rather than fantasies or dreams where this
roving capacity seems to have greater freedom -- such points of view
are selected expediently according to selective interests of group
belonging which focus our attention within the recalled scenes just as
they may in experiences of the moment. The roving focus of attention
reactivates fragments of historical, traditonal, fanciful and personal
experience which are selectively admitted to awareness as antidotes to
the fears and confusions of daily life -- the fear, particularly of
losing a point of view. Precisely the same "centering" of the self
may be achieved in memory and in fantasy, but the desire for the
security of a point of view bows to more truthful, experienced
recollections. Hence, if "incongruous memories" helped to establish a
margin between fantasy and reality, and "recognitions" and repetitions
a zone of familiarity with assurances, this centered event memory
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enables the self to differentiate its lived experiences from fantasy,
and it does so by enlisting imagination to its service.
Imagination and a selective interest are hidden within these
"factual" memories and it is easy to forget that even when we recall
something that is demonstrably as it was, with complete proven
accuracy, we may well recall it at an auspicious present moment to
fulfill a selective need to center the self. In this culture we might
remember a scene with the bird's-eye view of a camera with all of its
exacting focus, distance and implicit editorial capacity. So we
struggle to preserve the hegemony of "accuracy" and our place within
it, in a way that we may distinguish "our memory" from that of the
history, fantasy and belief which threaten to overwhelm it, but for
all their accuracy these willfully centered memories remain the
centerpiece of an interested identity.
6) Functional Retention : Deliberately, although often with less
effort than the centering memories require, we recall useful things by
employing what is called a "good memory." In the West this retentive
ability is particularly important to the kinds of tasks that are
valued, and it may well have superceded the less reflective habits
that once informed working skills. Functional retention is a
streamlined and circumscribed sort of "applied" memory and yet, a
certain selectivity has always been exercised upon it before the
actual act of recollection. Here, that is, specialized items have
been designated in advance to have priority for recall and a pattern
of priorities reimposes itself when evocative circumstances warrant
it. Applied functional retention is therefore a secondary memory of
pre-selected elements. It achieves its most effective results by
approximating the effortlessness of habit, by allowing pre-selected
patterns of instruction to guide thoughts and behavior without a
reflective pause that locates the self within them or breaks down
thei r el ements
.
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This "good memory" for faces, for names, for dates or special
skills, refers to a preparation for remembering as much as to the
remembering itself, and for this reason it has confounded the numerous
psychological researchers who study the "short term" memory that lends
itself so nicely to testing, and who have not discerned the prior
selectivity that operates within it. This retentive faculty is most
likely to be contingent upon the nature of the divisions in mnemonic
categories that precede it and are only brought to bear in the most
immediate short term, even if individual brains have different limits
in doing so. In this way, the seemingly dumb and thoughtless rigors
of applied functional knowledge contain the whole engram of the same
Western "rationalism" that values them so highly. Thus, while the
selectivity of retention precedes the act of memory, it imposes a
thematic field of expectations, of types and classifications, upon the
remembering itself. Because it is functional and controllable, good
retentive memory has set a standard for regarding other sorts of good
memory as being less important and it reiterates a hi erarchy of
retentive spheres. In America, perhaps, the good memory of facts,
rules, faces, skills is more generally valued than that of events, of
dreams or even of historical information. In its own secretive way,
retention distinguishes "useful knowledge" from merely private
experience, belief or fantasy, and nearly all historical knowledge.
Because it is useful it may be allied with the habits that seem to be
traditional, but it is less mired in a past and more open to changes
in a contemporary selective interest of memory in general. It
provides the distinctive category of the "present" with its own
favorite type of memory today, and it corresponds with cultural and
economic priorities to make certain functional types of things that
are retained within memory appear to be the primary concern of that
present
.
7) Wakeful Meditative Memory : By another kind of effort that is often
associated with leisure we engage in meditative reflections. In these
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we tend to locate ourselves just as we do in willful imagistic
memories, only here, our mental roving endures for a longer time as
our concern is to recall an entire event rather than a single image.
Whereas the alternation of perspective that moves us when we return to
a single image has the ultimate task of restoring one "true" perspec-
tive, these meditations tempt us to remain for a time in the different
postures concerning an event, and they encourage us to pursue
different points of view rather than to consolidate them. Within
these scenic ruminations that involve a play of action, like a short
film rather than a photograph, we are overtly engaged as both
participant and observer, and then again as the observer of ourselves
observing. As these memories endure for a time, are repeated in
succession, and as our posture within them is pointedly at issue, we
are able to approach memory meditatively. Meditatively we may ask,
"What if things happen differently?" and the inclination to fantasize
gives way to speculations that not only alter our position within
events but may alter the whole course of events as they are recalled.
Meditative memory allows us a special purchase in maintaining the
divisions of the past as it begins with an event as it was personally
experienced in its original integrity, may then add historically
informed hindsight and a new locus for the self in a way that makes
sense to the present, and it is something that we continually do in
daydreams if not in more rigorous thinking. In contrast to functional
retention, this memory applies its selectivity in the act of remem-
bering and not before it, and it may therefore pursue more incongruous
elements of the past than other sorts of memory as it fosters a
critical self-reflective attitude. Nevertheless, meditative memory is
motivated by the need to orient the self and to grant it special power
within a network of shared assumptions about the nature of events, the
likely course of certain causes and effects. In particular historical
circumstances when it is favorably sanctioned by a group, this
meditative memory becomes the seedbed of new beliefs as it replaces
the need to appeal to continuous shared beliefs. In other
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circumstances it is less highly regarded in the hierarchy of kinds of
memory
-- as it is currently consigned to fantasy - and it is
subordinated to the service of more functional considerations. It may
fulfill the requirements of orientation by admitting public rules and
criteria to its dramas in a way that maintains the distinction between
fantasy and recollected experience while testing and recreating the
boundaries of the familiar world.
8) Analogy and Association: Each of the modalities of memory here may
function by forming clusters of association and they exhibit the
tendency to call forth analogies from among their contents. While
this may seem to be only a subfunction of memory, the delineation of
topical fields is so crucial to its organization and so much inclined
to proceed independently that it deserves to be counted as a kind of
memory as well. By means of this ability we omit the incongruities
that do not fit comfortably with the familiar associations and
customary analogies of our memory. Here there is a struggle between
the roving inclinations of a meditative memory and the neat selective
order of functional retention, and between the two we generally come
to rest with finite fields of association that keep us from getting
lost or from becoming too simple in our thinking. By this selective
tendency to keep enfolded clusters of remembered things we gain the
ability to "re-cognize" the types for which we have nouns and verbs in
language -- all trees, all running, etc. Yet this quality of memory
is also crucial to the willful and less automatic series that seem to
be more meditatively and deliberately pursued.
As in daydreams this analogic function of memory provides a
series of corridors for daily thought which may be timely and useful
options or may present themselves without warning. When certain tasks
require concentration prescribed corridors are opened, but when our
attention is released we may slide into a series of associations that
draw upon a different imagery of types which provide a more general if
momentary orientation. As if to impress ourselves with our own
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elasticity of thought we might recall the lake where some vacation
took place. Rather than meditating upon the events of that vacation
in particular, we might find that memory has led us on its own down
the corridor of visions of other vacations, of possible vacations that
are desired and are recalled from travel literature, or down yet
another corridor of different lakes, and so on. Our analogic memory
might lead us down a path to unsolicited nostalgia or it may present
crisp new types to measure and compare. Significantly, it provides
the thematic basis of selection that distinguishes the content that is
pertinent to each of the other types of memory and their claims upon
the past. It provides a means of movement from one to the others if
by switching tracks, and most of all it keeps those fields of
association separate and distinct at the same moment that it seems to
lazily wander from one to another. In that way willful centered
memory slides into meditations, into beliefs or historical knowledge.
In each distinction it tends to go only so far, so that it does not
disrupt an orienting balance among the different kinds of past and
their pertinent associations and so that it keeps the boundaries of
sanity
.
9) Sel f-ref 1 ection : Although there are various kinds of self-
reflection that involve meditative memory, they are all, generally
speaking, more than memory. They contain consciously directed
meditations that make analogical comparisons and deliberate appeals to
the knowledge of shared beliefs. Self-reflection inverts meditative
memory that puts the "I" within a scene in order to draw many scenes
to the service of the present "I." It is therefore the most conscious
use of memory that is dedicated to the present. Where a meditative
memory allows us to choose by asking, "what if things happened differ-
ently," self-reflection tends to ask, "what should I be and how might
I orient myself now vis-a-vis the past." In asking such questions,
self-reflection addresses the common divisions within the past
judgementally and it is inclined to take a stand in favor or against
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the mode and content of each. It is inclined to say, "I am" one thing
in history, another regarding tradition, and another regarding certain
fantasies, and further, that a part of history or a part of the
personal past ranks higher in the formation of one aspect of "my"
identity than other pasts. It brings the limiting principles of every
kind of memory to bear as if it could move them to decorate the center
stage of a centered event memory, only now the seVf_ rather than the
event becomes the stage, as all of memory becomes its adornment. It
is a process of locating oneself despite and within the imposing
mnemonic patterns of a communicating group. Thus, self-reflection
stands at the margin between experienced memory and that which is not
experienced as a means of integrating them; it polices the distinc-
tions among the types of memory and the kinds of past, just as it
selectively calls them forward to enhance the self.
By means of all of these types of memory we preserve the
distinctions among our pasts that provide us with orientation.
Nevertheless, there is a certain unity to them, such that every kind
of past and virtually every exercise of memory contains a mixture of
all of the others in almost measurable proportions. A recollected
fantasy contains some measure of willfully centered veracity, some
vague reference to history, familiar objects that are recognized and a
subordinate texture of contained associations. Our most present
awarenesses are set apart in the balanced light of many pasts and the
multiple illuminations of the range of memories that give us identity.
Hence, if we are a "rationalistic," "narcissistic" or "reified"
people today it is by virtue of the same illuminations, but really
they offer us a more complex and carefully balanced set of priorities
than those descriptive terms connote. The deceptively simple notion
that identity might now refer to "having a profession in the '80s"
more than it does to piety, ancestry and the like, may also refer us
to the rich pattern of memories that stands behind it. Now, for
example, a selective sense of history defines our sense of the '80s or
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the present, and might fuel our beliefs more than religious or
traditional pasts. Now, certain kinds of functional relations define
our professional worth as they inform the most valued kinds of memory
and are cultivated over and above the more meditative reflective or
habitual varieties. Regardless of its narcissistic trappings
individualism today relies upon particular nostalgic frames of
reference, those more desirable pasts along with their wishes that are
meditatively retrieved or survive in fantasies. The entire self-
defining process of reflection now thrives upon certain omissions,
certain strict delimitations in the associ ational fields that
contribute to what "I am" and what "I should be."
Each day, in virtually every memory, the hierarchy of elements is
reiterated. A schematic memory is pressed upon us and at the least it
must contain the following ingredients, attributes and functions:
1. Kinds of Divided Pasts (each being subdivided and referring to
distinct content)
:
Personal
, Adult Pasts
Childhood
Experienced Events
Yesterday's Events
Words; Knowledge
Fantasy Pasts (personal
and mythic)
2. Types of Memory Applied:
Historical Pasts
Skills; Habits
Ideological Legacies
Various Beliefs
Religious Pasts
Traditional Pasts; (other
legacies e.g. , fami 1 ial
or etymological
)
Wi 1 lful -centered Memory; Functional Retention; Meditative
Memory; Continuous Shared Belief; Analogy and Association;
Sel f-ref 1 ecti on
;
Incongruous Memory; Re-cognition; Repeti-
tion...
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3. Qualities of Pasts as they are Variously Remembered:
- ascribed attributes of space, time and creation
(including distance, duration and process depending on
whether they are images or other sorts of impressions)
- pastness; presentness; futureness (memories held in
anticipation)
centerstage, nearness or distance in relation to the "I"
- familiarity, acceptability; difference, anomoly,
strangeness
lived; not lived...
4. Divisions which are Particularly Well Guarded in the
Hierarchy of Modern Orientation:
Past, Present, Future
Fantasy -- Reality; Imagination -- Fact
Habit -- Knowledge
Grand Beliefs -- Only "My" Memory of Instructive
Experience
Private Experience -- Common Experience
Historical Past -- Lived Past
Word -- image -- meaning
Within My Reach or Control Beyond My Reach or Control
Familiar, Meaningful Order -- Chaos, Strangeness,
Unfamiliarity
Accuracy Haziness of recall -- Imaginative invention
5. Within the various kinds of memory that effect identity
there are even more subtle means of selection at the
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disposal of the group which correspond to the psychological
defenses. These will be discussed in section III 0 f chapter
IX under the following headings:
1.) From "Denial" to Recontextual i zati on
, 2.) From the
Defense of the Ego to the Redistribution of Self, 3.) From
Undoing and De-realization to Obsolescence and Cliches,
4.) From Isolation to Thematic Reductions, 5.) From
Reaction Formations to Analogy and Association, 6.) From
Introjection and Projection to Personifications and Charac-
teristics, 7.) From Turning Against the Self to Monolithic
Reductions and Stereotypes, 8.) From Regression to Return-
ing to Pasts in Nostalgia and Selective History, 9.) From
Sublimation to a Hierarchy of Sublimations.
6. By employing all of these, the group will fashion thematic
preoccupations which will be discussed in chapter X, in
terms of their relation to the instincts and their place in
the contemporary crisis of meaning.
The entire pattern of these mnemonic divisions settles uneasily
in every meaningful notion. As a notion endures it is repeatedly
tested against each category of the past, by every attribute and
capacity of memory so that it stands in relief by having displaced and
arranged them and its "meaning" bears the mark of those encounters.
Our imaginative tendency to rove in memory may threaten to disrupt
these elements but it is outmatched once again by an impulse to
restore their order. Imagination, indeed, is always being used
against itself so that in the case of a single notion we are led
imaginatively through various associations to archtypes or paradigms
that restore its most common form and finally the particularity of the
notion again. But in making this little procession memory has staked
its claims for that notion against all of the intrusive alternatives
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that it might have pursued; it has used the interdependence of the
entire scheme of memory to claim indpendence for a portion of it. So
imagination assists in a process of subtraction that reinstates a
hierarchy of the elements of the past and memory and it lends a
certain authority to the higher elements in the schemes that may well
be beyond their intrinsic merits.
For the sake of clarifying our meaningful notions, then, we have
constructed a precarious hi-erarchy of the ingredients of memory. In
the modern period for example the highest testament to a notion would
be its compatibility with scientific reason and historical thinking.
It seems that our high regard for reason is what defends our mnemonic
order against flights of imagination and only where it fails do we
rely upon habit and functional retention to reach the same secure
ends. Yet if we step back to look at the entire structure of memory
it becomes clear that it is not reason that keeps imagination in
check, but imagination that continually restores reason because memory
cannot long endure to function without order. If History, Scientific
Reason, and Functional Retention are most highly valued in the current
scheme of things, it is because they share a deeper interest that
unites them. They are all concerned with accuracy which is the
quality to which imagination would restore its errant ingredients. In
the absence of religious guidance accuracy becomes the court of appeal
that credits different pasts. Whatever is accurate is elevated in the
authoritative scheme of memory, but only because it has been brushed
by all the other elements within it and extracted by an imaginative
and selective application of memory. It is this quality of memory
that makes the mnemic paradigms of single notions crisp, hardening
their edges and assigning them a place among all the divisions of
memory by a kind of mental artistry. Accuracy is an attribute of
memory that now achieves such merit because it appears to be an
attribute of the past itself which is given to us like a truthful
legacy. Yet it really functions as a present guide to the whole of
memory that harbors its own suspicious interests as they are
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catalogued, for example, in the hierarchy of academic disciplines.
Popular thinking does not necessarily correspond to that
curriculum however, and we must further distinguish that most appreci-
ated quality of accuracy from the academic precision of scientific
method. If it is true that a classical inclination toward meditative
leisure was lost to the industrial pace of work time and free time as
de Grazia claims, then one quality of memory may have surrendered its
dominance to another. In the newly rationalized routines of work,
functional retention may have come to outweigh other kinds of reflec-
tion in conformity with a more calculating set of interests. However,
the highly valued rationality that accompanied the scientific
revolution did not proceed without interruption into every realm of
thought and reflection. At certain moments in which it was least
effective, rationality extended an almost aesthetic principle of
exactitude and accuracy to the furthest reaches of memory in order to
establish priorities among them. Further, even at its most effective
moments, and especially while it commended certain tasks, that
rationality spawned a particular fantasy life of the sort that Marcuse
once discussed. Indeed, under the rule of accuracy, reason and
fantasy may become complements to one another within an orientation
that only seems to be governed by reason. If it is an interest in
accuracy that rules popular thinking more than the scientific variety
of reason, that interest is quite capable of embracing the most
primitive beliefs and of fostering the most fantastic notions in the
present. So it is that with extraordinary precision that a mythical
world may be swept up into the flow of modern daily life and identity.
Even the "special effects" that characterize the science fiction
fantasies of the media have become a significant aesthetic consistency
in our daily life which is precise and accurate, but not necessarily
rati onal
.
As memory has an interest in accuracy that has been elevated to
become a first principle of our orientation, that popular sense of
accuracy has provided a model of truth that is as important as the
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exactness of scientific method, even though it does not follow the
rules for obtaining scientific facts. Mnemic accuracy operates by a
more fluid principle than the methods of science as it reinstates an
order of mental events which always might be assembled differently.
Mnemic accuracy is not obliged to refer to a world of facts any more
than it refers to an imaginary world, but it does tend to reinstate
the priorities of a mnemonic order in each case. It depicts fact and
fantasy in kind, by exclusions that distance the least acceptable
elements of both so that a disagreeable event in war or a frightful
fantasy might equally be forgotten. Thus, if memory (and science as
well) has an interest in accuracy, accuracy has an interest jri the
whole order of memory. While the "facts" may be "disinterested," the
accuracy that dictates the task of recalling them, must locate them in
a meaningful order. Much like the work of our fantasy life, the
interest in accuracy strives to find a comforting locus for the self
and the sharp distinction between accurate memory and fantasy in the
West is softened where the two collaborate to that end.
The accurate recollection of a single factual experience
therefore reflects the broad divisions of memory just as the contents
of a room might be reflected on the surface of a polished sphere and
the sphere itself is only discernible to the eye by virtue of their
reflection. That reflected scheme distinguishes the image of an
object in memory and assists in the process of giving it the truthful,
substantial quality that we hold to be important. The thing-like
aspect of a memory is achieved as familiar structures dance around it
and as they are conjugated and choreographed to give them the
consistency that enables us to communicate. That air of familiarity
is not achieved scientifically in a way that might be tested, but as
the result of less secure associations that are nevertheless recalled
with precision and accuracy. Where such associations are not strictly
limited by the scope of scientific definitions, they may therefore
have variously pronounced emotional content. So it is that an
accurately recalled experience of the sort that is so important to our
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sense of identity may be a "kind" of event that occurred on a type of
"morning like this one," during a "war like that one," in a room like
this. Seemingly factual imagistic content runs together like schools
of salmon or packs of wolves bearing the emotional import and
fantastic imagery which provide conditions for understanding truth,
and at the same time reiterate emotional conditions of belonging that
have engaged the imagination.
As it is riddled with this content, even the scientific ration-
ality that would claim a seat at the head of our orientation provides
standards of truth in a most imperfect fashion. That rationality has
certainly managed to distance itself from the world of religious
belief, and it has sucessfully interposed its own version of the past
in the form of "history," in order to secure itself authority within
the mnemonic hierarchy of the whole society. Yet that rationality has
always established its lofty place among all of the convictions by
subtracting the elements of an impure world. It might even be said
that reason has required the opposition of religious faith and
superstition as stepping stones to secure its hold upon an entire
orientation, and that we have evolved the sort of reason that
flourishes in its own extrusions and hardly ever achieves the purity
it promised. Now that it has successfully subordinated the old
beliefs and functions in their place, this rationality must therefore
welcome new opposing principles. If the public is to continue in its
reverence for reason, reason must be presented against a different
backdrop, which now appears to be constructed of fantasies and
emotions that possess a new and special thematic content.
In this way, and still under the auspices of a principle of
accuracy, a new class of fantasy and superstition has ascended in
importance to identity. While it is said that we are "rationalists"
today, ironically we find ourselves in a culture that gives detailed
vitality to the most bizarre fantasies. Sometimes this is because
technology has become capable of lending carefully computed precision
to a new medium, but it is often (as in pornography) just for the sake
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of explicitness. With this in mind, the critique of reason that
emerged with the Frankfurt School might now distinguish different
elements of the rationality it would attack. There are distinctions
to be made between the intrinsic principles of applied rationality as
Habermas values them, the promises of reason for society at large, and
the principle of accuracy that allows a corrupt reason to be bolstered
by equally corrupt fantasies in order to secure its place in a
selective orientation. In this way "reason" of the last type appears
within a kaleidoscope of elements that give it force: It exerts a
principle of accuracy in science and history which now incorporates
fantasies as well; it becomes part of a shifting scheme that values
functional retention and centered, willful memories of a kind that
give unique characteristics to current "individualism"; and its
attachment to scientific methodology is provisional at best.
The current variety of "individualism" is especially obliged to
establish itself within this hierarchy of mnemonic ingredients since
it owes a unique historical debt to memory. Already, and long before
the notion of the individual was of much importance anywhere, the
capacities of memory had given the self a range of powers. The "I"
already had gained a sense of its own control over the evocative
associations that it could initiate, and it did command a degree of
choice concerning the memories that might be brought into view. In
memory, to be sure, the "I" best sees those elements that it is able
to control, as if by holding them before the mind's eye and claiming
them to be its own beyond the influence of anyone else. In epochs far
preceding the advent of individualism, memory already had the
propensity to distinguish things and to disavow certain influences of
Q
the group within a field of mnemonic vision. The selves of those
early times may not have celebrated this capacity, and they may have
failed to notice their own influence in every recognition or repe-
titive memory to the point that they simply accepted the cosmologies
that were given. Nevertheless, once the self could make mental
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exclusions of the influence of the group in extracting an image it
could begin to do so with deliberation, and it could gain purchase
against religious belief to become receptive to the historical
acquisitions of a developing will.
The conflict between the interests of the individual and the
group that is so important today must therefore have reflected a prior
internal conflict which had pitched the imaginative capacities of
recollection against prescribed memory. Even today the imposing
importance of the self not only derives from political struggles for
freedom, or from principles of "natural law" and philosophy that
justified "rights" and "will," but also from a sense that certain
elements of the self can_ control the exercise of memory and imagina-
tion. Consequently, the so called "private sphere" that social
thinkers refer to in characterizing the modern individual, is really a
very elastic thing and it is not at all a neat circle that is subject
to the intrusions of society. Instead, subjectivity has emerged in
the distributions of the self within long standing "intrusions,"
allowing more or less control of a type that is also very old. The
boundaries of the individual are not boundaries at all and the lines
that are drawn to define what is myself and what is other are little
more than accepted repetitions of what is near or far, different or
familiar, and what has the weight and merit to be recalled distinc-
tively.
Instead of boundaries that define the individual -- or "moats of
self-interest" as Horkheimer referred to them10 -- it is the sense
that if we tried we could control the memories that inform our
subjectivity which is so crucial to the composition of the notion of
ourselves as individuals. Given this, we become complacent over
meanings that we know we coul
d
expand upon if we bothered to recall
all of their content, and we are often so self-assured about the most
important things that guide us that we do not call them forward under
the scrutiny of the mind's eye. Thus, we are contented with the
simpl if ied images that represent those things, and we rarely
381
reintroduce mnemic depth to them; we do not worry over the signs of
our language precisely because we are so sure of the power and
rectitude of our memory. We do share at least this foundation of
individualism, and it shapes our guiding meanings to the degree that
we have chosen to reflect, or not to reflect upon the available
associations within each of them. Paradoxically, we involve our
freest capacity in establishing its own limitations so that we do not
recall too much that would threaten the order in which we have become
safely limited individuals.
In this way, the very notion of "freedom" is sel f
-1 imi ti ng in a
sense. It becomes meaningful as the self is located and exercises a
measure of control in all the dimensions of memory. As it is a belief
to begin with, it abandons a sense of pastness and the self appears to
stand in the present calling forward limited portions of learned
doctrine to enhance that meaning. It becomes more than a belief as it
is affirmed by images of historical cases and general knowledge of
circumstances of freedom and enslavement. Complementary images of
one's own pertinent experiences are called upon at will, until they
have sufficiently established a personal connection to the meaning of
freedom. In another direction, the self welcomes a record of
fantasies concerning the fulfillment of freedom that may be more or
less Utopian, and finally, the very fact that the self has such a
fluid capacity to establish meanings becomes a confirming simile (or
homology) for freedom as the notion is shaped, filled and affirmed.
In the mnemonic structure of that notion there is the quality of
belief, the principle, historic cases, personal cases, private wishes
and the quality of wishing itself. The self descends through these
with awarenesses that follow a distinctive Western order of prior-
ities, with content that is peculiar to the cultural groupings of the
West. Here memory proceeds at once through something like the
conjugation of the verb "to free" beginning, perhaps, with the plurals
that are embued with doctrinaire knowledge, and ending with first
persons as they are embued with sense, desire and their own
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recollections of lived experience. In general our imagination tends
to adhere to the prescriptive associations of meaningful notions
including just the proper mix of those ingredients. Otherwise the
content of meaningful notions becomes chaotic, a god or a stone might
be elevated to the height of great importance in some relation to the
observing self. But collectively one or the other achieves priority
by fixing that relation within a general order of memory. Thus, the
"free individual" may have ascended in importance for reasons of
economy and a Protestant ethic, but it has also acquired the accoutre-
ments of modern cultural mnemonics. Within them, the individual
memory ascends as the repository of accuracy and free motion, which
binds fantasy, functional realities, and a sense of history to provide
the guidance which is otherwise lacking.
As the well guarded divisions of memory are integrated within the
notions of the present they also affect the entire group experience of
time, and provide a means of ritualizing it. Indeed, memory does not
follow the empirical order of time from past to present and future,
but introduces the qualities of pastness and presentness according to
a scale of needs that flow from contemporary pressures, and not
strictly from a sequence of events. That is, the past may be thrust
upon the future in the group experience of time, and a sense of the
future may readily become part of the selective recollection of the
past. In much the same way as they are contained in an emotion like
fear, our anticipations concering the future contain certain memories
that are deprived of their quality of pastness and may shape the way
we look at the past as well. Memory moves in a cycle through time
that violates its boundaries in order to set them up again -- memories
are disguised within our selective assumptions concerning past,
present and future times. Accordingly in the group experience of
time, the faculty of memory itself imposes a teleological imperative,
whether it casts forward a detailed vision of Western progress, or
presumes that the future is open as in the Moslem sentiment that all
383
that will occur is subject to the unknowable will of Allah. That
self-transcendence of the human being that pursues itself into the
future which Heidegger calls Dasein
,
11
is subject to certain foibles
of memory as hindsight always delimits the future, and folds back
again upon the past.
Having stepped out of the instructive flow of religious time
from a moralizing sense of genesis, original sin and apocalyptic
punishment the modern "free individual" is inured to the accuracy
of empirical time and obliged to the sense of history that seems to
flow form it. Beneath the sequences of that history, however, memory
still casts forward notions of progress, Utopia and apocalypse, and
further beneath these, the secret wishes of many individuals quietly
enter into a general sense of things to come. It might even be said
that there is a secondary function of the superego that preserves the
memory of wishes for the future, that chastises and comforts the
present self on the model of a past promise of future attainment. If
this is true for the individual, then it might become a device for the
many individuals to escape the worst effects of the overly harsh
superego that Lasch has attempted to tie to modern identity. 12 In any
case, a pattern of common wishes selectively derived from the past may
become a salve for the failures of many individuals which signifi-
cantly affects their anticipations as a group.
For the generation of Americans who grew up in a period of
prosperity believing in certain kinds of progress, there must
therefore be a discrepency between the youthful dreams depicting what
they might have become and the memory of all that they have actually
been, which is sometimes painful. They find solace in a common
nostaligia for the time when such wishes seemed more plausible, not
necessarily because that time was better or less painful than the
present, but because the wishful dreams that are still alive in the
group life were only able to flourish then. Now there are laments for
what might have been in sorrowful songs of seasons changing or of
golden rings just beyond reach, and they are the same songs that were
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sung at the time that is now so much missed. In this way certain
groups and generations tend to have retrospective sensitivity to the
things most often promised and most starkly denied so that a particu-
lar set of regrets becomes the motivation of present fantasies and
hopes for the future. The nostalgic wish transcends the fixed dimen-
sions of time. Although these wish-memories seem to belong more to
certain subgroups than to a whole society at first, they may come to
have a formidable effect upon the political choices of the whole, and
thus, the Kennedy administration did not become our "Camelot" and a
standard for the future because of ideology or a notion of progress
alone.
If a wish or a condition of the past may be cast forward through
memory in teleological portents, then the reverse will certainly
occur. Our visions of the future will give direction to the selective
memory that we have of the past subjecting it to our current wishes.
As the general structure of memory has been impressed upon the future,
specific memories are called forward as the antidotes to anticipated
dangers which have also been shaped by long standing fears. In
America, when the Reagan administration began to forcefully advocate
the deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, visions of the
prospects of nuclear war ascended in the public awareness and in the
media. Almost at once, attention focused upon the history of the arms
race. The so called "revival" of American traditions that was already
being promoted grew even more sharply sentimental than it had been as
memories of the wished-for American family, idyllic children, the
beautiful land that would be destroyed and the innocents who would be
slaughtered were paraded everywhere, as if Norman Rockwell had been
given the run of all the media.
In this case, fears and wishes for the future had been thrust
backward as a motive force of selective memory, and as a chief
determinate of nostalgia. An America that had never existed except on
postage stamps was ferociously recalled in face of a nuclear threat,
and in response to a host of other fears. The message of those
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reconstructed memories has been so potent that it has become a prop in
the political positions of both the Left and the Right, or for that
matter, of any political persuasion that has recently been effective.
On the one hand, the ominous future may heighten hedonistic or
narcissistic inclinations to live for the present because that past
can never be restored. On the other hand, it may incline people just
to wait and hope, or it may set other people to counting their bless-
ings or ministering to past regrets, and a few will arm themselves so
that they may be the "sole survivors" as if they might still inherit
the old pioneering dream. In all such cases, the selective memories
of an American way of life are alike with slightly different emphasis,
and the general frame of a selective past has been called forward by
the same set of shared anticipations.
Although it is not usual that a single shift in government policy
will initiate a change in our view of the past, it is inevitable that
collosal events, inventions and new circumstances will. As each
reshapes the fear of future dangers it will set us searching in memory
for means of averting the danger and quieting the fear. Consequently,
every difficulty on a smaller scale will also generate appeals to a
reconstituted past especially where an all encompassing faith does not
provide guidance. Memory becomes a repository of fantastic solutions
that draw upon the promises of the past and the comforting sentiment
that "we've been through hard times before." In modern "disaster
films" for example, a solution is generally found and real disasters
are now quite often met with a sense that our legacy, our science and
our historic fortitude will yield solutions as they have in the real,
and also in the mythical past. There is no "future shock" where we
apply such a selective sense of the past to our present fears as an
antidote, and instead the future becomes a source of present faith as
a selective rejuvenation of the wishful past.
Selectively, we may tend to ignore centuries of epidemics and
other seemingly insoluble problems as we gaze back at the "miracles"
of science and medicine. In America, our deepest faith lies in the
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hope that the discovery of remedies will catch up with us, and the
"history" of "science" becomes the promise of a cure for every ill. A
popular version of this history fosters the illusion that some heroic
genius will appear with a solution in the nick of time and that the
mythical "they," will "think of something." Again, the accuracy of
actual science becomes a motivating priciple within fantasy itself and
for this reason we are able to preserve the illusion that there is no
such thing as irreparable damage to ourselves or our world. Selective
memory often causes us to overlook the devastation of the present on
the grounds of its observations that "we" have survived devastation
before, and in one instance, a television cartoon produced in Japan
promises children that future science will find a way to remove the
l
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radiation from a postwar world. Futuristic visions promise cures
and "bionic" prostheses that may very well be found someday, but they
also promise travel in time or at speeds beyond that of light, or
cryogenics that offer "virtual" immortality. Our oldest wish-memories
have been reshaped as the phrase "theoretically possible" has crept
into the American lexicon to mean that almost anything is possible
whether or not theory justifies it. This is true in part because the
"scientific" reconsideration of the history of our achievements has
blended with fantasy so that "history," science" and "fantasy" each
play a role in the orienting structure of memory. "Theory" comes to
be equivalent to a hopeful speculation that alters our expectations
and modifies the grounding memories of our identity upon the model of
future fictions.
These selective applications of memory are neither so fixed as
the memory of events nor so free as fantasy. They require just enough
flexibility to assemble memories that will rise to different occasions
but no more. They are like ceremonies that endure by accommodating
the elements of changing circumstances, and the antidotes that we
derive from memory appear like the beads of an abacus moving from past
to future which are constantly being regrouped and repainted, even as
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they remain the same. The beads possess that quality of memory which
proclaims that their own substance is accurate, right and true, while
each is also recreated. m this way, the modern American identity
that draws fantasy within the accuracy of science is also ritualist ic
to the core, and it repeats its themes redundantly as if to shake
rattle that will ward off the evils which threaten present interests.
As in the case of any ritual, the interests of the present secure
themselves by wedding the old and the new, and in this way too, the
actual ceremonies of the present day do several things to acquire an
aura of "tradition" for themselves. As if it might guarantee a
fleeting sense of continuity, those practices repeat certain activi-
ties with formal precision (always one candle for good luck; always in
Johnny's favorite color...). They make those practices belong to us
by filling them with nostalgic pasts and fantasies alike, embossing
them with the images of current participants until they have produced
an elaborate jumble of mental pictures that conflate the present with
the past in an almost calculated manner. During the ceremonies that
have been designed for festive and somber occasions, memories are
orchestrated and we are virtually guaranteed to reexperience parti-
cular pasts with special atmospheres. On those occasions the charac-
ters and events are always familiar types -- the spouse to be, is
first a "bride" or a "groom," or an old friend becomes "the deceased"
-- and in every case we have the proper memory into which we insert
the participants we are observing as if they might triumphantly affirm
it. We make the tradition something of our own and inasmuch as it
commemorates or enshrines a part of the past it also enables us to
forget, to cut away much of what does not belong to us so that the
comforting pattern of our entire selective memory is ultimately able
to use the traditional practice to reiterate its own divisions of the
past
.
Quite literally those events capture our imaginations within
their repetitious consistency even as they surprise us each time by
being different. Upon examination we can see the part that we play as
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we recreate and slightly alter the details of the redundant evocations
of funerals, weddings or birthdays. Indeed, the very ceremonial
consistency of such events precedes our intentions and quells them
with its evocative frame of memories, but at the same time it allows a
little space for our own creations as if it provided an antechamber to
our past that we most jealously decorate and defend. It is inside
this edifice of reconstructed legacies that American individuals stand
with all of their freedoms, rituals and constraints, seeking the shel-
ter as they would also wander out from it. So all of the divisions of
the past become the sources of our sacred ceremonies, a mental frieze
of ancient familiarities and oddities that stands above our restruc-
tured sense of "propriety." Now when we think that we are commemorat-
ing some important occasion we are really slicing it to fit that order
of memory. When we think that the gates to our sentimental recollec-
tions have been opened and our tears seem to rise up with the
procession of fond images, the very freedom of our memory has become
most selective and most strictly bound by propriety as it is for the
patriot who fairly weeps at the sight of the flag. In obligation to
the enduring patterns of memory we preserve the sanctity of certain
music, of special events and so on, by our own creative hand. We have
a personal stake in its continuity and our sense of sharing in that
propriety would be offended by the dissonant intrusion of the wedding
march at a birthday, a clown at a funeral, or if the bride wore black.
Of course it is not only in our ceremonies, but whenever we
pursue the limited musings that accompany our routines that this
propriety is reinstated. It is also for this reason that today,
almost any repeated practice may be given the epithet "tradition," so
that we have family traditions, sports traditions and "my own" private
traditions. What appears to be a conservative inclination really
arises to defend a present sense of propriety by giving it the
authority of the past, and every tradition, ritual or nostalgic moment
that claims to preserve a corner of the past has really restricted it
so as to keep the current domains of memory apart. Evidently it is
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the present selective interest that motivates the enduring rituals of
our lives and not the other way around. In the process, the exper-
iences of the past lose their integrity to become creatures of
"propriety" having "significance" which excludes precisely those
oppositional aspects of their recollection that might challenge our
sense of the present. All the careful divisions of the past strive to
carve up the truth to claim it for the present and to make our
identity at home within the confines of its own sense of the past as
something personal, traditional and historical.
A circle is tentatively closed by our need for orientation, as
the capacities of memory have redesigned the hierarchy of their own
ingredients. In lieu of powerful traditions a mnemic background to
modern identity is formed in the new division of the past between
history, personal experience and fantasies which are blended again in
timely nostalgia. It is forged among the numerous reflective
capabilities in the imperative of a meditative memory to locate the
self with the accuracy of a centered event recalled, in the repetition
of certain beliefs, ceremonies and common recognitions that describe
the familiar world and allow certain activities with their functional
retention to proceed unencumbered. Yet that hierarchy is also riddled
by the mystifying divisions within it, so that we do not see their
interdependence. Today, when we hear that the "new religion" is
ideology, science or medicine, law or history, we do not notice that
it is really no particular one of these that is equivalent to
religion, but the reflexive order among them all that fulfills the
same compelling need for orientation.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE PLACES OF HISTORY WITHIN MODERN SELECTIVE MEMORY,
AND THE MOVE FROM ACCURACY TO INTEGRITY
...since then I have read enough to know a little of the
actions in which I took part, but what the historians saythrows no great light on what I remember
.[11
Robertson Davies
Because it has become so difficult to simply adopt the tradi-
tional practices of our parents and identity is no longer located
within the harvest rhythms or religious cosmologies that once placed
it, we must gain our retrospective bearings by different points of
reference in the new order of memory. Today the instructions of the
past are given to us in the form of historical knowledge as well, and
the field of history epitomizes the latest phase of orientation in
memory. Now historical study has made a valiant effort to distinguish
its own version of the past from all others, and for that reason where
contemporary identity seems to have lost its path it is often said
that we have been set "adrift within history."
As if it might provide an anchor against that drift, the study of
history holds out the assurances of science and accuracy. It removes
itself from the current interests of the group and denies all subjec-
tive purpose. It most vehemently disavows all connections to memory
so that it may continue its timeless investigations of the artifacts
and documents that seem not to be memories. Yet the more we have come
to respect the aloofness of that historical work, the more we have
drawn it near and made it into our greatest standard of truth about
the past. Thus, and almost against its wishes, the field of history
has become the centerpiece of our reflexive orientation notwith-
standing all its biases. The relationship between history and memory
turns out to be much closer than we might have imagined and even a
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bit incestuous, as history allows us to examine the artifacts of our
identity in a present light for which it also provides a source.
A credible field of history is among the chief sentinels that
guard the borders between the divisions of our memory. Both as a
discipline and as the largest jurisdiction of the past within our
retrospective sense of identity, the limits posed by a notion of
history sharpen the distinctions between personal experiences
recalled and events of great importance to all, between the historical
record and a series of instructive legacies. In an impressive
synthesis of the purposes of our day, history relegates all other
pasts to subordinate places. It has reached the apex of meaningful
knowledge by making necessary exclusions so that it may speak with
uncluttered authority about the Progress which has placed it at the
head of progress.
At first, historians could claim civilization to be their own
particular province because they could look back across civilization
from a vantage point informed by its greatest achievements. From
there they could assess the coherence of great regimes and the reasons
for their collapse, or acknowledge the contributions of great men, or
the rationality of wars or of the periodi zations they punctuated.
They either disregarded the inexplicable, or explained it as a passing
moment within a reasonable progression which harnessed an otherwise
irrational and barbaric side of events. Today, on the other hand,
historians have acknowledged that such an approach is not quite
objective and their methods have become much more subtle. Now they do
not rush past the irrational event and they do not so frequently
disparage the less civilized elements of the past itself in order to
claim their place in civilization. But with a more delicate bias, and
instead of disregarding portions of the past itself, they remain
content to restrict their means of knowing the past by excluding the
more unsettling modes of recollection from their methods. That is,
where history has become wise enough not to exclude barbarism from its
civilizing range of vision, it still remains highly suspicious of the
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barbarous inclinations of unrestrained recollection, and in that way
manages to preserve a privileged place for itself in civilization. In
a certain sense, the more that historical study denies its connection
to memory, the more it is like a faith or a belief. By denying its
connection to memory history may cease to examine itself critically.
Just as the "sacredness" of things that are sacred rests upon the
illusion that they are not selective creations of memory, history may
also distinguish its truth artificially. Although historical methods
have certainly found ways of exempting themselves from the more
fantastic foibles of memory and they have discovered certain truths,
they generally rest on the illusion that history is neither sacred nor
selective; not memory or belief.
Despite cautions to the contrary, the same mnemonic passion for
orientation that is with us from childhood is now invariably attached
to a sense of history, and historical investigations are generally
careful to satisfy it. In the West, historians still tend to confine
themselves to a largely European scale of progress, and they tend to
leave the bits of civilization that seem outmoded on that scale to
ethnographers, regardless of how recently they may have presented
themselves. Historical investigations dissect traditions with
scientific precision, yet oddly borrow, rather than destroy their
instructive sense of virtue to incorporate it within their own
pedagogic style and purpose. They secularize apocalyptic thinking by
subjecting it to their own long view of time that offers its own
prognoses and proclaims its own wisdom. Secretly, the passion for
orientation drives the historical interest toward attainments that
would offer a veritably religious certainty and still it presses on
with the force of an instinct.
To identify the historical interest with instinct is not just
hyperbole. The passion for orientation quite literally drives that
interest with the force of an instinct because it bears the combined
force of the constraints upon all of the instincts as they pose limits
within a modern sense of identity. A notion of history offers a
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sounding board or rationale to the repressions that would confine us
to a civilized present. Indeed, the profound sense that we have
gained of our own time in history derives its force circuitously as a
party to the resolution of instinctual conflicts, and it is a guiding
light in the organization of a "reality principle." The historical
sense of the present is now enfolded within the overlapping purposes
that we generate for the "millenium," the present "epoch," "genera-
tion," or "decade." Hence, today the passionate need to ground
meanings that are more grand than ourselves has moved over from
religion and tradition to history, and the latter would tighten its
reins upon that need from a position of scientific distance which
insists upon accuracy. But even that distance and accuracy may
arrange the past to suit the present so that selective memory and
history powerfully intersect.
Historical investigations would like to view the past accurately,
but now accuracy itself must serve another purpose as it has become
the central feature of retrospective propriety in general. It is with
proper accuracy that the past is regarded in a presently acceptable
manner, and no matter how messy or shockingly aberrant the events of
the past may seem, they may still be welcomed approvingly into the
stream of detailed accounts that comprise our "history." From the
outset, with "accuracy" the historical past is provided with enough
vividness and precision to be accepted within our accurate memory --
and it seems that the ability to visualize the past as in a memory is
practically as important a measure of its truth in the verifiability
of evidence. History almost always has the quality of a story that is
being told in the present, in present terms of understanding, and even
when it is riddled with footnotes and methodological provisos they are
generally still the backbone of a story. Thus, history has set itself
off from memory by a unique pursuit of accuracy only to be welcomed
again into the secret fold of memories where the old standards of
truth affecting them are its hidden and silent judge.
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While this may be true, however, history is not merely another
species of memory, but a series of distinctions that keep apart the
elements of the entire retrospective horizon. As Oakeshott indicated,
history has established its reign by a series of special omissions'
It would like to omit all practical, present interests from its motive
to investigate; it resists looking for current justifications within
the past, and it generally severs the past from the flow of time to
examine it "for its own sake." 2 These omissions succeed in suspending
the most obvious prejudices of memory and in removing them from
historical examinations, but in doing so they manage to preserve the
deepest bias of memory in a new and rather more abstract form.
History now manages to preserve the abstract structure of an orien-
tation; one that has found and has verified in all its accuracy the
central ity of human purpose. It provides an orienting locus for
humanity in an otherwise chaotic flow of time, and it provides a
context for the temporal location of the self.
Thus, as Foucault has suggested, the study of history achieves a
very special mission that had begun in the nineteenth century. At
that time as it was uprooted from the earlier cosmologies and the
fundaments of religious certainty, the whole category of "the past"
needed to be redivided. No longer could retrospective attention focus
upon God's deeds or upon the classifications of things in the world.
The 'natural histories' that had inflamed an earlier interest in the
past gave way to a history of the human past, and the legend of human
events became the measure of a retrospective thought. In due course
history became a means of placing "man" at the center of the retro-
spective universe so as to organize that universe around him.
Says Foucault,
Thus behind the history of positi vities , there appears
another, more radical history, that of man himself... In
which case at a very deep level, there exists a historicity
of man which is its own history but also the radical dis-
persion that provides foundation for all other histories.
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It was just this primary erosion the nineteenth century
sought in its concern to historicize everything, to qo back
ceaselessly through time and to place the most stable ofthings in the liberating stream of time. [3]
Once humanity had been given such priority within the past the
applied energies of the historical endeavor could be returned to
enhance themselves in a peculiar way. By means of this global
retrospective consciousness, human thought and agency could be
credited more universally, and individuals in the present could also
regard themselves as historical individuals with greater leverage
against the fates. Not only did a sense of history center "mankind"
within the past, but it set the margins of personal identity as well.
That is, historical inquiry performs the rather extraordinary
selective trick of designating which pasts are beyond the reach of
personal memory in such a way that those same distant pasts may be
brought within the purview of a general Human memory as "Historical
Knowledge." By those circuitous means history graces individual
identity with a generic memory as it also preserves reason and
accuracy and provides new referential content for the lessons of
authority. It remains a possessive case of the past like memory, only
now it links the possessing entity of memory to that of the "whole,"
and sometimes overtly to the "interests" of all.
Now that history has become a carefully mapped region of the past
it plays a part in structuring even the most minute subjective aspects
of sel f -understandi ng. Indeed, it has direct bearing upon how we come
to regard our roving inclinations of mind as it designates our range
of movement within the past. As it places Humanity at the center of
the significant past, it allows the "I" as it was discussed above to
wander among the characters of that humanity with a retrospective
imagination that provides for its belonging. This historical
sensibility replaces the diminutive self that once stood beneath God
and the cosmos with the historically inspired "I" who moves more
freely to the center of past events as if it might have been sitting
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in judgement at the time that they occurred. Yet historical
investigation may often do this without overindulging the "I" or even
acknowledging its presence. As it magnifies the "I" to be the generic
"I" of "mankind," it also reflects that image through the special
objective perspective of the historian which overwhelmingly occupies
our attention as it directs the retrospective imagination. The "I"
that might identify with the historian's perspective is diminished, so
to speak, by believing itself to be objective, and that self all but
disappears into the background of historical scenes that are too big,
and too objectively true to seem to welcome it. If memory is an "I"
centering endeavor, historical inquiry has largely been a "man"
centering endeavor which nevertheless remains efficacious in the most
personal reflections today. Further, whenever we find ourselves
imagining past events as if we were hovering there, secure in certain
assumptions about humanity and watching keenly with detachment, we
refresh a self-centering aspect of that "history."
Oddly enough the attempt to be empirical is itself what most
tightly binds the objective study of history to memory.' The very
empirical quality of events is something that must be reinstated or
attributed in the course of making the past an object of empirical
study. The past only seems empirical, that is, when we interpose the
supposition that it will have the structure of a present, observable
event, a supposition that can only arise from the impositions of
contemporary memory. Indeed, historians cannot "experience" the past,
and the "truths" about the past are not corroborated by reproducing
them experimentally before witnesses. Their peculiar "empiricism"
derives its sense of certainty about the human past from the analogies
of observable natural phenomena and of the "historic" events of the
present. By such circuitous means past conditions are corroborated in
supposing that if a host of present witnesses coul
d
reexperience them
they would seem to be a certain way. What "was" is invariably
approached first from the point of view of what "might," "would," or
"should" have been observed. Once again, it is not the empirical
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encounter with evidence, but the mnemonic interest in accuracy and in
the precise unfolding of a memorable scene that best restores the
evidence to the time and content of its origination; a deep-seated
supposition of memory itself that the pursuit of the integrity of
events is worthwhile. In history, an empirical quality is moved
within the past and attributed to it where it lies beyond the grasp of
experience and experimental reproducibility, and there, the "empirical
past" may only be reached through the suppositions that a most
subjective capacity of memory undertakes.
What is more, historical knowledge has surreptitiously lent the
quality of the empirical to the past in order to welcome and harden it
within the modern order of memory. Thus, as Foucault puts it,
...History, from the nineteenth century, defines the birth-
place of the empirical, that from which prior to all esta-
blished chronology, it derives its own being History,
as we know, is certainly the most erudite, the most aware,
the most conscious, and possibly the most cluttered area of
our memory, but it is equally the depths from which all
beings emerge into their precarious, glittering exis-
tence [4]
The quality of "truth" that guarantees history such a prominent place
in modern memory is therefore a creation of the present means of
establishing truth. It is not, for example, a truth of the past that
great conflicts were waged dispassionately and that their emotional
content was added as an afterthought, although the historical texts
might present them that way. Rather, that characteristic is a trait
of historical method borrowed from other empiricisms to redefine the
human past and assign it to a sphere of contemporary expertise.
Empiricism is given to the historical past by the interpolation
of memory, and although it may claim to remove memory by decrying
subjective interests, history has no other means to assess the
continuity of events in time. Thus, a single artifact is only
empirical evidence of history when it is imaginatively restored within
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a sequence that appears as clearly as if it were remembered, and only
memory reintroduces it to the semblance of cause and effect. It is
not simply a rule of empirically observable events that there must be
cause and effect, it is also a requirement of the meditative memories
discussed in the previous chapter, those which grasp whole events,
differentiate them and locate the self within them, and it is this
capacity that is engaged in our 'reception' of historical knowledge.
So the search for coherent causes that is imitatively derived
from scientific inquiry has an additional burden when it is applied to
human pasts. The inquiring mind will often tend to perceive things in
those historical pasts as it does in its own memory, but in that case
the relationship between cause and effect is strained since empirical
causes and remembered causes have different attributes. The empirical
cause of events would seem to be fairly straightforward and demon-
strable. Remembered causes, however, are generally modified by a
sense of what would or might have been -- what I did, and 'condi-
tionally,' what I might have done differently to alter my own
experience -- and as a sel f
-observer I possess different powers
concerning events than I do in witnessing an experiment. Thus the
cause of events themselves and that sense of one's own causal efficacy
in memory may readily become confused. This might result in a glaring
historical error, but even if it does not, the very substance of
historical truth is evidently quite difficult to disentangle from that
of memories where other memories, fantasies, anticipations and wishes
collapse within what appears to be a simple sequence of events and
their cause and effect in time. Even the most scrupulous effort to
remain objective will not prevent the historian from searching for the
sort of definitive causes that conform to his or her own sense of
personal efficacy in the remembered past. Now when they mnemoni cal ly
isolate events as if they might approximate the isolation of the
experimental events of science, they "discover" such causes. Now too,
the actions of the historical individuals that they study may become
exaggerated as they seem to acquire the power that we ourselves are
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used to having in the mnemonic review of our past. For that reason at
least the popular view of history makes the category mistake which
asserts that "history" did this or that, just as "I" did this or that,
and a host of subtle biases accompany the inevitable confusion.
This sense that history has its own agency invariably restores an
interest in procuring lessons from the past of the sort that histor-
ians strongly disavow. Ironically, the moment that the historical
discipline has successfully differentiated itself from the prescrip-
tiveness of tradition, it appears to everyone that it is at last the
victorious party and people look to it for lessons. The "lessons of
history," however, are not so explicit and they do not immediately
instruct our practices in the way that traditional lessons do.
Consequently, they are more open to the selectivity of current
interests and they tend to suggest appropriate attitudes and moods
more than they instruct specific behaviors. When, for example, the
historical horrors of political power have been cooly presented in
academic history lessons, they also teach another comforting lesson.
They may teach- that all progress has been won at the cost of human
suffering, that suffering has its place in civilization and the
suffering induced by the current structure of power is better, or no
worse, than others.
With such lessons individuals ascend to the perspective of the
historian and they learn "from history" to observe power dispas-
sionately so that even when historical education ought to politicize
them, the "historical" perspective robs them of a sense of the
purposi veness of the past and therefore of a purposive present. It is
not unusual today to overhear the poorest and politically least
effectual people make grand historical pronouncements from the point
of view of having power. Cartoonists for major magazines regularly
find it funny to display indigents and alcoholics as they discuss
foreign policy and world monetary trends, and this parody has a basis
in fact, as the "historical" perspective has tricked many people into
a mnemic perspective that seems to ally them with power. If virtually
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everyone can share the historic perspective of power without having
any, then a great many things can be justified by those who do. The
very exercise of democratic rights may be modified by the position one
assumes in memory regarding historical events; the agonies of war may
seem less, and now political leaders may directly call upon a sense of
this history to claim that their excessive offenses will be "redeemed
by history." Further, if history will "forgive" the offenses of the
individual politician as it is hoped in America, it will also offer a
sense of the primacy of mass events, so that general solutions can be
justified with reference to historical tides and the mass agency "of
history," as is still often the case in Marxist countries and among
certain religious causes.
When historical investigation becomes part of a public instruc-
tion and part of memory, it might be said that it provides an abstract
plural content for virtually all of the orienting functions of memory.
At least, historical reflection meets the special requirements for
orientation provided by the functions of memory discussed so far: 5 it
reflects and seeks out origins and causes to provide a sense of
location in time, as it confers emphasis, distance and familiarity
upon aspects of the past; it combines chronological sequence with
special referents to orient the self vis-a-vis events; it provides
referential knowledge for successful participation in civilized
society and designates the boundaries of that knowledge with much
greater subtlety than anything we might call ideology. Further, this
historical perspective orchestrates a selectivity of memory, locates
the "I," and identifies it with "history" and present political power;
then it repeats themes and elements possessively to make them familiar
and our own. As it defines our epoch in that way, it gives content to
the continuous shared beliefs we have about the past and locates the
self within those retrospective musings, providing them with a
"historical" source of images. It stakes out requirements for a "good
memory" (of dates or of events), and it commands a sense of progress
and of one's place in progress.
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At the same time, this historical sensibility reacts negatively
to other peculiarities of memory. It stifles incongruous memories of
the past, resists the retrograde investigations which seek a heritage,
and ignores the idiosyncratic, and it gives these all over to
mythology, anthropology, psychology or theology. History proclaims
the centrality of "man" as Foucault suggests, and more broadly, as
Oakeshott put it, the whole "...activity of inquiring into and making
statements about the past appears as a hierarchy of attitudes toward
the past. At the head of this scale stands 'the historian' specified
by his care for the truth." 6 The care for the truth, in turn, unites
scientific accuracy to a proprietary concern for civilization, and
historical interest often becomes a noble, and therefore flawed
product of civilized memory. As civilized memory it is a most
possessive and selective memory, for as Mitscherl ichs warn, the very
notion of civilization must be used in a "sel f -ideal i zi ng fashion for
those things that one 'loves and treasures'; what is civilized is then
arbitrarily separated from what is uncivilized as though they had
nothing to do with one another." 7 Once again, history has succeeded
in civilizing certain regions of memory as it is dedicated to the task
of keeping them, and all other types of reflection, subordinate and
distinct.
Despite this we must still be grateful for the endeavors of
historians as a feuding class. "History" is both a distortion and the
nearest thing that we now have in collective works to a truth about
the past. Whereas its truth is certainly responsive to the prevailing
orientations of memory, history also poses strict limits to the biases
of that orientation and its formidable criteria often prevent the
arbitrary appropriation of the past to suit just any present interest.
Paradoxically, the highest standard of historical truth that prevents
those excesses is one that is first learned in memory and not in
science: the standard being that the multitude of different pasts can
always be viewed from so many angles that a chosen point of view must
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be corroborated. So it is only after it has corroborated its view of
the past scientifically ~ by the evidence as memory would accept it
-
that history introduces the inevitable falsehood of selectivity,
and that same selectivity of memory also contains the fundamental
requirements of all veracity. From this point of view it is certainly
not wrong for historical study to share some of the interests that
inescapably arise in memory, although it is wrong, or at least
deceptive, to remain oblivious to them.
If it is true that the divisions of memory affect all retro-
spective thought including the historical enterprise, then a somewhat
different truth about the historical past might be gained by candidly
acknowledging the ways that memory is part of it. Instead of casting
memory out, or assuming that it disappears along with subjective
interests, historical inquiry might grow reflective about its larger
interests, thus finding means to juxtapose them to the integrity of
things that are past. As usual, we ought to begin within the field of
history by strictly opposing the most expedient and obvious appropria-
tions of the past for present purposes, only now by regarding them as
tricks of selective memory.
To begin with, history most obviously becomes a part of selective
memory when the past of one people is made present in order to justify
a cause or to assuage a national sense of guilt. A few reputable
historians will be entrusted by political authority to apply histori-
cal commentary as a mnemonic antidote. Where a sense of national
purpose is at stake, as the Mi t scherl i chs put it, "The work of
investigating the past is left to a small group -- to specialists so
to speak -- to historians, public prosecutors and judges; it is left
to them -- and this is yet another defense -- to deal with the past by
8
proxy." With far greater subtlety however, the entire terrain of
Western civilization may be continually redrawn to demonstrate its
culmination in one nation, in one cause or regime. When historians
speak of "major trends" and "historical forces," their political
brothers may credit them if they find those trends to be uplifting.
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In the Mitscherlich's example, that reputable German historian
Heinrich von Treitschke had once catalogued historical forces which
gave his work a special political importance. So it was that when he
declared in 1979 that, "the Jews are our misfortune," the claim would
be accepted on the strength of the authority that had laudibly
identified those forces, and his whole theory would be expediently
embraced oy anti-Semites. As it already had lent itself to a politic
selective memory his general conception of "forces" in history could
be selectively redirected to a new purpose and, "what Treitschke
called the 'nature of things,' leading inevitably in this direction or
that was quite logically adopted by Adolf Hitler for his own purposes
as 'Providence.'" m varying degrees of complicity the historians,
the historical theory and current political interests will be
entwined, although fortunately there are always historians who resist
that tendency.
It is equally obvious that political interests may directly
intervene to alter historical understanding, although the more obvious
they are about it and the closer that they come to making decrees
about how to conduct historical interpretation, the longer it will
take for them to be effective. The "historical record" may be altered
by those in power, archives sealed and artifacts blamed for being
contaminated by the corrupt values of an earlier time. Interpre-
tations of all sorts may be forbidden or discouraged, but with even
greater facility the "historic" events of the present will be managed
and modified in order to affect the historical understandings of the
future. This happens by design in the countries of the Eastern bloc
when a political leader who is out of favor disappears from news
stories and may even be "airbrushed" out of existing photographs and
from history. People may well feel that they have not been fooled
by such obvious manipulations and that they will never forget what
they are supposed to forget, but the prolonged absence takes its toll
on memory and the psychic banishment may slowly become permanent.
Thus, in several variations of scapegoating, political interests may
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effectively rewrite the present for the future just as it has already
been rewritten for the present. One individual or an entire group
might be physically removed to exile, banned or killed in order that
they, or the painful memories that they represent, may be obliterated.
Commissions of inquiry may investigate the past according to radically
new criteria, in the way that war crimes trials employed a restricted
definition of "crime" so that a broader range of offenses and would be
criminals might be forgiven and forgotten by "history."
More commonly in the West today comparable ends may be reached
when a painful story seems to end abruptly in news reports and a
congratulatory, even nostalgic commentary replaces stories of horror.
The liberal variation of scapegoating is a much more subtle kind of
exclusion which effects the banishment of attention within the
framework of current issues. An evident reality of racial inequality
may disappear from the headlines for months at a time because the
history makers and news editors are glad to have it seem to be behind
us, and they congratulate themselves for dousing the "flames of racial
tension." Pardons, amnesties and token prison sentences of the
Watergate variety, dispose of the refuse that might disturb a current
sense of national self-esteem. The focus of the news decides which
issues will be buried, and now political news polls secure concensus
about what is to be buried and the means to be used, as they asked so
often for example, "do yj)u think Nixon should be impeached, imprisoned
or has he suffered enough?" A kind of psychological plebi scitariani sm
affirms the dictations of mnemic emphasis as it belatedly keeps one
face, one type or one issue in view of memory for everyone, while
removing others from consideration.
Of course, the more that people in the present are self-conscious
about shaping historic events to suit the image that they would like
to have for the future looking back, the more they will also generate
standards that redesign the recent past. This has been happening ever
since political leaders perceived themselves to have a mission of
great destiny, but the historical frame that now embellishes a sense
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of destiny has become highly self-conscious. It is self-conscious in
a way that is adept at inverting time by making a present for the
future and a past for the present, as it consigns certain things to
the "pages of history" or is exploited to suggest that "history will
redeem," or "history will absolve" those who also claim to steer it.
Even where sophisticated historical schools of thought resist the
temptation, the entire historical enterprise is irresistably drawn to
a historicism that projects forces of history into the future because
it is crucial to a modern sense of identity to do so. This is not the
fault of Marxism so much as it is a temporal inversion that occurs in
memory whenever history becomes a self-conscious matter, and even the
most conservative historiographer may be swept up in the tides that
push the past forward in that way. In memory the past always seems to
have been destined for our present and in the West, the "historic"
missions of the present subject all history to a historicist wish that
is wedded to the same motion. We look back from our moon landings at
the history of aviation and so forth, to redecorate the path to the
future. To that extent, history itself is being self-consciously
redesigned on the model of the mnemic self-justifications that might
affect the future sense of it. Artifacts are preserved, and records
kept for that purpose, so that even the historical methods that are
later applied and scrupulously resist their own current selective
interests, will not easily be able to resist the prior selectivity
that we would give to them.
As the historicist wish for the future becomes a formative part
of our past and our history, the historical perspective is accosted
from two directions. On the one hand, present selecti vities are
compellingly foisted upon the past, and yet so is the mnemonic
emphasis within events in their own time as it presses their selective
demands forward almost hypnotically. With legends of progress,
destiny and revolution, the past may trick the future as it has
tricked itself, and the future, in turn, will welcome the past
selectively by the tricks of its own present. By virtue of a general
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tendency toward historicism that supercedes any one method of
historical inquiry, the past and present will mutually affirm a legacy
of power. In this way, Marxism projects an analysis of history into
the future, turning prediction into a prescription that would
repatriate the alienated masses. Meanwhile, ordinary history, having
restricted its reflective access to the past, and having disregarded
its biased allegencies to memory, allows itself to be swept up in the
presumptuous self-definitions of the age with its own sense of the
future. The first would discover great "forces," and the other
generally ignores them, and neither holds the selective order that
provides its own motivation in sufficient contempt.
As the historical perception of events since the nineteenth
century has been bathed in historicist wishes and their selective
tricks of memory, it will very often miss a deeper set of wishes. To
borrow the word again, it often omits the urphantasien
, or selective
memory and fantasy applied at the time in question, and it omits what
tney omitted in turn. As if it could make life more simple, histor-
ical insight often omits the content of the promises, wishes and
passions that filtered beneath past events because its methods confine
it to an opposing variety of evidence. That much of the integrity of
the past is often as alien to historical inquiry as it was to the
restricted and acceptable mnemonics of its own time. Today however
the historical ground is so thoroughly beaten down that different
sorts of insight have come to be valued. In some schools of histor-
ical thought the revelations of a secret, wishful side of life, the
hidden and the obscure, have spiced the pursuit of the past and now
revive critical interest. The history of technologies, of single
topics, of certain rites; the fascination with single sources of data,
letters, oral traditions and the like, seem to be random rebellions
within the field, but they also offer a chance to unveil many of the
tricks and biases of modern memory. By an effort that is not often
self-conscious, the proponents of these interests contrive their own
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oppositions to the selecti vities of memory. Although they often begin
by making imaginary immersions into prior contexts that are similar to
those of their predecessors, they tend to conduct a meditative reading
of the past that essentially restores the artificial or selective
memory of its own time. Hence they become more self-conscious about
the enterprise as they test the limits of different pasts and
corroborate their facts by different means.
When historians do admit their own efforts to thwart a current
selective interest, and when they self-consciously assess the
selective memory that once made for the historical context they may
distinguish the past from the present more genuinely. For example, in
Britain during the First World War, communiques sent home described
battle conditions with a "limited selection of euphemistic adjec-
tives." One witness quoted by Fussell pointed out that battle
scenes were described in terms such as, "'sharp,' brisk'; e.g., 'the
enemy was ejected after brisk fighting'." The observer further
suggests that "...A future historian, if he leaned at all on such
1 o
carefully seived accounts would be quite misled." Nevertheless, the
historian cannot rightly ignore that euphemism and the role that it
played in the events of the time by simply rediscovering the "true"
horrors of that war. The distorting euphemism remains a truth as
such, and it is not only a distortion. Now the historian's decisions
to raise this question or not to raise it might appear to be a
question of historical style, but to report the events objectively, by
passing over the euphemisms which then shrouded them would itself be
euphemistic in another way. It would be as great a distortion as it
would be to accept the circumspect language of that time, for it would
spare us from the realization that the horror of that war had been
evaded and misrepresented. This common difficulty may be resolved in
various ways, but a most sensitive historian would feel obliged to
extract and weigh the whole selective orientation of that time, the
things that it had paraded so proudly, or hidden selectively, against
his or her own. This historian would hope to decipher the mnemic
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associations that are so forcefully omitted in the euphemisms of the
past and in the objective attitude of the present. These would be
revealed in the explicit contrasts between the present and the past in
question, as the different times are compared to display the patterns
of conflicting truth in two dimensions. By disclosing the euphemisms
of present methods as a selective interest of memory, historians may
match and confront the euphemisms of the past so that the two may be
reflexively undone.
The euphemisms of the past and the present, therefore, can only
be undone by comparisons between the hidden and expressed memories of
each time, which are best revealed in comparisons across time. In
that way, the problems of hi storography are expressly considered to be
problems of memory as well, and simple historical biases are revealed
to be mnemonic interactions across time and concerning time, that are
much more complex than any simple imposition of present subjective
interests. In order to neutralize that complex bias, then, we must
first review our inclination to apply to history the standards of
truth that we apply in personal memories. Just as the truth of a
personal memory appears to belong to our own present, for example, we
would generally prefer the historical truth to have as much substance.
The reflexive truth of personal memory that we seek in history is
suspiciously like looking into a mirror which frames one's own
experience and seems to offer a direct conduit to that experience.
But in each case the truth is that the mirror has moved backward a
step in time and the reflective image is actually an imagined one. It
is that imagination which offers the sense of direct access to the
past because it is subjected to a concentrated effort to disallow the
present interests and fantasies that might otherwise enter it. Just
as the restrictions of visual perception solidify the reflected image
of a mirror, it is the restrictions of contemporary memory that keep a
personal memory and a historical image free of certain excessive
biases. The present structure of selective memory determines the
nature of truths concerning the personal past as it provides one set
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of biases to replace another. One may abandon the most subjective
biases to find a "truth" about the past that is nevertheless deter-
mined by a current division of memory, and this is something that many
of the less reflective historians do.
On the other hand, serious historical reflection that makes
memory self-conscious will not be inclined to use the present
structure of memory to provide a sense of direct access to the past
quite so unthinkingly. Since that effort would now be overUy
confronted with the differently divided memory of another time, a
different context with its own standards of truth and so on, it must
match the present framework against that of the past and negotiate
between the two. Unlike a personal memory, and unlike the usual
historical endeavors, this approach may seem to have direct access to
the past and a quality of truth only because it allows imagination to
escape the current restrictions of memory and pointedly reinstates
them later as methodological constraints. Where a personal memory
seems true because our current orientation is applied to limit
imaginative flights of fancy, this reflexive history obtains its sense
of truth and direct access to the past by deliberately engaging
imagination to subtract the whole present orientation from the past.
This must be done, for example, in certain feminist histories which
base their insights upon the discredited record of a particular past
as it is discovered in diaries, and which remain suspicious of
contemporary selective interests in the field of history and beyond.
So this view of the past acquires a different "objectivity" as it must
remove much more than fantasy and the subjective interests of the
present in the way that ordinary history does -- it must also suspend
the entire set of mnemonic presumptions that lie behind them. This is
most difficult to achieve in a way that will produce a history that
can be communicated in the present, and it requires extraordinary
sensitivity to the methodological devices that are used to make it
communicable. It requires a kind of language that makes its methods
known and tells several stories at once against the expressed backdrop
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of contemporary interests.
To experience historical evidence in this reflective way is
rather more like discovering old photographs of oneself in long
forgotten poses, than it is like looking in a mirror. The veracity of
that experience depends upon acknowledging the past as a largely
different world, and the sort of evidence that it provides confronts
us with elements of a landscape that has been forgotten. In that
experience, the divisions and structure of present selective memory
along with their claims upon truth, are shocked by the evidence of a
different selectivity. The disconcerting discovery of a long
forgotten photograph of ourselves is an experience that involves a
movement in three parts. We are inclined to ask, "is that me?"; to
struggle to place the moment depicted in context, and to ask, as it
contrasts with our present self-image oddly, "did I really look like
that?"; and finally having made appropriate excuses for the quality of
the photograph we restore it to its own time saying, "I guess I did
look like that." We have introduced the world of the past moment to
our present, allowing ourselves to make the pause that enables us to
find common ground for past and present. Yet the movement from the
present to the past and back again, only momentarily acknowledges the
extreme distinction of the past, and does not quite capture it. Like
historical study it still credits the "evidence" with the final
authority concerning truth, and only after allowing the selecti vities
of the present to review it. On the basis of present criteria, the
photograph gains credence as a fact, but only once it has induced us
to forget all of the doubts it had momentarily aroused in stepping in
and out of the past; and now that it is settled as a fact, the
photograph is not therefore true as a^ memory that is aware of its own
path of reflection.
The critical study of memory therefore reveals the stages of bias
that also affect the historian and it would draw them into the open.
The first is most familiar as it occurs when obvious present criteria
seem to affect the viewing of evidence. For example, a woman
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suffering from anorexia may look directly at an old photograph of her
own emaciated face and announce that she was "too fat" at the time 13
Even in such an obvious case of present selective perception however
we realize that we are also encountering a long-standing bias which
has endured in present perceptions to be cast backward upon the
evidence again. Indeed, if it is a prejudice that originated at the
time of the evidence, then this leads us to another dimensions of bias
altogether. When one of Stoller's psychoanalytic patients recalls
that she posed nude in photographs that she took of herself at
puberty, and the recently discovered photographs reveal her to be
fully clothed, then the claim is factually disproven by the same
authority that we give to historical evidence. 14 However, if she did
not recently interject the memory of nudity and it was a fantasy at
the time the pictures were taken, then the fantasy was part of the
experience itself. The proven fact that she is clothed in the
photographs is only a present truth which does not in itself reveal
the whole truth of the experience. What appears to be a trick of
memory, thus reveals that the selectivity of past mnemonic frameworks
has its own substance apart from the evidence. It is a different part
of past reality which presents different evidence and like the
euphemisms of a past war, it is constitutive of that very different
world. As there are three parts to the experience of an old photo-
graph of oneself, there are three distinct phases of truth involved in
the weighing of any evidence: there is the mnemonic context of the
past itself in its integrity; the present selective framework of
memory that examines this as a fact, and the image of the past that
survives after oscillations between the two have been completed and
which has accomodated bits of both worlds.
In light of this, the factual evidence, like an old photograph in
hand, does not suffice as the only corrective to imagination that will
lead to the truth. The evidence of facts of that caliber only
obliterates the worst subjective biases, but there are other biases
beyond those of a present subjectivity. The consideration of memory
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suggests that historical evidence must be viewed from several angles
and it only clouds the issue to consider "historical objects" from a
strictly scientific point of view that excludes rather than admitting
bias. The series of prejudices that are encountered in the past
itself, in every claim to have access to it, and in the complex
mnemonics of the present, are not corrected by the facts alone, but
only when the facts are £llowed to evoke the special associations of
their own time as well. As in the case of the photographs we obtain a
different reality in the past along with the nudity or fatness that
had meaning then, and this is possible to some degree when considering
pasts that are beyond the reach of living remembrance.
In the first instance this approach conveys an old message --
that the historian is a historical being and that the forces operating
at a time in the past are contextual ly distinct. In this vein, the
concern for mnemonic contexts might seem to reiterate certain rules of
dialectical materialism, and yet it does not suggest that an analysis
of "objective forces" will suffice to gain access to the past and
instead, it finds a rather more cluttered route to it. For that
reason, it is important that the historian develops a reflective
awareness of his or her place within a present orientation that calls
upon the evocations of the special contemporary sense of history that
has entered private experience. It is precisely this personal and
contemporary sense of history that must be weighed and subtracted
within the past. Biases will be eradicated by comparing biases and
not by ignoring them, so that historical self-reflection would become
a methodological requirement of historical inquiry.
Here the historical study of the recent "modern" past may make
the greatest gains where we are reflectively aware of our own interest
in the history of the groups of our belonging, of the Western world,
of America, of one or another wave of immigrants, and so on. The
arbitrary division in our orientation that separates the contemporary
past from the historical past may be bridged and we must see how the
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two have been woven together in the mnemonic fabric of our daily life.
Historical study of recent pasts that pertain to our own present must
begin in appreciation of the thick texture of the pasts compounded in
every moment of experience. The important persons in our lives; the
experiences of their generation and the time line of "historic" events
with its peaks and valleys, and a vague knowledge of long past events
are all enfolded into the present in a way that provides criteria for
viewing other pasts. Hence we must pay special attention to the
compounding of tenses that are self-consciously expressed in attempts
to grasp one's own experience.
Halbwachs, for example, recalled his parents as if they were
mired in the period following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, a
period he describes as lasting fifteen or twenty years until about his
fourteenth year. Not only did the crucial dates and newsworthy events
of that period infuse that memory of his parents, but also the special
associations and more abstract ideas belonging to the "atmosphere" of
that time as he now imagined it in the moment of recalling. As an
adult conceiving that period, he found himself irresistably drawn to
combine the memory of his parents with a subsequently acquired
historical knowledge and aesthetic apprehensions of their possessions
which all seemed to run together. He found himself "filling in" for
the abstract conceptions that were characteristic of that period as he
recalled his parents, and he found himself supplying the imagery of
several differently acquired memories to give them substance. He
expresses the matter this way:
But I can fill in these conceptions, substituting images and
impressions for these ideas [of the period], when I look
over the paintings, portraits and engravings of the time or
think about the books that appeared, the plays presented the
style of the period, the jokes and humor in vogue.
I don't fancy that this picture of a world so recently
vanished and now recreated by artificial means will become
the slightly contrived background on which to project pro-
files of my parents -- a sort of solution in which I immerse
my own past in order to develop it as one might a film. On
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the contrary, the world of my childhood, as I recover it
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The personal memory, and newly acquired historical knowledge of
this recent past are fused together so that there is an atmospheric
bond between the two that even the best historians are ill equipped to
break. Whenever it was that Halbwachs began making these connections,
and it may have been during the period in question, his own sense of
that time had been thickened by them, and they are therefore pertinent
to our current sense of Halbwachs himself "in history." Indeed, by
his own reckoning childhood memories and historical memories are
utterly inseparable and ought to be taken together as one thing. If
that suggestion were seriously pursued, we would certainly eliminate
the different extremes of a circumscribed personal past and a distinct
historical past, but to do so would extend the argument too far.
Indeed, this conflation of elements leads Halbwachs to suggest
that
,
Even when considering childhood remembrances, then we are
better off not to distinguish a personal memory that would
reproduce past impressions just as they originally were and
would never take us beyond the circle of our family, school
and friends, from a "historical" memory that would be com-
posed only of national events unfamiliar to us as child-
ren. [16]
The suggestion does make an admirable attempt to extend the tendency
of memory to compound its pasts into a self-aware methodological
principle. With an honesty that is true to memory we ought to regard
the personal past and the historical past as parts of the thick weave
that we genuinely consider to be of the past. However, if we do that
to the extent that Halbwachs suggests, we will miss the crucial fact
that modern Western orientations also distinguish these two pasts
abruptly, separating the personal from the historical by such clever
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means that they may be covertly intertwined.
For this reason a reflexive view of the past must take account of
the blending and the divisions that present memory is inclined to
make. It must see the past orientation and find the wishes within it
that would affect our present view, as it may also decipher a present
structure of memory that we would impose upon the past even beyond our
subjective interests. It must discover how every historical milieu
compounds other pasts within itself and, at the level of the diary,
what people at that time think of themselves. It must weigh those
discoveries self-consciously against its own selective orientation
toward the past so that it will know precisely what to subtract in
pursuit of the integrity of other pasts. For Halbwachs, recent
history and his own childhood are so well mixed that he does not
regard his parents by "immersing" them in a contrived sense of their
historical period. Yet after making the appropriate subtractions it
may be possible to discern different levels of contrivance, and it may
be possible to immerse ourselves partially into the distinctive
mnemonic world of another time by moving willfully through our own.
The greatest obstruction to this does not lie in being too
subjective, nor does it lie in being too objective and historical,
rather it lies in the acceptance of selecti vities of retrospective
thought that permeate both. It is important that we see clearly how
the historical past forms an imperfect dividing line within our own
subjective identity which keeps the many pasts separate so that we may
begin to move back and forth across that line. Rather than revoking
the special license that history has had in seeking past truths of our
identity on the grounds that there is always a present bias, we might
interrogate history from the perspective of different pasts and on the
grounds of the different modalities of remembering. Then we would not
be content with a simple historical story, nor would we be content to
refute it dialectically by discovering deeper historical forces. Both
approaches see history at too great a distance from present memory,
from childhood and identity. Instead, we would weigh considerations
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of the past and its "forces" against our own interest in redividing
the past; the present framework of memory would itself be seen as a
selective force in comprehending history and that comprehension would
expand as we pursue not only the accuracy of evidence, but the
integrity of memories as well.
A Movement Toward the Integrity of the Past Through Fouc a.n t <
Analytic of Fimtude. ~ 2
The revolutions that have occurred in historical thinking have
each involved an angry refutation of the narrow-minded self-interest
of their predecessors, and each claims to have come closer to a pure
moment in the past by radically excising the fanciful part of some
former approach. So it is that the factual approach to history
excises the subjectivity of the simple historical story; the trans-
cendent teleology of the Historical Spirit is battered and restored to
"material" contexts and so on. Now, Foucault's "analytic of finitude"
exceeds even the most severe efforts to reduce the bias of grand
interpretive schemes, since he would only make the barest set of
claims concerning the historical moment. 17 He offers the most
emphatic resistance yet to the conflation of the historical past with
the biases of memory as they have come to rest in the historical story
or in the postulate of grand historical forces.
Since the notion of historical "forces" is presumptuous to him
from the outset, he does not wish to restore the immanence of
historical objects of inquiry within a stream of material forces as
the Marxists might. On the other hand, since he feels that subjec-
tivity has only been moved to the level of a general bias in favor of
human achievements by the conservative historians who pursue the
facts, he seeks an altogether different "positivity" within the
historical object. Indeed, he is so suspicious of contemporary
prejudices with their forces, facts and fancies that he would only
address the rarefied positive immanence that may be read upon the
"surfaces" of historical expressions themselves. For him, no
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subjectivity, no current bias or scheme of understanding should muffle
the voice of the artifact or impute hidden motives to it. No concep-
tion of "structure," of historical facts or forces should obscure the
"radical positivity" of an epistemic substance of the past, and the
limits of the time that would define its intrinsic qualities and
form.
By confining himself to the "surfaces" of historical expressions
in this way, Foucault efficiently avoids the anthropocentricity that
placed "man" at the center of retrospective thinking. He violates the
bias that has made history the search for human origins and purposes
by removing virtually all subjective aspects of the past at the same
time that he removes the subjective aspects of inquiry as well. His
extreme contextual i zati on of texts and discourses would only recognize
the structure of the contextual limits that they themselves reveal,
and this way the analysis shakes itself free from the "historico-
transcendental
" themes that preside over most historical reflection.
If we are to discover the order that is within the expressed past,
rather than imposing an order upon it, he insists that:
We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its
sudden irruption... Discourse must not be referred to the
distant presence of the origin but be treated as and when it
occurs. [19]
This "analytic of finitude" would examine the "rarety of statements"
20in their "exteriority," without locating them in the familiar
continuities of "history." It proceeds, "in order to restore
statements to their pure disperson
. . .to seize their very irruption at
the place and moment at which it occurred." 21 In other words, within
the textures of the moment the analysis pursues what might be called
an abstract version of the integrity of the past; of reflexive
experience in its own time, to which I have been referring all along.
Thus Foucault's analytic of finitude focuses upon the pure
abstract form of what has been expressed by purging memory, except in
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general sense, and other vital aspects of its meaning. By such
exclusions, Foucault pursues the least corruptible surface of the
past, an immanent and contained abstraction that remains true to its
moment of expression and to a certain aspect of its integrity Yet
for all of his healthy caution, he has reproduced an extreme version
of the same reduction that historical abstraction has always tended to
generate. In its own way that analysis proceeds toward something
solid in the past by omission ~ not by subsequent inclusion - and
like the more ordinary approaches to the historical past, it excludes
the subjective fantasy and interests of the time in question, as it
also omits unconscious and hidden forces there. The analytic of
finitude excludes all that ordinary historiography would exclude only
more thoroughly and more self-consciously, to the point where it is
left with only the rather confined set of objects of interest in which
it may discover a rarely noticed "epistemic" form. The method seems
to deduce a structure of limitations in past expressions and therefore
discloses a portion of their integrity, but by disgorging them of
their mysterious side. Since this finitude admits nothing hidden or
unconscious it is least likely to corrupt the artifacts it examines,
but it also leaves them more starkly on their own than they have ever
been in any momentary sense of reality.
For this reason Foucault does not provide us with a critical
perspective by virtue of what is discovered within history, but by
isolating the whole category of the past itself. His purpose, as he
reveals it,
...does not set out to be a recollection of the original or
a memory of the truth. On the contrary, its task is to make
differences: to constitute them as objects, to anaTyle
them, and to define their concept. [22]
Nevertheless, it would seem that this interest should lead us to step
down from that level of abstraction occasionally. His abstractions
are so closely bound to their finite expressions that they have led us
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to the brink of reinstating the concerns of the reflective subjects
involved in them, without quite doing so. That is, to make differ-
ences is to violate conditions of familiarity; conditions of familiar-
ity which belong to a most mundane memory. In the same breath that
Foucault would emphatically sever his analysis from the haughty
philosophical interests of the memory of our own time that pursues
human origins, he should also subtract what he discovers from the
background of more ordinary presumptuous memories as they stand in our
time, and in the time under consideration. Indeed, since the very
"discourse" that he would address within the past has always referred
back to its own sense of origins mnemoni cal ly , he should at least
consider the relationship between such "surfaces" and all kinds of
memory that contribute to the sense of their meaning, and in the
process he would be obliged to elaborate upon the very subjective
experience of memory that he excludes.
In ignoring this, Foucault has perhaps excised too much, and
where he sticks to the eviscerated surfaces of things he may miss
other aspects of their integrity as pasts. In order to void the
unthinking abstractions of the mainstream, he gives us the counter-
abstraction of an immanent structural aspect of the past. But that is
not the whole story of the past, and in doing this he has made an
entire analysis out of something that is really a first step from the
point of view of memory. From that point of view, we may acknowledge
that there are many different orders of elements that are hidden at
different depths within our expressions and that some deserve to be
considered along with the finitude of their surfaces. There are, of
course, such hidden elements within the memories attending a dis-
course, and again, in later memories which are attached to it, as it
becomes part of the past; and surfaces are encrusted with the memories
of various times as they were in Halbwach's memories of his parents.
Therefore, it may be that by accepting the radical cautions of
Foucault's method which would confine us to the surface at_ f i rst
,
contemporary critics will be able to grasp a greater integrity in the
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past thereafter. 24 By making very careful excursions beyond the
"analytic of finitude" we might initiate a different analysis of the
details of past experience. We might proceed out from the "archive" 25
that Foucault refers us to, toward the diary, and from the diary to
our own autobiography and back to the archive again with a heightened
sensitivity to imposing layers of time, memory and their " epistemes ."
It may be that Foucault's method already leads beyond itself in
these directions. Since the radical distinction that he would
discover in everything that is past begins at once to free it from
memory and from the homogenizing effect of history, in the end it must
suggest different considerations of memory and different applications
of it to the past. Thus, Foucault prefers to pursue what he calls
"Effective" history that isolates the human past from its comforting
flow of reflections, from its own sense of continuity and the purpose
it server in self-recognition:
"Effective" history differs from traditional history in
being without constraints. Nothing in man not even his
body -- is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for
self-recognition or for understanding other men. The tradi-
tional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of
history and for retracing the past as a patient and continu-
ous development must be systematically dismantled. [26]
In this, the bare bones of the past are to be preserved as something
absolutely unique. Yet we must ultimately add the flesh of memory to
them later on, and if we have violated Foucault's intention in
acknowledging the need for that addition, we have at least heeded his
warning as a first step.
Further, in exceeding even the youthful efforts of Marx to
27
contextual i ze the human capacities, Foucault offers a stark and
minimal vision of the human repertoire in extreme isolations of the
past. In those radical isolations he breaks the hold of a conti nuous
sense of history and of fami 1 iarity in memory quite deliberately --
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History becomes "effective" to the degree that it introducesdiscontinuity into our very being -- as it divides our
emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and
sets it against itself. "Effective" history deprives the
self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it
will not premit itself to be transported by a voiceless
obstinacy toward a millenial ending. It will uproot its
traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pre-
tended continuity. [28]
But if this approach to history is designed to "deprive the self of
reassuring stability," then it must either know or find out just what
the self secretly supposes that it is, and just what the self supposes
that it has been in being stable. For this reason, as we pursue the
integrity and distinction of the past we must do two things. With
Foucault we must regard the past in its finitude, stripped of the
usual historical biases, and we must also sift through the selective
schemes of memory, the suppositions of identity which remain unspoken
within those pasts. To the greatest extent possible, we would
consider the past as something that has been alive with an active
memory that made its own efforts to fill the gaps in its discourses
and experiences. Short of proclaiming universal forces in those bits
of the past we would still look beneath their "surfaces." Indeed, the
"surfaces" are not opaque, and although they may not be so transparent
that we can discover immutable truths beneath them to confirm our
cherished sense of history, they are translucent enough to reveal a
content that is particular to themselves. There are regularities
beneath these surfaces that are not unconscious hidden forces, but
which express an unspoken content of each epi steme .
Once the power of an epi steme is revealed within the stark
conceptual limits that have been set out for an age, it is apparent
that we have extracted it from the surface of expressions for the
purpose of contemporary examination. Suddenly it is no longer like
the skeletal facts that allow historians to reconstruct past scenes,
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but more esoteric and perhaps more like the list of antiquated
physiological principles that might have been applied to the skeleton
in its own time. As a means of addressing the past, Foucault's
approach strikes us with the vibrant distinction of a former time at
the level of the concepts then applied and it offers us the aspect of
COnceptua1 integrity by making an implicit comparison with our own.
The conceptual pattern that is revealed in an episteme is cleansed for
our examination and it is removed from context to give distinction to
its context by confronting the homogenizing tendency of historical
conceptualization upon its own terms. In order to address selective
understanding at its own level, the revelation of an episteme
deliberately avoids the clutter of other selecti vities that were
contemporaneous with it, such as those concerning moral obligation,
fantasy or themes of emotional content which proceed at other depths
of experience. It portrays the former context but not by weighing the
condition of its subjective familiarity against our own. Nevertheless
that rarefied scheme is one modality of reflection that does restore
the distinction of the time it considers since, unlike the simple
historical "facts," it leads us to dissect and compare the mnemonic
prejudices of that past against those of the present. The study of
epistemic surfaces, of the "interplay of transmissions, resumptions,
disappearances and repetitions..." * as Foucault puts it, allows
reflexive thought to address the past at the level of reflexive
thought, and that demands a degree of honesty. However, as this
honesty is extended, it must become comparatively self-conscious of
the reflexive process itself and it must move beyond the limits that
Foucault has set. It must embrace the psychological dimensions of the
past in measured contrast to those of the remembering psyche viewing
them now. As the epistemic world collides with the world of mnemonic
content, the "surfaces" acquire new dimensions and now might appear to
be faceted like a gem with a variety of planes of selectivity
extending beneath their exterior conceptual skin.
By seeing the matter in this way we move through the "analytic of
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finitude" toward different aspects of the integrity of the past
However in respect of the radical caution introduced by Foucault, we
will have proceeded by means that directly confront biases at the lost
abstract level of conceptualization where they might most easily be
hidden. Again, this does not mean that we would suddenly disclose a
lurking universal truth that unites experience across time and foils
the distinctions rendered by "effective" history. But it does mean
that we would address the field of immanent memories that are not
self-evident in the expressions of the past. By going a bit further
in that direction than Foucault is willing to go, we will have freed
the past from memory by finally recognizing the past as memory. Then
we would seek the memories that were on the verge of being expressed
in the past but were not fully expressed, and those that were so well
accepted and so familiar that they did not require expression at the
time. We would pursue the integrity of the past along a different
surface than Foucault has in mind, since it would not appear only as a
positive, manifest present belonging to some previous time.
The historical object is therefore revealed in its mnemonic
associations in contrasts that rupture our own organization of the
past and our own associations to it. We do not only pursue its
socio-economic context or its unconscious side, but the evident
surroundings that provided it with a temporal locus within the
orientation of its time -- the letters, diaries, day dreams, windows,
rooms, corridors, images, issues and conceputal i zati ons with which it
shared the quality of familiarity, the terms of familiarity that can
only be deduced from Foucault's analysis. With attention to the
unspoken mnemonic framework of a past, we would revive an aspect of
dialectical analysis -- only now we have been cautioned against the
historicist bias that gives the past over to continuous historical
30
progress. Now we would look beneath surfaces for what might be
called the immanent "negative" background of their expressed "posi-
tivity," and though that does not give way to a view of the totality
of historical forces, it does offer a reconstructive perspective to
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the critic.
So it is that in the end, just as critics must ultimately
reinstate the particular considerations of subjectivity and memory
that are conspicuously absent from Foucault's historical method, they
must restore a critical sense of the present. Although we would not
want to make the everyday thinking of the present concerning the
standard for critical insights into the past, we must readmit it after
it has been placed in isolation. This is especially important if we
wish to take the method beyond historical study, to enrich our
everyday consciousness with a sense of the thick moment of experience
that Foucault begins to approach, the point being to discover such
moments in our present experience as we also discover the play of
history there as well. Then it may be that by passing through an
expanded sense of our present, of its memory and episteme
, we may
better grasp the rich integrity of every past.
Foucault's method demands that we quietly, implicitly abandon a
present, subjective, historicized point of view; but this must be done
explicitly in order to gain a truly "effective" sense of the past. As
critics undertaking this task, we would not expect to rid ourselves of
imaginative bias entirely, nor would we let it guide us surrepti-
tiously because we would focus our suspicious attention upon the
processes of reflection and memory themselves. In confronting those
most intimate selective processes we will be able to resist the
historicist impulse to claim the past for the future. Then a deeper
sense of the rarity of the historical moment may emerge in stark
contrast to the present schemes of reflection that are orientations
for our identity. This "effective" history must be juxtaposed to, and
not merely cut off from the present mnemonic scheme in order to grasp
its integrity as a vital source of contrast.
In order to illuminate what this notion of juxtaposition means we
might consider the alternative approaches available to cultural
anthropologists who face the immediate prospect of entering another
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culture. Admittedly their attempts to be objective cannot entirely
succeed, and as they would like to find some truth that preserves the
integrity of the other context, they must pursue their investigation
with a special sensitivity that might allow them to immerse themselves
there. Whether they are merely objective or highly sensitive in this
way, these students of culture face the same difficulty that arises in
a comparison of mnemonic contexts. As they become self-conscious of
their biases, the methodological problem becomes a problem of memory
and identity and it is precisely this experience that Foucault
suspends. But now if we consider the obstructions to cross-cultural
analysis in this nearly psychological way, they may appear to be more
like surmountable defenses than impenetrable philosophical dilemmas.
It might seem that we are capable of cross-cultural understanding but
are stifled in the attempt by the repressive forgetf u 1 ness of our own
society. Then it would seem that psychoanalytic "insight" of the sort
that the Mi tscherl i chs propose would penetrate the selective biases of
memory by means of a special "empathy" 31 that has been elevated to a
methodological principle. They would justify this empathetic approach
to cultural study in two ways. First their approach rests on a moral
ground: that empathy with other nations, cultures or times, or with
potential enemies, or of parents with children, might awaken the
better impulses of a forgetful civilization. Secondly, they imply
that the understanding of different contexts can only really obtain
accuracy if it is empathetic -- if it honestly attempts to piece
together the experiences of a different context as they were, or
inasmuch as they can be reexperienced on the terms that they were
first experienced as if to step beyond the restrictions of contem-
porary memory. It is a methodological extension of liberal tolerance
that would bridge the differences between peoples if it could, and
would require an accurate appraisal of their distinct situations.
This empathy would like to penetrate selective biases to allow
immersions in the different context, but the hope that is held out for
its truthfulness is too sentimental and too loosely directed to
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accomplish the task. m being unaware of its own exclusions, the
empathetic perspective may easily reproduce the problems that afflict
objective analysis because it also attempts to purge itself of bias
It unwittingly generates abstract generalizations of the sort that
rightly makes Foucault suspicious. However, empathy has one important
advantage in this. If objective analysis would exclude emotional
attachments and deny its own selective interests entirely, empathy
offers a brief comparative moment, an instant in which the selective
interests of two worlds stand face to face. Although empathy fails to
enhance that moment and proceeds as if it could void the emotional and
conceptual restrictions of one world in order to enter another
entirely. There is an instant of parity when the observer has stepped
quickly to a place between two points of view, even though the per-
spective that is momentarily achieved is quickly destroyed by the
fiction that one can wholly adopt the point of view of an alien world
and orientation. Nevertheless, in that flickering moment of compar-
ison, attention focuses upon the very sort of content that is to be
suppressed in the fiction of quick assimilation, and it addresses
questions of identity that objective analysis and Foucault's approach
both dismiss.
In making the implicit comparisons that would bridge the distance
between contexts, objective social scientists presume to be unemo-
tional and unbiased, while the empathetic observer presumes to know
his or her own feelings well enough to subtract them from considera-
tion. Now, if instead of being objective or empathetic concerning a
distinct object of inquiry we make a methodological pause at that
moment of comparison and allow its impressions to gain their full
voice, they will genuinely seem strange to us. In the pause that
allows such a comparison we would not denounce the uncomfortable sense
of strangeness as biased subjectivity, and instead, we would allow the
peculiarities of another world to disclose the subtle evocations that
they have for us as_ "peculiarities." If this is done systematically
we will not merely come to appreciate the esoteric. Instead, this
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special sort of comparison will resist the liberal impulse to don the
native dress, and to submerge cultural differences in empathy. it
will force the issue of objective structures and classifications on
the basis of specific and distinctive content. Hence it requires an
oscillation between contexts that becomes aware of their limits by
contrasting patterns of familiarity and difference. It tests one
selective set of interests against another, and consequently it makes
acknowledgment of differences in the way that is methodologically more
honest just as it is always a deeper basis of trust between peoples.
In a sense, the process is not unlike what occurs much less self-
consciously when we live in a new and different culture for an
extended period of time.
Immersions in Respect of Strangeness
The paradoxical truth is that to grasp hold of the integrity of a
past or different kind of experience, people must seem to release it
allowing it to become estranged from their present way of thinking.
Estrangement is a means of confronting the subtle mnemonic bias of
familiarity, and though it may seem to be a contradictory notion, it
is necessary to welcome things within one's own understanding by
virtue of their place outside of it. To that end, it is not enough to
grant that a thing is unfamiliar, but as critics we must go further to
disclose the very terms of familiarity that make it seem alien in a
way that engages our own subjectivity to disrupt the usual terms of
our subjectivity. We must not fool ourselves about the distinctions
in experience by setting up abstract categories of measurement to
"appreciate" them, because those categories secretly unite them. In
considering social distinctions, we must be wary of all attempts at
formalism which seem to grant distinction to their objects of inquiry
by "estranging" them, but really seek to restore them to our familiar
32
and selective world.
Here, on the contrary, critics must give the respect that is due
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to the distinction of their object in the first instance without
imposing a formal scheme. In the inescapable event of interpretation,
we always have measured the historical object against familiar
memories of our own, and now we would make that measurement explicit
in order to discern each step it makes. We might then acknowledge the
anomaly of an object by measuring the familiar contents of our
thoughts against the most disparate aspects of it, and according to
the reasons we have for them to seem anomalous. In that effort, the
sequential quality of time that seems to dictate a forward movement of
events will collapse before the fluidity that time has within memory
when we move forward and backwards beyond the restrictions of "our"
experience. In this, the effort to penetrate our own selective memory
is not virtuous because it allows us to "go back" to the past in its
integrity, but rather because it gives the past and present exper-
iences their own distinctive integrity within the present world. In
this attitude, the strange qualities of things past become a primary
interest of present memory; history and our present experience become
revelations about one another, and not just mutual affirmations.
As we appreciate the distinctiveness and peculiarities of the
past in opposition to the familiarity that memory would bequeath to
it, we must overrule that quality that Schachtel calls, "the posses-
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sive attitude of memory." This means that at first we must suspend
the impulse to understand by either "empathetic" or "objective" means.
Objectivity and empathy both seek to possess experience -- both
dismiss as vulgar prejudice the sense that it might seem "strange,"
and tighten their possessive grip by claiming that nothing is strange.
Conversely, by admitting that our inevitably possessive memory
experiences the variety and finitude of other contexts as^ something
strange, that possessive attitude may be dispelled most honestly. We
would thereby consider how a thing seems strange, instead of dis-
paraging that subjective experience a priori. In that way, we will
allow ourselves to be struck by the very same force of insight that
often accompanies "incongruous" personal memories, and challenges us
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in the speculative postures that we adopt within "meditative"
memories. And so the many pasts will be allowed to come to us through
recollections as welcome strangers that challenge our habits of
recollection. As Schachtel recalls them, for example, the childhood
memories that moved Proust had similar significance as they often
struck with unannounced distinction:
The involuntary recovery of the forgotten past very often
intrudes on this present life like a strange, alien element.
The person that was then, the child that Proust sees in the
scene recalled, has long since been buried under the years
of social routine, of changed needs and interests, of the
preoccupations of the present. He has become a stranger.
But this stranger may also assert a life and interests which
had been starved by the time gone by and the pressures it
brought. [34]
Especially when such a past is seen to lie within the purview of
subjective experience, the memory that seems to bear an alien element
is at once more frightening and oddly less elusive. The entire past
in all of its distinctions whispers to us through the experiences that
remain to be barely within our grasp, and the integrity of another
culture or time in history is invariably recovered by virtue of the
extractions we must make from the memory of our own unusual exper-
iences. Since both the historical and the strange personal experience
strike at the heart of familiar memory in a similar way, we may appeal
to the series of steps that we normally take to restore familiarity in
face of them in order to refresh our methods of investigating the
past. Instead of removing subjectivity from the path of investiga-
tion, therefore, we must consider how the past is already subjective;
how it involves a movement of reflection that causes different pasts
to measure one another, to determine the mnemonic terrain that is to
be strange or familiar.
Methodologically, we may erase the forgetf ul 1 ness and the
arbitrary divisions within the present mnemonic pattern if we allow
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the voice of strange hidden experiences that calls through all of the
pasts to be heard. That voice expresses terms of being that cannot be
located in our time and familiarity with ease. It expresses a unity
between the private and the distant past, between subjective and
historical memory, as it reminds them of experiences which cannot be
assimilated to present sensibilities. It redivides the past and
refreshes its distinctions as it revives the strangers within our
memory. Here a childhood evocation that once powerfully affected
Adorno is indicative:
One evening, in a mood of hopeless sadness I caught myself
using a ridiculously wrong subjunctive form of a verb that
was itself not entirely correct German, being part of a
dialect of my native town. I had not heard, let along used
the endearing misconstruction since my first years at
school. Melancholy, drawing me irresistably into the abyss
of childhood, awakened this old, impotently yearning sound
in its depths. Language sent back to me like an echo the
humiliation which unhappiness had inflicted on me in for-
getting what I am. [35]
In this meditation Adorno has regained his painful sense of
identity by a process that starkly differentiates his present from the
past, and consequently the past has also been awakened "in its
depths." The past and present identity have each been restored in a
confrontation that involves three steps: a depleted present identity
moves to confront a distant past -- it struggles with, and seems to
immerse itself in the distinctiveness of that past -- and it extracts
itself again with a refreshed sense of its being. Like the theatrical
device of dimming a center spotlight at the same time that a backdrop
is illuminated from within, the past and present receive alternating
emphasis. The purposive sequential order that the past and present
have obtained in identity is momentarily exhausted as they negate one
another, and they are revealed as the elements of a dialectic within
memory that restores and redesigns identity.
As the past and present are reclaimed in this sort of interaction
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they acquire new boundaries that violate their own currently accept-
able divisions, and now they also acquire a new content. Since this
highly reflexive pursuit of the peculiarities of experience moves us
through our own subjectivity toward the past, it becomes particularly
attentive to those aspects of experience that we consider to be most
subjective, especially those of fantasy and desire. This is because
the utter distinction, "finitude" and strangeness which first mark the
integrity of the past are really captured in the moods, atmospheres
and subjective passions of that time. As we know it in our own
subjective experience we may discover the particular constraints upon
desire in another subjectivity. Thus, in a sense, we may enlarge our
reflections on the past through the most subjective considerations.
Says Ricoeur for example,
...it is only by interpreting the signs of desire that one
can recapture in reflection the emergence of desire an thus
enlarge reflection to the point that it regains what had
been lost. [36]
More pointedly, in all of our inquiries into the past we may
partake in a subjective reflection that enumerates Us_ own elements
and interests, and develops categories of analysis out of them. But
this pursuit of mnemic integrity never fully objectifies those
categories or abstracts them from a reflexive context for the purposes
of anlaysis. Indeed, the present possessive attitude of memory is
best rebuked in the acknowledgement of the possessive desires of
another time measured against our own, and not only by formal criteria
of interpretation. Thus, when we turn to another cultural context now
or in the past, we may do well to accept Foucault's warning against
applying universals and imputing hidden motivations. However, we must
also seek a limited rapprochement with the force of desires, fantasies
and associations circuitously expressed in the subjective integrity of
that time or place.
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Now we should be inclined to take several steps in analysis to
approach the integrity of events and to stake our claim for a new
understanding of accuracy. First we approach the finitude and
exteriority of something past, its rarefied epistemic order as
Foucault has done. Secondly, we acknowledge, if not assess, the
mnemonic and psychological dimensions interior to those events', not
necessarily those which are unconscious, but those which may be
corroborated in the unexpressed milieu of mnemonic associations that
survive as artifacts beyond that context. Thirdly, we need the
insight that may accompany a contextual immersion that is different
from either objective or empathetic approaches to another time and
place, since it generates a reflective comparison between our own
selective memory and another as if we were engaged in deep conversa-
tion with the other. Fourthly, general or universal categories of
analysis will be broached differently, more reluctantly, as they are
measured against the distinctive content and mnemonic order of two
contexts.
As pscyhoanalysis has taught in another way, the power that our
memories have over us cannot be lessened as effectively by denial as
it can by facing their strange and threatening content. So it is too
that in social analysis our methods should be sensitive to the
comparable force of shared memories that is often missed when we apply
general categories of analysis. There are many surfaces to the
objects of social inquiry and they reflect their own memories as well
as those we bring to them, and when we approach them all at once we
will credit the great variety of experience and the validity of many
points of view. This approach is initial 1y relativistic, although it
does not seek to establish the equality of all points of view or of
all objects of inquiry in the end. Instead, it seeks to challenge
itself by including many points of view in strategic areas of concern.
It admittedly researches the "family," the "state," the "individual"
or "history" itself because they are troubled aspects of our identity
today, and because they have pasts which have become especially
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knotted within our current selective memory. Far from being
relativistic, the approach would unveil the distinctiveness of those
pasts and immerse itself within them to confront its own impulse to
restore a simple comforting sense of them. The approach risks a
disturbing uncertainty for a time and accepts the strange feeling of
disorientation in order to cleanse the mnemic palate, and only then
can it move beneath the surfaces that seem so fixed.
Memory is not a going back, but a bringing forward. The
integrity of the past experience that we would pursue is therefore a
mnerrnc relation that is aware of itself
. Thus, no matter how
sensitive the historian is, or the anthropologist or psychologist, not
one of them can fully immerse themselves in a bygone context, and none
of them can wholly enter an unfamiliar context while remaining con-
scious in the modern sense of consciousness with its detached observ-
ing self. They invariably carry their own selective memory with them.
And yet, with an effort, they may expand the terms of that selectivity
by allowing the most startling attributes of the past to stand in
relief and to exert the potent force of their different orientations.
Hence, if we cannot project ourselves into the past -- and that sense
of hovering above former scenes as if we had travelled in time is only
a wishful illusion arising from memory which needs to be challenged --
we may still recognize a different self coming to us by way of the
past. For this reason, social criticism has something special at
stake in the effort to be "historical" when the consideration of
memory tests the imposition of present categories upon the past,
against the strange categorizations belonging to the past itself. A
different self and a different history are revealed in the light of
those contrasting patterns of memory that may allow us to regain a
sense of ourselves. In this connection, too, we might discover a
special relevance to Adorno's mysterious comment that the, "retention
37
of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement."
In this reflective approach to the past, however, a sense of
peculiarity gives way to particularity as we look beneath general
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categories to the special memories of each circumstance and meaning.
Here a source of critical and historical insight will be found at the
edge of people's memories, as a grand sense of the "forces of history"
is tempered at every turn by encounters with the details of particular
experiences that make them strange or unique. This way, for example,
the analysis of the worker entering the factory might reveal certain
predominant "forces" operating in capitalism, 38 but those forces would
always be recalled again in terms of the content from which they are
extracted -- restored, as it were, to the mnemonic material which the
analysis of forces would prefer to reveal as being mere "appearances."
As well, this analysis would recall the clatter of machinery, clocks,
lights, scents and meaningful evocations that were expressed in the
fixations surrounding the experience, in the revelations that also
make it substantial, as well as those that were quite evidently
alienated from experience and memory. It would evoke comparisons of
that experience with one's own, and the difference in time and content
would disclose the numerous determinations in the cultural mnemonics
of one historical moment. The predominent "fetishism" of one society
would only be revealed as it is tested against the background of all
manner of fetishes so as to discover its inner workings where the
orderly operations of memory harden the reality of so many appear-
ances. Although materialist historicism would not be stood back on
its head, it would be turned inside out for at least a moment so that
it may be restored to a consideration of the details of experience
that do comprise a way of life, and in the hope of discovering
39
elements of sufficient subtlety to reconstruct a way of life.
We are therefore concerned with a distinctive accuracy that is
made real for us on empirical grounds and by the confirmations of a
self-aware memory. As every present is composed of different pasts it
is as if we have a series of telescopes aimed toward a panorama of
memories that have been made presentable by various means. Each is
focused differently, some by means of experience, and some by
agreeable hearsay; some are clear and others are blurred or reversed
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as if to shrink their image. Some we move and others are held in
place by convention in what I have called the distortion of emphasis.
A precise sense of what is "we" and "they," "self" and "other," near
or far, is set in those reductions and magnifictaions, and things are
recalled in collective imagery that makes them familiar or strange.
Now the critic may detect these patterns with a historical eye to
their mnemonic integrity so that they may be unraveled, and the most
subtle aspects of their power revealed. As critics focus upon this
composition of the familiar world, it should become clear why the
works that have flowed from Marxism have not explained the role of
"consciousness" in history, and subsequently why they have not
explained how the educators will educate themselves. 40 That self-
educating may make reference to a historical theory, but it must also
be continually informed by a confrontation with the limits of the
educators' own memory that dares them to move the telescopes of
retrospective understanding. As Adorno once put it, "Thought waits to
be woken one day by the memory of what has been missed and to be
41
transformed into teaching."
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CHAPTER IX
REPRESSION AND THE SELECTIVE MEMORY:
FROM THE DISTINCTION OF CHILDHOOD TO THE STRATEGIES OF DEFENSE
If we were primarily concerned to map the regions of modern
memory, we might now move on from history to the realm of childhood
that has come to be so important in this age of history and nostalgia.
But of course, it is not just another piece of the map that is at
issue and we should look instead for the complex standards and
processes that have made our youth appear to have a place of its own
among the visions of the past. As we have noted in the reflections of
Halbwachs and Adorno in the last chapter, the demarcation of personal
memory is already a highly selective process that entwines one's own
experience with a sense of history. The historical cyclorama casts
complex shadows over our memories of childhood, just as the events of
our youth may infect the atmospheres of historical scenes in such a
way that the study of an ancient urn might evoke the wonderment of a
childhood discovery or a childish excitement might have provoked our
interest in the artifact in the first place. Yet we tend to believe
that we have sorted out this confusion when we recall the urn as
something historical, precisely because we have applied special
standards of selective memory over and above historical knowledge, and
beyond those private criteria that work through psychological
repressi on
.
Once more, that is, the regions of memory that appear to be
distinct are united in the standards that they share. While the
mutual exclusion of "my past" and the "historical past" is vital to a
Western orientation, it appears that the criteria which are applied to
exclude certain considerations from historical study are also the
hardened standards of general adult reminiscence. So it is not
entirely a coincidence that the 'attitude' of the historian is often
oddly like that of a punitive parent where common standards bridge
-440-
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their separate domains of memory. For the same reason, it seems quite
natural for us and not confused when historical study seems to punish
the 'irrational' tantrums of certain pasts, banishing them to their
own special place as if they had committed some childish blunder and
were sent to their room. Then it might seem to be equally reasonable
when self-righteous adults treat the behavior of children - and
recall the strange experiences of their own youth - as something
'barbaric' or 'primative' which they would exclude from the preferred
recollections of childhood as if they might belatedly instruct their
private repressions in the ways of "civilization."
The civilized adult excludes aberrant memories on the basis of
standards gleaned from all the divisions of the past. Therefore it is
one and the same function of memory that selectively distances similar
aspects of the social and the personal past to make them seem dim and
dreamlike. Those aspects are pressed to the outer reaches of
acceptable, familiar memory, and as a unified set of criteria is
hardened to the task of distancing them it is not necessary that they
be repressed or entirely forgotten. Significantly, the item that is
so excluded from favored memory is not made unconscious by the
processes that psychoanalysis describes. Rather, we will find that
this selectivity operates at a more nearly conscious level of mind and
according to principles that are often shared and articulable. For
that reason the experiences which seem odd or merely hazy and distant
to us, may deserve a special reconsideration even though they are not
repressed -- and just as recalling the memories that are repressed has
an important bearing on the present it may also be important to
reflect upon those memories which only seem to be strange and distant.
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Section I
The Strange Integrity of Childhood in Reminiscence*
Of course, the memory of many disturbing childhood experiences is
subject to the direct censorship of repressions that are personal and
idiosyncratic, but even those repressions may be instructed by a
curriculum of adult relevancies and meanings. Each repressive turn of
mind that accompanies sanity is refined and propped up. by the culti-
vated acquisitions of the well adjusted adult looking backward through
time. For that reason, adults will rarely recall the ill formed
behaviors of their own childhood just as they were, and the punish-
ments that they once received to correct those behaviors have now
become a punitive condition of their own selective memory which dims
that recollection. Eating with the hands, slouching, not knowing the
words, spitting up and scraping heels are not impressions that are
generally retained in our own self-images and they remain in memory as
archaic embarrassments. For this reason autobiographers tend to
regard their childhood selves as little men and little women giving
them an exaggerated sophistication of language which admits with
amusement, while secretly denying, the aspects of their own immatur-
ity. In the interest of adult propriety we reject such memories or
only vaguely recall them when we encounter the children of the
present, and the subversive awkwardness of our childish minds and
bodies is kept behind us. With the same sort of verbal nicety that
historical study applies to our roots in barbarism, adult refinements
cultivate a selective store of memories and those awkward childhood
experiences that have not been repressed, have nevertheless been
*While I am aware that the distinction of a phase of life called
"childhood" is said to be a rather modern invention, I am using the
term to display general differences between early experience and that
of maturity in order to discuss how the former has acquired a special
historical status within memory.
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disregarded and have fallen to the side of our awareness.
Now, even when we take notice of the strange experiences that do
survive in conscious memory but remain so different from the exper-
iences of mature life, we are still likely to search within them for
the elements that seem most familiar. We may often strive to
repossess the strange bits of our lives and change them all at once.
Often very rapidly, and by a process that is more concentrated and
deliberate than repression, we transform the most quizzical elements
of the past, filling them with present knowledge and acceptable
attributes. Sometimes with fear, and sometimes with humor, we
selectively address them as if to apply the kind of hindsight which
says, "Oh, I must have felt this way about that," and if we never
play in a certain sand pile again or remember it just as it was, it is
not for reasons of repression, but because of a reaccl imati on of mem-
ory that cannot now accomodate the childhood mood of such a place.
If we could really grasp that infantile experience it would
certainly strain our minds more than the most advanced philosophical
cognitions, and our adult mnemonic order must sternly resist all
efforts in that direction. So it is that even when we dream of a
scene from childhood we most often return to it as our adult selves,
or with our adult selves watching as if to play the part of superego
to our past, reacting, and monitoring each step of the return. Beyond
the host of private repressions that we may apply, we are seldom, if
ever, ourselves as_ children in the dream and least of all when we
recall it in a wakeful state. Conversely, in those rare moments when
we are most nearly able to recall the actual events of childhood as we
felt them in their own time, we are likely to recall them as if they
were a dream, in the haze of sweetness or terror that we now attribute
to childhood. However, at the same time that we find those memories
to possess the estranged distance that we commonly find in the recol-
lection of dreams, they are still just barely within the reach of
memory and we may sometimes appeal to them as a source of salvation
444
which revives a different life that we have lived and awakens the
memories of childhood from that same mystification as if they might
become a revolutionary force within ourselves.
Insofar as the past of childhood holds that radical promise of
dreams, it is important to discover how the remembrance of dreams and
ultimately of the dreamlike quality of certain childhood memories has
been contained. In that vein it is most significant that Freud
originally discerned two distinct contributing factors in the
forgetting of dreams which also pertain to the difficulty in recalling
childhood experiences, and it is even more significant that he chose
to concentrate on only one of them. On the one hand, the dynamics
that he analyzed revealed that the peculiarities of dreams might be
repressed when the specific contents that they held in memory were
repugnant to the conscious self. Yet on the other hand, as he
suggests in passing, it is also the alien quality of the sleeping
states themselves that induces forgetful ness
. Certainly, in repres-
sion it was the specific content of the dream thought that prompted
forgetting, but this was only the central motive. The loss to memory
depended more upon this "resistance [to the dream thought] than on the
mutually alien characters of the waking and sleeping states," 1 but
still the estrangement of those two states of mind was determined to
be a factor in forgetting as it is also, evidently, a dominant
division in the structure of memory overall.
Schachtel is one of several who have given greater emphasis than
Freud to the importance of this qualitative difference between the
mental states. As he comments,
...resistance is operative in the awake person, not only
against the dream thought but against the whole quality and
language of the dream, a resistance, to be sure of somewhat
different character, yet fundamentally related to that which
represses and censors those dream thoughts which are intol-
erable to consciousness. [2]
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For him, the dream, like the occasional odd childhood experience that
may be fully recalled, is by its very nature a violation of the
conventionalized "memory schemata" of the Western adult. Insofar as
those general criteria are at work to affect the quality of mental
states he says, "dream amnesia and childhood amnesia are due to
related causes." 3 However, if the causes of these amnesias arise in
the difference between mental states and not only in the discomfort
associated to the specific content that has been recalled, then we
must press on further to understand what that qualitative difference
in mentalities might entail. We must inquire further into the adult
standards of culture that seem to establish which qualities of
childhood and dreams are to be systematically forgotten, forgotten by
the banishment of certain characteristics of difference and distance
in memory that are effected by functions other than those we associate
with repression.
To a certain extent, that is, our exacting ability to forget is
augmented by a sense of the distinction between the many worlds of a
divided memory and not only by repressive processes. Dreaming and
wakefulness are sundered in our recollections by one virtually
'contextual' displacement, while childhood and maturity are divided by
another, and the exclusive regions of memory discussed in Chapter VII,
each seem to acquire a special style of thinking all their own. So it
is also true on a more minor scale that every topical field of memory
every kind of thing we pursue in its associations -- is able to
hold our attention as it constitutes a mentality of the moment that
finds others to be incompatabl e. When we concentrate on a mathe-
matical task for example, it is usually difficult to recall faces at
the same time, easier to recall music, disruptive to envision abstract
paintings, and so on. While we might repress sexual thoughts in those
moments of concentration, there are other impressions that loom
closer, and which we more casually dismiss from the possessive field
of memories at hand. It is partly because we have acquired such
qualitative adult distinctions among the fields of our memory, and
446
especially once they have been given a hierarchy of attributes, that
we find it so difficult to recall an infantile experience'. As
Halbwachs reminds us, it is extremely difficult to find, "remembrances
that take us back to a time when our sensations reflected only
external objects, when we hadn't introduced images or thoughts
connected with men and groups around us..." 4
In this way the distinctive world of the child seems to have the
especially well kept boundaries of particular physical surroundings
and very limited groups of belonging which are radically unlike those
of adults for Halbwachs, and it is only by the most jarring shift of
experience that such a world is ever expanded. In his words,
At the time a child becomes lost in a forest or a house he
is immersed only in the current of thoughts and feelings
attaching him to the family. As events proceed he gets
caught in another current that remove him from it. [5]
In Halbwach's view, unavoidable tides seem to push the child forward
in development as they press outward toward the "nonf ami 1 i al " adult
world by a series of painful initiations that utterly transform the
distinctive mentalities of the child. But something else occurs in
the process that he does not discuss. As the difference between the
world of the child and the world of the adult seems to be foisted upon
the child, it is also preserved in the memory of the developing young
adult. The harsh currents of experience that have moved the child out
from the familial context carry a set of rules with them which the
child must reapply in a series of exclusions that pave the way to
adulthood.
Whereas the world of the child seems lost to the adults who have
acquired the complicated baggage that informs their understanding, and
to recall those early experiences would seem to mean the revival of a
unique time that has completely ended, it is precisely because some
vague memory of childhood is preserved that we are able to distinguish
ourselves as adults. Thus, if Freud understated the distinction
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between these two worlds, many, like Halbwachs, make it too absolute.
Instead it is the record of our escape from childhood contexts that
provides the skeletal standards for our wakeful, adult state of mind.
In this regard it appears that cognitive development proceeds as if
one mentality and its referential context overwhelms another, and then
another, while each is preserved as the ground on which the next will
distinguish itself. In this way the adult standards of thinking which
appear to be exlusive are secretly inclusive, and the very fact of the
child's development depends upon specialized means of keeping much
that has also been superceded. As the child matures and struggles
against the mentalities that have previously been experienced, he or
she appears to forget them, but in fact they are not forgotten so much
as they are estranged. Indeed, the special quality of pastness that
we attach to that different childish world in perceiving it to be
outside of us and gone forever, is not something that is 'true' about
childhood and it is not something that repression does, but it is
something that memory applies as it learns the rules of estrangement
that come to preserve adult mentalities. We are adults by virtue of
the memories which we do keep of our childhood experiences as being
strange
.
More precisely, our development into mature beings may depend
upon the repression and absolute forgetting of certain experiences but
it also proceeds by referring to those experiences that we do_ recall
as being threatening, peculiar or somehow unworthy of our adult
selves. It depends upon our own hazy ability to distinguish the
changing world of memory that we have partially shed. Hence, when we
are humiliated by our childish impulses, the humiliation resides in a
subtle characterization of difference that has been attached to
attending memories of childhood and we remember them with humiliation
as something "childish," "naive," "naughty," or "innocent." Such
qualifications instruct us in the ways to be adult almost as if they
could alter the tone of voice that expresses the prohibitions of the
superego, and the distinctive nuances that we come to attribute to
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such memories provide the negative background of our adult self-
esteem. But rather than being condensed, displaced and distorted
under the rule of repression as Freud explained it, the subtle change
in the character of memories that accompanies the alienation of mental
states leaves them more nearly intact and within the reach of our
memory. Thus, in the daydreams and quiet thoughts that accompany our
everyday activities and continually reestablish our adult identity, we
refer to a set of accessible memories that instruct us and evoke less
dramatic emotional states than those involving repression.
When we are uncomfortable about making a childish gesture, or
when we judge ourselves to be confused and pathetic in a way that we
should have outgrown, complex criteria instruct us by virtue of a
feeling of uneasiness that has a more modest emotional charge than a
neurotic compulsion and less precision than a lesson in manners. When
we can_ remember a childhood trauma the mood of that memory is often
one of embarrassment that evokes our earliest vulnerabilities. Under
the tutelage of that embarrassment we shy from what was once frighten-
ing and tint its memory, just as we might laugh at our cruelest
childhood behavior, or even be shamed into being adult by the
moralizing effect of that same embarrassment as it becomes a means of
self-reproach. We might remember childhood events with a discon-
certing sense of their irrelevance now, as they tend to come to us in
incongruous memories. We might view them with a sense of our own past
inadequacy, and in the same breath we may mentally reconstruct a more
advanced sense of ourselves that might cope with them better now. For
that reason we ought to consider how we lend a selective cast to those
things that we do remember, why we remember them, and not only why we
repress them.
In this consideration, even the most innocent characterizations
of childhood that inform its recollection should also make us
suspicious, and we should wonder how even these may become pawns to
the selective memory of adulthood. Indeed, it is with devious
subtlety that those experiences of childhood which we are able to
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remember are only endowed with a modified and tolerable hint of
strangeness, a uniform and acceptable distinction which does not often
allow them to be as unique as they might be. Conveniently, by this
means, we do not need to repress an experience when we can repossess
its threatening peculiarity and convert its disruptive difference into
something sel f
-aff i rmi ng
.
just as the use of odd and startling images
in the classical memory arts served to sharpen a memory and
paradoxically, to make it familiar, 6 this cautious estrangement of
one's own experience becomes a vital means of mnemonic adjustment from
childhood onward. The embarrassment of a reminder of childhood goads
us on in partial recollections of former activities without addressing
them in their more radical distinction - so it measures me against
the part of myself that is not quite myself, though not fully
distinguished as a former self.
As it is swept up in the process of maturation, memory tricks the
true differentiations among experiences into collaborating. It turns
their genuine incongruity into a tool of its own order in the same way
that it secretly includes many of the most threatening peculiarities
of the past. Just as the perception of estrangement in memory works
to affirm the familiar world, the whole category of adulthood depends
upon a modified retention of alien childhood mentalities. The really
profound sense of bewilderment that struck us as children when we
encountered certain new circumstances is kept within memory at a
manageable distance. Such memories are not quite repressed, although
the provocati veness is drained out of them as they are consigned to
the miasma of vague and inappropriate pasts where they can be seen but
not heard. At that distance where we construct the subtle oppositions
of youth that affirm adult identity, childhood becomes purposeful and
hence unreal in a way that encourages us to develop elaborate
mythologies concerning the child. While the content of our early
memories is affected by repression it is also subject to the series of
self-estrangements that begins to divide our accessible memories into
different worlds almost from the start. Ultimately, adult selective
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memory descends upon childhood, obliterating its most wondrous
distinctions while making others its own.
The Adult Language of Psychoanalysis
With appreciation for the way that adult memory comes to possess
childhood we must even be suspicious of the adult point of view of
psychoanalysis. For all of its concern for the distinctive mental
life of the child complete with its many horrors, psychoanalysis leads
to the assimilation of that experience to the process of mature
reflection in other ways. Freud was probably more aware than anyone
of the differences between the adult recollection of early events and
the childhood sense of them, but for his strategic purposes it was not
always crucial to maintain the distinction between the two so
vigilantly. Psychoanalytic treatment does rely heavily upon the
revival of intact childhood memories and it may take years of analysis
to recapture their initial force, but then particular and exacting
memories are called forward as a means of applying their revived force
to the task of undoing the specific repressions that have accumulated
into the present. As the psychoanalytic process utilizes those
memories to undo a repressive aspect of the present it is primarily
concerned with childhood incidents as they are a motive force within
the present, and it is not interested in restoring them for their own
sake or with any special reverence for the past.*
*The relationship of adult attitudes and clinical language to the
experiences of childhood has changed with recent developments in psy-
choanalysis. Heinz Kohut, for one, was compelled to set aside the
expectations of a "health and maturity morality" to focus upon the
reconstituti on of early experience in order to "remobilize" it. The
language of object relations theory and of Kohut 's "sel fobjects" may
provide a somewhat different, lingering access to the integrity of
childhood experiences with beneficial results that deserves further
consideration in this regard. See Heinz Kohut and Ernest S. Wolf,
"The Two Analyses of Mr. Z," International Journal of Psycho-Analysi
s
(1977) 60, pp. 12-13.
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In several respects the strategies of psychoanalysis cannot help
but make childhood into another, if less restricted, ward of present
adulthood. In the course of therapy, the repressive thinking of the
adult must be confronted with the force of certain specific memories.
Not only are the boundaries of that individual ego to be expanded, but
to an extent, the whole category of childhood experience must gain
credence for the patient in such a way that the prejudices of
adulthood are themselves broadened to receive the affective force of
those formative experiences. A therapeutic revelation is only
possible when the usual prejudices of adulthood have loosened their
grip, and yet the adult mentality may only be modestly expanded for
that purpose and it is seldom confronted in its entirety. Indeed the
psychoanalytic revelation releases obstructions to memory as it
becomes much more than a memory. The revelation enforces a perspec-
tive that would place us at the juncture between original formative
events and the repressions and fantasies applied to them thereafter,
it inclines us to view both in a greater awareness that is ultimately
obliged to the present and to adulthood. In this way the analytic
interest in childhood memories focuses upon their usefulness in
undoing the idiosyncratic repressions of one adult but it stops short
confronting the prejudiced orientation of adults in general. It
strategically restores particular memories, and from them it fashions
its own perspective and a special selective memory that might counter
the effects of repression, but that is a selective memory neverthe-
less, which is still a guardian of narrowly conceived adult interests.
The theoretical language of pscyhoanalysi s has its own place in
maintaining the strategic efficacy of this perspective. On the one
hand, Freud's most profound critical insights came to him in reflec-
tions upon his own early experiences in their integrity, but on the
other hand, they only became viable insights into adult experience by
way of a secondary adult vocabulary. In his original "seduction
theory" as we are often reminded, Freud first claimed that adult
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patients suffered from the memory of the early sexual molestations of
their parents. Later, and with a fuller appreciation of the desires
and awarenesses of the child as they were experienced at the time, he
concluded that it was not the memory of sexual incidents that plagued
his patients, but that of fantasies of parental seduction which they
had engineered themselves. In memory, as at times in their own
childhood, they were unable to distinguish actuality from fantasy and
the memory of a fantasy was every bit as traumatizing as the actual
event might have been. 7 Freud had gleaned this much by taking an
extraordinary step in self-analysis, having allowed himself to revive
the painful memory of his own seduction fantasies, and having granted
the formidable reality of childhood fantasy and desire themselves
without adult embellishments. Paradoxically, however, he had to
communicate the import of that experience in a language that would
both awaken the early wish or fantasy and penetrate adult awareness
with the sense of it as something real, something factual.
The adult terminology that Freud manufactured for this purpose
would ultimately succeed because it straddled the worlds of fantasy
and science so ingeniously, taunting both with their similarities by
the use of names drawn from myth, and generating new myths to secure
the sense of hitherto outrageous meanings. This was necessary because
analysis could not succeed merely by acknowledging the sexuality and
fantasies of the child, it had to legitimize them and to place them on
a par with the efficacies of adult sexuality. The very language of
the theory had to reinflate the experiences of childhood so that they
might stand up to the experiences of the adult, or address the latter
at their own level. So it was that Freud sought to persuade adults of
the distant roots of their predicament with the adult language of
sexuality, of "seduction," "rivalry" and "pleasure" or "lust," because
only the existing adult phrases could reveal and also penetrate the
connection between infantile traumas and the repressions that survived
them into adulthood. Such terms would approach the matter from the
attitude of the adult while rebuking that attitude at the same time,
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and with them, Freud could indicate that the childhood passions were
more than analogous to adult sexuality, for indeed they were its point
of origination and still its current foundation. While the termin-
ology shrank the distance between the experiences of child and adult,
it also used the disturbing attributes of adult sexuality to disclose
a difference between them; to cut the veil of innocence that adults
would cast over their youth to draw it even closer.
Here of course, and at the core of Freud's "analogical method"
there is a necessary distortion. The experiences of childhood and
adulthood are drawn too close together and in certain respects the
most peculiar aspects of early experience are made acceptable in the
same breath that places them on a level with adult experience. In
having been made suitable to that level of mature understanding, it is
not the sexuality of those experiences, but the adult quality of
infantile sexuality that shocks the psychoanalytic patient into new
awarenesses. A new mnemic relationship between the adult and his or
her childhood is prodded by those shocks which gives the adult ego a
greater hegemony within childhood memories. In posing such a
challenge however, the psychonalyti c language of repression makes more
bridges to the unconscious infantile world than it can sustain because
it arouses still another set of memories of childhood experience. It
reminds us of experiences that are not repressed, which are dimly
memorable and seem even more distant and beyond reach than certain
infantile passions. Where it alludes to a childhood sexuality, it
also reminds us of the strangely different mentalities we once
possessed that better reflect the great distance between childhood
experience and adult memory and might better serve as its measure.
Since we are able to recall a few of our most powerful infantile
desires and we do have an occasional truthful glimmer of a distinctive
early experience, we know that repression has not denied us access to
it all. If we pause to reflect, we also know that such experience is
so utterly unlike our adult experience that even a theory of repres-
sion as it is touted in contemporary middle class society may provide
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us with too easy access to it. All adult parlance, including that of
psychoanalysis, deprives us of the awareness of that distinction in
the end, and even the most penetrating language of analysis neces-
sarily clouds the picture of what childhood experiences must really
have been like. This is quite a reasonable tack in consideration of
what the adult has made of childhood in repressions, and it is
invaluable to a process that allows the individual ego to gain sway
over repression. However, it is not quite as useful to the critical
analysis of adult experience in general, where criticism seeks to
discover the bias within that same adult ego. In other words, where
psychoanalysis is interested in curtailing the 'tyranny of the past
over the present,' its use of adult language is laudable, but a
general social critique must be even more concerned to limit the
tyranny of the present over the past, and it must select its terms
accordingly.
We should therefore give special attention to the portions of
psychoanalytic work that momentarily recall the unique mentalities of
the child, the infantile "theories" which possess their own reality as
they are applied, for example, to a distinctly youthful sexuality. As
Anna Freud reminds us in this vein,
We have only to think how the infantile sexual investigation
which psychoanalysis regards as the clearest manifestation
of the child's intellectual activity, hardly ever leads to a
knowledge of the true facts of adult sexual life. As a rule
they result in the construction of infantile sexual theo-
ries, which do not represent the reality, but reflect the
instinctual processes in the mind of the childish
observer. [8]
That is, in spite of the facts which are not yet known, the child has
developed an entire theoretical landscape concerning sexuality and
while many aspects of his or her experience will come to be repressed,
that landscape as a whole is more likely to be ridiculed and drawn out
of the limelight of memory and therefore outmoded. On this margin of
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exlusion that very nearly involves judgement, psychoanalysis occasion-
ally provides us with a profound sense of contrasting experience that
may not be therapeutically useful, but still leads to other insights
as it rediscovers the distant experiences that secretly illuminate our
fixed adult meanings from within.
In the pursuit of this we must direct our attention to a
different subject matter than the dreams of sleep, and to different
clues than slips of the tongue, and the peculiar condensations of
self-expression. As adults it is quite common for us to catch the
scent of strange childhood memories in quiet musings that deserve
renewed attention, and to make self-conscious corrections within them
according to what we now know to be true. Embarrassment motivates
this process of interpolation that is not a simple imposition of adult
biases, but an application of standards that have been cut from the
implicit comparisons of past and present mentalities. It is not that
we have "repressed" the childhood experience in such cases or that we
have recalled it only in the repressive condition of adulthood.
Rather, a conceptual scheme of childhood has been discarded as it is
found to be lacking in a comparative moment that is neither subject to
the rule of repression nor entirely unconscious.
In this way the memories of our childhood sexual understanding
may often flicker in our awareness only to be edited by a system of
judgements that enlist quite conscious operations that now deserve our
attention. Whether we view them as being "childish," "amusing," or
euphemistically, perhaps, as the manifestations of "instinctual
process," we have detached ourselves from those experiences by means
of an adult selective memory. The latter is easier to apply than
repression, and a feeling of embarrassment is its most likely
accompaniment. So in the interest of continuity and orientation, we
deny* the fact that we have led other lives and a vital portion of
identity is at stake in the course of discovering those distinct
worlds of experience. Thus, it is also true that we might obtain a
greater degree of choice if we made the implicit comparisons of the
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worlds of our experience explicit and question the standards that
generally arise from them to preserve the selective memory of
adulthood. For this reason, as critics we must offer the same
protection to the distinctiveness of childhood that we would give to
historical experiences in pursuing their integrity.
One means of assuring that distinctiveness might be to proceed
along the investigative path that Foucault has chosen, to dispense
with a theory of repression altogether in order to focus upon the
surface of things within an entire "regime of discourses" where power
has marked them as being unique. If Freud had rendered the pecul-
iarities of childhood accessible to adult experience in certain
uniform expressions that would hold for the history of civilization
overall, something is to be gained by the radical distinction of
historical periods that Foucault insists upon as it was introduced in
the previous chapter. He argues, for example, that the entire pattern
of sexuality in children had shifted by the seventeenth century, not
because it was repressed, but because it was then expressed differ-
ently and even more frequently:
...the boisterous laughter that had accompanied the pre-
cocious sexuality of children for so long -- and in all
social classes, it seems -- was gradually stifled. But this
was not a plain and simple imposition of silence. Rather it
was a new regime of discourses. Not any less was said about
it; on the contrary. [9]
In fact it would seem that where Foucault is concerned with the
expression of sexuality as a manifestation of a power and not its
repression, and where he is so much concerned to reveal the dis-
tinctive "surfaces" of those expressions, he might lead us beyond
Freud where he had failed to account for differences in historical
context that determine changing conceptions of childhood. The method
ought to take us beyond attempts to ' historicize' Freud as well, for
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now it seems that in fairness to the peculiar experiences of the
child, they might also be examined as unique artifacts, and at least
where childhood can be recalled, it represents another past that is
worthy of such a careful "archaeology."
Nevertheless, a problem arises in doing this for the theorist who
is schooled in structuralism and prefers to observe the expressive
patterns that have been dispossessed of subjectivity. He is so much
concerned with those expressive surfaces that only a limited field of
the memorable experience which is not expressed may be uncovered in
them. What he calls the "unspoken" is only considered as it pertains
to the accountable shape of power and not only does he discount the
strata of repressed experiences, but also those of a childhood which
might have been variously recalled at the time in question. In
distinguishing the uniformities of power in one historical period as
they overwhelm subjective experience, Foucault neglects the uniqueness
of the pasts which are locked within the same period and the elaborate
mnemic means of drawing them within its order. As he represents the
historical sexuality of children as being particular to its expression
in each era he offers a vital contraposition to Freud's account of
repression. But if Freud offers an articifical consistancy to such a
history and ultimately subjects childhood to the adult expressions of
psychoanalysis, Foucault also presents us with an artificial unity of
the subject as he subsumes the experiences of child and adult within
the historical flow of "power."
Foucault does not carry the same extreme resistance that he
applies to the historical theories which impose continuity upon the
flow of events over into his own consideration of the stages of
personal experience. To do so would lead him away from his surfaces
to a more thorough consideration of the "unspoken" and back toward a
notion of repression -- a notion of a self divided between youth and
maturity at the very least. By extension, however, Foucault's own
theory might lead us to consider the peculiar mnemonic means of
uniting and distinguishing the experiences of child and adult as they
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were applied in different historical periods. It might take us beyond
those which Freud has considered to an even more precisely divided
historical understanding of youth than Schachtel has proposed.
Consequently, we might reconsider one of Foucault's most poignant
observations. He offers the example of a "simple-minded" man in 1867
who, "obtained a few caresses from a little girl," was subsequently
arrested, and subjected to the broad new set of judicial and medical
interventions that comprised the latest social power. Foucault refers
to this supposedly common practice as having been a pursuit of,
"inconsequential bucolic pleasures," in order to display the fact that
the enjoyment of such pleasures had met an abrupt historical ending in
that harsh new series of examinations and confinements. 10 Excessive
though the public response to this activity may have been, however, it
could only seem innocent and inconsequential if the worlds of the
child and of this man had really ever shared a common unified realm of
meaning beneath, or before the encroaching machinery of the new power
that Foucault describes. If there were ever such a unique time in
history in which one might have found that sort of encounter to be
"inconsequential," one would need to have regarded childhood and adult
experience as something unified. And in order to look back upon it
now as something "inconsequential," we would have to suppose that
there is never a barrier of repression that separates adult experience
from childhood experience in general.
However, if we proceed to twist Foucault's own point of view back
on itself, we might find that supposed unity of experience to be
suspicious. That is, if we apply his thinking in another way, we
might suppose that even though the sexuality of child and adult were
both expressed in the same homogenizing channels of power, the nature
of those expressions were still likely to have been very much
different for each since power is not distributed evenly in its effect
upon everyone. So the difference in the mentalities of child and
adult as we have been discussing them, and that curious propensity of
adults to forget their early years that Freud noted, 11 may also be
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considered as quite different expressions of power. Most notably, the
enduring power of adults over children in all historical periods makes
anything that happens between them very 'consequential,' and the
different memories accompanying their actions do not allow them to
ever share the same sexual pleasures. Unless Foucault's simple man
had suffered some impairment that left him outside of the stream of
acquired memory that leads to adulthood, he would not in any period
be able to share such 'pleasures' with a child.
In light of this we must take the view that the network of power
and discursive unity in each epoch is really subdivided according to
the different varieties of people's experience, and according to the
varying sense of themselves in the developmental sequences that they
share. The subdivision of power leads us back to a theory of the
relations that modify its expression, just as it leads back to a
notion of repression in some altered form. Now we are obliged to
consider a childhood experience with appreciation of the unique
divisions that mark it historically as the offspring of one manifesta-
tion of power; and also with respect for the more lasting divisions of
memory that provide it with its own unity and continuity and allow it
to stand in its various historical relationships to maturity.
The distinction of childhood is therefore restored by drawing
explicit comparisons between the changing worlds of reference that
psychoanalysis partially unveils in different stages of life, and
which Foucault's method might be led to acknowledge. Today for
example in the adult mnemonics of sexuality there are complete images
of sexual activities occurring in adult contexts; informed images,
which include the memory of actual events and a certain knowledge of
what goes on, for example, in the marital bedroom, that is lacking for
the child. There is biological knowledge, recollected experience of
the bodies of others, media imagery, fears of particular sorts of
rejection or of specific inadequacies, knowledge of unacceptable
activities to be avoided, explicit images of genitals in contact, and
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an entire entourage of mnemic associations to sexual activities and
their "pleasures" that would be much too disturbing to be considered
very much "fun" if they should suddenly be encountered by the
unprepared child. Much more than the recollection of the graphic
facts of sexual intercourse informs the adult and this later "sex-
uality" will not be found in children. Thus it is often really our
adult sexuality -- or our childhood sexuality as it is infused with
adult characteristics later on -- that we must repress. Childhood
sexuality is mnemically distinct from that of adults and the adult
cannot be expected to "remember" an informed sexuality in the course
of psychoanalysis or otherwise unless that memory has been infused
with later experience. But this fact does not destroy the integrity
of childhood experience by turning it into something we consider to be
just innocent playfulness. On the contrary, if we take note of the
distinctive associations of the early stages of life we will discover
that the experience of the child is perhaps even more unbounded, more
polymorphous, and sometimes more threatening than psychoanalysis
suggests, as it is generally forgotten for reasons that go beyond the
usual guilt and repression surrounding sexuality.
Insofar as we have access to a time in our lives involving
different evocations it is indicative of an almost impenetrable
distance that also characterizes the sexuality of the child. If we
recall our first childhood trip on a boat or a plane vividly and
without the selective adult knowledge that we are tempted to apply to
it now, we would recall both the events and the youthful wondering
that was inspired by so many unanswered questions as they strained our
poorly structured memories at the time. We may have wondered what
strange monstrous sea creatures swam beneath us, or how high the sky
might be, or where the engine must be hidden, and the speculative
answers that we invented may still flavor our adult travels. During
that trip the mental map that marks the divisions between the regions
of science, magic and fantasy was not complete, and for all our
immature efforts to secure an orienation the underside of things,
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the unknown creatures, and the height beyond the sky remained opaque.
Now as adults we might easily review such childish first impressions
without noticing that we are filling them in and poking windows in the
opaqueness with an adult knowledge and its informed images. Now we
know the fish and may visualize the workings and location of an
engine. We tend to recall the childhood experience as if we had then
seen all the 'cut away' graphics that later instructed us, and for
that reason we fail to grasp the extraordinary contrast posed by less
mature orientations in memory, or to see how they inspire our adult
musings, religious or scientific cosmologies. Thus our later memory
not only represses specific experience, but actively averts the
entirety of the distinctive orientations given in earlier experience
as it regards those childish constructions of memory with embar-
rassment. Now, the distinctive world of the child that Foucault's
method ought to have revealed for all of his resistance to a notion
of repression presses us to reconsider the psychoanalytic notion of
repression and to account for more of the reasons why we forget.
The Strange Paradigms of Genesis in Psychoanalysis Pose a Methodo-
logical Puzzle for the General Study of Memory
It was in order to make disparate worlds of experience meet and
to address a scientific community that Freud offered his propositions
in a "genetic explanation" that drew its cases and analogies from
natural history. It is in this presentation that the question of
accuracy, of the integrity or reality of a psychic legacy seems most
acute. While Freud's notion that childhood conflict is at the root of
most adult disturbances has met objection, it is his accounts of the
explosive paradigmatic events affecting the phylogenesis of all
humanity that are even more contestable. It is distressing when Freud
refers to the killing of the "Primal Father" as if it happened one day
1
2
in late May, or to the precipitous incidents that aroused the
fantasy of being seduced by a parent at times as if that were all that
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was necessary to account for a pattern of adult neurosis. Yet the
question of the truth of such propositions should not be settled
factually, since there is a different order of truth at stake than for
the usual matters of fact. There is a special kind of truth that is
regained in considering these "events" to be 'causal' incidents,
because in considering them that way we are compelled to come face to
face with the forces that arise from a "reality" belonging to memory
that is not precisely a reality of actual events, and it is the same
distinctive reality that we have been led to consider in the sexuality
of the child.
The reality that we must face as a causal force in these cases is
once again a "psychical reality" comprised of events and fantasies
that may originate at many different points in time. 13 The single
formative "event" may already contain the influence of previous
sibling rivalries or subsequent oedipal desires that make its
organization in time most difficult to discern. For this reason, when
psychoanalysis addresses the entire train of occurrences leading to
and following from a precipitous incident, it is addressing a reality
that is peculiar to the fluidity of psychic time. Indeed, only in
that way is it able to locate incidents in the timelessness of the
unconscious, and simultaneously restore them to the temporal sequences
that adult consciousness depends upon.
Thus, the distorted picture of origins that Freud offers is also
his genius, as it effects an instant translation of the past into the
present for his audience, and if we read him carefully those strange
analogies will produce an almost magical self-awareness within
us.* Each of Freud's mythical events is presented as if it belonged
*In The Analysis of the Self: A Systemic Approach to the Psycho-
analytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders (New York:
International Universities Press, 1971), p. 26, Heinz Kohut summarizes
a similar argument: "Harmann (1960), for example warns against abuses
in this area and refers to the logical errors which are responsible
for them as 'genetic mistake' (p. 93) [Kohut refers as well here to
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to a present reality, each is expressed in an adult modern language
that involves us in the enigma of a past that is both fanciful and
real, strangely past and ominously present. The distortion restores
the formidable impact of things that we might otherwise overlook and
it is also a counter-distortion. For this reason the very language of
the theory cuts its mental material like a scalpel. In the literature
we find fully sexual children, murdered parents, cellular pains and
pleasures, that legitimate the most arcane aspects of experience in
adult terms. However this psychic reality must be conveyed in
analogies that are treated as if they were real, precisely because
psychic reality works by analogy. Therefore when Freud portrays the
instincts as forces in the life of the single cell or in prehistoric
activities it is more than an analogy, just as it is more than the
result of the scientific research that it claims to rely upon. 14 In
these propositions, whether he meant to or not, Freud is duplicating
and simultaneously challenging the very analogical processes of memory
that are so fundamental to our understanding.
It is for this reason, in dealing with the fabrications of the
reflexive world, that psychoanalysis could not resolve itself as a
science just like the other sciences. Despite Freud's efforts to the
contrary -- or perhaps as an unconscious part of them -- the course of
events described in the literature retains the mythical quality of the
names that he gave to it. In each event that is described by this
science of the mind, the relationship between cause and effect that
Langer's use of the term 'genetic fallacy' (1953)]. On the other hand
it is at times of crucial importance to affirm the deep genetic and
dynamic unity of a group of seemingly diverse phenomena by subsuming
them under the same term, e.g., through naming them a potiori . Such a
'genetic' term will evoke most compel lingly the right kind of meaning
in us. In addition it will mobilize the internal and social resis-
tances which, paradoxically, must become (optimally) engaged in the
conceptual field -- especially in a science that deals with complex
psychological states."
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underlies the other sciences is only approximated, and as it attempts
to reproduce that sequence, the method occasionally collapses a whole
class of events into a single and apparently causal event that is
paradigmatic for the individual or the species. But the mnemic
subject matter of psychoanlysi s does not quite follow the same rules
of cause and effect, since a "cause" in memory may be the motive that
Presently cal1s u P° n the past, or the past which erupts in the
present, and since in either case the individual bears it out as if it
happened with the force of a single, empirically causal eve7t~that
proceeds from past to present.
When Freud presents one cataclysmic event that alters the course
of life everywhere he is therefore addressing the way in which
repeated analogous events act with the force of a single event, or
come to be represented in paradigmatic cases. Psychoanalysis must
revive and also create an order of cause and effect in memory and in
this respect it is evident that memory is not a fit subject for the
physical analysis of causes since it is only provisionally analogous
to the temporal sequences accessible to science. Unlike the other
sciences which apply themselves as a means of interpretation that may
grasp particular sequences of cause and effect, the psychoanalytic
means of interpretation bear a different relation to their object.
Psychoanalytic theory moves within the object in a way that heightens
the interpretive paradox caused by its own imposition. It acts within
the mind as if it were a magnet seeking to duplicate the charge and
effect of the very casual forces it claims to discover, just as it
works against resistances to effect a cure in therapy.
In one rendition of human prehistory, for example, our baboon-
like ancestral brothers may have repeatedly and murderously competed
for the positions of sexual dominance that had already been achieved
by their male elders. Perhaps a pattern was formed that is still
preserved in our unconscious minds with the undiluted and horrific
force that our complicity in the murders of the Primal Father might
have had; especially when it is affirmed in the unconscious feelings
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of guilt we have had concerning our inclinations toward our own
fathers. Freud's method dictates like no other, that we must not
forget, and indeed have not forgotten, the powerful "event" in which a
particular patriarch was killed as If it were fixed in our memory.
Yet by that perverse assertion Freud reveals how an "event" is also a
creation of memory, weighted with an unconscious significance that may
override all of the divisons and rules of memory that normally hold us
accountable. Now, where the memory of fantasies, of a profound hi s-
torial repetition, of archaic symbols, of fears and actual occurences
that are usually distinguished all combine with the force of a single
violent act, that paradigm defies our usual methods of inquiry --
since the act is an object of inquiry which is also quite capable of
positing itself in time and of contriving its own substance in
violation of the same divisions of memory. Like a magnet, such a
paradigm also alters the content of memory where it persists like a
truth or a cause even as it alters the truth.
Although Freud's analogic method directs our attention to this
subversive reality, it does so imperfectly and without reminding us
that it is playing a trick upon the tricks of memory in order to
rectify them for examination. In every psychic event that he consi-
dered to have the force of a cause, he has revived and reassembled the
elements of memory patterns, analogies, fantasies and actual events
in order to thwart the defensive tendency to repress, forget and
deny that they have the force of a cause. The theory moves us to
divide and reassemble memories in one quick motion that seeks their
origins and reveals their depths and yet this motion presents a
challenging methodological puzzle. If we were to slow the process
down to examine each step that it causes us to take, we would realize
that it moves us through at least three levels of meaning and memory
that might otherwise not be noticed: 1) It challenges adult memory
and its obligation to a hidden structure of present priorities that
has selectively drawn elements from the past. However, psychoanalysis
scarcely pauses to address this selective memory because it proceeds
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at once to the next step. 2) Here, it addresses repressed fantasies
and experiences, but at the same time it also addresses the estranged
symbolics of early experiences which have been locked in memory
because they contain a language that is no longer usable. Thus, in
pursuing the repressed, analysis passes through a region of experience
that is not repressed although it is so different as to be irreconcil-
able with adult vessels of memory. 3) Nevertheless, as an arbitrator
between repressed content and acceptable adult mentalities, analysis
makes its own orderly selections from memory, relocating the disparate
elements in a new synthetic reality of adulthood.
In one enlightening motion, psychoanalysis forges a new unity
within memory, restoring its worst aberrations to a place within the
selective order. A subversive reality is awakened by the chilling
immersion that has sent us through several reflexive organizations of
the past and brought us back again, and yet in therapy the process is
managed so that we do not stray too far in any region beyond that of
adult reality. Indeed, the peculiar diagnostic power of psycho-
analytic notions is due to the fact that they are always anchored in
the most distinctive memories of a single patient so that they do not
drift at random, and so that those odd memories are bound to its
clinical purpose. Particular memories of the individual patient are
called forward so that they attach themselves to psychoanalytic
notions as a corrective -- as the content which provides a limiting
condition for the theory -- and a carefully controlled complementary
tension is set up between memory and theory as psychoanalysis engages
in the translations that are crucial to therapy. In this way psycho-
analytic notions remain "accurate" insofar as they are corroborated by
the complete motion through the layers of memory that they themsleves
evoke. They remain "true" insofar as they serve the purpose of
translation, juxtaposing realities, matching one to another, and
measuring one against the other within the confines of the therapeutic
purpose.
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Nevertheless, social criticism and the general study of memory
are not obliged to heal the individual for the present, and as they
question the entire condition of the present they must also dis-
tinguish each of the steps in the reflective process and redivide the
elements that Freud condensed so elegantly in his cutting language.
In social analysis one does not find the same idiosyncratic mnemic
content attaching itself to one's language as a corrective to instruct
one's reflections, and once we have seen how psychoanalysis must
violate the usual sense of cause and effect in order to lead us
through the different levels of memory in one motion, as critics we
will have to duplicate that same motion more self-consciously. In
addressing the most general constraints upon memory, we will also have
to separate and linger in the regions that psychoanalysis hastens to
reunite. In the process we must temporarily forgo the adult scien-
tific language of present-day psychology so that we can reappraise the
integrity of things that are past and examine the place they have
occupied in the order of our memory. While social criticism must
preserve the psychoanalytic categories in order to break the hold of
certain adult prejudices it cannot rest comfortably with them for very
long. Especially since the study of society is not rebuked and
modified by the resistant confrontation of a patient, and its cate-
gories are not anchored or corrected in therapeutic interactions, it
must find other ways of confining its conjectures of the integrity to
the past. It is perhaps for this reason that Habermas suggests that
we be more rigorous than Freud in observing the distinction of an
unconscious "excommunicated" language -- a different and more general
material in which to anchor our critical reflections -- and it is
really the mnemic integrity of distant experiences that he refers us
to as much as the way that they ultimately find expression. 15 Without
dwelling upon the conditions of youth, he wishes to establish a route
to the core of formative meaningful experience that does not upset the
vital contrast between the unconscious and consciousness, or impli-
citly, between the strange expressions of childhood and fantasy that
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are hidden within memory and adult selective remembrance.
Once again, since a society is unable to speak its memories in
the way that a psychoanalytic patient can, the terms of social inquiry
generally seek to be corroborated on a different basis of that sort.
Since a resistant object of inquiry does not qualify the interpretive
notions of social analysis, it seeks to be affirmed by other, indepen-
dent voices. Hence it "discovers" statistics; a social 'structure,' a
'political economy,' or even perhaps, a 'collective unconscious' or
'genetic memory' which test its assertions abstractly. In pursuing
certain topical interests social analysis seems to become more refined
and it seems to find new sources of corroboration, but none of them
speaks with the force of the internal voice of its object; none of
them poses the challenge of a patient's unconscious language. While
social science has sought after something as solid as the relationship
between cause and effect in physical events to harden its interpreta-
tions, it has inevitably encountered the realm of memory which
disrupts that relationship just as it did for psychoanalysis. For
this reason the most potent means available for social analysis to
secure its conjectures is by a self-conscious assessment of the
selective influences that reign in the memory of the group. It can no
longer be content with a speculative notion of "ideology" or a
statistically affirmed sense of "public opinion" that does not have
sufficient substance to check and correct its assumptions. Now the
terms of social analysis may be tested against the elements of memory
that form shared accessible patterns in the reflections of the group
even if they are not often expressed. That is, while psychoanalysis
weighs its truth by calling forward the repressed memories of an
individual to confront and qualify its own assumptions, social
analysis must address a range of distinguishable experiences that are
within the reach of conscious memory instead. It must locate the
limiting margins of a selective memory that modulates a shared inner
voice.
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Section II. Selective Memory and Repression
Once again, it appears that some specific childhood experiences
are repressed, while others have been selectively excluded from adult
memory by virtue of a qualitative difference in their composition. In
the second case, there is a selectivity of memory that now deserves to
be considered as something really distinct from repression, although
the two must often function as allies. If we are able to distinguish
this selective memory however, we must be careful not to assume at the
beginning that it belongs to some existing mental agency or function
that we are familiar with. It is not merely a set of conscious
standards, not only a "cognitive" function, and it does not fall
solely within the province of an "ego psychology" as something that
the ego undertakes. It is not quite a "defense" as we shall see in
the next section of this chapter, and it is not distinct from
repression only because it is a "social" or communicative apparatus or
a set of cogent rules. On the contrary, the selectivity of memory
seems to arise in response to the operations of the ego, to cognitive
structures, societal orientations and instinctual repression all at
once as if it might provide them all with the points of reconciliation
that are ultimately accessible to consciousness.
Certain experiences are driven into the depths of forgetf ul ness
by repression, and others have been made presentable, but there are a
great many memories that hover at the edge of our awareness where they
are altered and kept at bay by other means. These silent and often
highly organized currents of thought may never be spoken or recalled
with clarity, and yet they form an indispensable well of choice from
which speech and consciousness must draw. Much of this material seems
to simply pass us by, while much of it is systematically excluded by
priorities of remembering, and in the process we tend to discount and
evade more content of memory than we repress. From this stream of
memories that has essentially escaped repression, we make further
selections, and almost as a matter of preference we allow the elements
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that we do not like to remember to slip through our nets. Even when
they are not so horrific as to need repressing, those elements that do
not fit comfortably within our present thinking are pushed aside.
Selective memory shifts its focus away from them and away from the
elements of experience that we now deem to be unimportant, as if to
put them all out of our attention.
Repression, as Freud explained it, is certainly a selectivity of
memory that proceeds within the unconscious, and yet there must be
another level of mnemonic selection that operates closer to the border
of consciousness and intentional ity where the inward focus of
attention is directed. Here, as certain retrievable, but currently
unconscious memories that Freud identified as being "preconscious" are
called forward, they are subjected to further organization. For this
reason, I want to suggest even more emphatically that there is a
post-repressive function of selective memory that operates especially
upon the material that is often forgotten but not necessarily
repressed, a selective interest that even comes to guide us uncons-
ciously, or rather, at the edge of consciousness. Patterns within the
chaotic flux of memory are weighed and fetishized by a selective
activity that pertains to consciousness but is not strictly conscious,
and here culturally acquired criteria that exist outside of memory
become instruments of memory such that identity is cut within a format
that is not thoroughly explained by the familiar theories of social
and psychological structure.
It was Freud's revelation that the moment in which we think we
know ourselves and our reality is only the smallest fraction of our
mental life. It is like a flickering light that barely illuminates a
sea of unconscious material where certain elements briefly appear upon
the surface and then become latent in consciousness, while others are
kept from ever being seen as they are held within the currents below.
There are parts of the unconscious that are repressed and parts that
1 c
only slip away to recede for an indefinite time, and the development
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of the human psyche from infancy is a matter of resisting the combi-
nation of instinctual energies and acquired memories that might rise
disruptively to the surface. Yet it is this same resistance that
motivates the development of the organism which generally seeks
pleasure by the discharge of its instinctual energies, and at the same
time is assailed by the demands of reality that require the contain-
ment of those energies. The individual must repress such material,
but risks the danger that excessive repression will displace the
instinctual energies and distort the memories attached to them
resulting in painful psychological disturbances. As we have noted, it
was Freud's therapeutic interest in those pathogenic effects of
repression that led him to concentrate on the repressive variety of
forgetting. But of course, there are other means of forgetting and
perhaps other agencies that assist in the process and those may be
revealed as we return to examine a few of Freud's more ambiguous
noti ons
.
In his work we come to know repression by considering what must
happen to unconscious material to the material of the dream, the
instinct, the wish and those potent events that must be buried in
memory. The central question in this is how a thing remains uncons-
cious, and Freud is not so much interested in every mechanism of
forgetting as he is in the repression which binds psychic energy to
the task, causing the 'condensations,' 'displacements' and 'distor-
tions' of memory and instinct that produce the notorious symptoms of
neurosis and other problems of that kind. Significantly, the
repression of this mnemonic material establishes a province within the
mind where the elements that are to be perpetually excluded from
consciousness will remain to form the "unconscious proper." At the
same time, however, the elements of memory that are merely latent and
which can be recalled to consciousness with some expenditure of effort
find a different locality. They are also "unconscious" in the
descriptive sense of the term, but Freud distinguishes them by
indicating that they belong to that part of the mind which he termed
472
"preconscious." Instead of accounting for what might happen to
these preconscious items beyond the influence of repression, however,
Freud is satisfied to have discussed their fate as the outcome of the
dynamic division of the psyche into an unconscious, a preconscious and
a conscious realm. In the end, the question of how all things might
remain outside of an immediate consciousness, gives way to more
complex dynamics of repression as they involve the agencies of mind
which Freud called the Ego, the Id and the Superego. 17 So it seems
that the problem of the emergence of memory into consciousness is lost
in the battle among these agencies as psychoanalysis discovered them.
Nevertheless, some clues to the solution of this problem were
given as the theory developed. Even the slow acquisition of the three
agencies of the mind first appeared to be the result of a rather
passive function which is unlike the dynamics of repression that
follow. At first it seems that the developing infant naturally
discards all that is irrelevant to its growth, like the shedding of a
cocoon, and if repression is not the only factor in the forgetting
that advances development, it may not even be the initiating one. In
1911, for example, Freud suggested that the discarding of certain
infantile encumbrances first involves "fixation," which he called a
"precursor and necessary condition of every 'repression.'" In this
event a single instinct or component of an instinct is simply left
behind, "at a more infantile stage," and there it "behaves in regard
to later psychological structures as though it belonged to the system
of the unconscious, as though it were repressed." Yet in the
discussion of the distinctive worlds of childhood experience above, it
already seems clear that such forgetting cannot occur passively as if
to simply leave behind undesirable ingredients, and it cannot proceed
exactly "as though it were" repression, and so it must also involve
complex criteria which are actively applied in another way. Further,
if there are such exclusions made in the fixations of infancy, we have
no reason to believe that they do not persist in adult life, and
perhaps they continue to act in small ways to keep the elements of
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preconsciousness out of mind. If infantile experiences are dropped
from memory systematically, they must be rendered obsolete by some
preexisting standard. Indeed, the central philosophical problem that
Freud does not resolve is how the unconscious act of repression seems
to apply standards of consciousness such that even the earliest
repression must already be informed by a systematic means of distin-
guishing genres of experience. It seems that there must be a
selective means of distinguishing unacceptable childhood genres of
experience that is unconscious, while not being equivalent to repres-
sion and that persists to enforce the understandings of adult life.
Freud recognized early on that there was an ambiguous quality of
intelligence at work within repressions, and because of it he had
difficulty explaining how an intelligent, structured and purposeful
rejection of memories could proceed unawares. For that reason, he
tended to characterize this censorship as if it were nearly a
conscious application of judgements. He distinguished "fixation" and
the primary processes of repression from a secondary repression that
he called "repression proper," in a way that is indicative of the
problem. This secondary repression as he explains it, "...emanates
from the more highly developed systems of the ego -- systems which are
capable of being conscious -- and may in fact be described as a
process of 'after expulsion.' It gives the impression of being an
essentially active process, while fixation appears rather to be a
19passive lagging behind." On close examination -- and regardless of
the impression it gives and where it emanates from -- it seems odd
that this repressive force sets boundaries for the self, binding the
unconscious sea as if the ego controls it while the ego does not
control it. If Freud could not identify the active means of exclusion
in an initial fixation which seemed like a "lagging behind," then now,
in the more developed repressions, he resolves a similar function to
be something just short of a judgement.
In 1915 he wrote that there may be a "rejection" of mental
stimuli, "based on judgement (condemnation)," but that repression is
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rather, "a preliminary phase of condemnation, something between flight
and condemnation."^ But even this ambiguous solution to the problem
implies that while repression is not itself a conscious activity, it
depends upon the fact that the mind has already developed standards
for what should be conscious and unconscious. Further, repression is
not only concerned with the containment of a world of threatening
instincts and infantile memories, but now it excludes "trains of
thought" that have, "come into associative connection with it." 21
Repression now "condemns" associational complexes of memory that are
much more elaborately formulated than the instincts within them, and
it must respond to them according to equally complex criteria that are
as sophisticated as those of conscious judgements. Significantly, we
must assume that if repression is the guardian of consciousness,
consciousness must send out the sentinals of a highly selective memory
to preform an independent function in assisting it.
Clearly, then, the ambiguities that befall the relationship
between repressed ideas and conscious ideas are not resolved by the
claim that repression lies somewhere between "flight and condem-
nation." Once Freud had settled upon the notion that pathogenic
symptoms result from a traumatic i ncompatabi 1 i ty between unbearable
memories and the present sense of a person's reality, the question of
the standards governing repression followed. Repression condemns and
flees from unconscious material on behalf of a "reality principle," as
directed by a superego, but at what level of mind exactly do its
motivations arise? How could it be that systematic forgetting appears
to be unintentional and unconscious when it must have motives that are
intentional? It may have been sufficient to the needs of psycho-
analysis to establish that repression "emanates" from the advanced
systems of the ego, but as Jerome Neu has explained so well, the
notion of intentional motives for unconscious processes opens a wide
range of problems associated with "self-deception" that philosophy has
yet to solve. Although the problem has been superficially resolved by
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the suggestion that there are different "selves" within the psyche
that may deceive one another, the central difficulty remains, and as
Neu puts it, "Intentional forgetting seems to require following a rule
under conditions which do not allow you knowingly to follow it..." 22
Ultimately, the question is one of how an unconscious " rule " might
ever be applied as such, and whether or not a negative force like
repression is sufficient to the task. Although Freud eventually seems
to have dispensed with the problem by dropping his use of terms like
"intentional repression,"
23
it still must be that some degree of
consciousness of a thing is necessary in order to edit it out of
consciousness, and it is this line of reasoning that has led Sartre
and others to go so far as to replace the notion of repression
entirely with a theory of self-deception. 24
In a similar vein, and because Freud had not resolved the matter,
philosophers like Stuart Hampshire doubt that there is such a dramatic
division in the mind between those spheres of consciousness and
unconciousness. A champion of conscious intentional ity
,
Hampshire
proposes instead that the entire human inner life follows from
consciousness, and in fact it "begins with the power of intentional
inhibition" in infancy, which eventually changes to become less
conscious as a "habit of intentional inhibition." 25 In this way he
wants to distinguish "motives," which may be genuinely unconscious,
from "intentions" which must have a greater range of action than Freud
supposed. While unconscious motives may account for some aspects of
behavior, it is intentional ity that guides the larger realm of "that
kind of knowledge of what one is doing, and of what one is inclined to
do, that is fully conscious and explicit." Yet for all of his
worthy emphasis upon the activities of consciousness, Hampshire has
not really solved the puzzle either and at best he has balanced the
scales a little. As long as there are unconscious motives at all it
remains unclear how that sort of intentional ity might enter into them,
as it also remains uncertain how much force they exert and what
aspects of their content will affect consciousness. Even if it is
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true that a great deal of unconscious activity is guided by the habits
that derive from intentions, they have changed even in becoming
unconscious habits and have mysteriously joined with other material
that is not remembered so that the barrier between conscious inten-
tions and an unconscious remains unexplained.
Nevertheless, if the very link between intentional ity and
consciousness is reexamined in light of Hampshire's challenge to
Freud, then Freud's postulates will be compelled to yield new results.
First, it may require an excessive leap of imagination to suppose that
the inner life begins with 'intentional inhibitions' in infancy as
Hampshire suggests, but if it does not, we must still determine how
unconscious and repressive activities behave as if they were inten-
tional. If it is true instead that mental life begins with the
primary repression that provides a model for the later inhibitions
that are intentional, then intenti onal ity itself may not only be a
creature of consciousness but also a reiteration of an unconscious
paradigm, model or pattern. In that case intenti onal ity appears to
blindly follow dictates that precede consciousness and make exclusions
from memory that are not the deliberations of a wide awake mind. It
could only be for reasons of such an instructive model that infancy is
so universally and systematically forgotten, and it is a model that
seems to form a partial intention to forget. In this way, we must
continue to look for a kind of i ntent i onal i ty that is not quite
conscious -- a type of intention that is stripped of agency and the
deliberations of an intending person -- the type of intenti onal ity for
which psychoanalysis reserves the term "dispositions."
Accordingly, as Stoller indicates, such unconscious dispositions
are distinguished from intentions because they do not possess, "all
27
the attributes of a person. . .memory a point of view a wish..." So
it appears that the variety of ' intentional ity' that we find in these
dispositions is the creature of an incomplete person, or rather it is
the product of efforts that are undertaken by many lesser parts of the
self that are not quite up to the task of 'deceiving' one another.
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Still, in varying degrees of consciousness, conflicting motives do
seem to address each other from an ego, a superego and an id, or from
different "selves" that have distinct intentions in each case. Now
the fact that there are different selves at work effecting disposi-
tions does not resolve the matter ~ and it would be slight of hand to
define as "selves" those parts of mind which do not each possess a
consciousness, intenti onal ity and so on - though it does suggest that
there is some way in which the work of different parts of the self
imitates more intentional efforts. Now we must find out how that
imitation occurs, and it must be that these different selves have some
common means of applying themselves and of addressing one another that
makes dispositions act like intentions. That is, these 'selves' are
only able to 'deceive' one another, or to step outside of conscious-
ness and affect it so profoundly because they share a_ format for
intentionality, selective rules of memory which form a third and
connecting piece in the puzzle.
In certain minimal respects such a format must be present before
either repression or intentionality can develop, and if the two are to
be conditions for consciousness, a format must proceed in the form of
general requirements for a selective memory that are much more
elaborate and active than a "reality principle," and more selective
than intentional standards would admit to being. So it is the case
that patterns of memory which are inscribed with the coherence and
vivid examples of a conscious intentionality are sequestered in
different parts of memory where they may lend that coherence to the
most bizarre impulses. They must persist within parts of the self
that do not yet possess a point of view or sel f -awareness but do share
criteria for selective memory by virtue of their mnemic content. Even
if intentionality did rule over all of memory without the interven-
tions of repression, it could only do so by means of prior standards
of memory that set it off and allow for its very existence. Inten-
tionality could not contend with memories that still possessed their
origi nal force -- which came to mind with the clarity of original
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events demanding all of our attention ~ or it would be completely
overwhelmed, and it must regard them from a distance that provides for
their ultimate coherence. That i ntenti onal ity must somehow achieve a
certain perspective upon its mnemic objects so that it may appear to
look back at them in a way that they may seem to have been reduced by
distance, and in a way that will allow it to make choices among them.
Intentional ity requires a minimal set of standards to attain that
necessary perspective, but as such standards are repeated in memory
they become more than a habit; they accrue to become an active force
that has the attributes of yet another almost hidden agency of mind.
Where those criteria of intentional ity contain and whittle down
our memories they do not undertake a self-deception. The repression
that may have affected such memories is not an 'intentional' censor-
ship because it has not been conducted from the point of view of a
conscious ego or intending self, but has only reproduced its selective
standards. Indeed the conscious ego is twice removed from the
process; first from the intense affectivity of past events, and
second, by the selective standards that it cannot prevent itself from
applying. Therefore that ego cannot be held accountable for applying
the rules which are the prior conditions of its own existence, rules
which have a quality of i ntenti onal ity even before there are inten-
tions. Thus, when Sartre offers the postulate that, "...I must know
the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully..." as an
argument against the whole idea of unconscious repression, 28 his error
lies in the words "knowledge" and "truth," just as Hampshire's error
rests with the word "intention." Repression may certainly act with a
precision that is neither 'intentional' nor 'knowing,' even as it
applies general standards that are shared by that kind of knowing.
Repression only "knows" the "truth" about a memory insofar as that
truth has been ini ti ally grasped according to precise restrictive
standards that allow it to be just a memory instead of a complete
revival of something past that would overwhelm the self. The
"knowledge" necessary to repression already contains unconscious
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standards as it is applied to this truth which is itself selective, as
it is in the first instance known selectively
. So the truth of 'the
initial integrity of experiences is accompanied by the secondary
"truth" of a selectivity that is precise but not consciously applied,
and it is not self-deceptive since it is what allows the self to step
out of the swamp of its own memories in the first place and before any
single part of the self is fully formed.
Without a self-conscious, intending self it is still possible
that selections may be made unconsciously that have almost all of the
effect of conscious choices. Exacting and intelligent criteria
persist beyond the reach of repression, and as they repeatedly repair
elements of memory to make them presentable, it is as if the "secon-
dary revision" of dreams were available for other applications. 29
Beyond the negative effects of repression, those coherent criteria
draw out their favorite aspects of memory and introduce order within
the unconscious itself. A great deal of our unconscious memory is
therefore not completely incoherent so much as it is a non-coherent
jumble of very coherent elements, and even the phantoms of our dreams
may have size, shape and rather contemporary features before they are
revised for conscious apprehension. The mnemonic order is reflected
on the surface of each mental element and becomes selectively active
beneath the surfaces of them all. That selective memory behaves like
a previewer who is apprentice to a censor -- the censor, like repres-
sion, knows what to do because it is assisted by a general first
reading. The previewing reader in turn, already anticipates the
response of the final conscious audience. Hence, both repression and
intentional ity depend upon their clever associate -- the selective
memory -- which is indi spensi bl e to them both.
Selective Memory as Distinct from Repression
Evidently there is a great deal of memory that is not conscious
which is really a very highly organized material, and much of it may
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never be allowed to become conscious. That sort of memory seems to
present a situation in which intenti onal ity could operate, even if it
does not, because it possesses a prior coherence of sorts that is not
just a random rush of instincts and images. Even the "repressed" is
well organized and meaningful in its own way, and although it does not
necessarily follow all of the rules of meani ngf ul ness that we
consciously apply, it is an artful construction of memory wedded to
instinct and fantasy. Indeed, most of what is unconscious can only
ever become conscious because important features of the order of our
consciousness have survived within it, and because its own skewed
order is not entirely alien to consciousness, the two having at least
the structural similarity of one language to another. For this
reason, we do not revive or recall just an instinct, but we recall a
set of circumstances and goals pertaining to it in memories that
possess that same pre-coherence.
Yet the coherence that consciousness and repressed ingredients
have in common is not merely 'knowledge' or a set of linguistic rules.
More than that is needed, and we must be able to identify the numerous
orienting features of a familiar memory if we are to walk into a room
and know it for a room or recognize a place in the activity of
recalling it. Even when we dream of some twisted space that we later
take to be a room, but unconciously meant to be both a room and a
sexual orifice, the importance of the dream room is not that it
"really" represents an orifice, but that it is both a room and an
orifice according to terms of meaning that are both conscious and
unconscious aspects of our orientation. The room possesses cogent
attributes of two sets of meanings combined. The order of thoughts
pertaining to a consciousness and intentional ity that would recognize
the room or the orifice is shared by such a dream, and although the
dream does do something different with it, that order deserves to be
considered in its own right.
As it is usually explained, repression seems to operate like an
obstruction to the free flow of the most threatening passions and
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memories
- as a negating force among them which prevents them from
disturbing our coherent selves. Yet these repressed elements are not
threatening simply because they contain the force of buried passions
but precisely because they share many of the terms of coherence of
consciousness itself and therefore threaten to burst in upon it. When
it is viewed at the level of each battle, the war between mental
agencies that Freud portrayed is revealed to be a competition between
types and organizations of memory that possess many of the same
weapons. The elements of consciousness and the repressed are danger-
ously interchangeable because they have been given a structural
similarity to one another. In fact it is only possible for repression
to negotiate a truce among them because a selective memory has done
its work in making those weapons comparable. Thus, before things
become conscious and before they are subjected to repression, they are
already affected by a positive force that possessively gathers them
up, shifting and drawing their elements into a presentable order. In
this way, when the persons who we have known have disappeared from
memory, it may be for reasons of repression; but insofar as they
remain ready to be recalled in only certain postures, with certain
attributes, in certain localities during the sequences of action that
their name might evoke, that is the result of selective memory and
repression acting hand in hand. As experience reflects back upon
itself, selective memory imposes conceptual order before, during and
after repression.
Selective memory is not the sole property of the powerfully
repressed complexes that exert their influence unseen. It does not
respond to that hammering immutable force that must always be
contained. Instead it is a positive, possessive and highly adaptable
facility that is more closely allied with free floating conscious
thoughts, or again, with the musing of daydreams rather than night-
mares. Selective memory may form a flexible standard of containment
that affects our repressed experience and our most acceptable notions
in kind. In this way for example, a group of adolescents may share a
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strict set of standards according to which one of them might feel
inferior and hide or even repress certain of his or her failings.
Those standards, like the selective criteria of memory, are neither
unconscious givens nor fixed cultural terms of assessment and new
experiences may alter the units by which they measure the desirability
of attributes. The terms of acceptance for that group may change -
clothing, hairstyle and even moral convictions may be altered -- and a
host of unarticulated, unconscious standards that are quite nearly
conscious may be thoroughly revised. If a repressed complex does not
readily change, other aspects of identity may be quickly revised by
selective memory as if a nob had been turned to make some subtle
adjustment
.
Although there are ingredients of the unconscious which have no
coherence until they are subjected to repression and released to
consciousness, the unconscious material that does have coherence (even
if it is repressed) may be distinguished by virtue of its distinctive
organization. So there are shapeless, timeless passions that are also
unconscious and gain coherence after they have met repression, and
there are unconscious memories which already bear the mark of the
ordered space and time of our 'real' world. Normally it is not so
necessary for us to repress the latter — if those memories threaten
to enter the consciousness with which they share coherence, the threat
is subdued -- and they seem only to have been set aside. But that is
because they have been subjected to a different set of constraints
than repression applies, the constraint of another economy of mental
energy which serves a somewhat different end. Here, a derivative of
the 'reality principle' has been compounded into an active instruction
to memory, inclining the conscious efforts of memory to instate
certain organizations within remembered material beyond the require-
ments of a self-protective repression.
The more disconcerting memories that do become conscious in daily
experience are indicative of this since we commonly keep such aspects
of the past behind us in the shadows of memory, or run from them in
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semi
-consciousness, as much as we contain them in neurosis. For
example, the displaced and fleeting memory of a loved one does not
speak only of repression, but of a more subtle and discriminating
means of summoning and filling significant memories. As one lovesick
character confesses in describing the deep state of his infatuation:
,
There were wh o!e nights when I lay awake from one
o clock till morning calling up her image before my imagina-
tion. On such nights I would suffer, again and again, the
worst horror of the lover: I would find myself unable to
summon up the adored one's face and -- I write it hardly
expecting to be believed except by someone who has suffered
this abjection of adoration -- I would shake at the blas-
phemy of having thus mislaid her 1 i keness
.[30]
In this case there is certainly repression and a highly fetishized
sel f
-protecti ve condensation of the loved one, and yet it is an
unusual sort of repression since the woman in these waking dreams is
evidently present just at the edge of the speaker's consciousness.
She has been reduced to the motionless mental picture of her face, but
even this is kept tantal i zingly out of sight in a way that is really
very common although the speaker would not admit it. It seems that
with the right effort her likeness could be recalled, (and as anyone
who has suffered this abjection knows), with greater effort the entire
object of adoration may eventually be recalled from the depths where
it has not quite been repressed.
Significantly, however, this is a case of an unrequited love that
is most inappropriate and ill founded -- or so the speaker describes
his middle-aged obsession with the exotic young performer named
Faustina -- and while he may be repressing the fear of losing her and
other evocations along with her image, he is also caught in a conflict
between two possible worlds of meaning each of which he is quite well
able to recall. Even without recourse to her image, he is able to
discuss the virtues and dangers of pursuing this improper affection
into an imaginary world of different properties where it would be
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acceptable, and it is as much unwillingness as it is repression that
keeps him from dwelling upon the comparison between his life without
her and his life as it might be with her. The visage of the loved one
is not exactly repressed, but the whole imaginary world in which she
might be seen as a lover is excluded, so that her image finds no
context. Thus he struggles to salvage her image in a way that keeps
that world just beyond the focus of his attention and keeps the
selective coherence of two worlds separate. Since he can do this, he
is finally able to recall her more fully, and now he can rely upon
selective memory to affirm his usual sense of propriety. She could
not have been completely repressed when her likeness was mislaid, for
now a living, moving image of her has been selectively retrieved as an
antidote to his passion: "And then," he continues,
-- for common sense never left me I would think of the
beautiful Faustina talking to curious, gaping boys at Col-
burn College, or meeting the other master's wives at one of
their stupefying tea parties, and something like a laugh
would shake me.
. .[31]
Upon this strange and partially lighted edge of the speaker's
consciousness, some special agency seems to have proceeded across the
barrier presented by repression and to have retrieved a summary
version of what he fears most, now tailored to a tolerable selective
fit. In this reflection, Faustina is not merely a condensation of
what has been repressed, but an antidote that is designed with
precision by the speaker's own standards of propriety in order to
affirm that propriety and to prevent her from destroying his carefully
balanced orientation. The speaker does not suffer the neurotic
manifestation of a repressed desire, but experiences a self-reproach
that is virtually conscious. As in the case of certain childhood
memories, he suffers a feeling of embarassment that produces something
like a laugh in him and that keeps worlds apart selectively, although
it is not a function of repression. It is as if the weakest point in
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a repressive armor where a repressed object has nearly become visibl
has given way to another protective device, and there, selecti
memory structures the escaping vision to protect the order of its
scious world. In this case, after repression has guarded the ego,
selective memory has also reinstated conscious terms of coherence.
From a psychoanalytic point of view it remains prudent to
consider this secondary organization of memory to be a function of
repression, but at least in this regard, repression appears to have
two sides: one which responds immediately to unconscious dispositions
editing out their unacceptable content, and another which seems to
linger and labor over the result. Hence, repression is not only an
obstruction or a negating function of the sort that Foucault often
criticizes, it is more like a permeable membrane that owes its very
existence to the pressures operating on either side of it and
filtering between them. On the first side of repression there are the
unconscious things we never know, but on the second side of repression
-- which is this side from our conscious pont of view -- memories and
dispositions are shaped in the fashion that they will appear to us.
The selective interest affecting this side of repression positively
draws upon repressed and unconscious memories or it excludes memorable
experiences, almost self-consciously keeping them in the shadows
behind us. It does not only protect the ego, but goes on to assemble
the elements of our sociable identities, and as it protected the
familiar world of the unrequited lover above, it protects our entire
social orientation from all threatening dissipations of memory.
Accordingly, this second, selective side of repression really deserves
to be considered as something distinct from the first. It tends to
predominate in certain phases of mental activity, and while it may
reach within the unconscious on behalf of consciousness, it tends to
operate with greater frequency at the little noticed border between
the unconscious and the "preconscious" where the limits of the ego are
continually being reestablished. It promotes conscious principles
before they become conscious when we try to regain a fleeting memory,
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like the face of a missing loved one, or more ordinarily in our sense
of things being familiar.
Now however we must be careful not to ally this function too
closely with consciousness. It is not an activity of the conscious
mind, but an effect, like an echo, that repeats its form and consis-
tency unconsciously. In fact, selective memory exerts its force from
within the unconscious even as it derives from consciousness.
in a passage which deserves greater attention Freud suggests that,
...it is a mistake to emphasize only the rejection which
ronnf!!
S/ r°u ^ Side of consciousness upon what is to bee V W\n* ve t° consider just as much the attractionexercised by what was originally repressed upon everything
with which it can establish a connecti on
.[32]
Significantly here, the "repressed" elements of mind themselves
acquire a function, and it is one that is different from the
activities of repression which keep them in their place. The
repressed idea attracts and selects material to form an order of its
own, it has a magnetic effect that organizes material just as an
intention might, and it redesigns the mental constituents of the
unconscious on the model of memories that were once conscious
experiences. Selective memory is responsible for at least one type of
material in the unconscious, and those things which seem to be moot
and inert aspects of the past are still active in memory. So the
exciting and terrifying images that reach us are a convergence of
instinctual and conscious memories affected by repression and
selective memory alike, and they often reflect our most private
longings as well as the most public themes and images.
Still from a psychoanalytic point of viewwe might be tempted to
consign this function to the established agencies of the mind, to the
ego or superego. However it is not precisely the ego which selects in
this way, and the very constancies and formats of selective memory are
487
the joint production of all of the mental agencies coupled with the
lessons of public instruction. It is no more a property of the ego
itself, than it is a property of that general "humanity" that stands
at the center of the collective historical perspective discussed in
the last chapter. Selective memory may even act against the interests
of a unifying directorship of the ego as it lends the force of its
organizations to parts of the id. Thus, selective memory does not
belong to the field of 'ego psychology' per se, and it does not smooth
over the conflict within the 'split subject' that is so important to
classical psychoanalysis and the several varieties of criticism that
derive from it.
What is more, the matter is not resolved by suggesting that these
selective functions of memory belong to the agency of the superego.
The superego does exercise its own selectivity as it prods us to
conform to the ego ideals that become the forbidding models of moral
instruction. But those selections are of a most particular variety
that generally pertains to the desirable characteristics of person-
ality and arise in situations of moral conflict. The superego appears
to us as a moral injunction, or a "conscience," and as Freud indi-
cated, it seems to address us in the voice of a third person. 34 It
exercises its authority rather overtly as if, when the censor of
repression has failed, it must make conscious appeals for self-
control, and it allows consciousness to appear to do its own cen-
soring. Quite apart from this particular selectivity, however, there
is another which affects our sense of what is true, and not necessar-
ily of what is good and proper. This occurs without the forbidding
voice and superior location of the superego as it proceeds where
unconscious structures crystallize to form an order of their own. If
these seem to speak to us, it is not only in the voice of a third
person, but again, in the whispers of every different voice that we
seem to hear in our daily musings, the faceless voice that pronounces
the words we know, the voices of people we know or imagine coming from
nearby, and the voices that suggest what we ought to anticipate and
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which give our expressions authoritative bearing and credibility.
As selective memory does not speak with a single voice it does
not have a single locality within the mind even as it always appears
at the boundaries of consciousness. Freud himself has referred to a
special variety of instinctual derivatives that seem to share that
same marginal space, and in a passage which underscores the attributes
that we might assign to the realm of selective memory, he describes
them:
On the one hand they are highly organized, free from self-
contradiction, have made use of every acquisition of the
system Cs. [consciousness] and would hardly be distinguished
in our judgement from the formations of that system. On the
other hand they are unconscious and are incapable of becom-ing conscious. Thus, qualitatively they belong to the system
Pes. [preconscious], but factually to the Ucs. [uncon-
scious]; their origin is what decides their fate7T35]
There appears to be organized material that does not belong to
consciousness or the unconscious; to the ego, id or superego. Rather
it makes assimilations from all of them, and yet it is not only the
origins of these derivatives that decides their fate but the sum total
of the coherent organization that resides within them.
Perhaps there is a degree of unity within the 'split subject' of
psychoanalysis, but it is not a unity that minimizes the divisive
effects of repression. Rather it finds them to be intersected by a
broader series of mental divisions which may even split the subject
more. In this way the intentional ity of a conscious ego is not the
diametrical opposite of the murky, deceptive repressions of the
unconscious, since the two possess different organizations of
selective memory that also have attributes in common. They are like
the different voices of distinct parts of the self which nevertheless
may often speak the same language. In that way, the very sense of
control that would distinguish the "I" within its own mnemonic theatre
is gained in ascending organizations of memory that might address one
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another while remaining distinct.
Consequently, selective memory has a special place in individual
development just as it has found a location at the border of con-
sciousness, and in each case it is the orderly vehicle that allowed
the mixture of old and new experience to become coherent. Not only
does the ego finally assert itself in individual development, but a
whole series of selves emerge, and the ego solidifies by means of a
sequence of self-alienations which proceed according to certain
'acquisitions' of consciousness which have been slowly stored within
the unconscious. It is in this way that the repression that splits
the subject is trained to a particular purpose, as it becomes the
agent of a reality principle in reconstructing a changing sense of
realities. While some variety of selective memory is first evidenced
before the repressions of infancy as the child begins to shed
incompatible mentalities, selective memory ultimately becomes a
post - repressive function that preserves the developing order and unity
of a deeply divided mind. Now we might even consider this function to
be a tertiary repression that finally exerts influence at the very
gates of a developed consciousness, but it would be best to leave the
terminology of repression to its strictly unconscious province.
In the end, this function -- for which I reserve the term
selective memory -- reveals itself with particular clarity at the
moment that something occurs to consciousness in a form that is worthy
of verbal expression. More precisely, it is evident in the many
thoughts that could be spoken but are not; the daydreams and musings
which present mental scenes that we might pause over and describe, but
which also tend to choke our words with the embarrassment they would
cause if we tried. When our words seem to flow freely from images
rather than pausing to describe them, we are also making selections
but in those more careful, meditative pauses we seem to do so
deliberately. In making such careful selections our willful sense of
i ntenti onal i ty tricks itself into believing that it has made a
judgement on its own. On one hand, our own act of will seems to
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exercise a choice, and as Stoller suggests, when something i ike this
is not spoken, our "motives may be unconscious and the product ofinfantile experience. But whatever the unconscious roots, at the
final point of delivery
- at the edge of speech - that elusive devil
free will' is at work; one decides not to speak." 36 On the other
hand, in that same moment, our will is not necessarily free and it may
be elusive to the point of being absent.
When we pause at that edge of expression, the will does not
usually pronounce a judgement to itself to the effect that, "I don't
want to say that." Instead there is a much more automatic process
that renders things suitable for speech, simplifying their assocations
and making them sane and coherent, and the will extracts what is
properly expressible after the greatest portion of it has been
discounted by other means. At this point again, selective memory has
managed the chaotic memories which could become conscious and are not
unconscious or repressed, by shaping the form in which they do appear
to us. Accordingly, if we reflect carefully on the process that
allows a certain evocative word to build up to the point of being
spoken, it is only after many of the images and sensibilities that it
evokes have been put in order or laid aside that we exercise fully
conscious choice and decide whether to speak it. In each suitable
expression then, and at the brink of speaking, cultural and epistemic
rules for apprehending memory establish the borders of will and
identity.
In this, selective memory does not exactly precede intenti onal ity
any more than it follows after repression in some strict sequential
manner. Indeed, it is part of the internal construction of intentions
themselves, and their choices are not only buffeted by elements of the
unconscious in a way that makes philosophers like Hampshire uncom-
fortable, they are also modified by selectivities that they do not
control. If we might once have supposed that consciousness is a
positive force following the negative force of repression, the picture
changes when we discover that there are positive functions of
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selective memory that work secretly within both. It is not that
consciousness is a state of fully revealed thought and memory, while
the unconscious keeps them hidden, and it is not that one is positive
and the other negative. Now we discover that we are continually
adding to the associational schemes in each of these dimensions by a
selective process that positively seeks out new material, and our
willful choices are affected in the bargain. Psychoanalysis has
taught us that the repressed memories of past experiences tend to cast
dispositions into our present and future lives. Selective memory is
therefore most distinctive as it runs this same track in reverse ; as
it recalls and assembles thematic antidotes to a threatening present,
reworking our fields of associations for a current purpose, positively
consolidating identity and altering the format for our choices quite
expediently.
Therefore, since selective memory is not at all restricted to a
conscious and intentional side of mental life it may even reconstruct
our experience of the instincts. As an instinct like hunger 'presses
forward' for example, and as it emerges into consciousness, it con-
tains the indiscriminate desires that once cathected the mother's
breast which are now well repressed. The selective associations that
we have subsequently made to various foods and means of acquiring them
-- by purchase in restaurants, in raiding the refrigerator or in other
milieus of adult feeding organize the desire itself as well as the
intentions regarding its fulfillment. Perhaps different nerves than
those which were activated in infancy are now activated. The nature
of our response to that instinct — the cold sweat that accompanies
the longing for pizza, or the salivation that begins when we recall
our favorite ice cream -- responds to much more than a bell, so that
there may even be different degrees of response to the instinct
coupled to different objects of desire. As one fictional character
suggests in a moment of great hunger, "I was beginning to hallucinate
about hamburgers and cashew nuts by the time I gave up... visions of
pepper steaks danced in my head, when I got really hungry I never
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thought about coq au vin or steak Diane..." 37
Significantly, this extreme circumstance had not restored the
instinct to its original form and if it is prevented from doing so by
repression it is also mnemonically constrained to a particular path.
One layer of the post-repressive construction of associations to
hunger
- which might include steak Diane - has been disassembled to
reveal another level of imagined fulfillments where selective memory
has also done its active work. These selections may not cause
desires, but they reach back, perhaps even to their initial associa-
tional content, adding to it and reorganizing a portion of its
ingredients so that the image of the mother's breast if it survives at
all, is only one among many other means of satisfying that instinctual
demand. Thus, as it constructs the steps that lead toward articula-
tions of desire, selective memory takes the things that have been
rendered acceptable by repression and makes them accessible to the
terms of consciousness. It is therefore much more obliged to the
prevailing conditions of reality, what Marcuse called the "performance
principle," than the repression that accompanies it. Selective
memory becomes an avid translator to that end, a means of moving
memory toward articulation which affects the ' propositionaT form in
which unconscious forces address consciousness.
Inasmuch as it is a preparation for communication that composes
the 'appearance to us' of latent thoughts, the selective memory has an
even more refined purpose that is distinct from repression and
intenti onal ity
.
In the moment before articulation when an image
becomes clear and precise the creative work of that facility is
undertaken. Wittgenstein described this process in a phrase which has
been rendered in English as, "we picture facts to ourselves," but
Janick and Toulmin comment on the significance of the phrase as
follows:
...the original Germans says, " Wi r Machen uns Bi Ider der
Tatsachen ." A Bild, or picture, is for Wittgenstein
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something which we make, or produce, as an artifact- just as
a painter produces an "artistic representation" of a' scene orpersons so too we ourselves construct in language "propositions" having the same forms as the facts we piaure.[S]
Such mental pictures are distinctive products of mind. They are
creative propositions that are partly assembled from memory, that are
not quite words by themselves, nor are they fully artistic "sublima-
tions" yet. They are envisionings of facts because they follow strict
rules of reference and construction and yet they are also imaginings.
They cannot be nouns because they are simultaneously adjectives and
verbs and the mental picture undergoes the active constraints of
mnemonic composition; they acquire a form in the act of picturing
which goes on to affect the expressions arising from it. The Bi_]_d is
a selective emergence from memory which applies constraints beyond
those which are repressive or intentional to produce the "propo-
sitional" quality that will inform conscious choices later on.
Now the reason why the freedom and willfulness of these con-
structions is such an ambiguous matter, is that selective memory
stands right between creativity and constraint, consciousness and the
unconscious, words and pictures, past and present. Those pictures
which occupy so much of our mental life, result from a discriminating
intelligence which is not freely creative, and there is seldom a
completely fresh construction among them even as they respond to the
quickly changing circumstances of the present. Instead they make
their propositions in repetitively accumulated layers that build upon
one another so that the mental picture is not a pure embodiment of
something once seen, but a selective recreation. In this sense
selective memory is very much like the "constructive activity of
intelligence" that Piaget describes in the following passage:
The structures of intelligence are not extemporaneous
gestalts but schemes which derive one from the other by
progressive relation during a continuous construction.
Associationist empiricism would consider these schemes the
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^Zt 11 k Previous experience. Drucker rightly repliedthat the subject turns to the past for what he needsresult of the present situations. In fact the present
structure is a scheme which proceeds from other schemes but
which reacts on them by integrating with them. [40]
The mental pictures of selective memory are creative and continuous as
they are also compounded schemes of thought. They have a present
interest which selectively draws from the elements of the past to suit
present needs while keeping others in the periphery of attention.
Finally, it is the expediency of this selective function in
making focal adjustments that distinguishes it from repression since
it is especially adaptive to present needs. As we have noted,
selective memory is capable of adapting to circumstances almost
instantly, and while repressions have sunk hard and fast into the
psyche, the constructions of selective memory seem to shuffle and
change. Even the most enduring objects of memory, the objects which
we have learned to regard as enduring parts of the world since
infancy, seem to have an equivalent permanence in memory which is also
surprisingly mutable. Indeed as we focus our attention upon actual
objects in the world before us, we are also immediately focusing upon
analogous objects as we picture them within memory and we inevitably
shift our focus rapidly back and forth from objects to mental
likenesses in such a way that the two quickly conform within the
impression of a single image, and focal attention affirms our
orientation in the world. This ability involves what Schachtel has
called an "exclusion mechanism of focal attention" that once again is
like repression only different, as it diffuses certain awarenesses and
brings others into sharp relief. Says Schachtel,
This implies that the temporary exclusion mechanism of focal
attention often, perhaps always is structurally and dynami-
cally similar to repression. It is distinguished from
repression by its brief duration and by the fact that the
person is able to terminate it, whereupon attention can be
directed to that which before had been excluded from focal
awareness .[41]
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As selective memory contains a focal mechanism it may rapidly dis-
assemble and rebuild those of its images which are neither products of
repression, nor elements that the present social orientation relies
upon too heavily. It allows us to have a modicum of control over them
so that we are not "reified," even if it does tend to return us to the
same redundant patterns of their construction. As attention is
focused within memory the selective functions of differentiation,
association and analogy confer emphasis upon their objects according
to cultural properties of the moment rattier than long standing
repressions. The process is comparable to that of listening to
familiar music with an "educated ear" that has been augmented by
something newly learned and now applied to the same music with subtle
satisfaction.
In the end, selective memory plays such an important role in the
internal focus of attention that the repetitive influence of its
criteria virtually amounts to a mental agency. It assists repression
in navigating the sea of unconscious material, but. we have now discov-
ered that it is unlike repression in the following ways: 1) Selective
memory may have preceded or accompanied the earliest repressions of
infancy where unfit worlds of experience were being shed, but it
continues to act as a post-repressive mechanism. 2) At that level it
is unlike repression in that it affects all of memory and not only
that which has been driven into the unconscious. 3) It affects that
memory on its way to becoming conscious, like a secondary revision
that is more clearly manifest in daydreams and in the mental con-
struction of pictures at the edge of speech, than in the dreams of
sleep. 4) Beyond the condensations that occur in repression,
selective memory positively seeks out elements that are currently out
of attention, and even those which have been repressed in order to
preserve central aspects of its own changing design. 5) It is
changeable and adjusts to circumstances much more readily than
repression by a creative process that is not intentional, but which
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exerts criteria of conscious life and orientation and may be altered
or terminated at once. 6) Thus, in the end, selective memory is a
social as well as a personal function which is established along more
common avenues of association than the superego, and proceeds from
more diverse points of view and different parts of the psyche to
instruct repression according to the order of public interests. It
reproduces the criteria of an educated prejudice that excludes
tolerates, or embraces attributes of the past as it consigns them to
memory and draws them back again. If selective memory is a post-
repressive function it is also a prerequisite of prejudice in the
fullest sense of the word, and therefore plays a crucial part in the
maintenance of social power.
Power is also a Function of Selective Memory
To the extent that our modern conceptions of power have grown
more subtle, we have lost a self-assured conception of how it proceeds
and where it stands in relation to our thoughts. The more that
certain critics have tried to grasp the hidden and least familiar
effects of power, the more they have been tempted to identify it with
psychological repression. Still there have been a few theorists who
have denounced the idea that power is a hidden negativity affecting
the mind, without simply reviving the idea that is is an overt
exercise of public control. For Foucault as we have seen, power is
not a forbidding intrapsychic event but a positive arrangement of
thought and practice that resembles intentional activity without being
intentional. In this sense, his understanding of power might seem
analogous to the functional attributes of selective memory and yet it
is really quite different, and even the expansive consideration of
power that he offers must be altered in light of these considerations
of memory.
Again, for Foucault power is neither an unconscious negation nor
a conscious exertion of one being over others, as it exists between
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them in the epistemic arrangement of their interactions. It exists
beyond the psyche as a constructive, subjectless positivity of schemes
and strategies, and there it, "produces reality; it produces domains
of objects and rituals of truth." 42 This power is not only a force
that works upon us from above, and while it does not work within us
intrapsychically, it works among us quite independent of subjective
endeavors. Once more we find Foucault to be in extreme opposition to
the precepts of psychoanalysis, but still in his formulation power
"produces" the individual
,
4J
and if it is to do this and to construct
the rituals of truth it must somehow set limits to memory. Therefore,
there must be a selective memory that accompanies power and which must
be capable of placing its propositions somewhere within the psyche
addressing both consciousness and repression if they exist at all.
There must be a selective memory having a less independent status than
Foucault would assign to power, and if power operates positively among
us and in producing us, a selective memory must also work through us
at a different level
.
Perhaps selective memory is the point of departure for power
within the mind, a nexus of public and private influences which are
simultaneously more available to consciousness and less radically
distinct from repression than Foucault's notion of "power." Accord-
ingly, when Foucault suggests that power is, "both intentional and
44
nonsubjective," he is either contradicting himself or eliciting new
definitions of those concepts in which there must be new and different
varieties of each. Power might only be intentional and nonsubjective
if the two qualities are subdivided, and if we can find a public side
of intentional ity beyond the realm of subjectivity that is a special
source of motivation in its own right. Then it will appear that power
must be restricted to an equally special place within the many minds,
a place where it is not "intentional and nonsubjective" so much as it
is preintentional and preconsci ous
,
finally exerting its influence
before the deliberate positivity of subjective intentions, but after
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the negativity of repression.*
In this, selective memory appears to be like Foucault's episteme
only with claws that grip the subjective flesh rather differently'
Not only does it effect a conceptual scheme, but it also provides an
order to the passions which are governed by repression and draws both
out in the redundant memories which appear to us "subjectively." At
all of its levels power is selective, but limitations to memory are
its cutting edge within the mind. Consequently, power is not
nonsubjective instead of being subjective and it is not positive
Instead of being negative. Rather, power moves from the nonsubjective
into the subjective, and it becomes positive in a series of steps.
That is, as conscious standards are reiterated in various ways they
become unconscious patterns of mnemonic retrieval. They form a non-
-conscious, positive, constructive latticework that is taken for
granted in the complex familiar thinking of daily life. This
structure may incline people to make exclusions rather negatively, but
it becomes a positive force as a summation of prohibitions -- a
combination of repressive negations and social prohibitions. The
nonsubjective becomes subjective; as the pattern of negations becomes
positive and assumes the form of a theme that may now arise positively
in consciousness.
If power is "positive" and one wishes to dispute the negative
formulation it has received in concepts of oppression and repression
as Foucault has, then it ought to be done at the level of those
agencies which are said to possess it. Thus it is true that the
negativity of repression must translate into a positive set of
instructions, and either repression itself must acquire that subtle
ability, or some auxiliary agency must become active. Such positive
*Foucault's resistance to the notion of repression will receive
further comment in Chapter X, but for now it is sufficient to suggest
that the latter cannot be dispensed with entirely and I have reintro-
duced it deliberately here.
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instruction does not necessarily achieve the clarity of a "reason not
to" but it does bear the fundamental ingredients of instructive les-
sons which convey a sense of propriety. By means of this, an episteme
does not hover over life as an autonomous force perpetuating the
"significations" that are dumbly received. Rather it enlists
individuals to pull forward the elements of history, tradition and
private experience that assemble a fairly prescribed identity. it
must weigh and pursue significance within memory, but as an exercise
of memory it becomes a power that is subject to the creative endeavors
of individuals. That power runs through individuals in becoming the
only reasonable repository for their creative energies, but just as it
is fixed at the outer limits of their reach it is also something they
might occasionally change.
Those of us who believe in freedom like to think that the most
infamous oppressions cannot chain the mind completely and that in some
corner of critical awareness we will always remember what is necessary
to our freedom. In any case we do not like to confuse public
oppression with irrevocable repression, and certainly the two are not
the same. Yet in the most subtle constraints of familiar thinking, as
negating forces become positive "deployments," the public power and
psychological processes touch. Individuals and groups share passions,
masters and slaves together affirm slavery, conservatives and radicals
disavow the same commitments according to consistent selective
apprehensions of the past. If one aspect of power structures the
positive expressions of a way of life, selective memory directs its
interests, fantasies and fetishes; it preserves the divisions of the
past discussed above and now enlivens them with the consi stancies of
familiar themes, themes that consolidate mental pictures, give vent to
the passions and form a restrictive power of their own in organizing
memory. Especially in a failing condition of group life this aspect
of power is most important, for then, selective memory is a means of
self-selection that continually strives to reconstruct an orientation.
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To that conservative end, selective memory may summon the full arsenal
of common experiences, and employing tactics not unlike those of the
psychological defenses to construct its own protected world which
alienates the threatening integrity of childhood, of instinctual
pressure and of disturbing social realities at once.
The adult selective memory is no longer that of the naive infant
who might seek to record or recall anything and everything, nor is it
that of the child who resists the impositions of parental standards
while playing with the order of shells along the beach. This adult
selective memory administers power, it solicits and disguises the
memories it calls forward and it alters the integrity of each one that
is within its grasp. It denounces and rebuilds and it can turn
dictators into angels. It blends fantasy and reality and it has an
extraordinary knack for ideological adherence as it directs the
wishful content of daydreams which are also too conscious, and too
well organized to be called neurotic. That selective memory does not
coerce and it does not teach overt lessons, but it conveys the effects
of power in consolidating the instructive themes of preoccupation that
guide one's cultural experience. As it is both our own power and a
power over us, it allows us to find the antidotes to the failings in
our sense of identity but also leaves the door open to the most
dangerous kind of public madness.
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Section III
A Note on the Defensive Strategies nf Selective Memory in thp Groug
Since memory must ultimately become the vehicle for the strate-
gies of social power, the examination of the defensive strategies that
belong to memory itself must properly be included in the study of
power in collective life. In the exercise of selective memory,
psychological defenses have been joined to public interests in such a
way that the past is not only divided into portions that seem near or
far in time, but into those which seem to be precious or undesirable,
nostalgically favored or obsolete. Because selective memory pertains
to consciousness, intenti onal ity and public standards, while having
many of the characteristics of a mental agency, it creates special
defenses that are not precisely the same, but not unlike the defenses
of the ego. For this reason, and because it has stood the test of
45time, it is prudent to consider the complete range of psychological
defenses that Anna Freud unveiled in her "ego psychology" as means to
similar ends in collective life. The defenses that she enumerated and
which must now be considered include the following variations: 1) Re-
pression, 2) Regression, 3) Reaction Formations, 4) Isolation,
5) Undoing, 6) Projection, 7) Introjection
, 8) Turning Against the
Self, 9) Reversal, and 10) Sublimation, 46 and these may have
distinctive bearing on the selective memory of groups.
Although a group does not possess an ego, and does not engage the
psychological defenses as such, it must maintain a status quo of
identity in a parallel series of efforts. But since those efforts are
undertaken in the more nearly conscious endeavors of selective memory,
they are particularly concerned to establish a general pattern of
exclusion from memory that is essentially a rationale for forgetting.
There are therefore different paradigms at work in the defensive
strategies of the individual and the shared selective memory of the
group. If the paradigmatic defense for the individual is "reversal"
that ability to convert one's impulses toward an object and to
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change the object into its opposite - as it appears to be in Anna
Freud's overview, 47 the comparable paradigm for the efforts of the
group is likely to be the "isolation" or "undoing" that would sever
certain affects from 'ideas' about a shared reality. Accordingly,
there is a dramatic shift in the character of the "defenses" that we
find within the group from which a series of other differences must
follow.
From Repression and "Denial" to Recontextual i zation
In the pursuit of generalities which makes the group more likely
to "isolate" or "undo" the past than to "reverse" threatening
evocations, it is also more likely to engage the defense of "denial"
than that of repression. This is because denial, as Anna Freud
distinguishes it from repression, is directed against external
stimulations rather than against internal impulses. 48 Of course
'external' stimuli are a more decisive presence in group life because
the very things that might occur to the individual as something
internal have there acquired a cumulative effect that no longer seems
to come from within. Thus, the group may deny a great many things
that come from within itself and its members as_ i_f they were something
alien. In addition, denial is a defense that is especially fitted to
the present, unlike the repressions of long standing, 49 and it is
therefore well suited to the rapid changes and expediences of group
selective memory -- its styles and its issues which become the proper-
ties of an exclusive present. In other words the group tends to
regard itself as a present society of insiders which denies certain
external stimuli as well as certain pasts. Indeed, a process very
like denial may motivate a formulaic response within the group that
treats repetitions of internal stimuli as if they were present and
external threats to identity.
However the concept of denial sounds too much like a self-
deception to capture the comparable processes in the group which,
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properly speaking, has no 'self.' For this reason, as the Mitscher-
lichs have indicated, the group does have a special ability that
allows it to disavow the feelings associated with a particular past
and to regard that past as something external to its own experience.
In this, as they say, the process of denial moves one step further and
it is, "reinforced by another, by undoing
, that is, the process by
which the past is turned into something that never happened." 50
Because the memories of individuals within the group may keep alive
undesirable aspects of its past the group resorts to more deliberate
means to curtail them. By argumentation, ritualized repetitions, by
censoring, banning, reeducating or prosecuting, a profound complicity
may be forged between public rationalizations and the strategies of
psychological denial. This may proceed to the point where there is
virtually no difference between certain standards of "rationality,"
and the exclusive standards which are applied unconsciously, so that
the terms of what is to be included in "reality" may be affected in a
collusion of rational and unconscious interests. In this way the
denial of the past may ultimately engage the tactic of "de-realiza-
tion" which the Mitscherl i hcs have identified in the contemporary
German effort to forget the Third Reich. 51
So the defensive processes of the group seem to become ever more
like the most conscious attributes of individual denial, those for
which in Stoller's view, "the word 'disavowal' seems best, with its
connotation that one still retains awareness of what one wants to be
rid of; while denial connotes that the denied is closer to becominq
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unconscious." Nevertheless, if the group utilizes more conscious
strategies of denial or disavowal in its selective use of memory, it
does not possess a collective "awareness" or "consciousness" of that
which it denies in the same way. Instead, it possesses shared cri-
teria for what is real and what is unreal; what belongs to its context
and what does not, and what is most likely and least likely to enter
any individual consciousness. Accordingly, the group does not
'repress,' 'deny,' 'de-realize,' or 'disavow' its pasts so much as it
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recontextualizes them to secure the 'real' terms of its identity.
2
-
From the Defense of the Ego to the Redistribution of Self
It follows that the constant recontextual i zati on of memories is
not a procedure which simply defends the ego but one which realigns
all of the agencies of the psyche to accord with common referents for
identity. Since each agency of the mind - the ego, the superego and
the id — is possessed of its own series of memories, and since those
memories may be somewhat affected by official judgements and media
presentations, their construction and the very sense of self which
they comprise must also be affected. Each agency of the mind may find
that it has allies among the public sources of mnemonic orientation,
and that it is meaningfully suspended within that orientation by the
force of public analogues to its own agency which help to locate the
"I." The superego, for example, is partially oriented with reference
to the responsible moral institutions that assume a portion of its
burden. The demanding energies of the superego -- the feelings of
guilt or responsibility that it generates -- may even be assuaged when
public agencies take up their charge in a way that makes people
complacent. In that event it might take a public figure like Edward
R. Murrow to begin to undo the work of a Joseph McCarthy before many
people can regain their own sense of responsibility for the issues
that the two addressed and so that the content of the superego may be
defensively redistributed.
Similarly the agency of the ego may be "defended" by even more
devious means. Since we know that the "I" of memory is comprised of
both a viewing self and the selves which are viewed, it should not
surprise us that the two may become detached systematically in public
constraints upon memory. Where the ego meets with the instructions of
shared memory, it may respond to guilt, express desire or feel
responsibility indirectly because it is able to displace a special
part of its own sel f -concepti on and credit it with the experience.
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Rather than feeling themselves to be wholly resposible for something
in the past life of the group for example, individuals may shift that
burden to a special part of themselves, particularly to that self who
they seem to observe internally in their daily reflections about their
own public performance. That observed self ~ who is also the one who
notoriously wanders through memory - now tends to assume the
attributes of a "type" of person who the observing self imagines an
alliance with. It becomes the kind of "identity" which "I" would feel
most comfortable to possess whenever I step into the public limelight.
Thanks to this fanciful subjunctive subject, responsibilities may be
disclaimed internally and laid upon the shoulders of another self
within ourselves that civic minded being whom "I feel, should feel
x about y." While this might be considered to be an effect of
superego, the activity in question is not only directed by the
superego and it is not precisely the ego which is blamed. The agent
who 'feels' the guilt is the result of a specially prescribed split; a
special one of one's selves who best accomodates the models of good
character that have been instilled in memory. The self and its guilt
are redistributed among the selves represented in memory, which are
something quite different from the mental agencies.
Finally, the group creates a facile link between the host of
unconscious dangers stemming from the id and the characteristics of
persistant enemies in rather stable projections. Of course the
unconscious fears of many individuals will have an intrinsic common-
ality that will forever be "projected" onto some external foe, but now
under the influence of a special group sanction, the same fears are
reiterated, received and accepted again as_ something alien, the
precise details of which are now illuminated in that peculiar light
that gives them the tinge of unreality. They become part of the
f ami 1 iar strangeness and the persistant unreality that complements the
real and sets limits to the redistribution of self, as they provide a
kind of "twilight zone" at the edge of memory. In these ways, it is
not that the ego is protected from the harsh superego, or defended
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against the id, but the three are redistributed in a tolerable scheme
that is instructed by common themes of memory.
3
-
From Undoin g and De-realization to Obsolescence and Cliches
In the interest of this redistribution of the self, acceptable
ingredients of the past must be tethered to a present sense of
reality. If the psychological defense of "undoing" would dissociate
the past from a larger sense of current reality,
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and it is further
assisted by the process which the Mitscherl ichs call de-realization,
the process is also advanced by obsolescence which guards a present
sense of reality from the past without making the past seem completely
unreal. While the Mi tscherl ichs dispense with the notion of obso-
lescence in their account of collective guilt because they find that
it is not properly a "psychological" concept, it is a contributing
factor in selective memory nonetheless. 54 Indeed, where there are
members of the group who have not forgotten a painful episode in
collective experience, even their own private memories may be affected
by the criteria that determine what is obsolete, since they too have
learned to locate "historic" occurences in appropriately belittling
contexts of memory. Just as the embarrassment that accompanies adult
selective memory sheds certain childhood experiences without forget-
ting them entirely, the sense of obsolescence suspends collective
experiences at the outer limits of acceptability which are established
by distinguishing contexts in a progressive sequence. Obsolescence is
no longer just an attribute of disused technologies, but of all that
is dysfunctional to a sense of contemporary modern life in progress.
Since the application of that standard is certainly more
self-conscious than a usual 'defense, 1 public authorities seek to
influence it directly in the way that Japanese educational authorities
have recently sought to soften the textbook descriptions of the
infamous "rape of Nanking" by the use of more euphemistic language.
Authorities may re-edit the past, canonize it or subject it to
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prolonged and highly contained debates encouraging the public to wait
patiently for the demise of a threatening recollection. So it is that
such a memory will be revived in a series of different forums until it
seems vague, outmoded, hypothetical or mythical. Just as every other
society has its particular means of producing archaism, we have
therefore devised our own procedures to that end. Here in America,
one can anticipate how calamitous events will first become the
"issues" of political debate, next they will be moved to formal legal
forums, then to televised specials and out the rear of "docudramas ."
This occurred when self-procl aimed American Nazis marched in Skokie as
dramatized on CBS in 1981; it has occurred with the issues of 'bus-
ing,' the bombing of abortion clinics and in numerous other instances.
The issues are dispersed as they are antiquated, and they are sus-
pended in obsolescence or fetishized in nostaligia so that those two
attributes of the past become part of the same distancing process like
two sides of an old coin that is displayed with only one side showing.
The processes of obsolescence proceed as if to inoculate our
current orientation against seemingly alien memories in the same way
that we may hear about slavery in America, or "the atrocities of
Vietnam" so often that their associations become fixed and may seem
detached from our experience. On the one hand, this process succeeds
like a defense in the moment when people become bored by the past and
regard its enduring wounds as mere cliches. On the other hand, it
succeeds when that past is preserved only in the excitement of those
commonplace nostalgias which seem to have been rescued from obsoles-
cence, but really provide the exception that proves the rule -- the
bit that is saved and distorted in order to justify all that is not.
The obsolete is therefore dispersed all around the "memorable" in
such a way that nostaligia and the ordinary cliches of one society
form a platform of current memories which are not obsolete. Special
commemorative events thus take on the quality of those familiar and
convenient markers which punctuate the course of life that Schachtel
observes in conventional thinking:
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Adult memory reflects life as a road with occasional sign-
posts and milestones rather than as the landscape throuqh
which the road is led. The milestones are measurements oftime, the months and years, the empty count of time goneby... moving from one place to another, so many birthdays
and so forth. The signposts represent the outstanding
events to which they point -- entering college, the firstjob, marriage, birth of children, buying a house, a family
celebration, a trip. But it is not events that are remem-
bered as they really happened and were experienced at the
time. What is remembered instead is usually, more or less,
only the fact that such an event took place. The signpost
is remembered... they point to the events that are conven-
tionally supposed to be significant to the cliches which
society has come to consider as the main stations of
1 ife.[56]
In the end, the feeling of nostalgia merges with such cliches to claim
them for us defensively against the backdrop of obsolescence.
4. From Isolation to Thematic Reductions
Psychological "isolation" is said to retain powerful affects in
the form of ideas, while cutting off the associational contexts at
their roots which might provoke unwanted feelings. 57 Since it is just
such a process that is necessary to the ordinary communicative forma-
tion of meaning -- the formation of generalities, or abstractions of
agreement -- the group is the instigator of special isolations that do
not appear to be defenses, but which are repeated in highly contained
and protective themes. Thus, "freedom" comes to mean something that
is detached from the exhilaration that followed a successful rebellion
-- and the general suffering which unites a people may mean something
without recalling one particular suffering. The group fashions
multiple isolations containing reduced memories that pertain to birth,
death, sex, violence, love, war and the like, which become redundant
themes of the sort that will be discussed in the next chapter. As
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each idea is fitted with a popular imagery that is devoid of origi-
nating contextual associations, it becomes more in a way that makes it
less. At the same time that original affects are detached from the
isolated idea that is recalled, those affects are also freed from
their initial contexts so that they must now be resolved thematically
and be given a common expression that is not too evocative. Difficult
memories may therefore be divided so that some portion of them remains
as a semblance of its former self, often as "history," while another
portion persists as an affect which has become linked to common themes
and fantasies.
Thus, two kinds of isolated "idea" survive in the group, and as
affects, contexts and ideas have been divided from one another they
are brought back together again at two distinct levels of reflection:
In the first, there are isolated ideas that seem to be just like
those which occur in private thinking and fantasy, but which are also
the distillates of public standards. These are topical memories, and
they arise as the affects which have been dislodged from their con-
texts return to motivate that special order of shared memories which
imitates the private fantasies at their origin. In this vein the hero
of one best selling American novel offers his favorite memories to us
as a sequence of private fantasies that are really very common themes
male, American themes which link a specific set of images to
sundered affects and give them more of the substance of 'ideas':
...I collect moments of total subjective pleasure, box
them up and put them in a shed in the back of my head...
So what would be a gem in the collection? -- A time when
I am totally fit and I have just come wading through one
of the fringes of hell... I am out of it, and if there is
any pain it is too dwindled to notice. I am in some warm
place where the air and sea are bright... there is good
music when and if I want it. There is a drink I have not
yet tasted... there is a lovely laughing lady, close
enough to touch, and there are no tensions between us
except the ones that come from need. [58]
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At the second level of reflection where isolations become
thematic reductions ~ ideas, affects and contexts are brought back
together again as overt justifications for the sel f-procl aimed
identity of the group. They do not masquerade as fantasies, but
instead somewhat fanciful notions now masquerade as truths that tie
the identities of many people together. Hence, the isolation of a
painful past may become a real, if mythical source of unity for a
subordinate group as it construes that historic suffering to be the
justification for contempoary pride. However, the idea of that pain
may readily be adjusted to become a vehicle of assimilation to a
larger group as its content shifts in selective memory. For example,
if American culture is generally preoccupied with certain bodily
concerns and victimizations as we shall see, these may become the lens
through which the subgroup recalls its own pain. Certain priorities
sweep through the unique legacies of the different subgroups giving
thematic emphasis to special features of their suffering as to the
particular physical tortures that they endured. Now we tend to recall
these first in the history of a group so that we envision Black slaves
in chains, Jews in camps, Irish starving, and so on. The record of
that particular suffering often stands in place of the broader
recollections of a legacy that is less easily assimilated. Even when
we are enjoined by our subgroups to remember our roots in torment, we
might well be suspicious of the broad selective intent that would rob
them of a fuller distinction as it might incline us to regard the
whole history of "our people" in terms of its thematically reduced
pain.
5. From Reaction Formations to Analogy and Association
Following closely upon the inclination of the group to make
thematic reductions is its ability to sustain limited fields of
analogy and association which seem to be more ordinary and are
certainly less evocative. We commonly contain disruptive evocations
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in the fixed associatonal schemes that guide our expressions rather
than in fantasies or group identifications. Among these, there are
prevalent cultural images of opposition and dualisms of the sort that
will be discussed in the next chapter, that work like a "reaction
formation" to bind the threatening past. For the individual, reaction
formations are enduring repressive configurations that are repeated
emphatically, each, "secures the ego against the return of repressed
impulses from within.
"
by
Yet for the group a comparable function does
not need to be so assiduous since its medium is generalization of the
sort which must keep everything in sight and cannot entirely repress
it. The unwanted past or the extraneous threatening evocation is
therefore contained when it elicits restricted associations and finds
only limited analogies that have been fitted to common usage. These
may contain or even reverse the impact of former experiences and the
more they are repeated, the more their reduction obtains the weight of
"reality."
In this way, a subtle change in the referential memories of
commonly expressed meanings may effect a special kind of "reversal"
that is open to the manipulation of people in authority. A particular
meaning may actually be converted into its opposite if persons in
authority successfully redefine the limits of analogy and association.
If they dare to bring hiterto unspoken contrasts into relief -- to
introduce a selective transparency into the meanings which have been
opaque to the painful memories at their source -- they may invert the
troubled associations of a particular group. They may even displace
the need for each member of the group to maintain certain reaction
formations if they reconstruct analogies and associations in such a
way as to affect the terms of repression and the 'reality principle'
to which they adhere.
Thus, in one extreme example, Himmler could turn "conscience
upside down" by realigning the associ ational imagery of "strength,"
"decency," "hardness" and "glory," with parallel and hitherto opposing
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images of slaughter in an attempt to justify the killing of Jews:
...most of you, will know what it means to see a hundred
corpses lying in front of you or five hundred or a thousand
c^P ,
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Insidious inhumanity is passed off as proud and even innocent decency.
Himmler seems to show compassion for his audience of would-be killers,
twisting and assuaging their fears by daring to evoke the imagery of
their deepest fears; refashioning their patterned reactions according
to what is -- or will become a common memory for them. The dead
bodies of the defenseless people who have been slaughtered are associ-
ated with honor and decency rather than cowardice, the observing pos-
ture that his audience assumes in their own imaginations is made anal-
ogous to a posture of moral superiority. Unspeakable cruelty becomes
speakable in precisely that sudden twist of associations, and as it is
repeated again and again it may alter the very sense of virtue.
Significantly, such experiences are "never to be written" as a
glorious history because this "glory" is to be achieved as it is
memorized with the unrecorded humility that is to receive Himmler'
s
immediate and silent approval. A reversal is internalized and carried
out on the spot and in a manner that would only be upset by subsequent
textual scrutiny. Indeed, such attempts to restructure memory were
not concerned to deliver a lasting message to posterity so much as to
alter the associations of the foundation of identity among those
present, and to press them into action. The limits, inclusions and
exclusions of those fields of association were therefore able to twist
and convert meaning in the manner of a defense.
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*
F™m Intro.jection and Project ion to Personifications and ThPir
Characteri sti cs ~~
"
Psychoanalytical^ inspired thinkers have given much considera-
tion to the hypnotic power of leaders over their groups. 61 On the
model of love, as by the historical example of Fascism, they describe
how individuals in a group may give up their egos to a projected
version of their parental ego ideals with which they infuse their
leaders. Yet this is an extreme case that may misrepresent a more
common and much more qualified appreciation of the leader or of the
lesser personifications which do not move entire agencies within the
psyche. In other words, there are intermediate steps toward giving
oneself up to a leader in which we may recognize the less severe
predisposition of collective life to personify important features of
the past to make them correspond with the complex themes of the
present and to envision the gestures, facial expressions and minute
characteristics that express them.
Before people cherish the person of a leader they have already
populated their selective memories. Almost from the time when they
made introjects of their parents that would later become the founda-
tions of superego, they were also able to remove the faces from the
persons in their memory and to imagine them in various instructive
guises as the limited personifications of different states of being
and desire. They learned to "project" their own threatening impulses
onto the outside world, to "introject" the attributes of others
defensively, or to reverse the danger they posed by forming an
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"identification with the aggressor." In this way too, the per-
sonification of attributes rather than of individuals who might be
fully recalled, becomes the focal point for important associations.
Faceless characteristics are split from ego ideals even as they still
retain a portion of the intrinsic memorability of important persons
and we formulate defensive personifications that also guide selective
memory.
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Adults will therefore tend to imagine persons without familiar
names or features who represent the memory of meaningful aspects of
their lives. Even public issues may be recalled in this way as in
consideration of capital punishment, people imagine an archetypal
criminal committing a crime or bolted to an electric chair or
regarding abortion they might recall the image of a woman in anguish
over the discovery of a pregnancy, the fetus, or a newborn child, m
this, personification is a particularly adept means of streamlining
the past as it is a convenient means of reducing ideas generally it
combines the psychological defenses of introjection and projection in
that it calls upon individuals to apply the two selectively, and yet,
since the group has no ego of its own to "project" from or to "intro-
ject" to, this personification appears to reside in popular images
that seem to be "external" to the individual. It makes a partial use
of introjection and projection as it ceases to be concerned with
entire persons in favor of their qualities and types of "character."
As such characteristics are suspended in this way, they become a
ready means of joining personal pasts to the historical and tradi-
tional past since both may be embossed upon the same personified
images. With the same efficacy that it once may have had for the
ancient memory arts, the single human face recalled may therefore
become a "type" of enduring importance. The evil face or the happy
face may have characteristics recalled by everyone, while each
individual also imagines them differently with the condensed impres-
sions of persons they have actually known. Accordingly, the selective
introjection and projection which are at work in this do not proceed
only as defenses, but in order to reconstruct the very foundations of
identity defensively. They form imaginative suspensions which are
everywhere, and everywhere they guide selective memory like the astral
spirits who are said to lead mediums through the nether world.
As the capacity to remove the face from early introjects is
amended by the inclination to fill them continually with the ficiti-
tious characteristics, the heroic and villainous attributes that are
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provided in a cultural legacy, it is hardly necessary for an effective
leader to be infused with parental ideals in a projected cult of
personality. He or she might more easily provide a point of intersec-
tion for the current list of valued traits and be revered for
possessing the very attributes that seem to be lacking in the parents
of an entire generation. Especially in America, where apathy seems to
have greater sway than adoration of the leader, those who do lead may
do so as they embody the suspended attributes that have only been
partly introjected by most of the people. If those leaders cannot
generate the legitimacy which is necessary to power, they may still
personify the characteristics that have won legitimacy elsewhere, and
borrow a portion of their credibility. Thus, the modern leader who
operates amidst antiquated meaning may yet personify traits that are
venerable without embodying or even expressing the ideals which seem
crucial to state and party.*
7
-
From Turn ing Against the Self to Monolithic Reductions and
Stereotypes
The defensive tendency to generate stereotypes and monolithic
reductions is related to this tendency to personify and it is
evidently an extension of the propensity to limit associations and
analogical fields. However it is more a matter of consolidating a
series of attributes in the maintenance of types and classifications
that are necessary to group orientation. In this, the group accom-
plishes something like the psychological defense of "turning against
the self." That defense responds to instinctual demands toward others
by reversing them so that they fall back upon the self -- in the way
*This tendency has lately been parodied in two films: Being
There
,
based on the novel by Jerzy Kosinsky, with Peter Sellers as the
simpleton onto whom everyone projects the traits of leadership; and,
in a sense, Woody Allen's Zel ig -- the character who is lauded for his
chameleon-like ability to assimilate the characteristics of others.
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that the voyeuristic impulse is the hidden motivation of the exhibi-
tionist, and an aggressive impulse that of the masochist - so that an
active aim turns passive and is contained. 63 Although the group
cannot replicate such a reversal, it may generate stereotypes in a
similar way. The extreme reversal that is accomplished in turning
against the self depends upon the fact that those involved will
simultaneously experience both the role of being active and the rol
of being passive, by assuming an exaggerated passive posture that
mockingly expresses the very aggressive impulses that it elicits.
This is all the more apparent for the group "identity" which is not a
self, but a creature of many parts that cannot be well hidden. Within
it, the active and passive types are distinguished and caricatured
only to be united again in a tight thematic play of opposites. the
process sets itself the task of defining what is an opposite, what are
monoliths of opposition, and since it cannot hide these efforts from
itself, neither the active nor the passive type will necessarily
determine identity. Instead the two are often overtly portrayed in
public expressions that reveal their embattled presence and reflect an
uncertain identity in sado-masochistic themes or voyeri sti c-exhi bi
-
tionistic attitudes.
For this reason we do not require scapegoats when monolithic
reductions of ideas and stereotypes suffice to express the conflicted
aspects of shared identity. As in turning against the self, we may
shift our perspective outward as if to view the reduced features of
our culture from the passive seat of the spectator. We may dissociate
ourselves from the aggressive or passive expressions of group identity
while indulging both, as we regard the distant monoliths that we 'love
to love' or 'love to hate.' We may be exempt, like the exhibitionist
who sees himself as the passive recipient of so many acknowledging
stares, or the masochist who would be the innocent victim of his own
deepest desires. But we choose sides with far greater flexibilty than
the exhibitionist or the masochist inasmuch as those roles are made
public and as we recall them by type. If we fail to break down their
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memory further, we will persist in the effort that distances a part of
our identity from our identity, and we will finally resort to
scapegoating.
8
*
From Regression, to Returni ng to Pasts in Nostalgia and Selpc.t.ivp
History "
lt should be evident from the discussions above that pasts of
long duration are the special province of shared memory, and that
today they tend to be claimed in a "historical perspective" more than
in the religious or traditional notions that once held them. Since
the historical past seems to be so vast and so much less purposeful
than the legacies which tradition would provide for us, we are now
inclined to search within it for instruction so that today the age of
historical self
-awareness is also that of nostalgia. In this, the
selective memory of our period makes special use of the psychological
defense of "regression," binding it with historical biases to serve
identity. As mentioned above, our collective ability to render the
past obsolete is matched by our tendency to fetishize other pasts
nostalgically. Thus, in one stroke nostalgia may preserve and deny
the reality of the past. In nostalgia we are hypnotically entranced
by the special scenes of former life which are so often repeated that
they melt within the ordinary cliches of the present to produce a kind
of stupefaction that may often inhibit other refletions upon the past.
Nostalgic preferences provide the present with the familiar
tracings from which the archaic may be cut away, and they foster the
grand patterns of selective memory which engage all other strategies
of defense. Making such isolations, nostalgia separates affects and
ideas about the past in order to refashion them. It restricts the
fields of association attributable to those pasts, de-realizes their
surroundings and seeks out personifications within them that might
refurbish present identity. Thus nostalgia paints a richly descrip-
tive miniature of a mythical "history" that maintains the principle of
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historical 'accuracy' just enough to secure its creations as if they
had both the integrity of a personal memory and the veracity of
history. It enhances by violating and redividing the vital Western
division between history, fantasy and individual pasts.
Among the psychological defenses, Anna Freud has suggested that
"regression" is the most primitive, since it may even precede
repression as it allows infants to revert to the earliest instinctual
phases. But the group, as we shall soon see, does not actually
regress to an earlier instinctual phase, and for the same reason that
it does not regress to a stage of 'narcissism' 55 as an adolescent
might, it does something more complex with the instincts by affixing
them within a public sense of time and important events. The group
may generate nostalgic fetishism for a historic period that is within
the reach of memory for a large number of its members to induce
another kind of "regression." Modern collectivities will therefore
tend to regress to recent historic phases that best represent the
qualities that seem lacking in the present and in the absence of
historical knowledge these may also be informed by anal ogous • experi
-
ences in individual development. As mentioned above, groups tend to
fetishize the wishes of those times and to cast them forward again as
wish-memories that define identity and chart the future.
Therefore nostalgia actually conflates historical regression and
a personal regression. As we see so often today, special historic
periods are matched up with the formative phases of life in the
generation of people who have now achieved their most potent adult-
hood. An especially lively nostalgia thus refers everyone to the
powerful currents of events and styles that shaped the lives of people
now entering middle age and that nostalgia may not belong only to
those who can remember it. In the 1940s and '50s, heroic images of
the young families of the 1920s might have been a powerful nostalgic
response by those of several age groups to the experiences of World
War. Later, the experience of highschool and rebellious adolescence
in the 1950s becomes an appropriate theme for nostalgia, and next, the
519
experiences of a slightly younger set in the 1960s. Of course it is
the favorable caricatured images of those times that infuse the living
memory of people who will tell their grandchildren that "I was a
flapper," or their children that "I was a hippie," regardless of what
they thought of themselves at the time.
Thus, the most primitive defense of regression is inverted to
become a most sophisticated device for the group, and now, by similar
means, the group will ceremonially fetishize other sets of historical
events that took place before the living memory of its members.
Fantasy and distant history may combine to call forward some signi-
ficant era as if we had visited it in a time machine. Many indivi-
duals may imagine themselves roving about in history where they
presumptuously claim all the autonomy that they wish for in the
present, each like a "Yankee in King Arthur's Court." 66 So too,
without noticing it we may make small regressions and quasi -hi storical
recombinations in the mnemonic content of a single notion: the
presidency (now recalls my first vote, George Washington and Water-
gate); Beauty (recalls someone I know, Helen of Troy, Cleopatra and a
bubble bath commercial); Love (recalls one's own object of desire, and
the scene of Cyrano's serenade).
9- From Sublimation to a Hierarchy of Sublimations
On a par with the complex mnemonic achievements of various
returns to the past and the ability to de-realize other pasts, we have
a remarkable ability to justify and repudiate them. Although this
might seem to be a matter of purely present judgement having little to
do with memory, it is as much a means of containing the memories of a
group as "sublimation" is a defense. Anna Freud considers sublimated
acts to be defenses because in those creative moments instinctual aims
have been displaced in conformity with "higher social values." 67 But
inevitably this involves the interjection of standards which do not
belong to the psyche per se. For this reason we must ask whether it
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is an creative thinking that is defensive, or particuarly that which
appeals to "higher values," and if it is the latter, how is it that
higher values came to operate within the process of sublimation?
Once more we must appeal to the functions of selective memory in
order to find an answer. There, at least, it may be said that we are
already applying standards of justification and repudiation as if they
were aesthetic principles, irrevocable likes and dislikes that are
stamped in memory. Accordingly it is not sublimation as such that
forms and applies the standards which make it defensive, and not each
and every creative pursuit that will protect the ego in the same way.
Rather, the pattern that has been stamped in memory for use in the
creative pursuits is something that has emerged from the contests
among alj_ varieties of creativity as they have been won or lost in a
particular society. Where each culture has managed to find its own
rules and referees, the creative energies have been divided and
arranged hierarchically so that they are now expressed in relation to
one another, and people may engage in mathematics, music, dance or
religious meditation, each by a subtle shift of attention away from
the others. The varieties of sublimation compliment and divide each
other until they have established complex selective criteria. In the
end, sublimation derives its defensive capability as it applies a set
of standards that arise from competing creativities, a ranking of
sublimations that immediately affects creative processes, as opposed
to a set of lofty principles which might be applied to them from
beyond.
It is not, therefore, a fixed aesthetic "ideal" that effects a
defense any more than it is the broad selective scale of sublimations
that detemines every such ideal in the first place. The character of
the sublimation that takes place in classical music, jazz or rock-
and-roll does not depend upon the intrinsic nature of each so much as
it depends upon its place in the hierarchy -- as is the case with
scientific creations, hobbies, fantasies and so on. That is, inasmuch
as it operates as a defense, sublimation is creative thought measuri ng
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itself by standards which it also helps to create for what is "higher"
or "lower." The same standards may then be applied in justifications
where, for example, a military rampage is recreated in memory as an
honorable action by moving it within a certain vein of sublimation
that is generally applied to honorable actions. We might explain it
by the relevant passages from international law which refer us to the
lofty 'ends' that justify such occurrences and the jargon of rational
sublimation that might turn a rampage into an act of heroism. We
might apply our "highest" standards of creative expression to the
matter as if they were immediate perceptions to effect a defense
against an alternative way of remembering it.
As I suggested in the early chapters above, the oriented activity
of memory requires notions of creative process a conceptual pole
which is as vital to our recollections as conceptions of space and
time. Hence the hierarchy of sublimations or of the various kinds of
creative activity is an embedded part of what Habermas refers to asCO
the "ordo-knowledge" of a stage in society, and what Foucault calls
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an
"
episteme ," and it generates rather general standards for
selective memory. Further, even when it appears that "technical
rationality" is responsible for the defensive exclusion of certain
pasts and certain instincts as Marcuse argued, it is still not
necessarily because "reason" is intrinsically more repressive than all
other kinds of sublimated creativity, 70 but rather, because a certain
restricted kind of reason has acquired a dominant place above the
others in prescribing the order of argument that renders justifica-
tions. As it was suggested earlier as well, that "reason" is already
a construction which combines scientific, technical and the most
fantastic kinds of thinking, and it will not be a release of the
instincts, but a different way of reasoning and remembering that will
begin to undo it. Thus, criticism might make the contest among
sublimations more evident in order to question the grounds of
justification and repudiation that are so defensively applied.
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By all of these means an engram of power and identity is detailed
for the membership of the group. The psychological defenses are
reproduced imperfectly as processes of shared selective memory which
may enlist each individual to the task of sustaining a collective
orientation. Now the means for arranging all of the types and
divisions of the past discussed in Chapter VII are available, and we
may see how the exclusions which function like defenses define the
shape of each self-reflection and every simple recognition. For this
reason, as the analysis of memory proceeds, it becomes possible to
assume a critical stance within the flow of public conceptualizations
just as it is possible to be suspicious of one's own defenses. With
that suspicious attitude, it will not be by liberating the instincts,
by fantasy or free association that we become most critical of the
limiting conditions of our memory, but by making ourselves aware of
the most subtle associati onal constraints in our most common and least
repressed memories.
As we illuminate these mnemonic constraints within the percep-
tions that are normally taken for granted in viewing a film or
listening to a political speech, something both psychological and
social will surface in our awareness. We will become aware of the
associations, the parade of types and things and persons who populate
the special pasts that our experience sends back to us. Idiosyncratic
personal fetishes as well as the special fetishes that arise in one
particular political economy will seem to recede as the background
from which they were originally drawn is moved into the light, and we
will see them both in a changed perspective. We will acknowledge the
various kinds of past which are assembled in each meaningful notion,
and the types of memory that give them the force to effect a special
meaning. We will see the points where a defense and a cliche
intertwine, and where nostalgic sentiment and history intersect. The
linguistic structure of a speech or the significations of a film might
be viewed in light of their evocations, and the persistant limits that
are born within them. Yet that sort of criticism cannot proceed on
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the assumption that we know the "truth" or can discover the "reality"
which lies beneath the deceptive "appearances" of this society
Rather, it assumes that memory constitutes appearances of varying
depth and intensity and that it must always make its own measurements
among them with reference to the elusive integrity of different pasts.
This sort of criticism will chart the common themes of memory with
reference to their own distant mnemic content so that we might now
examine a deadening familiarity with fresh eyes.
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CHAPTER X
SELECTIVE THEMES AND PATHWAYS IN MODERN MEMORY
As if they had finally solved the riddle, people often say that
memory "works by association." Memories certainly do persist in
associational schemes, but to say that this is so does not settle the
matter, for if the whole of memory has a fraction of the importance
attributed to it here, then those schemes of association have many
uncharted consequences for identity. As we have noticed, there appear
to be numerous landscapes within memory that fill the uncertain
consciousness which preceeds our articulations - landscapes that are
constructed from associations and designed so as to draw our attention
down the most accustomed pathways. Now it may be demonstrated that
the associational schemes which point the way for memory amount to
guiding themes. It may be shown that those themes have deep and
virtually instinctual sources which finally obtain precise cultural
formulations and that a study of cultural mnemonics may yet discover
systematic foundations among them.
In keeping us to familiar paths, memory constantly restores our
equilibrium in a way that suggests that it must serve a deeper set of
interests. Whether our reflections are led to pursue a closed series
of analogies linking comparable types of things, or to pursue a more
random sequence of associations, we often find that we have been
relocated within a familiar mental neighborhood. In each of our
worldly encounters memory satiates us with sane images, and whether
they are instrinsical ly pleasant or painful, they still provide us
with the comforts of an orientation, habits of thinking and even a
compulsion to reconstruct the familiar aspects of experience that
provides far more than comfort. Now, for example, when we visit
someone in the hospital we are likely to find ourselves at the
juncture of familiar mnemonic pathways concerning that person, the
disease and our bodily fears concerning it, the palliatives of modern
-529-
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medicine, images of doctors and so on, as inevitable thoughts seem to
fill the experience and provide it with tendrils of coherent associa-
tion. The most frightening thoughts are subjected to an abiding sense
of order and to a ranking of themes which provides its own distinct
satisfactions even during the course of an experience that might
otherwise prove to be agonizing.
For all of the divisions and structures of memory that we have
considered, what actually appears to us in the propositional form of
mental pictures, is a rather prescribed set of associations. As we
have seen, our memories contain a coherent division among the types of
the past which assigns them to history, personal experience, tradition
and the like, as they also contain the ranking of the types of reflec-
tive processes applied to each, and as they contain the conceptual
precepts of the age concerning space, time and creative process. Yet
in specific circumstances we find that we are almost completely unable
to resist the impulse to make particular associations and to extract
commonplace analogies from memory. It is those thematic images which
are so often repeated, and which contain the rules of memory that have
been secreted away in them. So it is that the persistance and
regularity of those images seems to arise from two sources. On the
one hand there are clear conventions of thinking that preserve them,
and on the other hand an evocation may arouse our passions and the
innervations we call instincts, to which memory offers a ready and
deeply engrained response. Repetitive themes seem to be suspended
between familiar, conventional associations, and the fundamental
incentives of instinct.
Accordingly, the special comfort that is afforded by a repetition
of themes is something between a bodily satisfaction and the pleasures
of reason and sublimation. There is a persistant ease of feeling to
those simple restorations of mind that may even compensate for a
degree of pain. Even if a particular memory is painful it may
therefore provide the emotional salve of familiarity, the satisfaction
of a marginal creation and the sort of modest pleasure of successfully
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completing an assigned task. Thus, the coldest calculation that the
scientist would dissociate from pleasure will still establish its own
comforting stasis, as it is a successful achievement within an order
that revives the singular satisfactions of order. That distinctive
comfort which arises when memory submerges an evocation within a
familiar theme applies equally to musings, to mechanically precise
thoughts, and even to painful thoughts, and it might be said that in
this sense memory works discretely as our greatest organ of deceptive
pi easure.
In ordinary themes of preoccupation then, memory propels us
like Freud's "pleasure principle" - toward a certain equilibrium,
only it is not an organic equilibrium and its pleasures are not
primarily those of the flesh. In this regard, pleasure itself is not
just a discharge or "diminution" of instinctual energies as Freud
suggested, but it is also a focusing of energy that thrives upon the
mental calm that is achieved in the acquired orientations of memory.
It might be said that pleasure does not only seek a discharge that
quiets the impulses and leaves them spent, but it also seeks to
restore them to the stasis of an orientation. At least there is a
particular species of pleasure that derives in coming to rest with a
clear chain of approved associations, and in that case, even the
repeated recollection of terrifying scenes may have the effect of
pinching oneself in the face of the special terror that a present
disorientation might bring. In the event that the sense and coherence
of the present world is shattered, the thematic memory of pain might
be preferred, and it may even be for this reason that the "pleasure
principle" sometimes seemed "actually to serve the death instincts" in
situations which Freud found to be deserving of further study. 2 Thus,
in providing their own class of satisfactions -- whether they are
entirely pleasurable or painful -- the persistant themes of memory
themselves may have the properties of a bodily instinctual satisfac-
tion as well as having the properties of a coherent conceptual order
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to which we are driven to return. They appeal to a principle that is
not precisely concerned with ordinary pleasure and pain.
In this way, for example, complex thematic memories provide
explicit antidotes to our fears, like the assurances given to a
terrified child. Indeed, when a small child first sees the contorted
expressions of anger appear upon a parent's face, knows that something
is wrong and suffers the deepest sense of dread, he or she is without
such antidotes. Later on however, when the same child has learned
adult frames of reference, those facial expressions will be remembered
as "anger," and now a belated awareness of the reasons for it may be
interposed along with the memory of its consequence - the food
spilled at the time and the scolding - which together contain the
initial dread within a manageable sequence. Even the unhappy memory
of that sequence is preferable to the revival of the peculiar dread
that arises when one does not know what to expect. Upon a later
recollection the sequence becomes sensible. The original vulner-
ability has been restricted to a thematic resolution that is now an
antidote as much as it is a richer understanding of deeds and
consequences, and thereafter similar scenes may even return as
pleasant or humorous recollections.
In a comparable way the comforting sequence may become part of an
explicitly shared belief. The collective themes which surround the
image of the martyr, for example, may provide antidotes to other
evocations of vulnerability. Even without recalling the principles
which were at issue, the recollection of great suffering met by
greater strength is available to be extracted from memory and applied
to frightening situations. The terror is quelled by a sense of pain
restored to a larger sense of purpose, and soothed again by the
relative pleasure of an orientation. The resurrected image works like
a remedy that has been extracted from old bark to draw away the most
terrifying memories that might fester in a present wound. Such themes
appeal to us at a level of instinctual conflict, but by employing a
conscious order of images that is neither narcotic nor entirely
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repressive in its effect.
In a profound crisis of meaning of the kind that we are nowfacing m America, the usual thematic comforts of memory begin to
unravel. It becomes more apparent that the guiding principles of
civilization and of our society in particular are a veneer of abstract
resolutions to the rather base conflicts that have endured the ages
For the lack of other guidance, and as if we might restore the content
of such comforting principles, we now find that we are tempted to
refer back to the fundamental bodily needs and inhibitions that are
expressions of the instinctual conflicts which our laws and customs
once contained. We may discover that when the customary antidotes of
memory fail we go searching for their roots, sometimes quite deliber-
ately and often without realizing it, and in those moments we would
like to find motivations as deep as the instincts to restore our sense
of purpose. But in this, our search seems to restrict itself to
superficial topics and themes of preoccupation that would only fill
the most evident holes in the veneer of our understanding. We seek to
find the most simple substitutes for the familiar sequences that have
provided the relative pleasures of our orientation.
When the ideological notions of freedom, equality and indepen-
dence seem empty and their corners seem to have been pried up from
where they were neatly tucked away, it seems that we should struggle
against the tendency to regard those sacred principles as artifice,
and pause to remember why they were important. Yet in these circum-
stances such guiding American beliefs are not altogether absent and at
least their facade remains. If the strength and bravery of our
pioneering spirit, or even our beliefs in God now seem archaic, it is
not because they are gone, but precisely because they remain in the
foreground of memory from which the background has been torn away.
Rather than returning to question their source, we rebuild them from
the surface -- we attempt to restore the inner mnemonic regularities
of those meanings along with the relative 'pleasure' of our
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orientation
- and rather than looking for their most archaic roots in
experience, we attempt to fill them with elements that are still
comforting and familiar. We would like to fill in the background of
accustomed memory as expeditiously as possible, and we step back only
a little from our failed abstractions to fetishize the familiar things
in life that have at least remained somewhat stable.
^
Within familiar objects and events we find a mnemic source of
equilibrium' and a hint of the quiet pleasure that orientation
provides; a special contemporary incentive perhaps, for the fetishism
of certain themes and commodities. In this we may certainly resist a
deeper reflection, but even as we look to those familiarities for
guidance we are compelled to notice a darker side of them where our
fears and passions have been evoked and are not quite laid to rest.
Because we have halfheartedly initiated a search that awakens those
ancient fears, and the more that we stake our identities upon the
familiar trappings of daily life, on professional styles or various
products, the more we are inclined to give them an almost mystical
importance. Hence, the most simple and familiar object may acquire a
weight of meaning far beyond the ordinary and it may summon up a
series of instinctual conflicts and a set of associations that contain
them. It is for this reason for example, that our deepest fears are
currently evoked in familiar settings, objects and events, as they are
portrayed by the producers of American horror films. In their
productions, every secure and sacred being in daily life might turn
against us or become "possessed." A chair or a child, the car or the
family dog become our villains, and the story provides us with an
antidote to our fear of disorientation by making a parody of that very
predilection. 3
At the same time however, this pursuit of orientation has
propelled the fragmentation of American beliefs as if by shattering
them from within. Now, as we look uncertainly to the familiar
elements of a way of life for the "basics," it seems that we may
follow any of a number of associational tangents that give way to
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fantastic daydreams, and we seem to wander in memory and fantasy as if
we might replenish our guiding meanings from any source. At first it
appears that our beliefs have become highly erratic and that beneath
religion and an outward reverence for freedom or hard work, there are
more secretive American beliefs which are as superstitious as they are
eclectic. indeed, we are not surprised to see rational democratic
pnncipes at work beside mystical and antiquated fears in such
conditions of crisis, and Americans might almost feel at home with the
observation which Thomas Mann's character Zeitblom made of wartime
Germans, that
"... peop l e who voted the Social
-Democratic ticket at
the polls are at the same time capable of seeing something daemonic in
the poverty of a little old woman who cannot afford lodging above
ground. They will clutch their children to them when she approaches
to save them from the evil eye." 4 But if our current superstitions
seem to be less of this archaic kind and even more eclectic they still
contain a patterned response to certain fears, a desire for an
orientation which might resolve the most rudimentary fears and
desires.
In America, that is, it seems that the 'evil eye' is as diffuse
as the cast of characters that all of the media provide to direct our
wishes and our imaginings of fear. Indeed, Jorge Luis Borges
menagerie of mythical beings 5 seems to pale before the parade of
creatures that march through the musings of daily life in America, and
if rationalism rules here at all, it rules uneasily over millions of
private gods and daemons. Although they will never be catalogued, we
have all met Americans who believe in a surprising array of secret
forces and beings, in mixtures of belief that go far beyond the usual
religious teachings. There are ghosts, heavenly angels, reincarna-
tions and poltergeists, interplanetary beings, leprechauns, devils and
witches, magic and magic diets. There are unicorns, trolls, gnomes
and elves, levitation and clairvoyance, Nefertiti, the spirit of
Lincoln, Santa Claus, Isis, Mercury, Zeus and Thor. There are mediums,
the Force, and often, pets who understand every word and nuance. For
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the less daring believer there is the creature at Loch Ness, or Great
White sharks in every body of water that are driven by a maniacal
power. There is the bad luck of breaking mirrors or walking under
ladders, the good luck of knocking on wood, the belief in miracle
cures, racial destiny, the New Wave, Astrology, and still the power of
Christ. But there is, for all of this, a degree of consistency - a
search for universal powers that might be reconciled with science -
and a set of themes which make some such beliefs more acceptable than
others. Evidently, it is not these eclectic beliefs that move
Americans, but something underneath which draws us to them.
Now as we seem to feel torn between the singular clarity of the
old beliefs and the muddle of fantasies that is slowly gaining the
force of conviction, there is an attempt to meet the particular fears
that accompany our crisis. The search for "basics" is not merely
superstitious as it takes soundings in the depths of memory where
instincts and images come to join. This crisis refers us to a
specific strata of meaning that lies far beneath the abstract
principles of a rational society, but not so far as to be given over
completely to mysticism and fantasy. Since the shells of the old
ideological meanings do still remain intact, we strive to fill them
again with an old content and we are inclined to unearth the very
fundamental concerns of life and bodily fear that were once resolved
by them. We would remake those particular ancient and puerile
concerns into the new fodder for freedom, equality and individualism,
but in this endeavor, we reach back only so far -- only to those
memories that are minimally necessary to provide thematic incentives
to our failing meanings. Thus we may almost regress to revive our
deepest instinctual longings, and yet we still seem to leave them
locked in a dance with our fading principles, each holding the other
at arms length, uncertain of the next step. This is not an end of
ideology so much as a waltz of confusion that begins again whenever
ideology comes to crisis. As Habermas describes it, a crisis of
legitimation will strike at the most cherished and familiar notions,
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but aga ln we will atte.pt to resolve the™ by whatever means we can
Accordingly, a memory hermeneutic of crisis will be necessary in order
to discover which aspects of belief have failed and which have been
revved within the minute reflections that guide our everyday
experiences.
Insomnia and Daydreams: From the Bodily nrg an0 n of Power, to the
Instincts as They Appear to Us "
Although people possess an orderly mental faculty that attempts
to rule over this contemporary confusion, we are apt to mistake its
half-conscious activities for those of "reason." Now, however, and
since we have considered the distinctiveness of that selective process
in its relationship to repression and to the conscious choice that
accompanies reason, we must consider it within its own orbit. There
-- since it is not an entirely unconscious process either -- our
selective efforts to secure identity do not quite share the condition
surrounding dreams of sleep, and once again, if they are not the wide
awake efforts of reason, they are more like the workings of a daydream
which still have a certain coherence. However the selective process
is often more frantic and purposeful than a daydream and it is
especially like the wakeful fantasies that we pursue when a crisis has
deprived us of sleep and we cannot get it out of our minds. In those
cases, indeed, we do not quite escape into fantasy but tend to have
orderly daydreams concerning the aspects of the crisis itself and the
contingencies that might conceivably arise within it.
Similarly, when a widespread crisis in cultural meaning alters
the very conditions in which we repress and exercise reason, that
stage of our thinking receives greater attention. We tend to observe
the uncertain formations of guiding images with bewildered fascination
and in such a crisis many people seem dazed. It is as if their sleep
had been interrupted so often by voices beckoning them to believe,
that insomnia had driven them to pursue wakeful dreams and wild
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flights of fantasy. Now the signs of this sort of crisis appear
everywhere as they have appeared before. When people accept the
dictates of routine with dull-eyed resignation while secretly seeking
more esoteric release, when art becomes idiosyncrasy and nervous
public pronouncements attempt to reinterpret past events or commem-
orate them with increasing frequency, thousands may seek solace in
religion, nationalism or therapy as if they had forced their eyes open
just enough to see and embrace whatever stands before them.
On this occasion of crisis it may even be that the faculty of
reason itself has wandered beyond the confines that it was said to
have found in the European Enlightenment and in becoming "instru-
mental." 6 Perhaps something about reason has grown restless with its
own 'technical-rational' applications and has turned impatiently in
wide awake but still dazed pursuit of any kind of remedy to the modern
confusion. Today perhaps, the rigid standards of rationalism barely
disguise a relentless search for the "rationale" of choices, whether
they are to be guided by a knowledge of facts and scientifically
ascertined causes, or by rather magical reasoning. A kind of
insomniac reason proceeds as if the Western exhortation to be rational
and to suppress desire had only brought the old desires forward again
in sleepless hallucinations that redesign memory. 7 Now it is as if
Minerva's owl had flown at dawn only to be blinded by the very light
she ushered in. For the insomniac, the barriers between sleep and
wakefulness, memory and fantasy are weakened once more, and again as
Adorno commented during the rise of Fascism, "the sleepless are on
call at any hour, unresisting ready for anything, alert and uncon-
Q
scious at once." In such disturbed circumstances, alertness may pose
as rationality and draw the interests of reason closer to fantasy than
had seemed possible.
Today, however, we are drawn to fantasies with a particular
thematic content that accomodates the precarious balance that has been
struck between unconscious impulses and conscious principles in this
half-awake attitude. When reason takes flight from the failing
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abstractions of power with which it has been allied, it turns
attention toward the fundaments of power and it develops rational
fantasies concerning the most basic human needs. In this, Foucault's
portrayal of modern social power as a series of strategies that
fundamentally affect the human body is especially significant. 9 In
fact, that analysis may seem so compelling precisely because the
bodily interests and their rational resolutions are in the process of
finding a new balance.
For Foucault, power works at every level to direct the body - in
physical bonds, survel lance, medical and educational practice and
verbal expressions. However, if a chasm opens between certain
immutable bodily impulses and those rational, positive expressions of
power that seem no longer to suit them, then selective memory strives
to fill that chasm, to create meaningful ways for power to regain its
command over the body by referring back to the most primitive and
infantile interests that power once resolved. That is, during a
crisis in meaning the emphasis among the mnemic contents of power is
redistributed. Then it is all the more apparent that power is an
adult imposition which always, at least implicitly, refers back to the
memorable childhood liberties of the body that it would contain, and
that a crisis of this sort may cause something like an adolescent
regression for many people at once. Here power has not simply shifted
gears, and it is not as if the dam of repression has finally burst,
but rather, a rational faculty of selective memory has reached behind
it to find an old substance with contemporary relevance which might
keep the dam from bursting and might prevent a more irrational force
from having its way with us entirely.
In the more secure periods of our past the painful bodily reasons
for law and tradition had been all but forgotten. The assaults, the
pains of birth and sexuality, disease, death, hunger and lust seem to
have been recalled in those times as if they were something almost
completely separate from the civilized remedies that had been con-
trived to contain them. The precepts of law and ideology contained
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the sublimated resolutions of rather fundamental bodily conflicts that
were distanced within memory by a process of abstraction. Normally
established power gives instruction in the thematic ways of appre-
hending those issues. It presents us with a guilded path that leads
backward from each painful case in the present, through pertinent
precedents, to a meaningful legacy that is filled with visions of
right and wrong behavior. Amidst all of these elements that give
power its air of permanence and tradition, the bodily concern at the
heart of the matter occupies only a small space so that without being
repressed it has readily been subordinated.
Nevertheless, the reversion that occurs in a crisis of meaning
awakens the interest in those topics, our daydreams may tend to take
us closer to things that were once forbidden or neatly resolved. Now,
vivid concerns of the body come to be expressed and the obsessive
themes of Western culture that surface almost rebelliously may incline
historical theorists like Foucault to look for them everywhere. Yet
instead of initiating a discourse that might find new resolutions to
those old problems we become caught at the level of daydreams,
fascinated by the vivid presence of those themes. Abruptly, there has
come to be an overt public concern for the most minute details of
sexuality and the precise aspects of its every variety -- extremely
vivid expression is given to sexual acts, pregnancy, birth, and to
every sort of medical treatment and disease. There is increasingly
morbid fasciantion in crime, in the exact details of the criminal act,
in reprisals of all kinds and especially when the crime involves
bodily assault, or the punishment is corporal. For all of this,
however, we do not become hedonists and it seems instead that such
topical conerns of the body are called upon to ward off the total
collapse of meaning that hedonism might bring. They become 'last
chance' memories that provide a means to their own containment. Thus,
we seldom remember a particular pain without its instructive reso-
lution, and we are almost never presented with vividly detailed
stories concerning bodily fears and interests that do not evoke a
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precise, satisfactory conclusion. We produce these, with the same
deliberation that declining empires of the past have applied in
calling upon their most primitive gods to provide them with precise
instruction in the midst of chaos and bodily debauchery.
Corporeal ization of Beliefs and Ideology
In America, the mnemic content of our guiding meanings has
therefore shifted substantially. Stabilizing conceptions of freedom,
law and justice, free enterprise, individualism, the family, techno-
logical progress, toleration, equality and private property have all
suffered the shock of incompatibility with one another, or of having
met with economic limitations. Each notion has been stripped down and
reconstructed imperfectly in almost surreal attempts to recapture its
early referential imagery. In the case of each specific meaning it
now seems that we have been left with even more simplistic envision-
ings and less explicit mental pictures than we once had and they are
all the more elusive. As the memorable content of these conceptions
has shifted before various obstructions, the problem is not that
bourgeois freedoms have succumbed to conformity and mimesis, but
rather that their referential worlds have collapsed, and there is a
common confusion which inclines people to seek comfort in other
places. That inclination is neither an escape from freedom nor a
revolutionary new freedom, but it appears instead to be a flight to
the smaller freedoms of bodily indulgence -- of physical motion and
appearances -- that takes precedence over the more abstract concep-
tions of freedom. In considering freedom, that is, people no longer
envision the propertied male bourgeois individual at home with his
family, as John Locke and his contemporaries seemed to do. More often
they imagine the decorations of the presentable body, ease of motion
and unlimited travel, fantasies of fashion and its rewards, the open
doors that seem to greet those who are thin and have jogged into
shape.
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Our conceptions of freedom have therefore become more dependent
upon the conditions of progress, and our conception of "progress" has
itself been redesigned to fit the scale of technological advancements
and changing markets. At first, Americans were virtually overwhelmed
by the frightful notion that robots and computers might escape human
control. Subsequently, these ominous prospects have led our faith in
technology back to more modest wishes, as in every other case of
changed belief, to the time-honored wish for the simple prosthetic
extention of the bodily powers. This restrained imagination abounds
in our "science fiction" which almost universally depicts the most
primitive prosthetic technologies as things of the future. That
fiction suggests, for example, that sword fighting will really return
a thousand years hence, and battles will be fought in individually
piloted craft equipped with single shot weapons that are best aimed by
one heroic eye. Of course, the technology of our fanciful future is
often well behind that of the present because it is the feeling of
power that is being pursued in shared fantasies, a restoration rather
than an endless extension of human senses and abilities that* would
repossess technology for the body and restore the abstractions of
technoglocial promise to the level of more urgent, individual
concerns.
Accordingly, the conception of the "individual" has been
augmented by the sensual prosthetics that have entered fantasy and
which bring fantasy and ideology into ever greater contact. The
entire notion of privacy has been modified by the common fear of being
"bugged" or spied upon and it is contingent upon devices that prevent
all sorts of intrustions. As the film media provide us with a
telescopic eye, they also feed the fantasy of having x-ray vision that
might allow us, or others, to observe people in their private
activities. For the music loving individual, there are loud-speakers
that are capable of effects far in excess of normal sound and seem to
draw the ear within the device -- among its tweeters and woofers --
rather than reaching out to it. There are events in "sensaround ,"
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holograms and numerous devices to hear, see, touch an even smell that
obviate the fear of inadequate sensual enjoyment, and penetrate that
special numbness that surrounds so many experiences for which we
cannot find a content or context. These are busy little pleasures and
small self-indulgent freedoms that are often highly creative, but they
still evade the precise sort of contemplative leisure that might
revive a worried and more fruitful search for the meaning of freedom.
Prosthetic fantasies or realities, automobiles and cosmetics would
restore a portion of every aspect of the alienated individual that
Marx once described, and to a limited extent they succeed.
Now more than ever, the liberal "toleration" for the beliefs of
all is suffused by an attitude of limited forbearance for the differ-
ent physical appearance, the bodily characteristics of other "types."
This might be noticed among city dwellers who ignore the bizarre mani-
festations of punk, but keep their distance just the same. According-
ly, the divisions of race and class are not bridged by a reciprocal
respect for "rights" so much as by a reluctant willingness to endure
each other's presence. In its turn, the imagery evoked by a notion of
"rights" has also changed. Now it includes visions of barred windows,
barricades and of the police reluctantly reading from their "Miranda"
cards. A colloquial sense of rights often relies as much on the idea
of escaping detection as it does on a conception of legal protection.
As much as they protect i ndustri ousness and the pursuit of happiness,
our rights mean, "doing what you want as long as it doesn't hurt any-
one," and sometimes even, "doing whatever you can get away with." The
interior of the conception of "self-interest" has radically changed
since the days of the "monad," 11 and today the terms of legitimate
self-interest have become so broad and comprehensive that we often
find violent criminals who justify their actions on that basis, as
they act self-righteous or indignant when they get caught. Like many
of the rest of us, they have acquired a reductive bodily sense of
their own justifiable rights and freedoms which appears to be defens-
ible in itself and not by any larger principle involving reciprocity.
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With an increase in violent crime and an exaggerated interest in
its gruesome details, the idea of physical retribution - of an eye
for an eye
- seems all the more compelling. There is a rebirth of
the ancient vigilantism that once gave way to law and the modern
preference for "legal justice." In the news reports of actual events
as in public performances vigilante activites are openly cheered an
even the agencies of the law affirm that sentiment by their own subtle
exercise of vengeance. Whereas notions of law and justice once
summoned a rather fictive memory of the court, of robed judges and
scales in equal balance, today it seems to refer just as often to
prisons, police actions and deserved beatings. In a span of twenty
years the shift in television programming is indicative and where we
once had CBS's Perry Mason pursuing the truth in a courtroom, we now
have NBC ' S Hill Street Blues
, where "street justice" is administered
in the mode of compassionate vengeance.
That vengeance, once so neatly buried within abstract principles
of law, now rises to the surface as there is increased sympathy for
the victims of crime who seek restitution or even bodily retribution.
The latest standard questions for news reporters as they conduct
interviews with victims and their families, is whether or not the
legal remedy will be "enough." Regularly the answer is "no," and
meanwhile, state by state, the death penalty returns with a vengeance.
Now the sense of urgency that is attached to protecting and defending
the vulnerable body in this way persists in other spheres as well.
The virtues of marriage and family are posted in opposition to the
lascivious horrors of the "singles scene," as we noted earlier the
interest in private property scarcely disguises its greed, and greed
itself is presented in the media as a boundless lust that inspires
almost everyone to prostitute themselves. Thus over all, the
protection of the body, revenge upon the body, freedom an satisfaction
of the body ascend within the mnemonic composition of our sacred
principl es.
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Once again, however, this tendency is heralded by a legitimate
need to return to basics," and it is not simply decadence. In each
dimension of the return, a bare, bodily correlate to threated meaning
is brought to the surface from private memory and collective experi-
ence m order to save a portion of that meaning, and we should not
confuse that effort with the release of the instincts or a regression
to some barbaric past. Instead this return is piecemeal, and rather
than seeking to destroy present meanings it is often filled with a
desire to reconstruct their wavering orientation. So we will discover
that the corporal izati on of belief in America generally stops short of
pornographic excesses. On careful inspection we will find that our
memory is directed to conflicted expressions of bodily interest and
not just to fantasies of satisfaction. Indeed, memory does not seek
to restore an anarchy of instinctual drives, but it attempts to revive
the fundamental resolutions of instinctual conflict that are just
within its reach. It does not lead us back to an infantile sea of
passions, but to the primitive successes we have had in surviving
them. Consequently, when bodily concerns seem to surface on their own
in these times, they do not surface in an unadulterated form, and they
are already modified to correspond to our pressing needs. Memory does
not restore the most primitive bodily impulses now, but certain
satisfying associative "couplets" that refer to them. Hence, many
people cannot readily imagine lust without secrecy and torment, greed
without money, power and its trappings, vengeance without a secret
collaboration with the law, physical prowess without prosthesis — the
reconstructive return through memory is incomplete. It halts its
regressive search for meaningful resolutions at the nearest extreme
where they might be found and it will only press on toward more
visceral sources of instruction if the framework of present meaning
continues to decay.
It is especially clear in historical comparisons that America has
not yet gone to such extremes. When the mnemonic pursuit of rudi-
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mentary sources of principle proceeds in one direction it becomes an
overt means of altering principle, as we might find in Sorel's ven-
eration for the "cleansing" power of violence, 12 or more concretely
in Fascist practices. In the extreme, that is, and as a means of
discarding the failed orientations of German society, Nazi propa-
gandists selectively called upon instincts by invoking bodily
analogies as substitute memories for every weakened aspect of the old
regime. Their writings were explicit in this regard as they corpor-
ealized desirable attributes and would eviscerate the threatening
elements of the old, or of any other culture. They depict the weak
limbs of intellectuals, the "racial" attributes of Jews or Gypsies,
the exaggerated sexual characteristics of every subgroup, the motherly
carriage of the women who would bear the future, and so on.
The new order was to be built upon the 'bones of the dead,' the
corpses of those who were not of the "Nordic blood" that racists like
Alfred Rosenberg sought to sanctify. 13 The future was to be woven
from the visceral horror that would sweep away the bodies of everyone
who was not Aryan and loyal, to turn their bodily substances into a
source of new creations, to ridicule their physical features quite
literally in order to construct oppositional meaning out of them. In
this extreme, selective memory could discard the old beliefs and
self-images by reviving an altered version of the idyllic body from
Greco-Roman sculpture along with imitations of classical architecture
to generate a new "legacy" of the "Aryan race." It refined the
techniques of the Inquisition "scientifically," using phrenology among
other means to examine the most intimate physical traits and to codify
every characteristic of birth and stature to determine who was a Jew,
a black, a homosexual, a Gypsy or a Pole. As Fascist Germany was
intent upon murdering a part of its own memory and portraying all
things past as "the dead," it finally secured its special amnesia by
means of the terrifying images of excluded physical traits, deformi-
ties and the dead bodies of its victims. The erect bodies of its
soldiers would seem all the more strong and self-assured as they
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appeared to conquer the most primitive memories of bodily fear by
walking upon the skulls of their victims.
It is for these reasons and not only because of its peculiar
fascination for the leader, that Fascism is often considered in terms
of a mass psychology and as a recrudescence of the worst instincts
Certainly it had introduced a kind of 'retroactivity' into virtually
every aspect of cultural life and if it is generally true that the
past instructs the present, Fascism fostered an extreme selectivity of
memory which tapped bodily fears in just such a way that the present
could recreate vast portions of the past. It is the closest thing in
collective experience to a "return of the repressed," but even there
the return was managed in the interest of power and directed within
constraints rather than allowing an unconditional release of instinct.
In America, by contrast, we do not go as far in that direction
and we do not resort to the extreme sort of bodily myth that allowed
the "Nordic blood" to become that "mysterium which has replaced and
overcome the old sacraments..." 14 Here the manipulation of cultural
themes is not so effectively conducted by the state, and the crisis of
meaning has sent us searching for the derivational content that might
restore tne sacraments and the old meanings rather than destroy them.
We do not come so close to a "return of the repressed" because we are
attempting to rescue certain abstract principles and we are therefore
more likely to meet the repressed before it returns. That is, in
attempts to restore order we exert our selective memories to return to
specialized aspects of the "repressed," and in this the general public
has kept the initiative for itself and may still make certain choices
in the formation of cultural themes. We still do not dare to immerse
ourselves in bodily and instinctual revivals that might seize that
initiative from us, and once again we tend to recall their less
extreme and more tolerable summations, the very euphemisms of thematic
expression that Fascism forgot.
Therefore in our institutional efforts to procure legitimate
meaning we are constrained as well. At one point, the National
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Socialists had deemed it necessary to grant broad discretionary power
to judges as a means of lessening the decisive weight of precedents
and subordinating law to the will of the Fuhrer. 15 They usurped high
moral abstraction by giving it over to expressions of a new interest
Although such strategic means of co-opting guiding principles would
scarcely have the same effect in America today, we have also begun to
tamper with precedents. If the move in Germany could be undertaken on
the basis of "healthy racial feeling," 16 in America there is some
reason to believe that the courts, l ike the media, are appealing to
new conservative' sentiments that are often quite similar. If not in
the courts, then in the bureaucracy the use of certain euphemisms may
cause us to forget that the rather abstract principles of governance
have derived from human experiences and ought to refer back to those
experiences continually.
The National Socialists succeeded in replacing a principled
content in the law with racial imperatives and the will of the leader
by disarming those principles in practice. Instead, we have kept our
principles by dividing them internally between a more and more
abstract and euphemistic content on the one hand, and a more vulgar
content on the other. We have not unhinged legal precedents by such
concrete means as the Fascists, we have not thrown off our abstract
principles, but we have allowed them to become mentally disembodied in
the euphemistic language of bureaucracy and then filled again with
confused popular imagery. We have altered the terms of principled
abstractions by altering their content, leaving them open to future
manipulation, and one day perhaps, to another assault of 'retro-
activity.' So it is that many Americans seem to have grown tired of
the stale imagery of poverty that had attended euphemistic liberal
pleas for more humane public policies, and political discourses often
forget the full scope of the experiences which they once summarized as
heartfelt precedents may seem oddly remote from them.
In essence, political administration in America seeks to legiti-
mate itself by reproducing that non-reflective habitual condition that
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traditions once obtained. It does not seek to stir up memories and it
uses abstraction and euphemism precisely in order to quell the buried
passions. Bureaucratic language remains euphemistic so that it may
refer us to memories of conflict resolution ~ to memories of
traditional solutions - without arousing too much of the memory of
the conflicts themselves. It affirms the contemporary importance of
that level of daydreams where selective memory operates with such
alacrity. Accordingly, and instead of recalling passionate conflict,
political phrasing in America often refers us back to institutional
reso1utions of conflict: not to the battle field, but to the "peace
talks," not to the horror of war but to the "lessons" of war, not to
the condition of segregation but to the successes of equal rights
legislation. Political texts and articles are rife with terms that
would direct the mind's eye to the settings where the policies of
compromise were made. Institutional resolutions are celebrated in
notions of equal protection, reapportionment, affirmative action,
Watergate, corruption, pork barrels, reallocation, scarce resources,
seniority, Warsaw pact countries, social security, welfare, discrim-
ination, decriminalization, restitution, special needs, deinstitu-
tionalization. The phrasing is not an attempt to deceive, but it does
refurbish the memory of the conflict at issue precisely in terms of
what the bureaucracy has provided to remedy it. Each term that may
have once stood for fairness and respect for the persons involved, may
also become a euphemistic screen memory that masks the unresolved
conflicts at their source.
In light of this we should take note of the distinctions between
the mnemonic condition facing the American right wing today and the
rightism of the 1920s and 30s in Europe. In our more moderate
circumstance, the American right would like to portray the liberal
humanitarianism of the New Deal and the 1960s as being hopelessly
outmoded. Nevertheless, and since economic collapse has not become
severe enough to arouse them, we have preserved the euphemistic turn
of mind that would dampen the memory of our bodily fears. The
550
political right is caught in the same referential web that contains
those fears and still contains its own worst impulses. On the onehand the right presses forward to portray liberal resolutions of law
to be archaic. It changes laws to undo them, and through law it
addresses the most intimate issues of bodily control to mandate
conservative principles. It would revive the laws that limited sexual
preference, expand the definition of pornography, eliminate access to
birth control for the young, ban abortion, ban certain books in
schools, restore capital punishment and impose mandatory sentences for
crimes, allow the possession of firearms, and restructure the content
of every principled resolution by calling up the memories of bodily
fear that lie at the root of power.
Still and in most respects, the American right cannot appeal to
those associatons in the same way that the Fascists did since it would
like to retain the role of being a guarantor of tradition, a guardian
of law and family, and it must preserve the framework of liberal
euphemism especially where it has achieved state power. In conditions
which threatened a total collapse of meaning and economy, Fascism
could twist the mortal referents at the core of power by daring to
recall them, daring to free them more, in certain ways, than other
movements. It claimed the body by daring to speak of its evisceration
and death, to bring forward and mollify an extant mortal terror by
giving it expression. Quickly it became immune to all appeals to
humanitarian principles -- appeals which came from those who would not
accept the shift at the foundations of power, and which rested on the
very principles that power had discarded. For us, however, guiding
beliefs still refer to the memorable resolutions of terrifying
conflict rather than the conflict itself. To preserve our orientation
they appeal to the memory of instinctual resolutions of conflict and
to institutional resolutions which persist in memory as a subliminal
court of appeals for our difficulties. So far the mnemonic foundation
of liberal principle survives as a kind of reflexive limit to the
worst excesses of political inhumanity. So far, rights and religious
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doctrine stand as a limit to a revived interest in eugenics. So far
President Reagan and the extreme right are at odds as the presidency
must be responsive to that limit and still remain somewhat susceptible
to the very humanitarian appeals that seem more and more archaic We
are at a turning point in selecting the associational content of
meaning and as the right claims authority by the evocation of memories
of visceral terror the amnesiac closure of pre-fascist power is begun.
Yet it is far from complete and cannot be completed until memories of
bodily terror and constraint are directly courted by the State - not
as a remote source of principle, but as a general substitute for
principles themselves that might displace their motivating force.
The Instincts Appear to Us
If there is a particular level of meaning formation that is being
courted in this crisis of ours, we must identify what it is and how
the resurgence of bodily concerns is being shaped there. If we are
now passionately interested in the resolutions of instinctual conflict
as I have suggested, rather than in reviving the instincts in an
unrestrained manner, then we must consider what that means. And
further, if selective memory has moved us toward the 'repressed'
without instigating its complete return, we must consider where it has
left us, what experience it has made memorable, and in what themes it
has reintroduced that experience into the common fabric of our lives.
With this in mind it is especially important to pay attention to
the way that we actually do experience our deepest drives and
instincts. In reviewing that experience and as it has been suggested
above, we should realize that we can never experience instincts
without the coloration of current mnemonic associations, and under the
influences of repression and selective memory we do not actually
"recall" an instinct and we rarely feel it in any unadulterated form.
At the level of our own awareness of the instincts it is as if the
long valleys that have been cut in memory by the repeated appearance
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of bodily needs are lined with the remembrances of prescribed
associations. Hence, and if the principles of pain and pleasure rule
the instincts as Freud thought, they are "recalled" in the guises ofjoy and suffering, heaven and hell, lust and the purity of abstinence
hedonism and asceticism, each calling forth a motivating imagery
replete with imagined consequences that is capable of guiding
anticipations into the future.
When we examine the instincts from this side of repression -
from the vantage point of more nearly conscious sel ecti vi ties of
memory
- we are not, therefore, perceiving the instincts themselves,
but some portion of their residues. Although an instinct is not I
memory in its own right our most immediate experience of it contains a
record of the personal and cultural imagery of the sort that attends
every driven impulse. It is for this reason that psychoanalysis is
only able to affirm the presence of pure instincts by working backward
through memory, and it is one of the reasons why it usually discovers
particular instincts in the precipitous time and place of an initial
trauma where the clutter of surrounding memories is least obtrusive.
Indeed, since it begins with the present and seeks to root out prior
conflicts in desire, psychoanalysis may often take the most common,
present manifestations of the instincts for granted along with all of
their accrued associations. Even when psychoanalysts discuss the
archaic roots of a common symbol within acceptable or healthy
thinking, they seldom disclose the contemporary assocations that it
arouses for the people concerned, or at least they would not dwell on
that aspect of the experience. Yet it is here that we find thematic
resolutions of instinctual impulses that fall under the influence of a
shared and present selective memory. Such resolutions are easily
overlooked since they do not have the distinctiveness and rarity of
neurotic symptoms, and even though there is no initial trauma to which
we might return to find their source, there is still a cumulative
presence of instinct and memory together that survives uniquely in the
framework of present reflections.
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For this reason it should be apparent that the instincts are not
only an infantile legacy which presses forward against the resisting
formations of adult repression, but they affect our motivations from
two directions. On the one hand, as we know from psychoanalysis, the
repressed memory of a trauma involving the instincts presents itself
neurotically, as bound psychic energy impells it to be reiterated
whenever the same instincts are aroused. In that case, the instincts
of the past are continually revived along with their repressive
constraints so that the past weighs upon the present unyieldingly On
the other hand, however, there may be a present conflict involving the
instincts that is not bound to such inevitable outcomes. Instead of
being predisposed to the neurotic resolution, a current instinctual
conflict may arise without precedent and in such a way that it re-
quires a search back through memory to find models for its resolution
-- and here a function of selection supercedes that of repression.
Although it is primarily a less conscious event, this occurs whenever
simple desires or present instincts elicit the memory of former
desires. It is in that event that selective memory reverses the track
of repression - there is no past trauma that is distorted in the
present, but there is a present trauma that must be thematically and
allegorically played out by a far less restricted entry of memory into
the past than repression would allow. Here, present instincts urge an
appeal to the legacy of instinctual containment, and it is an appeal
that begins with fairly loose impressions that do not often enter our
awareness.
It is with reference to this secondary presence of the instincts
where they are coupled with selective memory that it makes the
greatest sense to speak of the instincts being "social." An immanent
social conflict that engages the instincts of individuals will also
initiate a movement of selective memory to consider comparable
conflicts. For that reason it is not necessarily the presence of the
same universally repressed instincts that leads "the masses" to act in
concert so much as it is the shared means of reintroducing the
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instincts thematically within memory. Indeed, if multitudes of people
were motivated by the same instinctual trauma on the neurotic modeltheir destiny would be fixed, particular complexes of the past would
prescribe their general patterns of present life so that they mighttruly be a neurotic, masochistic or narcissistic people. But the
selective memory proceeds in another direction as well, from present
PartiCUlarS t0 fiSS! .generalities with far greater flexib^"
Present instinctual conflicts and interests become themes of culture
as they appeal to the pasts of individual and society alike. In these
themes we will cease to recognize the summations of earlier instinct-
ual conflict as such or as an individual might discover them in
therapy. They will be present, but they will emerge within common
trains of thought and acceptable imagery that might lead us to a
different consideration of the instincts altogether.
It seems that a very elaborate thematic bridge has been con-
structed between the murky depths of the instincts and the expressed
concerns of the body that have become so pronounced in our cultural
crisis. But if we are to understand the derivation of themes
effecting the entire span of that construction we must still go back a
step to consider their foundations in the instincts themselves, and we
must return to consider the problematic consideration of instincts in
psychoanalysis to see how it is that they make their appearance in
thought and memory at all.
From the beginning of his investigations into the unconscious,
Freud had to infer the existence of instincts, an he was the first to
admit the grave difficulty of knowing them in themselves. Their very
presence as a "basal concept" in psychoanalysis rested upon the
conjecture that instincts arise as internal organic demands from
stimuli which emanate from the tissues and nerves of an organism, to
become "needs" pressing for "satisfaction." 17 Not only did Freud
construe the nature of the instincts with some uncertainty, but he
went on to suggest that the "study of the sources of an instinct is
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outside th^ scope of psychology... in mental life we know it merely by
its aims." Yet insofar as his metapsychology depended upon a such a
notion he could not let the problem rest there, and he continually
addressed the same question that Ricoeur has so crisply articulated-
"What is the status of representation or ideas in relation to the
notions of instinct, aim of instinct, and affect?" 19
The problem is compounded because in Freud's work we do not know
how many instincts there are, what the course of their inclination
might be, and especially where they might break off or entwine with
those emotional and ideational compexes that approach consciousness
and expressability. 20 We do not know how they form aims or whether
aims might elicit them, why instincts are determinate for animals and
chaotic for human beings, or for that matter, how much they determine
our choices. We do not know precisely whether the principles of Eros
and Thanatos that Freud identifies as a cellular level precede each
particular instinct in an essential way or only amend them to modify
their outcome. We do not know the relationship between organ, nerve
and interest except that we know there must be one, and while we know
that extreme conflicts in desire that arise in organic development
will effect our sense of a gender identity, we do not know the order
of events and the most powerful motives among them for certain. For
these reasons the question of the instincts has rebounded in psycho-
analysis without resolution to the point that analysts today often
content themselves with the notion of the "wish" as a functional
equivalent to instinct, affect and the meaningful representations of
mental life taken together. 21 The exact nature of the instincts
remains hidden, if only because of the masterful defensive activities
of the ego which conceal it, and as Anna Freud comments, "the ego is
never allowed to experience them exactly as they are."
If we cannot know the instincts in themselves, then our under-
standing of how they enter mental life must suffer. With Freud, we
should suppose that the instinctual development of animals and even
that of primitive cellular life has a similar bearing upon our adult
556
uen-
mental activity. We may even suppose that the instincts are infl.
tial there in an unmediated way as they seem to be in animals
However in acknowledging the great variety of the human inclinations
we must also suppose that something else happens within us. As many
instincts arise and are repeated we reconstruct their expressions. We
remember the repititious presence of the instincts and the trail that
they have left in conscious representations and to some extent our
memory of them affects the way that they continue to present them-
selves in mental life. It may even be the case that instincts are
affected by memory at their source or nearer to their source than we
have supposed, and rather than being thwarted by repression each time
they are initiated it is possible that the character of the impulse
itself has changed as development proceeds. The instincts arise in
each cell and every organ as Freud suggested, but we do not know the
extent to which the mind affects the organs of the body -- although we
find some suggestion in hypnosis, faith healing and meditation, that
the effects are considerable. The pattern of mental life may rebound
back upon the instincts and they may even affect their organic or
neurological structure.*
Perhaps we should cease to consider the instinct as a unilinear
event like the retrieval of data in a computer or the ingrained beha-
vioral patterns of animals. If the instinct may be present in the
single living cell as Freud postulated in Beyond the Pleasure Princi-
£]_£, the cells achieve a cumulative organization in each organ which
may also be affected by the 'training' of its repetitious actions to
the extent that organs respond to memories as well as to present
events. If an instinct proceeds through the nerves to affect our
thoughts and actions, then to a lesser degree the mnemic accumulation
of thoughts may affect the same circuit in reverse. In computers and
certain animals, a stimulus might promote the retrieval of needed
information -- mnemic corridors are opened and then shut at once. But
in human memory these corridors are not necessarily closed. They con-
tinue to illuminate the sense of a response to stimulation by provid-
ing a frame of reference and a background of all that it is not at the
edge of the selective process that determines what it i_s. "Truman in-
stincts initiate a loop of memory so that a stimulus may be met by
memories almost at the instant that it initiates an organic resonse.
Thus a mood or a passion survives in the same repeated stimulations.
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In any case, instincts must somehow be transformed from innerva-
tions to impulses with aims, to affects and wishes in a manner that
stirs an accumulation of memories along the way. For that reason we
do not really know the instinct only by its aim as Freud suggested 23
but by the record of its many aims and the kind of mnemic tracings
that it leaves. We know it in its repetitions after the repressive
objections of the ego have directed it toward specific aims, and we
also know it as it proceeds along specific pathways of memory arousing
an awareness of associations that have become themes of interest.
Hence, the insistant repetition of an instinct stimulates certain
rather fixed memories, it arouses analogies which compound as they are
drawn from the surrounding world of experience where they are already
adjacent to one another, and the instinct becomes a party to the
culturally suggested themes of interest by which we came to know it.
While we must remember that there are numerous impulses that
never enter conscious life, we owe special attention to their
irruptions as they do appear to us. If we are to discover anything
about the murky bottom of our instinctual life through that record of
its many aims, we must not be so quick to address its source and we
might linger for a while among the common associations it arouses.
An instinct seems to thicken as it enters the realm of conscious
influence and like the tail of some aquatic creature it agitates a
widening trail of memories. In the Freudian terminology of psychic
energy, we might say that the moment instincts appear as cathexes that
seize upon a thing or an image, they begin to recall other images in
minute thematic representations. Cathexes and anti cathexes attach to
certain memories and enlist other mnemic material to the point that
the opposition to an instinct really appears to be a matter of greater
and lesser organizations of impul se and memorable interest together.
Certainly by the time of adulthood the bodily source of an instinct
has also set down mnemic roots the 'body' from which infantile
instincts once proceeded, and the 'body' about which the adult is
concerned are two different things -- and the collective outbursts of
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instinct" in adult society are generally those of the latter
where they seem to be quite infantile. Further, when Ricoeur asks
How can an interpretation of meaning through meaning be integrated
Wiethe economics of cathexis..
.withdrawal of cathexis, anticathe-
xis, we may tentatively answer that the economy of mental energies
is actually part of a construction that is made out of bodily and
mnemonic materials together, which weave thematic meanings at once.~~
Now when we speak of general instinctual drives at work in
history, as Freud spoke of Eros and Thanatos,
25
this thematic weave
will become all the more apparent. The meaningful appearance of such
grand instinctual principles reflects both primitive organic forces
and the advanced associations that adhere to them up to the point of
their delivery. When we speak of instinctual forces in history then,
we would take account of much more subtle formulations than the great
forces of pain and pleasure, or love and death would seem to admit.
For example, when the historian E.P. Thompson suggests that the
introduction of clocks into European daily life made those presumably
instinctual matters of "mortality" and "love" more "poignant," 26 he
must be referring to a more complicated phenomenon than the instinc-
tual drives of Eros and Thanatos would substantiate on their own. The
changing legacy of the experiences of love and death, their new con-
texts and associations as well as the organic reality all contribute
to that aspect of the collective experience of "instinct." Thompson's
idea here is much more than a casual historical observation if the
introduction of clock time and the changing conceptualizations
surrounding it had sunk to the deepest level of the mnemonic struc-
tures attached to the expression of the themes of love and mortality.
In that way it is possible that the internal consistency and the very
urgency of the instinctual impulses themselves had changed in becoming
"poignant." But whether or not something fundamental about those
instincts remained unchanged, the portions of them that escape into
view to become comprehensible are now alloyed with the altered
orientations toward life, love and death that had accompanied the
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prevalence of clockwork, and these are not without motivating force oftheir own.
Especially within a collective attitude, the emergence of
instinct involves a movement through the layers of memory alluded to
at the beginning of this chapter. Now, if we take the suggestion to
know an instinct by its aims' seriously, we will not only look back
from the peculiar repressive manifestations of a neurosis to some
distant source. Rather, we will inquire into its mre immediate
deMvatiQn
-
the series of ^eps that make impulses cogent and
ultimately communicable. Then for the historian as well as certain
psychoanalysts, the "retrievable form" of mental life will receive
greater attention. As Stoller suggests, the final form of affectivity
is not accounted for by the instincts alone and we must now address
their retrievalbe aspect that is comprised in fantasy. 27 Whether it
is the poignance of love and death or any other mood that settles
within the group experience, we will discover it where instinct and
memory coalesce in the shared fantasies that are thematic and
retrievable.
Current American preoccupations may now appear in a different
light. If there is a revival of bodily concerns going on here in lieu
of meaningful traditions and principles, then it may foreshadow a
signficant reorganization of instinctual and mnemonic priorities.
Here the idea that, "your body is your temple," may be more of an
axiom than just a slogan. For individuals it may mean dieting,
weightlifing or jogging to increase size or strength or to refine
bodily proportions. It may mean devout attention to special foods,
deodorants, cancer prevention, birth control, home security systems
and their maintenance all to protect the body like the obsessive
fascination in illness and crime that makes hospitals and police
actions such fertile ground for fantasy. To begin with, the zealous-
ness of the general phenomenon suggests that it is all much more than
a fad, but something that involves the instincts. Yet on the other
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hand, the visionary promise of a better life lurks in the background
and the temple of the body is endowed with a moralizing force that has
all of the righteousness of religious doctrine, where health and
illness amount to good and evil. 28 it might seem that the decay of
culture has allowed the instincts to surface in a "return of the
repressed," however there is a priestly quality to it all that
involves deliberate ministrations and once again, the return is not a
return of repressed instincts, but a return to the composite memories
that accompany them.
When American therapeutic fads urge us to "get in touch with our
true feelings," to be sexual, aggressive, assertive, to touch or cry,
they recreate as much as they unleash anything "basic." As we would
enlist instinctual qualities to support our failing orientations we
make them over with the attributes of oriented memories that are
accessible to conscious reasoning, and we obfuscate them all at once.
To be a "feeling person," born again in popular therapy, is to
assemble a self-image and not necessarily to feel as a person.
Accordingly, our "return" to instincts in search of identity is really
a return to mnemic residues of instinct which give us the material
that we can recreate. Here people seek to replicate and to approxi-
mate some notion of the instincts as they "soul search" for their
"deepest" motivations, but short of discovering instinctual conflicts
or traumas, they only find current themes of bodily concern in place
of them. When the worldly temples begin to fall and the coherence of
belief that once gave spiritual solace has diminished, then there is a
powerful interest in selectively revising the retrievable forms of
instincts so that they are not unleashed in barbarism.
In a crisis over meanings the dialectic is not between pure
reason and rank passion, but among a more narrow and refined set of
concerns. Then, as we appeal to the most memorable resolutions of
instinctual conflict and to the institutional resolutions that provide
us with lessons, we appeal to a most particular level of meaning
formation at which we may exercise selective memory to fashion themes
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that will f,ll the gaps in prevailing meanings. When we investigate
this, we should not assume that we know the primitive form of aninstinct and can suddenly see it surfacing, but rather that we know
many corrupt forms of deep motivation that are likely to be corrupted
again in selective memory. We would move from Freud's revelations
about the instincts to the mnemonic frames in which they appear to us
In that effort however, Freud's general postulate concerning the
instincts would also acquire a new worth for the purpose of identi-
fying the themes of culture. We would not be satisfied to say that
his work was the product of its time and locality, for now we would be
inclined to examine just how he rendered certain indisputable truths
concering our deepest motivations in terms of the thematic memories of
that age. We would then dispute postulates concerning instinctual
sources comparatively, by working backward toward them through our own
troubled memories in a way that reveals our particular themes of
preoccupati on
.
A Complic ated Legacy and its Apparent Derivations
The derivative course of the central "life instinct" that Freud
elaborated in his libido theory was seen to extend from the uninhi-
bited sexuality of infancy to the aim inhibited or sublimated impulses
that derived from it, and on to the sel f
-preservati ve instinct of the
ego. Eros, as Freud finally called it, comprised a series of
qualities he discerned in the cellular sources of their appearances in
all life, and in the course of the development of the individual
those qualities being, life, growth, pleasure, certain sexual impulses
self-protection, love, and creativity. 29 Although it has not been
shown why these incarnations of Eros must move forward together, or
indeed, why they must be regarded as proceeding from the same source,
the highly contested notion remains a paradigm.
There are, however, even greater difficulties that arise with the
second class of instincts, that Freud proposed. Thanatos, or the
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death instincts' were thought to be discovered within the tendency of
all cellular life toward dissipation and death, as a force of its own
which impels "organic life back into the inanimate state." 30 it was
believed that within the human psyche, the same set of death instincts
expressed a "conservative" impulse. Thus, rather than striving after
Pleasure and creative growth as Eros dictates, these instincts incline
toward repetition and stagnation. m this, the psychological
manifestation is a "compulsion to repeat" specific remembrances, which
by Freud's reckoning, are clearly not accountable to life enhancing
instincts and contain no possibility of providing pleasure themselves.
When he initially encountered that tendency to repeat painful memories
among traumatized war veterans, for example, they seemed to return to
self
-destructive visions of horror as if they had been possessed by a
"daemonic power." 31 So it seemed that death instincts could be
justified in their own right as they seek a series of aims which
apparently oppose those of Eros. They seek "quietude" and are
accompanied by qualities of 'dispersal;' 'repetition' and finally even
'destruction' which might be outwardly expressed in frightful
delusions, sadism or other aggessions. 32 In a series of pirouettes,
it seems that Eros presses forward toward progress, while Thanatos
seeks to restore an earlier state of things by its destruction. 33
Yet as the instincts make a series of leaps and dramatic transi-
tions it is still supposed that they remain consistent. Life
instincts inspire growth and certain sexual impulses and then turn
protective, while death instincts step from their own organic seat
within each cell to become psychic compulsions to repeat and to
convert sexual impulses into expressions of violence. 34 Nevertheless,
the consistency of each type of instinct is established by a peculiar
means within the theory itself. Their paths seem to be uninterrupted
because Freud traces them from their "primitive" source, following, or
rather representing what might be thei r own point of view. In this
way the theory takes us form the proposition that we know instincts by
their aims and according to what happens to them, over to a vast
563
speculation concerning what they do on their own. By his "analogic"
method Freud fuses suppositions about organic cellular life to
corollaries in human development, to propose that the same causal
sequence is at work in both. The instincts appear to proceed from
their organic sources to conflict with one another and to proceed on
into mental life. In these accounts it is as if the consistency of
the instinct relied upon its own memory to hold itself together
through each transition that it makes. In any event, where the
persistence of instincts receives so much attention as a theoretical
proposition
- as the instinct is alleged to retain the same funda-
mental interests through all of its incarnations - we may lose sight
of the fact that in human beings it is also the faculty of memory that
holds them together, indeed it is by virtue of memory that a whole
chain of disparate inclinations and events has earned the name of
Thanatos or Eros. These are not necessarily the names of pure,
original instincts, but names for the summations of a series of
associated events and attributes, and it is because we are secretly
aware that the human "instincts" involve this mixture of elements that
we would not speak of dogs with a compulsion to repeat, or sado-maso-
chistic fish. All at once that is, the names Eros or Thanatos apply
to a combination of: 1) organic tendencies, 2) conflicts that occur
among these tendencies, and 3) the refined content that they acquire
in the mnemonics of their final goal directed actions.
In actuality the course of events set off by organic stimuli is
never so neatly divided between constructive and destructive princi-
ples. This is because there is never an unadulterated movement of
instinct that has not met an opposing force, and all of the instinc-
tual manifestations that we encounter as adults, including those of
love and death, are the results of conflict as Freud revealed in
discussing numerous manifestations of sexuality. Even if something
comparable to those two groups of instincts can be detected in every
cell, each is established by the mediations of the other so that
conflicting drives produce their results together and together they
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drive one another to more complex manifestations and to specific
achievements. Further, if the suspicion that there is always a
multitude of instincts in conflict holds true, then the notion that
the perseverance of instinct is partially sustained in memory may also
be born out. That is, since the genesis of an instinct is already a
matter of conflict before repression has anything to do with it, that
conflict must itself create limiting conditions for the same inclina-
tion. As those limits come to be retained at such a rudimentary level
of memory, they may become models of exclusion and restraint that
serve to educate later repressions. Thus it may be very early in
their developmental genesis that the instincts lose the immutable
qualities that Freud assigned to them even if they continue to provide
a general set of instructions. Their powerfully enduring features are
not just given, but wrought in a series of confrontations with one
another and the many different fates that later befall them have as
much to do with those conflicts as they do with the prior organic
quality or with the vicissitudes that they are ultimately subjected to
in the repressions that protect the ego.
Whatever each instinct might do on its own, it is the conflicts
among them that provide the most powerfully motivating directives to
life and memory. Now when we engage a more conscious and developed
faculty of memory to inform our choices we are always implicitly
referring back to that memorable legacy of instinctual confl ict . A
residual awareness of the outcome of those conflicts has provided
memory with a base pattern and a founding instruction in the ways that
life may be expected to proceed, which always lurks in the background
and assumes the guise of "intuitions," "suspicions" or "inklings."
Early in childhood, for example, a frightening incident might take
shape as Halbwach's relates it: Following the discovery that a mortal
danger has been narrowly escaped,
The child's crying and the parents' comforting, caress-
ing, anxiety, terror and subsequent burst of joy consti-
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Even then, the presence of early fears and desires and the very
expression of life instincts is already suffused in a series of
responses. The scene establishes a pattern of expectations a
prototype of the objective motion of things that can no longer '-be
restricted to the vivid memory of a single scene, and it forms a less
precisely symbolized intuition instead.
Virtually all vague memories of instinctual conflicts in a state
of resolution may provide a last resort for understanding the shape
and sense of things to come. Indeed, quite often when events seem to
be motivated by instinct they are actually being guided by a selective
summation of instinctual conflict to fulfill a particular destiny.
The worst and most uncontrollable outbursts of the group are usually
reiterations of intuitive thematic containments of instinct so that
even lynchings, riots and orgies may have their own logic and
limitations. On the one hand, the individual may refer back to such
models of contained conflict unconsciously in the formulation of
repressions. On the other hand those models have thematic consistency
and the more conscious constructions of thought may also refer to
them, rely upon them expressly, or even adorn them with the instruc-
tive associations of archaic symbols or enduring myths in a way that
gives such representations the magical quality of truth that credits
our traditions. A series of impressions that has become more than the
memories from which it arose may therefore endure as an intuitive
sensibility, or it may be publicly affirmed in stories that follow the
same sequence of evocative moods. Seemingly incongruous states of
being, emotions, qualities and types of response may become thematic-
ally allied, just as they were in the culturally appropriate response
of Halbwach's parents in thier relief -- their joy and caresses in
consequence of terror, powerl essness and anxiety.
This is one reason why there is sometimes such a convincing ring
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of truth to Freud's accounts of the instincts. As we read him, they
do not seem to leap from one track to another - from sex to self-
protection to creativity; from quietude to death and aggression ~
because those transitions do form a thematic unity which feels
coherent as it appears to us. If the quiet that we pursued
~
violent outburst is likened to death, or sex associated with pro-
creation, life and creativity, it may be because of such thematic
memories as much as anything the instincts do on 'their own. Freud
discovered certain truths about the instincts but also he has
identified and reproduced a salient mnemonic construction that we have
made into themes of love and death since long ago. Pehaps what he has
also inadvertently revealed is a legacy of instinctual conflicts and
their analogical forms in a vareity of different states of resolution
that are not single instincts. In this regard, Freud may have not
only have uncovered the general instincts and their personal vicissi-
tudes, but something which happens - so to speak — between the two.
As it was suggested in the last chapter, the post-repressive function
of selective memory may have a pre-repressi ve counterpart. The early
instincts may establish a prototypical selective pattern that provides
a glimmer of meaning at the very point where the instinctual has been
fused to the mnemonic.
Now, if we examine the evidence for the existence of the death
instinct from this point of view, its composition will seem quite
different. If we choose to regard the instincts as they press forward
relentlessly, then it seems, as it did to Freud, that the incentive
behind the painful war reminiscences of traumatized veterans can only
be explaiend as something self-destructive. But from the point of
view of memory's appeal to instinctual conflict as a source of
instruction there may be another initiative under way, and the
"compulsion to repeat" may have a sel f-protecti ve interest.- We seem
to find that compulsion in people who have experienced the shattering
of their world in some profound manner and it is not only an instinc-
tual pursuit of quietude and death that motivates them thereafter, but
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the repetitious efforts of memory striving to repair the damage by
addressing the inescapable wound again and again. As suggested above
those painful repetitions may achieve the relative 'pleasure' of
bandaging the wounds to an orientation. They may aim at achieving a
certain mnemonic comfort that is quite different form the bodily
pleasure demanded by the instincts, and if a death instinct compels
repetitions of horror, repetition is also initiated from another
source to reestablish orientation affirmatively. As Stoller has
suggested, the repetition of painful memories and fantasies is itself
a means to controlling them that introduces minute changes into each
scene that is recalled, 37 and yet those returns may also be initiated
in order to rebuild something particular at the foundation of the site
where traumatic destruction has occurred.
In reviving the painful memory so often, people may be pursuing
another objective that is sometimes not quite achieved and is
attempted over again. They may be attempting to address an aspect of
the trauma that repression cannot affect, and attempting to restore an
element of pleasure that is no longer guaranteed by a repressive
reality principle. That is, if the traumatic incidents in question
had been less severe they might have been neatly repressed, but the
protective devices of repression cannot mollify them this time because
the disturbance they have caused does not lie within those memories
themselves. Rather, the traumatic incident has come late enough in
life and is so severe that it has caused a disruption among other
memories. It has caused a tear in the prototypical memories which
preceeded it -- those orienting memories of instinctual conflict that
once formed an intuitive basis for coping with trauma but failed on
that occasion. Indeed, the reason why only the most "minute" changes
are made in the repeated memory of horror instead of constructing a
triumphant fantasy, is that one is seeking to restore that intuitive
foundation that should have provided guidance during the trauma just
as it was
.
On those occasions people seem to spin their wheels in the
hope of restoring an intuitive state in which the trauma might have
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made sense.
Further, and while the repetition of a traumatic memory might be
the culminating manifestation of the death instincts, it might also be
an attempt to revive an earlier incarnation in the genesis of that
instinct itself. In other words, by its very repetitions, memory may
hope to circumvent the particular manifestations of Thanatos in which
aggression and death are paramount by returning to an earlier phase of
their own mnemonic legacy, to that "quietude" in which the painful
conflicts of life an death were once seemingly resolved. It follows
that the impulse to return to calm - to restore an earlier conjunc-
tion of instinct and memory that preceeded trauma and can no longer
quite be grasped also affects our more ordinary experience. We may
notice that every time our usually reliable intuitions fail us, we
find ourselves struggling to recapture them and striving to remember
some aspect of their content again and again. Most often, in fact, we
do succeed in reviving the model of instruction that guides our
intuitions and most often repetition assists us in that cause. Now
our selective faculty expressly repairs and detoxifies the memories
which arouse unresolved instinctual conflicts, and it appeals to the
most rudimentary memories of resolved conflict in order to do so.
Once more, in times of personal or social crisis, it appeals to an
almost 'bodily' source of instruction a feeling or intuition for
coping with crisis that may alter our deepest motivations. In the
selective appeal of memory to these resolved states of instinctual
conflict the very substance of 'Eros' and 'Thanatos' may be changed.
Now they become vicious or prudent, explosive or tightly organized,
artistically creative or destructive in accord with the themes of
memory to which they have been drawn almost since their inception.
Significantly then, we may suggest in more detail that is is not
irruptions of instinct that guide the responses of many people at
once, but certain themes which mark their deepest levels of memory.
In a crisis, it is also not high principle but those same themes which
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provide the grounds of 'moral' direction. At such times we suffer a
collective inclination to return to the retrievalbe aspects of
instinctual conflict and their resolutions, ultimately to themes
that are first derived in infancy and later compounded with historical
particularity.
In infancy we experience irresolvable conflicts among instinctual
demands, perhaps at that time, between the demands of Eros and
Thanatos. Nevertheless these conflicts do not leave us with a clear
apprehension of the one instinct that is victorious, nor do we feel
its effects unambiguously. What we are left with instead is a feeling
of irresolution
- of unfulfilled need that demands a remedy - and
with a sense of the vulnerability aroused by the many conflicting
desires that accompany the infantile state. It is this feeling of
vulnerability that survives within the reach of memory and repeats its
thematic respose to every conflict among instinctual demands. Perhaps
it is even this residual memory of wanting without limits that
accounts for the 'oceanic feeling' that Freud chose to disregard as a
basis of religious sentiment because it was too much of an "intellec-
38
tual perception."
In any case, while that vulnerable sense of being alone is
boundless and is rooted in the instinctual desire for fulfillment
provided by other people, the ideational consolation of 'feeling at
one with the world' might readily follow, for it is in our attempts to
appease that vulnerability that it may become a thematic instruction
for many of our responses. Thus, one thematic path that originates in
response to instinctual conflict moves us from vulnerability to an
oceanic feeling of security, to desire for others, and even to the
'good of all' as it is expressed in religious and legal principles. A
second theme responds to the same residues of vulnerability by wishing
to destroy them, to be strong and independent from all, and to defend
what is one's own as in certain forms of nationalism and chauvinism
concerning tradition. Both respond to that portion of instinctual
conflict that still appears to us in memory, they are responses to the
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^ory of the disturbing feeiing and as such provide grounds for mo ra,
choice in society.
It may seem to stretch the point to suggest that morality rests
upon those residues of instinctual conflict, but the moral foundations
of society do involve something quite different from a repressive
overcoming of the instinct. Instead of that, it is patterns of memory
that build upon those residues of instinct within memory to provide
justifications for the "positi vities" of social power. Initially a
conflict among the demands attributed to Eros and Thanatos was what
produced the sensation of vulnerability and dependence in infancy.
From that state forward, as Ricoeur intimates, it is the "'coales-
cence' (Legierung) of love and death," that is recalled in so many
wishes an fears. We might say that the fear of vulnerabilities
expresses its underlying conflict to memory, that frightful conflict
has been subdued in primary repressions and yet it is residual ly
expressed in selective memories of early states of being. Later on,
those derivations of instinct may be subordinated in a secondary
repression leading to various individual outcomes, this time under the
aegis of the ego and superego where the same instinctual conflicts
retain a thematic presence. That is, the memory of instinctual
conflict is not lost to the moralizing agencies of the psyche at all
but provide their own thematic field of reference.
Thus, when a moral conflict arises between ego and superego, it
inspires a feeling of "guilt," but guilt does not remain within the
ego or superego exactly, since it must initiate a selective memory
that takes command of other motivating aspects of mind. Guilt sends
us soul searching backward in memory as if to inquire into our deepest
impulses and motivations -- and again, what we encounter in that
reflection is not the instinct £er se, but mnemic residues; 'coales-
cences' and 'retrievable' themes that become a greater part of moral
conflict the more we seek them out. Guilt, and its more developed
counterpart in "conscience," must follow the same movement backward to
the mnemic residues of instinctual conflicts. In these, morality
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finds thematic and enduring motives that may bear very different
associations in different societal contexts.
Now this "conscience," as the Mi tscherl ichs are quick to point
out, is a consicous expression of conflict. 40 Yet even as it appeals
to consciously accessible associations, it inspires empathy on the
basis of vulnerabilities that first emerged in instinctual conflict
Here, conscience is obliged to retain that thread of contact with the
instincts. On the one hand, when we examine our highest moral choices
those which seem most characteristic of our advanced state of
culture and its threatened meanings ~ the influence of instinctual
demands will seem very far away. However, as those moral choices seem
rational and judicious they still refer to a select chain of associa-
tions and to a reminiscence of vulnerability with an entire legacy of
instinctual demands in tow. Morality does not overcome the instincts
so much as it puts them to thematic use and the early model of
vulnerability must always be a primary referent for later morality.
Consequently, when moralists think that they have superceded the
instincts by preferring the rational to more passionate or subjective
choices, they have also skipped a step and they have ignored earlier
resolutions of conflict in order to superimpose contemporary abstrac-
tions that have really derived from them. They dismiss the instinc-
tual world without addressing the manner in which it has become part
of the conscious mnemonic world. They write off " lust and unlust"
without considering the fragile memories of pain and pleasure to which
they are still themselves attached. They end up by substituting a
kind of safety in the present in place of a reflective, reasoned
morality without realizing it, but a truly reasoned morality would be
self-conscious of the very mnemonic residues "of instinct that they
fear.
The moral foundations of society are therefore more genuinely
presented at two levels of memory that intertwine. First, as in the
case of guilt, there is reference back to early desires and prohi-
bitions -- a memory of the resolution of instinctual conflict to which
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we owe feelings of "empathy" and self-protection. Secondly, as in the
case of conscience, there is a more conscious series of shared
associations that are communicable and contain terms of mutual
responsibility which are thematically related to the first. To these
associations we owe our convictions, our sense of enduring obligation
and a means of identifying enemies. Finally, a fully developed
morality has taken us a step beyond guilt and conscience so that we
might view the two with some detachment. Accordingly, morality
responds to guUt and articulates conscience in expressions of law and
principle. The shared morality of society is constructed from the
residue of fears and associations which result from instinctual
conflict, but it elaborates themes that disguise those sources as
well. Within the themes of conflict that finally appear to us, an
adult moralizing assessment has surveyed the vast pool of infantile
conflicts and vulnerabilities, it has subordinated that strange
childish world within themes of more contemporary association. Thus
the fertile ground of instinctual conflict moves within the articulate
concerns of the body which, in their turn, become the substance of the
issues of the day and their moral resolution. Special themes of
preoccupation harden as memory instantly traverses these dimensions
and they turn ancient strengths and vulnerabilities into the rote and
hidden frame of reference for morality that they have become.
The General Ground of Thematic Memory: Instinctual Conflict Proceeds
from Vulnerability, to Derive Themes of Innocence and Toughness .
Where certain vulnerabilities serve as the earliest represen-
tation of instinctual conflict in memory, we may now consider how
culturally motivating themes are derived from them. The first
memorabl
e
emergence of instinctual conflict is likely to be the
childish sense of frustration we may have felt concerning a desired
object and which left us on the verge of tears. Yet that vulnerable
state quickly translates when we are able to reflect upon it from a
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removed, adult moralizing point of view. In the course of looking
back from that vantage point we impose several fates upon those early
memories. Certainly they may be forgotten altogether, or they may be
recalled freshly as if in their original embattled condition, or
revived to apply that sense of conflict to some current circumstance.
More commonly those early states are modified in a succession of
memories of similar conflicts so that initial frustrations are
overwhelmed by a record of desires and prohibitions, and frustration
is replaced by feelings of responsibility and guilt. It is also quite
common that the same sequence of events will have the effect of
detaching the early feeling of vulnerability from that long chain of
its resolutions, so that instead of a sharp sense of desire and guilt
we may be left with a rather vague residual feeling of helpnessness
and infantile dread. This feeling, as much as any moralizing
resolution, is likely to be aroused in the very situations of adult
conflict that would revive the instincts.
In that case it is significant that an original sense of conflict
has diminished and we have only a vague memory of its paradigmatic
cases and of the uneasiness that surrounded them. Whether it is
because of repression, or due to the attrition produced subsequently
in selective memory, we lose the voracious quality of the desires
involved in early conflicts, and what began as an internal battle can
only be perceived now in the depleted state of weakness that we can
recall as the outcome or that informs our 'intuitive' sense of such
events. From the present point of view of the adult, in the aftermath
of battle as it were, the resulting vulnerability may acquire the
rather passive characteristics of a truce. The dangers vanish and the
intensity of desires with them, so that when we look back toward the
barest expressions of instinct we may only perceive a state of
depletion. The formerly feverish set of demands is now recalled as
something enfeebled and belonging to a childhood that was passive and
weak. This allayed passion is regarded as something that had once
lost control and is now embarrassing to the adult who does not dare to
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recall the same conflict in its integrity. Thus, an extraordinary
transition has occurred in the appearance of the instincts: They have
been moved from a sense of intense desire, to one of conflict, to
vulnerability, and on to become the possessions of a supercilious
adult attitude that looks back upon them with embarrassment.
Consequently, when a present situation arouses such a vague
memory of vulnerability, the very attitude of remembering distances
and reshapes the terrifying conflict that is more deeply evoked. The
adult may now regard that residue of conflict as something that
belongs to a remote, childlike "innocence." Beyond that, the detached
adult will experience those remainders of instinct with a profound
sense of being 'innocent of them now,' thus transforming the original
naivite or "innocence" of the child into the adult attribute of being
free of guilt. As a mnemonic distance is affirmed, the residues of
instinctual conflict are perceived to belong to an earlier time as if
to say, "fortunately I am no longer a victim of those passions which
could only have affected me when I was too innocent and incompetent to
view them as I do now with all my present moral knowledge to guide
me!" A distant affinity with the child who is blameless for its own
instinctual conflicts and resulting states of being is forged for the
adult who is also innocent by virtue of the reflexive distance that is
imposed upon all such memories. Therefore if it was Guilt which
provided the resolution of instinctual conflicts that allowed us to
build a civilization according to Freud, 41 we are only able to bear
that guilt and to make our culture in spite of it, by assuming the
distancing posture of memory which asserts our own Innocence as
adults. Indeed, the moralizing memory of instinctual conflict has
opened thematic pathways which respond to a residual vulnerability by
the disclaimers of guilt and innocence alike, and especially where
repression fails, selective memory provides for innocence. In
society, it is not guilt that is the central motive, but guilt and
innocence together which become thematic means of resolving the
conflicts that begin with the most arcane instincts, and if culture is
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to progress, a sense of innocence must ultimately outlast that of
guilt.
Once guilt has responded to the persistent demands of the
instincts it must be absolved by means that will serve the present
terms of adulthood. All of the defensive variations of memory
discussed in the previous chapter must now be applied, not to protect
the ego, but to preserve the preferred "I" of shared identity in its
innocence. The fetish that is often made of innocence and of all
those persons or attributes which appear to be innocent, may therefore
become a thematic corrollary to repression that is now a creation of
selective memory. It is a thematic device that accomplishes the
manifest purification of memories as it divides remembered experience
between the present and a distant childhood, between barbarism and
adult civilization and assigns the remnants of instinct to the most
remote corners of recollection. It is the foundation of all self-
justifying themes which distance entire classes of experience from our
present but since the terms of innocence are a means of reconciling
difficult memories more than they are repressions or firm principles
of morality -- they become underlying cultural preoccupations that
reveal themselves in collective fantasies and fictions.
Yet, even as they seem distant from clearly formulated princi-
ples, such thematic regularities of memory become the underpinning of
morality. They provide the rudimentary criteria for distancing and
absolving present adults from the peculiarities of the past that have
not been repressed. In any one society, the adults will generally be
embarrassed by the same things and distance themselves from them
according to consistant thematic standards. At first a vague
discomfiture with certain evocations turns upon such themes of
identity, but quickly that feeling of discomfort becomes a principle
of "moral exclusion," and a means to a self-proclaimed innocence that
sheds itself of all disturbing characteristics and would defend itself
by a tough and systematic disavowal. However, from one society to
another those criteria of adult identity may differ so much, that one
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"innocence- by „elc0min g the reminiscence ofi ood vulnerabilities and passions, while another seeks the same
end in disclaiming them. For this reason, the thematic response ofdifferent cultures to the same initial vulnerabilities may end inSum concerning them; in a tolerant fetishism of certain charac-
teristics of innocence; it may end in a preoccupation with those
vulnerabilities that proclaims a present which is innocent of them- or
a hardened disavowal of all that concerns them, which ends' indispising everything innocent.
Virtually every moral order must secure its authority with
reference to those thematic foundations of identity. Even the
Christian notion of Original Sin achieves its goals on behalf of
present interests by allowing them to lay claim to the "innocence" of
childhood. With the pronouncement that in the eyes of God there is no
such pristine innocence, the Church may claim the only authority to
restore a facsimile of the very innocence that every adult must take
for granted simply in being an adult. By the baptism that would
cleanse the soul of its initially sinful passions, in continual
repentance, or in the acceptance of the notion that the death of
Christ made repayment for the same sins, the present authority of the
Church rests in providing circuitous means to innocence or rather, to
an adulthood bathed again in the innocence that adults would generally
attribute to a child. Here indeed, the Church uses guilt as a means
to secure its own innocence and to justify its place at the head of
moral order and to woo its members to become the innocent sheep in its
flock. The Church claims the child within us who has already sinned
in its esteem, and is instantly remade in accepting the offer of
forgi veness
.
In this way, moral authority generally justifies itself in
adapting the adult attitude toward an errant child and applying such
forgiveness or punishment to all. It finds fault in the passions and
vulnerabilities of childhood and introduces them into its own thematic
order of 'the good,' and like the theme of innocence concocted by the
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Church, early passions and their current remedies are both present
within that order. Once again, in mnemonic themes the instincts are
not a hidden motivation because they have been repressed, but they are
a motivation insofar as they are expressed, and themes allow memory to
manage instincts and current conflicts together precisely because both
are kept in view. But since the thematic residue of instinctual
conflicts is within the reach of memory in such cases, and since the
threatening elements are not repressed, they must be confronted
instead with overt opposing themes and the glowing imagery of good
confronting
-evil becomes the essential adornment of every moral
doctrine. For this reason culture will contrive subtle thematic
oppositions to every threatening evocation and if it seeks a path to
innocence on the one hand, it may declare its hardness on another.
Especially when desperate social conditions make the evocations
of an incipient vulnerability most apparent, the old criteria for
guilt will not sufficiently contain them and sel f-procl aimed innocence
no longer distances them efficiently, then they will be met with
themes of cynicism and toughness in the arbitrary punitive mode that a
frustrated parent might adopt. Such a thematic turn will call upon
the most startling imagery to thwart the themes of innocence and it
will condemn those who were supposed to be innocent in the first
place. So it is that at the culmination of a long series of instinc-
tual conflicts and circumstantial shifts that have generated mnemonic
themes, it is no longer the instinctual forces of life and death or
their combined resolutions in vulnerability or guilt that emerge in
thematic opposition to one another, but themes of Innocence and
Toughness that act as supportive correlates to repression to contain
the elements of infantile passion. Further, and as general as they
might seem, those themes are carefully constructed organizations of
particular memories which become capable of selecting the most precise
targets. While those grand themes contain traces of original instinct-
ual conflicts they actively resolve them with the details of contem-
porary experience -- they may acquire the characteristics that are
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identified with a liberal or a conservative attitude as they obtain
the force of an instinct while having the elaborate precision of a
memory.
Therefore in America, as the themes of innocence and toughness
become precise, they have made careful accomodations to one another.
Here the array of tempting cultural productions do beckon the
instincts for release, and even though they do not quite succeed, they
manage to arouse fundamental conflicts and vulnerabilities. Neverthe-
less, as these productions are presented and perceived in topics of
bodily concern as I have suggested, they are also regarded from the
safe distance of the adult who sets standards of innocence and
toughness. That is, the preoccupations of the body are viewed from a
perspective which looks down upon them and makes them remote -- "not
mine" and an experience of which "I am innocent." A very precise sort
of innocence with regard to particular concerns is maintained in a
somewhat detached and almost clinical interest in pornography, or in
an equally clinical disgust that instructs the apprehension of bodily
themes for many people of widely varied beliefs.
Like the dedicated fan of a lascivious television program who is
involved and yet innocent of its content, or like the born again
Christian whose self-righteousness approximates an adult conception of
childlike purity and innocence, many Americans strike an attitude
which distances them from the conflict of passions that accompanies
their crisis in identity. Reminiscences of their own vulnerability
are selectively recalled and relocated in an elaborate thematic scheme
that grants a certain absolution to the very people who are assailed
by reminders of their most base conflicts. Now they tend to formulate
conflict as something for which "I am not responsible because it is
something external which happens to me." Now the external i zati on of
every personal and family function in the modern activities of
government and the media to which Lasch and others have referred, is
compounded within that special frame of innocence that settles around
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the most poignant memories. In this circumstance, people are likely
to maintain that they do not want to "get involved" in situations
where they are clearly implicated, and this attitude extends from
civic duties to the most intimate relations.
As it has been suggested in earlier chapters, this self-
proclaimed innocence fosters a most peculiar variety of individualism.
It is no longer the old liberal sort, nor is it narcissism, nor a
mimetic conformity within mass society. Rather it is an orchestration
of private desires along relatively acceptable mnemonic pathways which
are constrained by a desire not to be blamed for their expression. It
is a series of somewhat hidden thematic indulgences that rub against
the grain of a few remaining communitarian values and often have the
air of "getting away with something," while at times, it proclaims its
own childlike innocence and actually will cause us to remember things
in a manner that affirms that characteristic. Still, this inclination
to be exempt from culpability and responsibility where feelings of
vulnerability are aroused, has now coupled in memory with the ideolo-
gical remnants of "freedom" and "legal rights" that once defined the
individual. So today the individual may be innocent and self-indul-
gent like a child, and not culpable in the sense of being exempt from
1e9 a1 responsibility. Individuality of this sort is the result of an
almost mystical transformation in the old thematic content of indivi-
dualism. Now the American flees from recollections of vulnerability,
proclaims a childlike innocence of them which allows himself or her-
self to be secretly indulgent, and seeks to be publicly forgiven for
the indulgence. This innocence is to be toughened by public sanction
so that the American may readily assume the attitude of juridical
innocence
.
In this formulation, that is, the innocence of the child
has mingled thematically with the desire to be forgiven as adults by a
nebulous public authority -- a desire to be found "not guilty" accord-
ing to the same legal principles which once protected the individual
-- and finally a desire that bates the old legalistic ideology of
individualism into embracing a new and more desperate content.
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Today in countless public forums, good American citizens who are
possessed with this sense of their own innocence complain that one
community service or another halfway house should not be located in
their neighborhood, because they have worked hard for what they have
acquired and it should not be jeopardized. While the claim may have
merit, the tone of the complaint is often zealous and bitter like that
of the child who has been wrongly accused and the principled
discussion of 'rights' often occurs as if it were an afterthought.
The very style of the complaint as well as its intention to exclude
certain elements from the neighborhood is structured to cut short the
ugly reminder
- the memory that might make one empathetic, and
culpable. Indeed the lack of empathy and the restrictive memory that
attends the discourse precludes any full assessment of the interests
that are in conflict, and it generates a kind of communicative
'incompetence' that would fly in the face of the communicative
competence which Habermas wisely deems to be necessary to the sort of
ideal communication that generates new meaning. 42
But worse, where self-indulgence meets with absolution in the
tough innocence of a new individualism, we may make the most dangerous
accomodations. Under these conditions it is possible that the
religious man who despises abortion, hails the military as a patriot
and upholds "family values" may also feel justified in abusing his
wife and children, fostering racial hatred, committing assault or even
indulge in sexual aggressions on the basis of the very same thematic
resolutions of his fears and without feelings of contradiction. He
may, in fact, despise 'innocents' as a means to making himself aloof
and therefore "innocent" after a different fashion. In this situation
it is apparent that the oldest instinctual conflicts have not been
resolved once and for all in law and abstract principle, and that they
must find a thematic balance that is more rudimentary. In such
subordinate themes, fears of vulnerability have initiated a seeking
self-indulgence for this man and others, and a backlash which would
suppress vulnerability and make virtually juridical claims to
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innocence ln the process, m those the.es - where selective me.ory
may reappraise the fundamental instinctual conflicts within its reach
-
evocative bodily concerns gain sway just as images of violence anddeath may become the expressed justifications of political power m
those themes, Eros and Thanatos have contaminated one another and mem-
ory has provided them with a new genesis to fit the times. Now this
man ascends and his stilted memory may become the outline of power.
The Constitution of Themes and Their Instructive Message
As the instincts themselves are forged in opposition, so are the
themes that arise from them in conjuntion with memory to determine our
means of resolving conflict. However, since these oppositional themes
are not repressed like the instincts and since they are creations of
selective memory which are kept in sight of one another, they form
polarities of meaning that contribute directly to conscious orienta-
tion. In this respect, the thematic representations of conflict within
memory are as important as the conceptual poles of space, time and
creative activity to the orientation of a group. Such themes provide
the atmosphere and emotional charge of recollected things and places,
and as each theme arises from a series of conflicts and resolutions it
is already a model for the containment of other stark oppositions.
Thus, as every theme contains opposition it is also a reflection of
its opposites, so that they must effect one another as proximate
causes, in measured contrast and with the comparable force of matched
pairs in a formulation of 'either. ..op...'
In this way each culture has developed its own poignant dualisms
which seem to give expression to the most severely contradictary
qualities -- and yet, at the same time that those oppositions are
expressed, they will seem to be curiously subdued and contained. In a
strange way such opposing themes seem comfortable next to one another
as if they had managed to form some secret pact long ago. Much as
thematic variations in a musical score might mark the presence of a
582
villain and his hapless victim, oppositional themes are generally
portrayed in the same style of expression, imagined to be within
adjacent spaces at the same time, and to be created of the same
substance. Selective memory has muted and dulled the opposition of
themes and the imagined actors who bear them out, by granting them
comparable power, ignoring their most disparate attributes to focus
upon the points where they might touch, and thus minimizing the damage
they might do to one another. The wild instinctual conflicts of
infancy are restricted to more manageable fields of battle; opposites
form a genre together, so that Godly and Daemonic powers are roughly
matched, the Janus faces are of the same clay, the places of heaven
and hell are analogous, Dionysian and Apollonian attribues almost
match each other one for one, Eros and Thanatos, hedonism and asceti-
cism belong together as they are locked, united and contained in
conf 1 ict.
In this way simple themes build fortresses of opposition, but
once their construction is completed selective memory reduces and
condenses them to the point that we are left with a single symbol of
conflict -- a minimal and solitary communicable referent. Such stark
symbols evoke the most compelling sense of contrast for the group even
as they freeze it and provide immediate appeasements. At first, that
is, we might recall conflict in images that are utterly opposed -- the
solitary flower in the midst of battle, the guillotine in the tranquil
public square, the hoards of soldiers at the scene of the crucifixion,
the the dove flying back from the flood with a telltale olive branch.
Each evokes memories of conflict and quells them at once. In each
image there is a momentary reminder of a whole story of opposition,
but the opposition is contained as memory oscillates between the
contrasting elements of that story. Soon the elements of the story
appear in such rapid and familiar succession that only one shimmering
image remains in place of them. Indeed, if memory can be stimulated
by contrasts as it was in the early memory arts discussed by Yates, 43
then its more treacherous wanderings can be halted and kept to one
583
path by the collapse of oppositions into a siricjle symbol. Eventually
even the oppositional attributes of a single scene may be lost along
with Its story so that the olive branch by itself, or the flower
alone, becomes a symbol for "peace," no longer requiring the battle or
the flood around it to make the point; the guillotine by itself may
become a symbol of a sort of "justice," or the cross of another, and
so on. Symbols of this kind are elaborate enough to refer to
oppositions, and yet simple enough to prevent memory from going too
far to reveal their disruptive substance.
These subtle unities of opposition are therefore much more than
symbols and they have a more significant role in steering the whole of
society than we might suppose. In certain respects they even pose a
psychological limit to a social dialectic as they offer their own
implicit instruction in trie management of conflict. Often, in fact, a
dialectical conflict will not generate an absolute transformation and
may not even amount to a motivating "contradiction" because a public
sense of its oppositions has been educated to those mnemonic themes
with all of their underlying and appeasing compl imentarity
. Signi-
ficantly, in the current crisis of meaning our guiding symbols have
become so remote from their initial oppositional contexts and from the
stories of conflict that initiated them that they cannot fuel an
awareness of contradiction. The peculiar stagnation which now seems
to subdue the most threatening divisions in this society may be
traced, in part, to the state of resolution that such guiding themes
have achieved and to the fact that we cling to them more tightly in a
state of crisis in meaning. However, it is not just here, but
everywhere that themes of that sort generally function on behalf of
accomodation, and regardless of the historical circumstances. From
childhood people are always provided with thematic models for the
containment of conflict, and their imaginations are thematically
geared to that end.
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Psychologically and at an early age our education to themes
begins. We never simply adopt the behavior of our parents, and our
'introjection" of their personalities is accompanied by thematic
constructions of memory. Parents teach, and themselves become part of
an appeasing set of mnemonic lessons. They are not only introjected
on the psychoanalytic model, but they are combined with fantasies into
the elaborate instructions that guide the memory of the child
Certainly parents themselves will encourage their children to con-
struct the fantastic themes that are more than the sum of introjec-
tions, just as they will encourage them in the fantasies that deny a
painful reality. Certainly, at the same time that children are busy
introjecting precise parental models, their parents will relate
comforting fantasies to them, they will give them a security blanket
or a doll and proceed to check under the bed and in the closets for
frightful apparitions. As Anna Freud reminds us as well,
It is quite a common thing to tell even a small child
"what a big boy" he is and to declare contrary to the
obvious facts that he is as strong "as Father," as clever
"as Mother," as brave "as a soldier" or as touqh as his
"big brother. "[44]
y
In pointed contrast to their own sense of reality, parents compliment
their children for having fantastic strengths, as if to avert the
disturbing recollection of their own childhood fears by granting the
familiar thematic remedies.
Significantly, this early introduction of thematic appeasement
does not only encourage the child to be grown up, but also to adopt a
particular fantasy of what it is like to be an adult. This parental
encouragement entices the child to selectively favor certain of the
attributes that have been introjected, to remake the model of the
parent as the parent would prefer to be seen, and to build specialized
resolutions against vulnerability on top of it. In this the child may
develop a distinctive style, even a modus operandi for all of his or
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her budding defenses. If the child is effectively encouraged to be
strong, clever, brave and tough, those characteristics will accompany
the parental introjects that shape the child's identity, m conjunc-
tion with the distinctive cultural experience that the child comes to
face, these attributes form a theme in identity ~ a particular con-
tent of the toughness that contains vulnerability, certain trappings
of gender and so on - which do not necessarily lead the child to be
like the parent, but like the cultural legends presented by parents.
Indeed, as those formative themes are at odds with the 1 introjectable'
parent they may establish the terms of later rebellion, or the precise
ingredients of the emerging adult's toleration for contraditi on. The
disparity between the fantasy and the reality of introjectable themes
of identity -- the characteristics which become exaggerated by the
desire to possess them, and those which are disappointing - may
become collective terms of overcoming parental influence, and this is
one reason for the heightened idealistic sense of contradiction among
adolescents in a culture where the same contradiction has come to be
tolerated by their elders.
Further, as the themes that affect a whole generation are
constructed to effect patterns of psychological defense within the
individual, they resort to the paradigm of one of the earliest
defenses: the tendency to reverse assailing dangers. As that defense
has had a special place in the formation of the superego, so it has a
special place in the foundation of collective themes. In the
development of the superego the tendency to reverse dangers would
thrwart parental criticism by an "identification with the aggressor"
which allows a measure of independence. At first, as Anna Freud
expl ains,
the internalized criticism [of parental introjects] is
not yet immediately transformed into self criticism... It
is dissociated from the child's own reprehensible
activity and turned back on the outside world. By means
of a new defensive process identification is succeeded by
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an active assault on the outside world. [45]
However, in later life as Stoller maintains, a similar tendency
to reverse danger becomes a rather ordinary focus of common daydreams
that reproduce childhood traumas. In these fantasies, he contends we
change the role that we have played in trauma to its opposite as we
change a victim into a victor." 46 By now, however, such a repetitive
reversal has become rather more systematic. Thematic instructions
have joined within it along with images of the victims we would not
wish to be and the victor we would prefer to be. Now, just as memory
can reduce entire thematic stories into single images, it has refined
the defensive modality of 'reversal' into a play of types. But in
this eventuality a very subtle new ability has also revealed itself,
for now we no longer need to reverse dangers by an independent effort
of defense, because selective memory already presents us with thematic
oppositions in place of them. Where culturally procured oppositional
themes instruct our identity we do not need to go to the extreme of
forming fantastic reversals of every danger, and instead we may
catalogue the attributes, types and styles that we favor or oppose.
The social phenomenon of scapegoating arises from this, and it is
because of this tendency to be satisfied with the thematic oppositions
that take the place of reversals that there is really so little, and
not so much scapegoating in America of late. The scapegoating
tendency is an extreme, and as the Mi tscherl ichs have portrayed it in
the context of German wartime experience, it is a reversal which
arises in reaction to the common seeds of childhood subordination to
parents. As they suggest, where people cannot avenge themselves upon
the stronger they tend to dominate the weaker and to justify that
domination thematical ly
:
Collective scapegoats are then the most unprotected
victims of that reaction; the aggression directed at them
is confirmed by rationalizations that are demogogi cal ly
reinforced. [47]
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In normal circumstances, however, where enduring insecurities and
feelings of subordination are not evoked by every turn of events, we
will content ourselves with the thematic oppositions that calm 'our
more modest fears. If not too strongly evoked, the infantile dread of
losing warmth, comfort, food, familiar persons, or of being chastised
by a parent, may generally be contained at the level of the public
themes that address the fears of starvation, invasion, passion,
illness or ostracism. Rather than scapegoating a type of person who
might be taken to represent their deepest fears, people may hold a
thematic set of qualities in esteem or in contempt as we now tend to
do in America. In other words, people will be as reluctant as
circumstances will allow to revive the format of their childhood
reversals of danger, because that return would make the very same
dangers too pronounced in memory. Instead, people will prefer to
cling to the topical concerns that assure them security, like those
concerns of the body discussed above.
In such a time of subdued crisis when a social dialectic as
well as an individual inclination to reversal are more readily
confined within themes -- we are much more likely to indulge in a
morbid thematic preoccupation than to scapegoat a portion of the
population. In American films and television programs, for example,
the topic of rape has gained such proportions and may serve similar
ends. The scenes of rape that are so redundantly presented in the
media, condense the elements of violence, amoral lust, male strength
and extreme vulnerability. In witnessing this, the very people who
condemn the preoccupation most vociferously, as well as those who seem
to enjoy it, must bring the residual memories of their own vulner-
ability into a dimly conscious conjunction with the woman being
assaulted. There is a visceral reaction to the scene of a rape which
selectively stimulates the response of certain memories and fantasies.
Then, almost as in a daydream, one imagines oneself to occupy
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different positions within the scene in the same sort of shimmering
oscillations that give rise to singular symbols of opposition
recalling and resisting the recollections of comparable sensations at
once. The scene tantalizes us with our own evocations of vulnerability
and strength, let alone with the sexual excitations that the media are
so keen to arouse.
Despite the fact that the liberal, the feminist or the conserva-
tive may each respond differently to the display, they may share a
certain cultural fascination with it. Where the strict prohibition of
such topics in the public media has all but vanished, it appears that
the general interest in them has also acquired a new function. Now
they present a thematic balance of our deepest fears which allows us
to stand apart from them, it works like a "reversal" of those fears
but by placing them in controlled juxtaposition. The scene repeats
over and over and it provides the relative comfort or "pleasure" of an
orientation in that repetition. Interest in it does not wane because
the details of the themes that are evoked -- the vulnerability of
conflicting desire, mortal dread, female subjugation, the lawlessness
and the vengence that generally follows, the innocence and hardness of
the characters and events — are themselves instructive themes that
find sympathy in the insecure audience that is already preoccupied
with them. Most importantly, and in lieu of decisive moral standards,
the horrifying scene itself becomes a source of meaning as it presents
the stark thematic polarity of all of the raw elements necessary to
the motivation of a moral stance: there are infantile fears and
desires seeking resolution, empathetic identifications with assailant
and victim, and the distance of the observer from which to disavow it
and sit in judgement.
Something like an "identification with the aggressor" has
transpired in the topical preoccupation, but it is balanced in complex
and highly qualified identifications with the victim (a point of view
arousing guilt is matched by one proclaiming innocence). In this, the
scene of rape may even seem to satisfy a deeper need for resolution as
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means
c
it becomes a symbol of thematic oppositions that have lost other
of resolution and now threaten to arise in even more corrupt publi
expressions. In times like these it follows that the culture thai
indulges those evocations in order to balance one another, cannot long
tolerate the legal defense of "innocence by reason of insanity." This
is because people are now only able to salvage a sense of their own
righteous innocence within scenes of such violence by a thematic
encounter with every aspect of the horror including those which once
seemed so far from the norm. The society that repeatedly makes itself
the witness to crimes of that nature, now finds the motives that lie
within them to be too easily imaginable, too famliar, too much like
its daydreams and too close to something that is chosen for the blame
to be assessed in terms of "insanity." There have been indications of
this in the debate surrounding the treatment of Hinkley after his
attempted assassination of President Reagan or of Chapman after the
murder of John Lennon. Where legal, moral and religious constructions
of memory fail to guide them, people will look within disturbing
scenes and to all of their evocations for the fundamental substance of
instruction. There, the memory of different genres of opposition
revives our earliest bodily fears along with our earliest fantasies
concerning adulthood so that from a proximate seat of judgement we may
slowly begin to reconstruct a moral response.
Inasmuch as the compelling topics in question are still regarded
as crimes, the laws that address them and perhaps the whole idea of
law acquires an additional function. It can no longer be seen as the
simple embodiment of high moral principle or of a justice that stands
apart from the worst of human enterprises. Instead certain legalisms
will actually become props which allow us to mingle with the worst
that we can imagine without becoming absorbed in it. In attending the
media or elsewhere, when we indulge such preoccupations with certain
criminal activities we are also able to extricate ourselves because we
keep the law with us as a means of salvation. The meager allegiance
to the law that accompanies our cultural fascination in the
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victimizations of the body, protects us from the most painful
evocations. On the one hand, it keeps us at a distance from the
elements in the imagined crime - the visceral terror and all the
evocations surrounding the victim. On the other hand it restrains the
desire for revenge which would quickly stir up the same painful
evocations. If the structure of laws once balanced victimization and
vengence in abstractions that were remote from each, this thematic
concern for the law now returns us to the mnemic sources of those very
abstractions and creates a different sort of distance that becomes a
direct means of regulating our own distrubing memories. In this way,
when we contemplate scenes of violent crime we may indulge a fantasy
of vengeance because we secretly have begun to establish our distance
from it by reconstructing a lofty moral attitude and a semblance of
legal principle. We strip down the law to rebuild the law - indulge
ourselves in the worst in order to save ourselves from the worst and
to affirm that we stand above it in innocence.
The thematic persistance of law makes its way within our
apprehension of the most unsettling incidents and yet it also becomes
a moderator of fears and desires that serves as a more common point of
reference for the organization of memory. Today the perspective of
legal impartiality has become a popular public attitude in keeping
with the old ideology and yet it has also joined with the attitude of
the spectator which alternatively moves us from the perspective of the
judge to that of a participant. In this, the mnemic posture of the
"I" obtains a special social importance for as it moves repeatedly
from the standpoint of moral authority to that of aggressor and
vengeful victim almost at random, it becomes a means of reconcilia-
tion, a vehicle for producing the symbolic concord of oppositions and
a means to appeasement in the most contradictory circumstances.
In this way too, Americans have been able to revive a senfblance
of the old ideology of individualism and the framewok of legal rights
in the peculiar forum of minute topical interests. As the standing
legitimations of this society begin to fail and the frightful memories
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at their source are awakened, an aspect of memory proceeds toward the
source to contain them. In fictions that reflect a harsh reality and
refer us to painful personal experiences, the judgemental spectator
now effects small repairs in a torn ideology and in each case the
general crisis of legitimacy and meaning is slightly forestalled.
Once more our good citizens are interested but insulated. They are
stern and unmerciful toward criminal and victim alike and disavow the
memories that each evokes in them. Again they have rearranged the
inner structure of authority and adjusted their place within it to
proclaim a juridicial kind of innocence for themselves that is cut
from memory and ideology, and to salvage what they can, they have
mixed vengeance with the law and applied it from that perspective.
Indeed, where political scientists find apathy and depol iti ci zati on
,
there is really an obsessive interest that is secretly working to
build a special kind of detachment that sits in judgement and applauds
certain carefully aimed retributions.
Yet as the crisis at the source of legitimate authority worsens,
this perspective keeps Americans from extremes, and their tendency to
revive traditional standards is checked along with the inclination
that they might have had to make dramatic social transformations. The
stance that they have adopted within topical currents of memory has
created a place of compromise in which oppositions are tentatively
balanced, and as long as the option is open to them, people will
prefer to rebuild their fading standards in that very attitude of
moderation. Rather than leaping into an abyss of meani ngl essness when
those standards fail, Americans have taken a half -step backward to a
middle world of themes that were only partially expressed in them and
now those themes themselves become the locus of disputes over meaning
precisely so that something more dramatic or regressive does not
occur.
In themes, as Americans have seen, we have resisted the return of
the repressed by clinging to the expressed concerns of the body, they
resist the extreme reversal that results in scapegoating and the
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absolute reduction of the law to vengence. In each case they appeal
to the least evocative frame of reference that circumstances will
allow, but they must dare to go just far enough in memory to rein-
vigorate instructive meaning. In the same way that they do not sink
entirely into narcissism, mimesis and rationalism, but strive instead
to resist the traumas that such tendencies cause within them, they now
resort to a range of accessible memories in the hope of reassembling
their guiding meanings. They look to that region where selective
memory is active at the edge of our awareness, and they seem to tread
water as near to a principled surface as they can, concentrating to
remember how to keep their heads in the air with the greatest economy
of movement.
However, as they reach for themes to keep themselves afloat and
as they vacillate between the perspectives of judge and judged to
refurbish their morality, their guilt is not lessened but spread thin
and multiplied. Instead of recreating a few clear guiding principles,
their interests have scattered among the themes and minute topics that
they have turned to in desperation, and they have generated almost
polytheistic allegiances to keep from sinking. As they resist the
encounter with the memory of their deepest fears, they also act as if
they were hedging our bets concerning what they will include within
their reconstructed beliefs. In this way for example, many Americans
tend to invest a little of themselves in every possible means of
salvation while becoming dedicated to none. Without a single path for
their insecure thoughts to travel, they follow many -- they might
believe that it is a certain virtue that leads to heaven, or the luck
of the draw -- and they might be wicked one day and religious the
next. They might cherish their "relationships" and a "sense" of what
is American, but shy from the more orthodox commitments to family,
community, God and country. For the lack of grand identifications,
mainstream Americans tend to pursue an intricate series of small
triumphs in order to avert the fears that might otherwise drag them
down.
593
By such a reduction of our guiding meanings to topical interests
we in America are tempted again and again to the precipice where some
selfish desire is to be aroused, and where we have feelings of guilt
without quite knowing why. How when we witness sexual abuse, the
brutalities of war, poverty, excessive greed, racism or any of those
things that liberal society had almost achieved a consensus in
condemning, we feel morally unsettled. In these considerations, the
principled attitudes that we once shared seem strangely beyond our
grasp, and instead of them we perceive ourselves as the victim and the
victor, the judge and the judged, and although this posturing does not
amount to articulable principles it establishes priorities that do
have moral bearing.
Hence, where the liberal consensus has been weakened by so many
compromises, we tend to forgive ourselves for our little indulgences
-- the racial jokes, the sexual biases -- as we borrow the more
studied "forgiveness" of a prior morality and apply it piecemeal to
secure our innocence. We find sel f -j usti f i cati ons in the very
situations that call for the most selfless caring and responsibility.
We outwardly express empathy for the victim in a way that allows us to
forgive ourselves for the envy that we feel for the victor who has
made a clean getaway. In preferring to see ourselves as victims we
feel sorry for ourselves but not for our sins, and we often seek out a
mild moral rebuke to satisfy our post-liberal guilt like the exhibi-
tionist who seeks to be punished as a part of the excitement of his
48displays. Indeed, a kind of moral paralysis has' set in as guilt and
innocence have reached a secret parity in the redundant themes of
culture, but the remaining discomfort and the absence of an absolute
morality becomes our greatest fear. Thus, the failing of our own
moral will becomes the thematic underpinning of the threatening evils
that are presented in the dozens of small forums provided by our
medi a.
There we have been supplied with the most appropriate enemies.
It is not usually the Russians who receive the full force of- our moral
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indignation, but some mysterious agent of "alien mind control " The
horror films of the last thirty years have seldom identified the
danger with a foreign locality and even the face of the enemy has
generally been obscured as it might strike within one's own family or
as one's neighbors fell under its influence. it is rarely the
challenge of a different morality or political belief that seems to
incite the most fearful reaction of Americans, but the hidden enemy
that has infiltrated our lives, testing our insecure identities and .
disrupting the delicate works of our orientation. It is the enemy
wjthout conscience or distinguishable morality, the very threat of the
absence of moral orientation that might invade our bodies and minds,
and even converts the activities of all political extremists into the
myth of completely amoral and incomprehensible terrorism. In the
confrontation with such non-human enemies we may therefore imagine
ourselves to be the most righteous victims, we become the very best
innocents, who, in a desperate moment -- surrounded by the toughest
extremes of brutality - will defend our inalienable bodily rights,
maintaining them as the wellspring of our moral identity.
Similarly, the media prefer to resurrect Nazi opponents for us
instead of communists and generally they are Nazis who seem to have
misplaced their creed only to be portrayed as sadistic psychopaths.
As often, there are completely ruthless aliens, robots that would
purge our parasitic humanity from their flawless universe, and utterly
amoral phallic killers like the shark. In responding to these we are
spared from making moral judgements and we are encouraged to languish
in the vengeful self-righteousness of having been victimized without
suffering the real life consequences. For this reason the most recent
trademark of these "enemies" is their propensity to cause the bodily
mutilation of innocents, to eviscerate if not to "possess" their body,
mind and soul as they writhe in ghastly contortions. While these
presentations make use of every Freudian device, the images of
mutliation are often expressly sexual. The lower portion of the
bathing beauty is devoured as she swims gracefully toward shore, the
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alien erupts from the bowels of an astronaut in a horrifying parody
of giving birth, and so on. As our base heroic virtues are exagger
ated we find them postured against more and more non-human forces of
opposition like the "natural disasters" that are presented in "3-D" or
"sensaround." Whether they are floods, insects, infernos, volcanos
earthquakes, or some piece of failed technology crashing to its doom'
a minimal, action oriented morality of survival rises to the occasion!
Granting that there is a discrepancy between the themes that
recieve the highest ratings in all of our media and actual public
attitudes, we still ought not to be too concerned with who it is that
actually accepts them. Since those thematic cliches are themselves
bastions of contradiction they do not require agreement in order to be
affirmed. There is a much more subtle complicity at issue in repro-
ducing mnemonic themes as they are cast in the daydreams of distinct
groups and classes who may well resist their most explicit messages
but still share the same irrepressible preoccupations. Significantly,
the problem is not that people have been tricked into accepting those
themes, and the issue is not one of "false consciousness" in which
contradictions have been hidden, but of a reconstructed affectivity
and moral grounding in which contradictions have been tentatively
bal anced.
That thematic balance has therefore had an extraordinary effect
upon the "alienation" that has advanced with industrial life.
Especially where the intrigues of the media produce a rather false
sense of innocence in the face of such amoral enemies, they also
generate the moral distance that makes the very inequities which arise
in conditons of alienation more palatable. This is not merely
escapism but an elaborate compensatory structure of themes that enters
our daydreams and imaginations. In the distances which that structure
allows, we are able to evoke memories of the characteristics that are
most threatened in contempoary alienation -- as we do in unrestrained
fantasies of conquest or of the prosthetic extension of our powers.
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Thus, as a people who are now used to the contradictions that
accompany alienation and are even bored by them, and as a people who
suffer that odd contemporary lapse of memory in which we cannot quite
remember why it was that we were supposed to fulfill certain obliga-
tions, we have developed a highly functional sort of moral isolation
that determines the nature of our alienation.
That particular isolation has compounded now that so many of our
former moral obligations have become purchasable services or functions
of the State. The alienation that Marx described as a depletion of
the human capacities 49 has itself acquired a moral dimension as it is
now mediated by the same thematic structures of memory which enforce
that special moral distance of our innocence. In these conditions, if
we are continually drawn to face the thematic juxtaposition of contra-
dictions, and if we return to them repeatedly in memory, the process
may actually extend our toleration for alienation by establishing our
distance in a redundancy that becomes a moral disclaimer
. In that
case, the demoralizing "anomie" 50 of a people who are isolated -- not
only from their own intrinsic capacities but from an ethical sense of
purpose as well -- may even turn the effect of alienation into a
welcome aspect of their identity. Thus, when Marx addressed aliena-
tion and Durkheim anomie, they were each referring to different
components of a single balance that is generally preserved within
cultural themes. A debilitating alienation is often offset by a
numbing disengagement of responsibility from the very conditions that
produced it, and vice versa. It is for this reason perhaps, that
alienation and anomie tend more to stasis than to revolution or an
excess of suicides, and indeed, selective memory may have found the
precise balance of elements that makes alienation tolerable. In a
surprising turn of events it has produced a variety of anomie that
actually compensates for alienation and becomes an affirmative aspect
of individuality in resisting a crisis of meaning.
Further, as themes of memory produce this suspicious balance that
affects the moral aspect of alienation, they also affect the terms of
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political legitimacy. To a greater extent than in the recent past,
legitimacy is established at the level of those themes rather than at
the level of ideological principle or by communitarian discourse.
This is especially true in America, since there is a political
administration which effectively proclaims the righteous innocence of
the nation for past and present excesses by making use of those
themes. Further, the extent of political authority and the issues
over which it presides are not greatly determined in "public forums"
led by well meaning citizens according to firm ideological principles.
In many respects the very locus of the "public forum" has shifted as
the more private forum of thematic preoccupation has ascended in
importance, and our experience with many media has begun to take its
pi ace.
Once, when people shared a code of honor they might have kneeled
before a distinct authority with a sense of obligation and of shame
for their failings. But now that even the idiological remnants of
such an attitude have been shaken and a balance of themes assumes much
of the burden of containing people's fears and passions, they sit
before numerous authorities with a sense of embarrassment that is far
more confused. Legitimacy no longer rests so firmly upon a respectful
obeisance to principle and localized authority and yet it is
surviving a crisis of meaning because it now rests upon a balance of
more diffuse ingredients. It rests upon appeasing themes that modify
alienation and disorientation by guiding memory -- themes which
provide us with a toughened sense of juridical innocence, and allow us
to face those archaic and infantile vulnerabilities that emerge with
such force in a crisis of meaning.
Instead of accepting the verdicts of public authority, it is as
if we now proceed to an imaginary courtroom where subliminal arguments
take place in the privacy of our thoughts. The internal conflict that
ensues therefore has the quality of judicial gamesmanship, of plea
bargaining with oneself and others that seems to have subverted the
old vessels of right and wrong and to have adjusted the terms of guilt
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and innocence. In this, it seems that there is the danger that we
might exaggerate the amoral terrors that we face and bend morality in
any direction. Yet we do not allow it all to crumble, and in the
interest of an orientation we resist the most severe regressions as we
rush to forestall them in more constrained exercises of selective
memory, and as we restrict our expression of instinct to publicly
sanctioned concerns of the body. Thus, at the same time that
selective memory undermines us, it opens the door to a level of
meaning formation that had been forgotten. It enables us to return a
half-step toward the instincts to the residues of conflict that
might provide the necessary content for a reconstructed morality. But
instead of beginning that reconstruction, we still seem to be mesmer-
ized by the prospect. We prefer to persist in the same half -awake
attitude with which we witness the themes of the media, and we seek
instead to be absolved for a lacking morality. There is no Greek myth
that captures this contemporary attitude, but one might imagine the
American to be an anti -Socrates on trial before a confused citizenry
-- a character preoccupied with certain themes that have restricted
memory, who is striving for acquittal before a rather vague authority.
In consideration of memory, once again, Americans are not simply
a reified, mimetic, rationalistic or narcissistic people. Rather they
are people seeking a new orientation among disruptive conditions of
space, time and creation and among uncertain divisions of the past.
In a crisis born of the expansion of the administrative functions of
the state and the abstraction of conceptions fundamental to an
orientation, they have revived the creative and selective attributes
of memory that were first revealed in the ancient memory arts. Now,
however, and in place of traditional guidance, they apply these to
recreate a hierarchy of instructive kinds and uses of memory, and in a
psychologically self-conscious attitude they favor those which are
accurate, functional and historical even as they may also be fantastic
and nostalgic. In seeking to restore a collective sense of their own
continuity in time, they descend from the abstract meanings which have
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fa, led then, to the more Mediate concerns of the body that might
repair a 'dissonant' sense of self. Now at the ,eve, of daydrel
rather than principled abstraction, they engage selective Jo"
generate guiding the.es for identity. Without being guite unconscious
of the process they engage all of the defensive strategies available
to memory to prevent themselves from recalling too much, and with a
measure of adult embarrassment they resist the timely evocations ofthem own vulnerability in an attitude of sel f-proc, aimed juridical
innocence. They remain oblivious to a deeper core of memories - both
personal and traditional
- which are also within their reach and
they prefer to wander as if they were lost within a hall of mirrors
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION: CRITICISM, SELF-REFLECTION, AND UNFAMILIAR EYES
To repeat the concern with which I began, it appears that the
enterprise of social criticism is in as much of a state of crisis as
the troubled legitimacy of modern societies that Habermas has
addressed, and perhaps because they both turn upon the same axis of
exhausted meanings. Following the unsatisfying attempts of Marxist
movements to dethrone tradition and to overturn oppressive systems, it
sometimes appears that criticism still operates under two 'old
paradigms where it is not narrowly focused upon the details of a
particular oppression, or of language or power. It might wish to
restore the "unsel fconsciousness" that Oakeshott found at the heart of
tradition -- a pursuit that is doomed to fail even as it reveals
certain inadequacies of rationalism or it may renovate the Marxist
critique of "totality" to produce an ultra-self-conscious analysis of
the entire society. In the second case the dialectical tools of
criticism have already been amended to the point that they have gotten
cumbersome. They combine Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis, semi-
otics, Althusser and more, in unwieldy summations that may succeed in
matching our confusions with appropriate abstractions, but do not
necessarily cut through them. 1 But, if it is the degeneration of an
axis of meanings that is at issue beyond the many dominations of class
society that are now accounted for, it will not be disclosed by adding
new dimensions to dialectical analysis endlessly. While investiga-
tions into language proceed cautiously to reveal aspects of the
collapse of meanings, the comprehensive theories which point to the
'losses' accrued in modern societies have not satisfactorily explained
the mechanism of loss, or the processes necessary to a reconstruction
of meani ng
.
Further, as criticism enumerates so many dominating social
forces, it may hasten the end that it most fears -- the demise of
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do. nd subaect^ty. For this reason u especidlly
that critics return to consider the processes of constraint as they
affect the memory and identity of the beleaguered individual. In the
minutiae of emphasis and negation - the dialectic in which ourdeceptive appearances" are fashioned - we may find the insights that
will best resolve the question of our freedom. Here, in examining the
selectivities of mind that people have come to share for reasons of
economy, culture and so on, it will become clear that the alienation
of our capacities is not the most pressing danger, but rather the
terrifying prospect of disorientation which inclines us to preserve
the very structures of authority that have kept us comfortably
functionally alienated. It is not so much the exploitation of our
capabilities that threatens us at the moment as it is the loss of a
coherent and meaningful context in which we might reclaim them - a
structure of meaning and memory in which it would make sense to resist
alienation and domination and to redefine our own identity.
Because the alternatives have seemed so bleak, the critics have
offered slim hope for the future if any at all. For Marcuse, the
restored negativity of dialectical thought was to be joined with the
vast potentiality of the human instincts in the interest of libera-
tion, but the instincts are not very reliable things and their release
does not guarantee the liberation that is desired. Habermas replies
by resuscitating reason and principles of communication which may yet
furnish the grounding for a liberating morality and appropriate means
of analysis. But in the end we do not know the instincts without the
intervention of selective memory, and we cannot secure the foundations
of a rational discourse concerning human interests without extracting
them from the prejudiced division of the same selective modern memory.
While critics have made certain gains by means of the Marxian
realization that 'we are what we do,' and the Freudian revelation that
'we are what we have repressed and denied,' they might therefore
consider the proposition that we are what we have selectively
remembered and that we might, in principle, remember more with
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liberating clarity. It might be possible to face the memories which
guide the instincts and inform reason from their unreflective captiva-
tion within the divisions of history, tradition, childhood and all
things familiar, to restore that faculty ahead of the others that have
been alienated as a means to reconstructing a way of life.
Unfamiliar Eyes
Foucault begins his book The Order of Things with a few descrip-
tive comments referring to a well known painting by Velazquez that
presents a portrait of the artist as he stands before his models who
are posing for a painting in progress while others look on. 2 In order
to convey the richness of this canvas as a "representation," Foucault
does not preface his remarks, but moves at once within the scene
itself -- he begins: "The painter is standing a little back from the
3
canvas..." and proceeds from there to discuss the distinct perspec-
tive within the scenes of each character portrayed, rather than to
discuss the authorship, the framing, or at first, the fact that it is
a painting at all. The canvas is a play of representations to be
sure. There is the poised figure of the artist about to paint, posing
children, a dwarf and a dog each with eyes fixed upon their own
momentary interest. Opposite the position from which we seem to be
viewing the gathering, there is an onlooker in a doorway and a mirror
reflecting the images of another pair or observers as if they stood in
our place, or we in theirs.
As the figure of the artist tempts us to envision the scene from
the position his likeness occupies, we are drawn within, where
Foucault's words would also take us. We encounter the fracturing
experience of many points of view beckoning at once, and as he
observes, "representation undertakes to represent itself here in all
its elements, with its images, the eyes to which it is offered, the
4
faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being."
Indeed the experience that Foucault finds in this work and intends for
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us is not that of the casual spectator. He expresses a courageous
willingness to step so far within the various perspectives of the
scene that his own place is forfeit - the roving "I" becomes lost as
it joins in the numerous points of view that are instantaneously
offered and withdrawn to that observer. The tenuousness of all
attempts at representation is revealed because he dares to unravel
each of the familiar elements that are presented until familiarity
itself has been disrupted. Foucault risks his own orientation in
order to enhance it as he meets the gaze of each of the strange faces
that are portrayed, and he brings life to their disruptive evocations
as he allows their unfamiliar eyes to become his own.
In risking the loss of the security that artistic representations
more commonly provide, Foucault has gone to the borders of sanity. He
has nearly undone that old trick of the memory arts that makes use of
the most unfamiliar experiences to designate things which are to be
memorable and familiar which draws upon the strange to shock us
into normalcy — because he indulges the chaotic moment of experience
and dares to give it his full attention. His small excursions into
chaos provide a means of making fresh appraisals as they suspend the
prejudices of memory to present us instead with the disremembered
scene. But he really cannot quite let go, and his own written words
create a net that keeps him on this side of sanity and order, in a
safe place from which to venture out. While he risks the very terms
of his own subjectivity, Foucault remains the author who woos an
audience that will ultimately judge him sane, and the text saves him
from the chaos it awakens in the same way that the writing of a sad
poem may rescue the poet from utter dejection. So, none of us can
quite give up the fabric of orientation to achieve the " counter-
memory " that Foucault prescribes elsewhere,^ and yet we may venture
far enough to counter the effects of selective memory as we find them
in the most familiar daily experiences which do not readily admit
their character as representations.
On rare occasions for example, while walking a familiar path one
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might briefly become lost in a jumble of images for no apparent
reason, so that the path will suddenly seem to be quite different
Abruptly the trees or the brick of the walk might take on a new
atmosphere as if they were being seen for the first time, and details
which had gone unnoticed seem to spring into relief. Perhaps the
strange yellow light before a thunderstorm might disassemble such a
comforting scene so that it seems to shatter as in a momentary seizure
and the firm lines of recollected order and locality appear to vanish.
The experience lasts for just an instant and we are inclined to let it
pass as disquietude presses us back to fixed and familiar things, and
reassigns their names along the path. Yet if we dare to prolong those
moments we should notice that the reconstruction of the scene is not
just as it had been. The ordinary has been shaken and it will be
recalled haltingly for a time, as it seems more magical, or we seem
more reflective in traversing it.
As we recognize the way that memory and imagination combine to
reassemble the familiar world to give us the "resemblance between
things," 6 that is its cohesion -- and as we become aware of our
occasional inclination to flee from it into a less restrictive
confusion of memory, we may learn to apply ourselves systematically to
the task. Now we might regard the imaginative construction of
meanings in a way that will allow us to reconstruct meaning, or
rather, to rediscover its sources in the shadows of memory where they
have been denied emphasis, where they have been trapped at a distance
in the contemporary associations and thematic divisions of our
orientation. On the one hand, this self-interrogation should not lead
to random Utopian fantasies about the future. It involves an
immersion into chaos that allows a creative anarchy of sense and
memory, but it knows that it must reconstitute order or it will suffer
the same sad fate as the anarchists. On the other hand, the immersion
cannot simply affirm contemporary interests since it is always a
response to selective order that reveals the selective order. It does
not rest upon Utopian visions or on prevailing assumptions because it
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begins with the thoughts that have been in quiet attendance (0 apartl cular present and makes modest claims upon our recollection of
experience to undo them.
Memory criticism refers to the experience we might have in
reading the great social critics as much as it refers to what they say
that experience which awakens the suspicions that have remained
locked in an earlier awareness - the youthful sense of frustration
with the same limits that the great theories call into question. When
theory disrupts a sense of reality by revealing historical forces, or
hidden, unconscious motivations that we had not perceived before' it
'rings true' because it has touched such a memory, and the critic'has
reproduced that synthetic moment of awareness that one has when the
familiar path has vanished and has been reconstituted with its
atmosphere forever changed. It is always that sort of evocation that
lays at the heart of "critical consciousness," and which makes it
possible in the first place. If criticism would like to discover the
hidden forces that move society whether they be the imperatives of
History, Material Relations, unsconsicous conflicts, linguistic
structures, strategies of power, or some combination of them all, then
it must consider what force we have assigned to them in the patterns
of our memory, and which of our memories might test the force of their
determining characteristics.
When selective memory secures the familiar world by the para-
doxical means of luring strange and unfamiliar experience within its
reach, it inverts a larger sense of meaning and deludes us with a
narrow understanding of what is real. In effect, it convinces us that
it has taken account of the aberration, of the "hidden force," by
allowing it to fade within the ordinary without emphasis. Just as the
Freudian notion that sexual desire motivates people unconsciously is
now so well accepted that it hardly receives comment, the frightening
or the unknown may be quickly converted into the commonplace. Then,
as the complaint of the dialectician goes, "Only what [people] do not
need first to understand, they consider understandable; only the word
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coined by commerce and really alienated, touches them as familiar " 6
Yet at the same time that we seem to be deluded by famliarity we
are often starkly aware of the great effort that must be expended tokeep our thoughts within its narrow frame. We are not entirely
fooled, for as Foucault indicates, we are always transcending the
limits to wmch we are subjected. "Man is," he says,
...the weight of experiences, constantly eluding them-
selves, the whole horizon of what is posited in the sandv
stretches of the non-thought. Because' he is In empiMco-transcendental doublet man is also the locus of misunder-
h-!
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miSunderstandin 9 that constantly exposeshis thought to the risk of being swamped by its own being
S ei. h1FiV) reC0Ver hiS ^^Hy on the basisof what eludes him. [7]
Indeed, people may 'recover their integrity' on the basis of what
eludes them because it does not elude them completely, and because
that integrity is itself the irrepressible daring of their own memory.
When we allow the dragons that we once feared, or the arbitrary order
of a childhood collection of shells to return from the shores of the
'non-thought' they may challenge the restrictions of our most sophis-
ticated understanding. In that creative instance, as Adorno put it,
"the value of a thought is measured by its distance from the conti-
nuity of the familiar." 8
Self-reflection and Criticism
When Georg LukScs suggested that self-criticism must be part of
overcoming the, "immediacy of the commodity form of life," 9 he had
envisioned a process that would uplift impoverished minds to perceive
the social totality. The process would challenge the antinomies of
bourgeois life, of thought and existance, consciousness and reality, 10
by achieving the "sel f -consci ousness of the commodity," 11 in which
people know themselves to have been reduced to a commodity. For many
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critics that path to self-consciousness
- the recognition of the selfdenied, as the prerequisite of the self fulfilled ~ remains the keyto liberation if it has any hope at all. Yet instead of taking
account of how the self is denied, and how the lesser "totality" of
memorable experience has been divided and restricted, the approach
replaces the simplistic dualities of bourgeois thought with their own
refracted image. It gives us a vision of transcendent historical
forces as they have descended upon an objectified immediacy, an image
which is every bit as restrictive as the antinomies it would reveal.
To a great extent the problem has been that this variety of
self-criticism does not admit genuine self-reflection
, and it readily
displaces an open reflection upon one's own experience and historical
experience with the rote learning of a doubtfully "correct thinking."
Too often the method redivides memory without really confronting its
content, and it proceeds as if it were providing tools of self-
reflection to reified, unreflective beings, when in fact it only
prescribes a way of reflecting to reflexive beings. Thus, and
especially today, the problem is not to discover the "totality," but
to examine the conceptions of totality which people already hold that
have been swept up within the familiarities of daily life, like the
historicism, psychological assumptions and thematic consistencies
which have become a part of our reality. We must therefore reflect
upon the means of reflection that have determined our restricted
understanding of the whole, especially because the influence of power
has revealed itself to have moved within the very strategies that
guide reflection and memory.
Habermas is especially instructive on this point since he is well
aware that much of social power now operates by setting the conditions
for reflection itself. As he comments,
...for the legitimation problems of the modern period
what is decisive is that the level of justification has
become reflective
. The procedures and presuppositions of
justification are themselves now the legitimating grounds
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on which the validity of legitimations is based. [12]
In the West that is, the legitimate power of the state does not
precisely rest upon class divisions, or tradition or even on the
presumptions of a reified consciousness. Now it gains force by
referring to conceptual procedures of justification that have come to
be valid. In claiming legitimacy, power refers to principles that
have been extracted from the reciprocal expectations of free and equal
parties as they engage in debate, and to the rules governing their
discourse. So today, the legitimacy of power corresponds to accep-
table rules of interaction and reflection, and a certain new style of
expression and reflections become part of the legitimacy of power.
Power formally appeals to the faculties of reason that might otherwise
resist it, and it even entails its own special kind of "consciousness
of the totality" that restricts critical reflection. A conception of
the whole society in conflict, even a class conflict, may therefore
justify adherence to legitimate procedures of discourse. People may
rush to sustain the form of legitimate communication in spite of its
content
,
and its content may be dramatically transformed -- as it has
with the new right -- dragging the old and valued procedures of
reflection along with it.
During the recent economic recession in America it has often been
a reflective sense of one's place within the 'whole system' that has
convinced workers not to strike, and to engage in the "legitimate" and
"cooperative" relations with management that have led to so many
concessions. The most negative view of the "totality" does not shake
their faith in that forum for reflection even as they recognize that
it may betray many of their own interests. This attitude cannot be
explained by alienation or reification, and it is not simply due to
the relative affluence of organized labor. On the contrary, it often
amounts to a preference for alienation over unemployment and the
profound disorientation that a breakdown of the system and its
legitimacy might bring.
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For this reason the post-cri ti cal sentiment in contemporary
America should not be confused with ordinary cynicism. The fact that
political corruption hardly causes anyone to raise an eyebrow and
that no one is galvanized into revolutionary action by the proposition
that they are victims of their social class, does not mean the end of
all criticism. It means that criticism must reckon with the formid-
able reality of appearances. Where power is seductively
"reflective"
it will not do for people to, "become conscious of themselves as com-
modities," or ever to become aware of their unconscious motivations.
They must examine the reflexive grounds of legitimacy itself at the
level of its content. They must examine the composition of legitimate
memories that allow power to proceed and claim its truth, and they
must examine the "whole" of memorable experience that is restricted in
power in order to reveal how the self is denied. Criticism must now
lead us to question that to which we refer in making our claims upon
the future, to ask what we envision in the notion of the good citizen,
the enemy, marriage, law or war, and how rigid limits are imposed as
each is recalled.
In certain respects Habermas has begun to revive the possibil-
ities of critical reflection along these lines. For him, as Thomas
McCarthy explains it, sel f -ref 1 ecti on initially examines the "sub-
jective conditions of knowledge;" the 'synthetic achievements' of the
knowing subject; the a priori realm of facts with which the sciences
must deal. Yet it also entails, "a dialectic that 'takes the traces
of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed."' 14
For Habermas, as these two aspects combine, self-reflection is
inclined to reveal an " emancipatory cognitive interest ." 15 Therefore,
as McCarthy suggests, this self-reflection depends upon "something
prior" on its way to becoming critical. It must begin with "the
natural consciousness of the everyday life world in which we already
find ourselves, phenomenological reflection traces its own genesis
through the successive stages of manifestation of consciousness." 16
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Lr r : fiXati °nS ^ deStrUCti ° n ° f Pactions.-"indeed, the "something prior" that critical reflection requires
appears to be a special extension of psychoanalytic insights into the
realm of everyday expression and memory.
Further, as Habermas' critical reflection contains an "interest
in autonomy" it might be said that it does so by reviving an awareness
of all the forces that have kept the "I" of memory suspended and well
oriented. In tracing these back it will inevitably awaken the same
daring of memory that brought Foucault to the borders of sanity and
continually threatens to undermine our orientation. When that
critical memory risked an immersion into the chaos of disorientation,
it nearly abandoned the order of reason within a limitless subjec-
tivity. But at the last minute we were saved as a special "interest
in autonomy" rose to the occasion by restating the principles of
order. Critical reflection of that sort rescues us from the perils of
its own undertaking, but only after exposing them in such a way that
Reason cannot pretend to save us by forgetting its roots.
Instead of freeing thought from chaos and subjective memory in
the way of rationalism, this sel f
-ref 1 ecti on frees thought to move
w1thin 311 kinds of m*mory - to awaken the nexus of identity where
subjectivity and objectivity are already intertwined - and there
discover its emancipatory interests. In this sense the ego is freed,
and it is only in such endeavors that the ego "obtains free access to
the interpretive possibilities of the cultural tradition," as Habermas
would like. In fact, this reflexive freedom is obtained in
oscillations between the formal promises of discourse and an ever
expanding referential field of memories that is at the heart of the
' possibilities of tradition.' For the same reason that motivating
meanings in society cannot entirely be administratively reproduced, 19
they cannot, then, be culled from the record of just any tradition,
but must be corroborated in the living memories of the people
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concerned; affiled in light of the extant categories of know,edge
wh,ch have divided their orientation, and which they now .ay regard
more self-consciously.
If memory is to be genuinely freed at all, it will be freed in
acknowledgement of the categories to which it has been subject and
for that reason critical reflection must traverse and unite the
different levels of memory as it moves through them. It moves through
the range of personal memories in which "I centeredness" has first
been established, but unites them with the integrity of different
memories that question that centeredness. It moves across the
threshold that joins this sphere with the familiarities of daily life
and in noting this conjunction, it questions them as well. As memory
awakens to its own selective impulse the abstract divisions of the
past that distinguish the personal from the historical, from the
traditional and religious, will become suspect. When we are through
with this procession we may not "grasp the totality," but we will
understand how we have already grasped the totalities of the past and
kept them in memory. Then we will have opened so many corridors to
our past that we will unquestionably obtain freer access to the
'interpretive possibilities of tradition.' Still however, and in
order to know what may be done with those possibilities for the good
of society, self-reflection must pursue the most personal sources of
moral instruction. Accordingly, we will not search for moral
foundations only within the traditions that are evidently corrupted by
contemporary nostalgia, but also within the very sort of archaic
meditation that seems to have accompanied the moralities that are now
traditional. We return to a process, if not the old content, that
will lead us to face the disturbing experiences which in their
integrity, have been the formative basis of our own morality.
Self-reflection and the Moral
As reflective criticism seeks to find a foundation for the moral
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advancement of society, it might turn to reconsider the content ofempathy that we found so difficult to ascertain, or it might
research the history of the idea of virtue once more as Alasd
Maclntyre has most recently proposed. 20 Yet the case for the moral
advancement of society having its own imperative has lately found a
most persuasive ally within models of individual moral advancement
Again, Habermas has adapted the theories of cognitivists like Piaget
and Kohlberg with their stages of personal development, and he holds
out the promise of a social advancement in morality on the grounds
that morality has its own developmental logic which is "homologous"
for individual and society. 21 With this claim he proposes a scheme
that amounts to a moral dialectic of social transformation, and within
it, even if progress is not always guaranteed, societies will always
tend to seek moral resolutions to conflict at the highest level of
their competence." However, Habermas relies heavily on the model
offered by Kohlberg and as he suggests that societies are inclined to
follow that logical series of steps to a higher moral plane, they seem
to proceed, as from childhood to adulthood, toward ever greater
abstractions of moral concern. Those moral stages seem to encompass
more and more of humanity so that we may not notice the lapses and
lags that affect them and raise questions concerning the content of
their attendant memories.
To begin with it does seem that the expanding world of reference
in Kohlberg's stages of moral development might also require an
expanded memory. The first infantile stage is defined in terms of
concern for one's bodily self in face of "others" in authority who are
rather starkly conceived. At a second stage, terms of reciprocity and
fairness are established with reference to those others who are
immediately present. In the third stage familial and national
standards of conformity are admitted within moral concerns, and at the
fourth, respect and duty toward the social order as such. At the
fifth stage there is a legalistic orientation toward the contractual
principles which might formally govern an entire society, and at a
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sixth and final stage, universal principles are embraced which referto all humanity/-3 NeverthPl^c* ,e ess, the more inclusive worlds of moral
straction in the higher stages of this scheme entail a rather
nta T SUbStanCe 15 m°rall > -^ctedco in, the masses of humanity, the consequence to them of hypothe-tical events, and the principles that might best secure theirharmonious living. The highest, is an almost heavenly abstraction
rem0ve ^from the subjective experience of needs and conflicts, Ithat abstraction is not equivalent to an expanded memory
Although Habermas does not intend to raise objection to this
scheme, his desire to apply the same 'logic' to society commends a
variety of reflection which takes us beyond developmental sequences
and toward a specialized content. To Kohlberg's six stages he adds a
seventh. Here, the discursive group that enters into self-conscious
communication may obtain access to, "the very structures of inter-
action" within a universal ethics of speech. The latter makes
reference to all peoples as members of a "fictive world society," so
that it may extract and interpret universal human needs, 24 and only in
this way can we find a coherent direction for the moral development of
societies. Nevertheless, and since Kohlberg's sixth stage has already
encompassed everyone as "all humanity," this seventh stage is really
more than a stage. It is a directed mode of inquiry that might
actually transform the highest moral principles as it asks who all of
humanity might be, and what is the nature of their needs. Unlike
Kohlberg's highest stage, this is a mode of inquiry that does require
an expanded memory of a special sort.
The "fictive" world society in which we might find universal
expressions of human need is revealed by making a reflexive loop back
through the memory of various interactions, and that 'stage' involves
a meditative prescription for discourse. It is not only concerned
with the abstract structure of language, or with the logic of
morality, but with coupling the two on the basis of actual remembered
experience. If there is to be any assurance of social progress in
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morality it is not because societies have the same imperative of moral
development as individuals - complete with parental models and
scholastic instruction ~ but because societies may become reflective
and dTscover hitherto unnoticed foundations of their own motivations
Yet because Habermas is implicitly aware of the fact that reflection
may only refer us back to experiences which have already been
redesigned by the expedient devices of selective memory, he does not
recommend just any self-reflection. He wants to refer us back to the
uncluttered expressions of need and moral concord that are at the
foundations of communication, but in order to get there we must still
expand the counter-selective capabilities of our memory. Rather than
deriving more abstract notions of "the good" of "all humanity" we are
directed to look within the structures of interaction - but this also
leads us to the integrity of certain memories that are the least
contaminated roots of a "fictive" world society.
Although Habermas may not intend it, the particular integrity
that this refers us to, is a record of our obligations and of the
persons who are bound within them. This is because, as our morality
develops, we seem to command a view of greater and more abstract
regions of responsibility as if the "I" of memory had ascended above
some populated surface. It is like that process identified in
psychoanalysis in which the ego obtains greater access to the superego
and changes its attitude toward those persons contained within it.
However, in the development of morality through stages if we pay
attention to that referential world of persons and obligations, we
will notice that their very substance changes as that referential
population becomes bigger and more inclusive. As the referential
persons who occupy the individual's sense of morality come to be
defined in abstractions of legal principle and the like, they are no
longer memorable persons -- they are not precisely the same characters
who initially occupied the superego -- and in a sense they have lost
their faces to become fictitious examples, abstractions, and even just
25
a 'feeling' of guilt. Thus, the principle of an expanding scope of
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morality that advances through stages has led us to a dilemma. Wehave developed more abstract and all encompassing categories which arein danger of losing the memorable persons who once defined our spheres
of moral obligation,, and to whom we must refer again if we are topursue the task that Habermas has initiated.
It is particularly important that we do this, because the
abstract and "higher" morality is most susceptible to a special
variety of moral regression when it fails to make the reflexive loop
back through memory. Indeed the abstraction of "all humanity," may
become as bereft of mnemonic content as those mysterious and ill
conceived "others" who surrounded the infant in Kohl berg's first moral
stages. High moral abstraction of a certain kind may even lead us on
a parallel course back to the self-interest of infancy. Once again,
and in spite of its lofty principles a whole society may retreat to
the very bodily concerns that were once foremost for the infant when
"others" seemed vague (or abstract). The thematic preoccupations with
certain bodily concerns that were identified in the last chapter, may
prevent us from discovering the 'human interests' that might advance
our moral insight.
Similarly, it is because abstraction does not guarantee any
specific morality that we find that many of the most "moral" persons
-- even experts in discussing abstract principles - may be inept in
their moral consideration of one other person. They may be self-
critical by the measure of a high morality without being self-
reflective about the intentions that have filled the various stages of
their own moral development, and they may have an impoverished view of
persons as long as their high morality does not include an expanded
memory of particular persons and of the failed or successful obliga-
tions they have known. Hence, a reflexive morality must repatriate
the persons to whom we have had obligations to the sphere of abstract
moral concern so that the two may stand as reflexive measures of one
another in much the same way that a particular memory might qualify a
psychoanalytic concept. It must expressly include those concrete
6?0
memones, the fictional or hypothetical persons we construct fro, the,
in moral reflections, and the moral principles we apply. it must
include a core of common memories, for example, of the sort that we
found in case of commitment above, which stood opposed to the
reductive memory of one vision of the family and casual sex. By means
of a slight fiction, if not a fictive world, the highest abstractions
must be recalled with reference to persons who are not mere examples
and who are now abstractly enhanced in turn.
Carol Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's stage theory has special
relevance for this. The crux of her argument is that when Kohl berg
excludes "self-interest" from the highest stages of morality and
relegates it to the lowest, there is no means to confront the
self-abnegation that this society expects of women. 26 She contends
that a high morality is not only abstract and global and at the
highest level of morality she would seek to reconcile self-interest
and responsibility toward others. That morality requires the recog-
nition of concrete responsibi 1 ties to specific other people, rather
than the pursuit of an abstract "morality of rights." 27 Although it
is not always clear what distinguishes this morality from good
old-fashioned caring, or what recommends it as a better motivation for
the group, Gi 11 igan has laid emphasis upon a forgotten dimension and
has awakened it to a higher purpose.
The reference world of others is qualitatively different when
both self and others appear as concrete revelations from memory --
when actual people are acknowledged within the abstractions of
morality not as the examples which are incidental to abstraction, but
as 'fictive' recombinations of identifiable memories which temper
those abstractions. If we borrow this much from Gill igan it may be
possible to obtain abstract moral principles without nullifying the
concrete obligations that they entail. Our moral reflections would
retain, rather than leave behind, each of the steps that have been
taken from infancy to adulthood in formulating our highest principles
so that the principles themselves would become reflexive and contain a
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record of their genesis. Those reflections would refer us to the«M» settings of our obligations, to specific person t
^abilities and appeasements that were paradiglti /or mo
n^nee:." «"
™«huma eeds in general and of the instincts as they 'appear to us
'
r°:
d Pefer US
* «— «« * -hies which mi ht proli 'abas,s of agreement
- a frame of reference for reconstructivediscourse.
,n such a reflexive mora,ity to he sure, selflle ^In
would be as suspicious as selfishness, abstract princip,e as unsatis-fying as personal obligation alone in motivating the group
,
C." 1 ' iz*tion and its Discontents, Freud wrote that he had set
out to, represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem inthe development of civilization and to show that the price we pay for
our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the
heightening of the sense of guilt." 28 But today, as we have seen
there are thematic means in culture that allow us to maintain the
sense of our innocence, to resist the increase in guilt and forestall
the moral aspect of our progress. So we must prepare to advance along
another tack, and since guilt depends upon an imagined community and
the watchmg eyes of others we must begin to view them differently
Though it seems paradoxical, guilt does come to motivate us in the
absence of the very memories that should comprise our conscience. It
arises as the persons within our superegos lose their faces to become
a diffuse and abstract power over us. Guilt stings us with a sense of
obligation and the charge that we should call those persons to mind at
the very moments when their memory escapes us - as if we were running
away from them while struggling to keep their image in focus as we
look back over our shoulder. For this reason the most important
persons in our lives who represent our daily responsibilities - our
parents or children for instance — may often be the most difficult to
envision. Just like certain high moral abstractions, guilt will often
fail to examine who such persons are, even as it makes us quite aware
of what they are to us in important ways. Guilt is the proposition
.
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the form and the result of moral incentive, but not its content.
Thus, a reflexive morality may supercede the more reductive varities
of guilt when it is able to bring that content back to consciousness
to revive the image of those it contains and restore the internal'
dialogue that we have had with them in constituting our relationships
to a conscience that has shed the feeling of guilt.
When Gilligan criticizes Kohlberg it is for omitting self-
interest and the responsibilities that are most familiar to women from
the highest stage of morality, and yet this stage does refer to,
"'humanity in the person of yourself and every other.'" 29 Conse-
quently it is not precisely self-interest and responsibility that are
missing from that highest stage, but a more particular account of the
content that each must entail - a content that would shake its very
status as a moral abstraction. As long as Kohlberg's high morality
still depends upon a veiled and mysterious mental audience of whatever
size, it will also depend upon the reductive enforcement of guilt --
of an imaginary confessional in which penitent and confessor both
remain blind to who the self is, and who others are as they might be
revealed in the light of a private record of obligations and of
forgotten sensibilities concerning a just and moral world.
In a manner that has been formally initiated by Habermas, we must
now pursue a distinctive moral content that takes us outside of
ourselves, or rather, outside of the complacent memories that define
our identity. As we research the "structures of interaction" where
moral precepts are embedded, we may search the memorable experiences
to which we implicitly refer for their explicit consi stancies. As we
recall those sources we might intellectually gain a fraction of the
insight that psychoanalysis fosters when portions of the superego
become transparent to the ego in understanding their origins. Yet we
must also step outside of ourselves to every past that comprises a
legacy of obligations defining our relationships. This must be done,
just as the law must occasionally refresh itself by looking beyond the
pertinent precedents and examples, as is the case when an interest in
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in a reflexive morality of this sort the mode, of atonement is
stead
6
it° 7 ° f 9UlUy aSSUPeS the1r ^formny .Ih I , s an honest confrontation with memory which violates its
ourselves and others. By the same daring memory that ,eads us toadopt the perspective of different, unfamiliar eyes, we may meet thegaze of those eyes which always seen, to watch us to see that we remain
".oral. Ultimately, it win risk once more the pain of those morally
motivating memories of personal vulnerability and desire that
prefigure "empathy" only it will resist the tendency to generalize
them in yet another abstract, empathetic morality. I„ this, we would
not be able to contrive a comforting distance for ourselves or to
embrace the cultural themes that provide us with a sense of innocence
By its confrontation with the selectivity of memory, this reflection
pursues the integrity of memories in which to find the basis of
reciprocity in the distinctive experiences of different people It
does not quite restore a classical sense of fidelity, of familial and
civic obi nations as such, but reintegrates the sorts of memory which
the classical moralities united and which have been redivided ever
since. It is not a stage of moral development, but a directed mode of
inquiry into human needs and capabilities that now must call upon the
distinctive remembrances of childhood and of fears and desire in all
stages of development. It may therefore find a common ground of
shared memories on which to reconstruct the terms of reciprocity, and
no principle that instructs us to "love thy neighbor as thyself" can
generate morality so substantially.
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Truth and Silence
truth that
^ °nly m° ral trUthS
'
bUt 911
°
f the
-^ables comprise our sense of the present must be questioned
ere Marxian strains of criticism have accomplished this by loca^their
^
objects of inquiry within the dialectical ly revealed contexts of
a historical past, this effort of memory questions the facts moreimmediately as it examines the manner in which they are themselves
composed of many pasts, m this, the approach may seem to risk a kind
of relativism, but the risk is temporary and just as Foucault wasdrawn back from chaos to considerations of an order that might be
reconstituted, we must return to reconstruct the elements of a
troubled orientation. Memory criticism addresses the post-repressive
sphere in which relative truths are formulated and it discloses the
evocative baggage that gives certain meanings a greater "truth-
effect" than others within the instructive presence of the past. It
encounters the depth and substantiality of tradition and the rela-
tivity of the composition of truths in a manner that allows us choice.
It does not discover the empirical truth per se, but a truth about the
dependence of the empirical upon variations of memory. Yet in
disclosing these it does not attempt to describe the workings of the
entire system or its ideology at the outset, before, or apart from the
conflicts affecting its more mundane meanings.
Indeed, it is because of the effects of a crisis that is now
manifest at that level where truths are kept and formulated, that the
things which once seemed certain now seem ghostlike. It is for that
reason too, that the enterprise of social criticism seems vacuous to
many of the same people who have valued it in the past. The critics
who remain, often seem to be striking at ghosts as the guiding
meanings that they address have grown more imprecise. Even when they
shift the attack to analyze the structure of meaning in its most
subtle aspects, they still implicitly refer to Utopias and visions of
"totality" that no longer have the sense or clarity that they would
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like the* to have, and even that totality Errors a spectra, reality
whiehi, confused about the past and equally confused about its wishestor the future.
It is in the hope of reviving such a vision for example, that
Frederic Jameson makes the disturbing observation that,
In practice.
..the attack on the concept of "totality" inthe American framework means the undermining and tilrepudiation of the only realistic perspective in which agenuine Left could come into being in this country. [30]
However the concept of "totality" has not suffered primarily from
theoretical attacks. It has failed to motivate the American people
precisely because it is not now a "realistic perspective," and because
the common attempt to repair the fractured divisions in the eclectic
American orientation of memory does not incline us to see in 'wholes.'
Despite the different sufferings of so many people, in memory and in
practice there is no uniform experience of domination that can be
unambiguously apprehended as the 'negation' of the social order. Even
in the current state of crisis, memory and authority have found such
subtle means of maintaining their order that no clear vision of
totality would convincingly undo their work. But if it is not
grounded in a vision of totality, criticism may still be grounded in
expanded memory -- in the forgotten particulars and in the spaces
between the restrictive expressions of power, where we participate in
its maintenance.
There, this criticism addresses a notable weakness in the
construction of meaning, a weakness that calls to mind a common
experience which has become upsettingly familiar today. Sometimes in
speaking, we may notice that we feel particularly well connected to
the memories we are referring to, and they seem to animate every word
with renewed clarity and conviction. Yet more often perhaps, we feel
cut off from the motivating memories in what we are saying, and our
words seem empty and distant from their source. This may happen when
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we are ,„.««*,». to our thoughts, distracted or disinterested, out
.ay also happen when a historical shift has moved the ordinary
referents of meaning beyond our reach and the foundations of truthave themselves been shaken as they often appear to be in the stunned
silence that follows a military defeat.
In such experiences we may discover the nature of the weak points
and the cracks that have developed within ordinary meanings which seem
so elusive in the current crisis. Accordingly, and if the "truths" of
our orientation can be confronted in the desperate process of theirformat.on
-
not only in the dialectic of historical forces in
unconscious motivations or in structures of life and language that' arehidden from ordinary understanding, but in the silences between
thought and word where memories are clarified to enforce meanings -
then our crisis in orientation might be put in a different perspec-
tive. It might be addressed at the level where people participate in
making some elements of meaning real for themselves and experience the
loss of others, so that they might reflect upon the constitution and
reconstitution of a way of life.
Rather than seeking to revive an old morality, then, we might
restore an aspect of the meditative means in which Cicero and
Epicurius might have instructed their disciples to pursue the moral
life. Only now, by a special focus of memory that resists contem-
porary selections we would focus upon the internal dialectic of
meaning formation. We would no longer see the "universal in the
particular" in the way that gives us a simplistic vision of totality,
and instead we would measure every generalization against the
multiplicity of the particulars that reflexive memory reveals.
Ultimately, we might reach for a larger, structural understanding of
our circumstance, but this time by exhausting what we know of it on
the way to what is hidden. Thus, and as we are as cautious concerning
generalizations as we are of lesser truths and Utopias, we will obtain
a certain degree of political restraint. This criticism does not
destroy, but disassembles the parts in order to find a subtle
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instruction within the. for what we might reconstruct. it cannotpretend that the "end justifies the means," since it is uniquely aware
a the means will become the determinate dories of those ends, andthat there is never a 'teles' which is not also a deja vu. In this
way, the ends that we do propose will rest upon a carefully extracted
foundation and they will evoke the details of our past and current
experiences that might best inform our claims upon the future
Criticism will not depend upon the good hearted efforts of a few
People to keep it moral, since it will require continuous reflection
upon the nature of the good, and it will never involve a "Great
Refusal" that is not first an inclusive reflection.
In returning to these details of experience, we return, in
effect, to the silence that precedes each word and surrounds each
dTscursive "surface" that Foucault would address. As he admits there
are, "many silences and they are an integral part of the strategies
that underlie and permete discourses," 31 and for every expression
there are aspects which "had remained silent." 32 But by the consi-
deration of memory we begin to see the extent to which those silences
compose and perpetuate our lives, and we find that as memory bridges
the gap between silence and the spoken word, between chaos and order
it is also our most creative faculty. Now, perhaps, we can reclaim
that ability by listening to the silence, allowing it to test our
patience. We may reclaim a contemplative attitude of the sort that
once was taught, only now we would indulge the associations which
comprise a thing, its analogies, its uses, its personal ramifications
and its legacies of many pasts, which might move us beneath the
surface. However, the indulgence of this silence is not only a
metaphor for a style of criticism, it is the actual threshold that
memory must cross. It is a confrontation with the uncomfortable pause
between the words that has been filled with prescriptive daydreams, an
examination of the quiet before a meeting is called to order when the
entire mnemonic structure is suspended, and before the rush of words
has interrupted it with their suspiciously comforting guidance.
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in the East the opposition is silenced, in South Africa people
are banned and never heard from, in America the silence is filled with
the didactic chatter of the media. I„ many d1fferent ways Mth
lays cUm to the silences and attempts to secure its hold upon memory
within them. Thus, when a parent uses the "silent treatment" to
rebuke a child, it is so that the child will be humbled to reconsider
the offending action, to obtain a different memory of it that will
suit the lessons of authority. When a priest calls for silence it is
so that the parishioners will contemplate the lessons at hand and
when the Judge bangs the gavel, or the bell strikes the hour, each
fills or claims that quiet space, and our daydreams are returned to
order.
If modern criticism is still suspicious of order and has not
utterly succumbed to an omnipresent power, that suspicion grows from
memories that conspire in silence. As children we once confronted
parental authority with our own voiceless timidity, barely hearing the
commanding words that we did not yet understand. We embraced that
authority when frustration drove us to break the silence with our own
cries, finally adopting the order of expression that was given.
Still, the remnants of that early silence hang before each word and
before every authoritative expression, and with some effort we may
reclaim the space where memories are authoritatively fixed to meanings
to confront authority once again.
By means of a reflexive memory that confronts its own divisions,
criticism may step within the given order to revive its distant
content. It may expand the grounds for reconsidering every bastion of
power, in labor, law, the family and elsewhere, by confronting the
many pasts that each contains. A meditative memory returns to
historical places, to childhood places and to the persons and contexts
of varied obligations, challenging their selective apprehension in
order to reclaim identity. It pursues the silence behind those voices
of authority that would slay the dragons of childhood and bury them in
the adult order of memories. That expanded memory extends the pauses
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in our speech and activity, revokes its own innocence, and dares to
recall the pain, embarrassment, and fear that are part of theintegnty of experience. It reveals the selectivity of the familiar
order with reverence and irreverence, and it may discover how that
order has deprived us of forgotten promise.
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